PROSPECTS FOR LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2007
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: October 11, 1983
• Content Type: SNIE

Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
Director of Secret
Central
Intelligence
Prospects for Lebanon
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Secret
SNIE 36.4-83
11 October 1983
Copy 4 4 0
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
S N I E 36.4-83
PROSPECTS FOR LEBANON
Information available as of 11 October 1983 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and
Treasury.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ............................................................................................................ V
iii
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
SCOPE NOTE
This Estimate examines the prospects and outlook for Lebanon
over the next six months. The goals, intentions, and capabilities of key
internal and external actors are analyzed. The role of the Palestinians in
Lebanon is addressed. The broader Palestinian issue and the Arab-
Israeli peace process will be the focus of a forthcoming Estimate,
Outlook for the Palestinians.
V
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
KEY JUDGMENTS
The prospects for a lasting political reconciliation among Leba-
non's confessional factions are extremely bleak. Domestic stability in
Lebanon depends upon reaching a new balance-of-power arrangement
in which the interests of the country's majority Muslim population are
more equitably accommodated and the security of the Christian
community is assured. Progress on these political issues is essential if the
cease-fire is to endure.
Maronite Christians-particularly the Phalange Party and Lebanese
Forces militia leaders-will resist changes that significantly reduce their
influence in the government. Syria will urge the Muslims and the Druze
to press for their maximum demands. Whenever a national reconciliation
conference is held, it is most likely to stalemate and eventually break
down, resulting in heightened confessional intransigence, renewed fac-
tional fighting, and a prolonged partition of Lebanon.
Meaningful national reconciliation depends primarily on the Leba-
nese and for the present they seem unwilling to make the concessions
and compromises necessary for a lasting accommodation. As a conse-
quence, the prospects of achieving a sovereign and politically stable
state free from foreign occupation are virtually nonexistent.
Instead, we can expect a weak central government which probably
can maintain control over greater Beirut but which has to contend with
autonomous Maronite and Druze heartlands and prolonged Syrian and
Israeli occupation. The legal facade of the central government's sover-
eignty will continue, however, since no party favors formal partition.
In essence, a de facto confederal or cantonal system might emerge
within which many of the essential interests of most internal and
external participants would be met. The weaker the authority of the
central government the greater is the likelihood of its acceptability to
most parties.
This situation, while far from ideal, may well endure for an
extended period. Even with continued US military support, the
Gemayel government may at best gain a breathing space from fighting
in which to begin political negotiations and arrange cosmetic deals with
some Muslims. Failure to achieve real progress, however, probably will
lead sooner or later to renewed fighting.
I
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
The introduction of US military power into Lebanon-symbolized
by naval gunfire and substantial logistic support for the Lebanese Army
defense of greater Beirut in September-has at least temporarily altered
the military equation in the country. The threat of greater US, French,
and possibly Israeli involvement, the credible performance of the
Lebanese Army, the exhaustion of Druze forces, and the fact that Syria
had obtained many of its political goals induced Damascus to shift the
conflict from the military to the political level in the near term.
The Gemayel government and Christian hardliners will look to the
United States for support to counter Muslim and Syrian pressure for
radical political change. The United States will be blamed for brokering
any settlement that is not responsive to Druze, Muslim, and Syrian
interests.
If the Christians agree to greater Muslim influence in the
political system, however, the likely result over the long term will be a
more pro-Arab Lebanon that will improve its relations with Damascus
and be less accommodating toward Israel. The 17 May Israeli-
Lebanese Accords will be in greater jeopardy, but we believe any
Lebanese government will hold the agreement in abeyance in any case.
The Gemayel government is now perceived within Lebanon and
throughout the Arab world as representing narrow Christian Phalangist
interests. US military support for Christian interests against Muslim and
Druze actions will make it very difficult for the Egyptian and Jordanian
Governments to lend further diplomatic and military support for US
policies in Lebanon. Should the United States become involved in a
direct military confrontation with Syria, Saudi Arabia would be forced
to support President Assad publicly-leaving US policy in Lebanon
without Arab support.
Both Syria and Israel want a central government in Lebanon
responsive to their own interests. Without such a government, both
countries will remain indefinitely in Lebanon and accept de facto
partition.
The principal Lebanese factions will continue to look to these
neighboring states for support to enable them to avoid making political
compromises with their internal rivals. These factions will be responsive
to the interests of Syria and Israel to obtain continuing support.
