NSPG MEETING ON THE LEBANON SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000300630018-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 15, 2011
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: September 3, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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SYSTEM 11
91041
THE WHITE HOUSE VIA LDX
WITH SECRET-
ATTACHMENT
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DONALD P. GREGG
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State
COL JOHN STANFORD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense
September 3, 1983
MR. ROGER CLEGG
Special Assistant to the Attorney General
Department of Justice
MR. ALTON KEEL
Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs
Office of Management and Budget
MR. THOMAS B. CORMACK
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
MS. JACKIE TILLMAN
Executive Assistant to the United States
Representative to the United Nations
Department of State
BRIGADIER GENERAL GEORGE A. JOULWAN
Executive Assistant to the Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: NSPG Meeting on the Lebanon Situation (C)
Attached is the paper prepared by State Department for the NSPG
meeting today at 11:00 am in the White Rouse Situation Room. (C)
Robert H. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary
National Security Council
WITHE
ATTACHMENT
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1. Cucce,nt situation
We are at a turning point in Lebanon. The past wee*
opened with heavy fighting in West $.irut which seemed to be
moving the country toward the precipice of civil war. The week
ended with s sore confident LAF in control of most of vest
Beirut and Intensified GOL efforts toward national
reconciliation. The IDF will begin its red.ploya.nt sianight
September 3-4 and should be out of most of the Shut by the end
of September 4 unless a last minute LAF approach to the 2DT can
win a tour-day phased withdrawal. Lebanon's future vILL very
likely be detsrain.d In the next few days by what we, the
Lebanese, the Israelis, and the Syrians do.
On August 31 President a.sayel issued a call for all of
Lebanon's major factional leaders to sett with his In
discussions on national unity. Although It was not the
announctant of a govsrnmont of national unity we had eapeated,
it was s stop in the, right direction wbid we strongly
supported with dasarchss in allied and Arab capitals.
Following the battle for West Beirut as it did, however.
G.aaye,l`s initiative may be too late. Juablatt'. initial
response was that be would s..t O.asyel only on the
battlefield. Following his September 2 s.eting with prince
Bandar, however, Juablatt said he and (Tripoli's Sunnj leader)
Rashid Kara.I would meet G.aaysl It he was not aceoapaal.d by
C.mayel's father or Sa'eb dalas. Juablatt thought Trap fleh
could also be persuaded to join the sooting. Nevertheless.
Jusblatt had not yet discussed the sooting with the Syrians,
who are unlikely to approve.
The OOL has, however, set with rabih Barre, the Shia
militia leader, and they are reportedly near agr..a.nt. The
Lau clearly needs to protect Its rear from the Shia In ,eirut
if i t moves to deploy In A.layh and the Shut. This may be the
reason for the current 'truce' between the LA! and Shia
^i l i tiamen In the southern Beirut suburbs. Sisl2trly, the
September 2 Cabinet Announcement that the LAP will deploy into
East beirut is clearly intended to domonatrate, that the Arsy is
willing to sore against Christians as well as Muslims. Whether
or not this move takes place. the, LA! .s.tg.d Eros the fighting
in West Beirut more confident and more credible as a military
farce. Above all, the LAY did not frags nt along confessional
lines as some had predicted. Nevertheless, the August 31
massacre of at least 24 Christian& In the Matn, including
woman, children, and old people, could be a harbinger of what
might happen If the LAF moves Into the Shut.
The OM has also stopped up its diplomatic efforts. A
letter has now been dispatched to the Arab League demanding the
SZCRZT
DL : R
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SECUT
- 2 -
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, including the
Syrians, and a copy of this letter has been sent to the Qs
Secretary General for distribution as an official document. X
similar letter is reportedly on its way to president haaaA.
President Ceaayel will also shortly approach the UK security
Council for assistance in the Shuf. It is unlikely, bor.ver,
that these initiatives will prove very useful in the immediate
future, especially with the Syrians.
