WORST CASE STRATEGIES FOR LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000300650014-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Content Type: REPORT

? SECRE~i?Approved For Release 2011/04/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300650014-7
,. ~..~ ~
WORST CASE STRATEGIES FOR LEBANON
Background:
Our stated objectives in Lebanon have consistently been:
- restoring the sovereignty of the government of Lebanon
throughout its territory;
- obtaining the withdrawal of all foreign forces;
- ensuring the security of Lebanon's borders especially the
northern border of Israel.
Ambassador McFarlane's recent cable on this subject underscores
the point that we may be at a watershed in our efforts to promote
U.S. objectives in Lebanon. The-problem simply put is apparent
Syrian determination to impede the process of national.
reconciliation, maintain a zone of influence in Lebanon and force
the withdrawal of the multi-national peacekeeping forces in
Beirut. Our efforts to date including measures to augment our
offshore presence and to undertake a more aggressive self-defense
of our MNF contingent may not have persuaded the SARG that we are
prepared to confront Syria directly in furtherance of our stated
objectives and in our support of .the GOL. Furthermore, the
precipitous Israeli withdrawal to the Awwali River--owing largely
to domestic political pressure and the refusal of the GOL to
imFrlement-the Lebanon-Israel agreement--ma have encouraged-the
SARG to pursue its objectives in Lebanon?i~~a manner that does
not cross redrawn Israeli "red lines" and thereby incur serious
risk of Israeli reprisals.
The Core Problem:
If McFarlane's analysis is correct, we have stark choices to
make. In short:
Retain our stated objectives and escalate our
involvement in the Lebanon problem, politically and
militarily, to bring an early and positive change in
Syrian behavior.
Retain our stated objectives but disengage from the
active effort to promote national reconciliation and
restore Lebanon's sovereignty and territorial integrity
in the face of Syrian intransigence. At the same time,
work in other arenas to encourage international and
Arab opprobrium for Syrian behavior.
Modify our objectives for Lebanon and realign our
strategy to what is feasible and doable without
incurring the risk of a direct confrontation with
Syria.
The first option obviously entails a high risk of military
confrontation with Syria and a serious. crisis in U.S.-Soviet
relations. It also entails a clear prospect for worsened U.S.
SECRET ~? f""' ~ t~ ~'?
r - - , -Approved For Release 2011/04/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300650014-7
 Approved For Release 2011/04/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R~-0.00300650014-7
~l.~~l ~~
relations with certain other Arab countries, although the
reaction of moderate Arab powers will depend fundamentally on the
degree of pressure which is ultimately needed to force a change
in Syrian behavior. To mitigate the adverse reactions from the
Arab world, McFarlane stipulates the need for prior assurances of
.support from the key Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia.
Given traditional Arab concern for U.S.-Israeli collusion,
McFarlane has made a multilateral approach by the U.S., France,
Italy, and the UK an indispensable condition for a strategy~of
escalating pressure on Syria. .
The second option leaves open the question of what we would do
with the MNF in the face of continued Syrian (surrogate) pressure
to force its withdrawal. We could buy time and reduce the risk
of casualties by continuing a policy of aggressive self-defense
although the question of how we treattthe provisions of the War
Powers Resolution might eventually require the withdrawal of the
USMNF. The most significant risk if we choose this option is a
serious erosion of U.S. credibility in the Middle East and
beyond. There is also some possibility that the tentative policy
implicit in this choice will lead to an expanded civil war which
culminates in a defacto partition of Lebanc.~n into Muslim, Druze,
and Christian entities and Syrian and Israeli spheres of
influence.
The third option is in reality a grouping for a variety of
sub-options. For example, we could settle for a partitioned
Lebanon and cut our losses by actively suppartinq a new political
entity comprised of Greater Beirut and the Maronite heartland.
Depending on the success of our efforts with the LAF, there might
be some possibility that the dominantly Shia districts in
southern Lebanon could ultimately be incorporated into such a
Lebanese entity, if Israel was persuaded that security of her
border could be assured. The common denominator in these
sub-options is acceptance of a Syrian zone of influence in the
areas currently occupied by the Syrian Army in addition to the
Alayh and Shouf Districts. The precise role of the MNF in the
various possibilities grouped under this option is not clear.
However, provided the Syrians acquiesced in a partition of the
type discussed above, there is a good possibility that U.S.
forces could be withdrawn as the situation on the ground
stabilized-- although we might continue a residual training and
support effort for the LAF. As true with the second option, this
option could also lead to an erosion in U.S. credibility.
SECRET
~~'~ ~~,
Approved For Release 2011/04/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300650014-7
 Approved For Release 2011/04/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300650014-7
SECRET 3
The Press of Time:
McFarlane's cables stress that the situation in Alayh and the
Shouf is very fluid and that the trends are adverse (massacres,
continued shelling, presence of PLO, etc.). While we would
ideally prefer more time to thoroughly study and sort through the
costs and benefits which attend these options (especially the
first one), we need to act promptly, if we decide to continue
with our present objectives.
Elements of bicFarlane's Recommended Strategy
The critical element is a multilateral approach to Syria which
for simplicity's sake would be limited to objectives which are
ostensibly shared already. The immediate. objectives of this
collective strategy would be: .
-- an immediate ceasefire in p:lace
-- minor LAF redeployments within Beirut
-- commencement of an immediate process of withdrawing all
_ foreign forces to be completed by a date certain

-- restoration of Lebanese sovereignty in areas evacuated
via a gradual extension of the LAF presence.
The approach would feature common determination to restore
Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity supported by a
demonstrated willingness to halt Syrian interference by Mi~F
deployments to "strategic locations" adjacent to Syrian
positions. Our chances for persuading the other MNF countries to
join in this approach will be enhanced if we describe the
alternatives as we see them. In the final analysis, they must be
' made to see that a coordinated multilateral approach to Syria is
the only alternative to the partition of Lebanon and the failure
of our respective efforts thus far.
Inasmuch as the objectives are already included in the "Bandar
Plan," we might expect Saudi (and other moderate Arab} support
for this-multilateral approach although the "muscle" would have
to be provided by the MNF countries. The recent crisis in
Saudi-Syrian relations owing to Syrian rejection of Bandar's four
elements, provides us~with an opportunity to capitalize on Saudi
frustration, if we move quickly before possible Syrian
counterpressure can be brought to bear and the Saudis back away
from their commitment to Gemayel.
Approved For Release 2011/04/07: CIA-RDP85M00363R000300650014-7