Syria's key goals in Lebanon are to establish a government
responsive to its interests and to minimize Israeli influence in the
country. Damascus will continue to support its allies and surrogates in
Lebanon to weaken the government of President Gemayel and force
2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
Gemayel or his successor to reach an accommodation with Syria. Assad
can use either indirect military pressure or political negotiations to keep
the Army and the Lebanese Forces on the defensive.
Regardless of the outcome of talks on Lebanon's internal political
configuration, Assad will not accept a Lebanese government that
maintains overt ties to Israel. Damascus will continue to press Gemayel
or a successor regime to abrogate the 17 May Lebanese-Israeli
agreement.
Consistent with the USSR's primary aim of increasing its influence
in the region, Moscow supports Syria's policies. Damascus, not Moscow,
determines Syrian policy in Lebanon, but Soviet support reinforces
Assad's confidence. Like Damascus, Moscow does not want a Beirut
government that is aligned with Israel, or any solution to the Lebanese
problem that has been brokered by the United States. In addition,
Moscow has a strong interest in having the US military presence in
Lebanon removed or be seen as ineffective. It is also interested in
frustrating broader US peace initiatives in the region that do not include
Moscow, damaging the US image and undermining its credibility in the
Arab world and elsewhere, and hindering the United States' ability to
use its military might in other parts of the world.
While Soviet advisers and air defense personnel already in Syria
could become involved in the event of major escalation, we do not
envision direct Soviet military support to Syrian forces in Lebanon.
Moscow has long made it clear to Assad that Soviet support 'to Syria does
not obligate it to protect the Syrian presence in Lebanon. The Kremlin
would prefer that the level of conflict in Lebanon remain low so that a
Syrian-US or Syrian-Israeli confrontation is avoided. Moscow, however,
cannot control Syrian actions that could lead to escalation of the fighting.
Israel's key goals in Lebanon are to guarantee the security of its
northern border and to prevent the PLO and Syrians from establishing a
presence in the south. The Israelis hope to avoid renewed` military
involvement north of the Awwali River, but they would respond to
specific Syrian or Palestinian provocations with airstrikes or artillery
and would not tolerate a Palestinian presence in the Shuf below the
Damur River or a Syrian drive to Beirut. Israel would first try to
intimidate Damascus, perhaps by threatening to move against Syrian
forces in Lebanon, but ultimately would be prepared to move physic-
ally into the Shuf.
the Gemayel government crumbles, Israel will look to the United States
3
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
to save it and will be extremely reluctant to intervene on its own.
Nonetheless, a Syrian-inspired move against the Maronite heartland
north of Beirut designed to cripple the Phalange would prompt Israeli
intervention.
The three West European contributors to the Multinational Force
are likely to maintain their contingents in Beirut over the next six
months unless there is a dramatic increase in their casualties or a major
uprising in West Beirut. They will be unlikely to agree to an expansion
of the size or mission of the force, unless it is approved by all of the
Lebanese factions, because France, Italy, and the United Kingdom are
highly sensitive to domestic concern over casualties and to Arab charges
of meddling in an intra-Arab dispute.
Syria is likely to avoid a direct military confrontation with the
United States in Lebanon. Assad almost certainly believes he can attain
his objectives in Lebanon without significant direct Syrian military
involvement.
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
hinder, but not necessarily cripple, broader US initiatives to promote
peace and regional stability.
Nonetheless, very real risks emerge from our involvement in
Lebanon. For the Phalange and much of the Maronite community, the
United States is the latest in a series of foreign power patrons to be
exploited in an effort to preserve Maronite hegemony. Deepening the
American commitment to the Gemayel government may shore up
central authority, but there is always the risk that it also will take the
pressure off the Phalange for further concessions.
~b i7 O t 1?- 5,04AkLti 741
GAT Moreover, US involvement will continue to offer enormous oppor-
tunities for anti-American groups of every variety. Pro-Iranian Shia,
Lebanese leftists, radical Sunnis, and Palestinians will have a ready
target against which to vent their frustrations and carry out their
antigovernment activities.
5
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
Figure
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
Figure 2
Predominant Lebanese Religious Groups
Maronite
Greek Orthodox
Greek Catholic
Mixed Maronite and Greek
- Shia Muslim
Sunni Muslim
Druze
Mixed Druze and
Greek Orthodox
Population shifts caused by the June
1982 Israeli invasion are not depicted.
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
8
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
 Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8
Next 9 Page(s) In Document Denied
Approved For Release 2007/09/25: CIA-RDP85M00363R000701600031-8