The role of'the Syrians remains crucial. We have
delivered two strong desarchas to the Syrians this weak.
Rhaddas predictably rejected our first deaarche urging the
Syrians to support Gemayel's call for national reconciliation.
He insisted that the LA?'s actions in West Beirut had baea
designed to ensure that it would be politically impossible for
the opposition to join national unity calls. Be also argued
that V.S. Marines had aided the LAY on fighting the West Beirut
militias. We have pop also delivered a strong desarctie putting
Syria on notice that the united States intends to defend its
personnel against attacks from any quarter. To buttress out
warning, we have moved a 2000-man Marine unit to the
Mediterranean and tpe Eisenhower will resain on station sear
Lebanon. The line has been drawn.
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*LCSS'r
Major Issues
1. Political reconciliations Geaayel's strategy is to
offer the most pro^inant leader. of L.b&non'. cossunal groups a
share in governing the country. Beginning with consultations,
thle would end in formation of a goverment of national unity.
The coat iss.diat* focus is on getting the support of Shia
leader liablh Darri. G.aay.l has his own agenda but will
respond to our advice even on thus delicate internal mattes.
Assumptions.
-- Broadens government's communal base and popular
support.
Pulls basically anti-Syrian opposition leaders away
from Damascus orbit to gat more political influence.
Undercuts Syrian propaganda and increases Arab support.
Beduees OOL cohesion and ability to act quickly.
-- Delays any possibility for irpleasntation of
Lebanon-Israel Agreement.
Ouestionst
sae Oessy.l .ov?d too ?lcvly to accomaodats other majoz
lslers7
Should O.S. diplomats entourage his to proceed?
What should we say about the Agreement?
Sow can we help induce positive responses to the
reeosailiation offer?
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SECRET
2. LAY Deploymsnt? We agree with the Lebanese that LAP
must demonstrate both readiness to employ force to maintain
security and iapartialit toward the different religious
communities. An army which uses massive force to restore order
in West Beirut but i? unable to clear Christian militias from
the streets of Last Beirut will in time create the very
violence it seeks to halt. President tiemayel and his top
political and military aides understand this. they also know
that the army must be seen as fair to Muslims it it can hops to
be accepted in the Shut.
Assumptions#
-- The nest LAY save may be to take control of Zast
Beirut in an operation which would assure Lebanese forces
acquiescence in advance.
Alternately, Oesay.l may order the LAY to seise the
approaches to Beirut in Alayh and south of the city, possibly
with IDY cooperation. Unless limited to Christian areas cow
under ID? control, it would be very difficult absent a'
political agreement with the Druse.
-- Hovesent of the LAY Into the Shut or further up the
road to Damascus can be successfully opposed by Druze militia.
backed by the Syrians. Absent a political agreement, it would
not make good military sense. The necessary political
agreement wih Juablatt appears unobtainable for now.
Questions.
Should the LAP tu'ly secure the streets of Beirut befare
venturing out of the capital?
What could Isarelis do to facilitate LAY deployment
outside Beirut?
What could the Nut do to further bolster LA? presewos is
Beirut?
Ones p need any additional equipment or trining for its
short term mission?
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3. Syria's Role: Syria's objectives in the current
situation are twofold -- to force abrogation of the
Lebanon/rsrael Agreement and to bend the Lebanese Government to
baaascus' will. To these ends, Assad is willing to run a high
risk policy using his considerable assets to physically
intimidate Lebanese communal leaders as well as to employ
military force in support of Syria's surrogates. Syria saes
Genayol as totally controlled by and committed to the Phalange.
Syria has become so implacably opposed to Amin Gesayel that it
is willing to not his tall rather than attempt to reach some
accossodation with his. In discussions in recent days with
toceign Minister abaddaa, It has become clear that the Syrians
ate unwilling to accept anything less than total acquiesoenoe
in their policy towards rabanon. The Israeli redeployment and
?.gin's forthcoming resignation are being read in Damascus as
vindication of Assad's policy.
r- Assumptions:
-- Syria is unlikely to be persuaded to change its present
course through persuasion and the implicit threat of Israeli
military reaction is no longer a credible deterrent.
