MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: WORST CASE STRATEGY FOR LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000300650012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: September 9, 1983
• Content Type: CABLE

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
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DISTRIBUTION: MCF /001
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WHITEHOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
SECST-ATE PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF AND--CJ CS
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FROM AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE
E . O . 123 5 6: DE CL: OADR
TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: WORST CASE STRATEGY FOR
LEBANON
1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)
S 2. WHILE IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEKEND I EXPRESSED, IN NSC MEETINGS
AND IN THE BRIEFING TO THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP, MY VIEW THAT
THE CENTRAL FACTOR IN THE LEBANON CONFLICT IS SYRIA'S DETERMINATION
TO MAINTAIN AN ENDURING INFLUENCE OVER LEBANESE POLICY. GIVEN HER
OVERWHELMING MILITARY POWER RELATIVE TO LEBANON, AND ABSENT MAJOR
THIRD COUNTRY MILITARY INTERVENTION IN BEHALF OF LEBANON, SYRIA CAN
ACHIEVE HER GOAL. SHE CAN EXERCISE HER INFLUENCE TO A GREATER OR
LESSER DEGREE BY MAINTAINING OCCUPATION FORCES IN THE COUNTRY AND/OR
RELYING UPON LEBANESE POLITICANS IN THE CABINET WHO ARE SENSITIVE
TO SYRIAN CONCERNS. FACED WITH THIS PROBLEM, OUR POLICY HAS BEEN
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TO INSIST UPON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON BUT TO AGREE TO THE
N
FORMATION OF A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY, ACCEPTING THAT IT WILL
N
SURELY INCLUDE FIGURES BEHOLDEN TO SYRIA (E,7&., FRANJIYYEH, KARAMI
AND BARRI). OUR POLITICAL STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO DEVELOP THE BROADEST
S POSSIBLE SUPPORT FOR LEBANON' S FORMAL CALL FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL
THROUGH BILATERAL CONTACTS AND (IN THE DAYS AHEAD) THE UNITED NATIONS
CONCURRENTLY-WE HAVE ENDORSED THIRD COUNTRY SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S
CALL FOR A CEASEFIRE IN PLACE, AN IMMEDIATE CONVENING OF THE LEADERS
FOR THE NATIONAL DIALOGUE, MINOR.REDEPLOYMENT OF LEBANESE FORCES IN
THE BEIRUT AREA AND AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE FOR THE ULTIMATE DEPLOY-
MENT OF LEBANESE ARMY FORCES TO. MAINTAIN ORDER IN THE SHUF AND
BEYOND. TO GIVE CREDIBILITY TO THIS POSITION WE, AND OUR ALLIES,
HAVE GRADUALLY EXPANDED OUR MILITARY FORCE PRESENCE IN THE AREA.
IT HAS BEEN OUR HOPE THAT SYRIA WILL RESPOND TO THIS COLLECTIVE
POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURE AND ACCEDE TO THE CEASEFIRE, THE
FORMATION OF THE GNU, AND WITHDRAW HER FORCES, ETC. INTELLIGENCE
REPORT-S RECEIVED WITHIN THE PAST TWO DAYS ANQ.,
JUSTIFY A
REVIEW OF OUR STRATEGY AGAINST THE POSSIBILIG THAT' SYRIA HAS NOT
N YET FOUND OUR STkATEGY CREDIBLE. WE BELIEVE FURTHER THAT-PROPOSALS
SUCH AS ARE CONTAINED IN THE STRATEGY PAPER AND DRAFT NSDD FOR THE
O
D GRADUAL EXPANSION OF FORCE PRESENCE TO RESOLVE THE LEBANESE CRISIS
I , COULD BE AT BEST IRRELEVANT, AND AT WORST CATASTROPHIC UNLESS APPLIED
S IN THE CONTEXT OF A SPECIFIC STRATEGY DESIGNED TO BRING AN EARLY
POSITIVE CHANGE IN SYRIAN BEHAVIOR. ON THE OTHER HAND WE BELIEVE
THAT THE STRATEGIC ESCALATION -- IN BOTH POLITICAL AND MILITARY
TERMS -- COULD ACHIEVE THE DESIRED RESULT.
3. IN PRACTICAL TERMS WE BELIEVE THERE ARE THREE CRITICAL CONDITIONS
WHICH SHOULD APPLY BEFORE SUCH AN ESCALATION IS CONTEMPLATED. FIRST,
THAT WE ARE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR ABOUT OUR OWN POLICY AND ITS LIMITS
AND CONDITIONS; SECOND, THAT WE HAVE THE ACTIVE. SUPPORT OF OUR MNF
PARTNERS: THIRD, THAT THE KEY MODERATE ARAB STATES, PARTICULARLY
SECRET
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 to/I-lITF 1-ICII IMP q[TI I A TION P()0 ?u',
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SAUDI ARABIA, BACK UP OUR STRATEGY AND OPPOSE SYRIA. THE STRATEGY
WOULD BE BASED UPON THE PREMISE THAT SYRIA HAS NO INTENTION OF
AGREEING EITHER TO A CEASEFIRE, TO THE SUPPORT OF A NATIONAL
DIALOGUE IN LEBANON OR TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF HER OWN FORCES BUT
ASSUMES THAT WHILE SHE MAY TAKE A POSITIVE POSITION ON THESE
ELEMENTS PUBLICLY SHE WILL CONCURRENTLY PROPOSE SUCH PRECONDITIONS
AS TO MAKE HER REALIZATION IMPOSSIBLE WHILE, ON THE GROUND, SHE
-SUPPORTS AND ULTIMATELY CONSTRICTS (THROUGH THE PSP) THE ENCLAVE
OF BEIRUT LEADING TO THE FALL OF THE GOVERNMENT.
BT -
SECRET
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