CABINET MEETING ON "DRUG CZAR" LEGISLATION
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85M00363R001002280005-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
5
Document Creation Date:
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 29, 2007
Sequence Number:
5
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 17, 1983
Content Type:
MEMO
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17 October 1983
STAT
unier, Litigation & Legislation Division/OGC
SUBJECT: Cabinet Meeting on "Drug Czar" Legislation
1. The issues paper for the Cabinet meeting this morning
is essentially the same as the paper distributed prior to the
Cabinet Council meeting last Friday. The comments in my note
to you on that meeting, and the papers which were attached,
remain relevant (I've attached the whole package to this note,
just in case you didn't have it handy).
2. Once again, the DCI might want to be ready to offer a
comment on how the Intelligence Community system operates,
because one of the options to be discussed involves using the
Intelligence Community as a model for structuring
interdepartmental anti-drug efforts.
STAT
STAT
ILLEGIB
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
CABINET AFFAIRS STAFFING MEMORANDUM
Date: October 14, 1983 Number: _ 168803cA Due By:
Subject: Full Cabinet Meeting - Monday
Cabinet Room
ALL CABINET MEMBERS
Vice President
State
Treasury
Defense
Attorney General
Interior
Agriculture
Commerce
Labor
HHS
HUD
Transportation
Energy
Education
Counsellor
OMB
GSA ^ ^
EPA ^ ^
OPM ^ ^
VA ^ ^
SBA ^ ^
REMARKS:
CEA
CEQ
OSTP
Baker
Deaver
Clark
Darman (For WH Staffing)
Jenkins
Svahn
^ ^
............................................................................................
CCCT/Gunn ^ ^
CCEA/Porter ^ ^
CCFA/
^ ^
CCHR/Simmons ^ ^
CCLP/Uhlmann ^ ^
CCMA/Bledsoe ^ ^
CCNRE/
^ ^
The Cabinet will meet Monday, October 17, 1983 at 11:00 A.M.
in. the Cabinet Room.
Discussion will center upon the Administration response to
Drug Tsar Legislation pending on the Hill, and issues contained
in the Economic Equity Act.
Presidential approval will be requested on the options presented,
in the attached briefing papers.
RETURN TO: ^ Craig L. Fuller ^ atherine Anderson ^ Don Clarey
Assistant to the President Tom Gibson ^ Larry Herbolsheimer
for Cabinet Affairs
456-2823
Octnhpr 1 7., 1 gf33 11 00 A *i
TOPICS: Drug Tsar Legislation
F:nnnnmi n Fqi ' -y ACt
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FROM: Edward C. Schmults
Acting Attorney General
SUBJECT: Administration Response to
"Drug Tsar" Legislation
xs f ingInn, P. (It. 20530
October 14, 1983
I. ISSUE
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
AND THE MEMBERS OF THE CABINET
The Administration must determine its response to
continuing efforts by Congress to establish a "drug tsar" to
oversee all federal drug enforcement efforts.
II. BACKGROUND
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?ffim of t1P Altvmrg Omani
Presidential veto of previous "drug tsar" proposal
Over the past eighteen months, there have been
repeated efforts in the Congress to create a "drug tsar" to
oversee and coordinate all federal drug enforcement efforts,
which we have consistently resisted. Despite our opposition
and Senator Thurmond's efforts on our behalf, a Biden "drug
tsar" amendment to the Violent Crime and Drug Enforcement
Improvements Act was accepted by a 2-1 margin last year by the
Senate. During the "lame duck" session of the 97th Congress,
the "drug tsar" proposal was attached to the so-called "mini-
crime bill" (H.R. 3963). As you will recall, the Biden
proposal would have created a "super Cabinet-level" drug tsar
with vague and sweeping powers to "direct" departments and
agencies to carry out the policies he establishes, including
the power to reach down into departments and agencies and
reassign enforcement personnel.
The President withheld approval of this crime bill
primarily because of the "drug tsar" provision. The President
stated in his veto message that "[t]he creation of another
layer of bureaucracy within the Executive Branch would produce
friction, disrupt effective law enforcement, and could threaten
the integrity of criminal investigations and prosecutions."
He also noted that the coordination of the federal enforcement
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efforts against drugs accomplished under the Cabinet Council on
Legal Policy has been effective. The President emphasized that
our war on drugs does not need more bureaucracy in Washington,
but more enforcement action in the field.
B. Continuing Congressional efforts to
create a "drug tsar"
Despite our continuing opposition to the "drug tsar"
concept, Senator Biden has succeeded in having his new "drug
tsar" bill (S. 1787) reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee
by a vote of 12 to 5 (3 of the 5 votes against were proxies
voted by Chairman Thurmond; in at least one case the proxy was
from a Senator who favors the tsar concept). The Biden bill is
substantially identical to the "tsar" provision of the mini-
crime bill pocket vetoed in January.
On the House side, Congressman Hughes' version of a
"drug tsar" proposal (H.R. 3664) has been reported by the House
Judiciary Committee. The Hughes' bill builds upon an existing
structure (the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office), rather
than creating an entirely new structure.
Senator Biden will, as part of his agreement with
Chairman Thurmond, be able to bring his bill to the Senate
floor as a separate bill upon completion of Senate considera-
tion of the President's crime package, possibly within a few
weeks. Congressman Hughes can be expected to try to get his
bill approved by the House before the Senate acts on the Biden
bill.
C. Legislative Prognosis
House and Senate floor action on "drug tsar"
legislation is imminent, and the result will almost certainly
be overwhelming approval by both bodies. The simplistic and
superficial appeal of the "drug tsar" concept appears
irresistible. Even if the President were to veto a "drug tsar"
proposal, we must recognize that the vote we anticipate on
initial passage would be so strong as to raise concern about a
veto override. Moreover, the Administration would suffer from
the public's confusion of vetoing a "crime" bill.
It should be noted that the Democratic strategy may
be to secure Congressional approval of a bail, sentencing,
forfeiture and "drug tsar" package, leaving the balance of the
President's anti-crime package to gather dust in the House
Judiciary Committee.
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III. ADMINISTRATION OPTIONS
A. Continued opposition to all "drug tsar" proposals
One Administration alternative is simply to continue
to oppose all legislative efforts to impose a "drug tsar" on
the Executive Branch with the threat of a second veto.
As noted above, however, it is increasingly likely that some
kind of "drug tsar" proposal will be passed despite this
threat.
B. Possible revision of the Biden bill
A second alternative would be to approach
Senators Thurmond and Biden to attempt to revise the Biden bill in a
manner which would make it acceptable. Despite the shortcom-
ings of the Biden "drug tsar" bill, there is reason to believe
that Biden may be willing to make a number of changes to
accommodate our concerns. In this regard, Biden has held out
the intelligence community as a model of a successfully
coordinated multidepartmental effort. We believe his bill
could be modified, therefore, to make it more consistent with
the organization of the intelligence community, while at the
same time bringing it more into line with our current cabinet
council system.
An organization patterned after the intelligence
community model can be structured in such a way as to allow a
single witness to appear before Congressional committees to
testify on anti-drug efforts and.accommodate certain other con-
cerns without unnecessarily infringing on the important opera-
tional programs of the several departments.
More specifically, the alternative we would suggest
would be to establish a Drug Policy and Operations Board
chaired by the Attorney General and made up of members of the
Cabinet Council on Legal Policy. Such a board would set drug
policy and oversee drug enforcement operations through a partici-
patory process that respects the powers of Cabinet officers to
supervise the internal affairs of their departments.
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