Syria will do all in Its power to prevent the L U iron
peacefully extending its authority into the Shut following the
Israeli redeployment.
?- Gemayil's attempts to form a government of national
unity are likely to be opposed by Syria unless the intluewe
and power of the Phalange is significantly reduced and the
Geaayel Government caves completely to the Syrian opposition to
the Lebanon-Israel Agreement.
Questions:
What will be the likely Syrian reaction to a LAS attempt to
enter the Shut? What can we do about it?
What are the most appropriate means to counter SYriaa overt
or covert military support to Juablatt's militia? I
should we react to Syrian artillery shelling of last Beirut
or to Syrian military deployment into the Shuf followia, an
Israeli withdrawal?
Are there ways to lessen Syrian control over Lebanese
communal leaders in order to give a greater chance of
success to Geaayel's efforts to tort a national unity
government?
Drafter: MIA/IAI:EAbington
x23572 Kong $62095
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4. Israeli Kilitary Posture in Lebanon: In response to
the President's r.gu?at which was put to Pride Minister Begin
on August 2), the Iarsells have delayed yet again their
redeployment from the Shut until Sunday, September 4. Current
planning is for the move to begin early morning on Septesbtr 4
and Begin has sad? it clear that be wants to be able to
complete the Bove in time to release as many troops as poasibLe
for the Now Year's holidays beginning September 7. The
redeployment to the Awa1i Line ii likely to be carried out
during the Course of one day. It is unlikely that Israel would
agree to a request for a phased withdrawal lasting several days
since this would require going back to the drawing boards on
planning and also because the Israelis want to complete the
move before, the Jewish Now Year. The ZDF will be In a high
state of alert during and tasediately at ter the redeployment
but in essentially s defensive poetute.
Assuaptionsi
?? The Israeli decision is irreversible and redeploym*nt
will begin at first light on Sunday.
-- The Israelis will strongly resist the notion of even
phasing the redeployment ova- several days. They want to gory
quickly so as not to put the ZDl at risk.
?- The IDl is unlikely to resist Drnse demands to turn
over military fortifications to Juablatt's militia rather than
tun the risk of suffering Israeli casualties in order to have
the LAY take over the positions.
Qusstions$
Once withdrawal to the, Awali has taken place, would the
Israelis react to a Syrian attempt to infiltrate its.focces
into the soul?
Would the Israelis stand aside if violent i-ntereogdmnml
fighting broke out in the Shut?
What should we ask Israel to do with its assets in the
Ocuse comunity and with the Lebanese forces?
If the LAS tries to light its way into the Shut, should we
urge Israel to provide air and/or artillery support?
S. MW Ible (being drafted by David Mack)
is Military Options to Respond to 3yiLkfe1
(b.tv rsf'.A br 1t l' 4 Vn -i
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-'mow
.
S. pole of the 141,' The President decided that we waold
deter any decision on an PWF deployment to the Shut until we
_ had full assurar is from the principal parties (the (ot.. L1 and
Druse) that they ad reached a prior -poi i t icai -ag=ewreart--sQ --- --~.,
were confident V t they would live up to that-agreemeat. -
Mowsver, should t ~ LAP deploy to the Shut, and President
Gesayel ask for M r assistance to beleaguered LAY unite, ors
response would have to be well thought out and rapid. Leaving
the 'IP in place in the face of a request for assistance would
be damaging to the morals and effectiveness of the LIP whose
officers might interpret our lack of visible support as a look
of confidence in their capability and that of the OOL, causifg
a 'presence' could both help to stiffen the 1AF and deter O
Syrians and other elements opposed to the 1J-F. it could rescue
a deteriorating situation. On the other hand. effective
resistance to the LAP by dissident elements despite PSI?
asp presence could t)%en tore* us to another major decision. Coos
our presence was- prowidea: ?fa1-Rus& woo i- :~-- -
humiliating. An inevitable consequence of simply providing `presence' could be active Mir support of the LAt. Althou*- - WAS
mov?ment of the MT into this cole could be effective agaiatt
the dissidents and tfip the excess'against a politically
hesitant Syrian intervention, the PU? is not contigur to
fight the Syrians in an all-out war unless major !~-~~ ?~--+r
elemento wore engaq?d.
Assumptions
-- There is no prior political agreement when tie. 1.17
enters the Shut.
-- The ZAP is unable to carry out its mission as a resell
of active Syrian opposition, or b?cauas, of covert Syrian
support for its opponent. (There are reports, for .:ample, of
plans for large-scale movement of Syrian troops-disguised an
orvse Into the shut.)
Congressional and Legal Considerationse
Any deployment of U.S. forces in support of the LAD whi*
has the effect of introducing them into actual or imminent
hostilities would trigger the requirements of the war Powers
Resolution for prior consultation, reporting to Congress within
48 hours, and withdrawal within 40 days in the absence of
Congressional authorisation. Many in Congress have strongly
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insisted that our forces have already been introduced into soft
.a situation, and have sharply criticiited our failure to
acknowledge this in our August 30 War ?ower? report and to seek
Congressional authorisation. The deployment of U.S. foros
into areas of active hostilities. such as might be the case in
the Shut* would raise serious War Powers questions and wouLd
undoubtedly increase Congressional pressure to seek
legislation. even it U.S. forces did.not have a direct eanbet
role.
Purthersore. section 4 of the 1983 Lebanon iupplmwm%sL,
which requires Congressional authorisation with respect to soy
substantial expansion of the nuaber or role of U.S. forces in
Lebanon, would clearly be triggerrd by their assumption of a
combat role, and it would be very difficult to escape the seer
result with respect to any U.S. deployment in the Shut under
present conditions. We would not need to obtain this
authorisation riot to deployment. but would need to propose
legislation an marshall Congressional support as soon as
possible.
Quest ions e
What action will Ge?ayel specitically request of the 1W?
Will he ask for Mfr 'presence' in the Shuts because on
LAP is simply stretched too thin# to reassure the bell
populations as the LAT begins to replace hose-tow
?ilitias. or to lend authority to the W as it begins to
shoulder aside the local militias?
..a rn.1I. . wkl#w,
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as Wo
in ease of deployment without priot agreement (or it &w
agrNMnt were to fall apart)# would oeasysl ask for
direct lotr support?
Now would we respond in a situation
?- where the Syrian Army bad stayed dormant and the Lk1
proved unable to copy with Militias?
or alternatively Where ZAP orsrcame the, Lebaa"o
opposition, but the Syrian Army joined in to rearm its
allies?
Would we respond by
leaving the Pity in place?
redeploying to lend ?preeence??
?- intervening to actively support the IA ?
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4. Military Actions to Dates the jyrianst it will be
important for the U.S. to make good oa Its declaration to %be
Syrians that the MY would take appropriate steps to dated
itself. In addition. the contest of L#p movement into the
Shute we soy want to deter the Syrians ?cos directly oar
indirectly disrupting LAl efforts to .extend OOi, authority to
the area.
Assumptions:
?- We obtain solid evidence that two Syrians age firtag
on or actively supporting others firing on the LA! os 1s!
positions.
Questioiei
Should the U.S. response by
?- expanding V.S. and allied naval presence In the Secure
Msditerransan?
visible coordinated U.#.-Israeli stlitary coattells o;Y
planping in contest of.Lsbamm?
selective electronic warfare against Syrian
s*Nwvn i ca t i an? In Lebanon?
wee of U.S. naval gunfire, artillery, quoahips add
attack aircraft against Syrian ocVUpiad arena?
-? !My patrolling to Syrian lines?
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