MEETING THE SOVIET CHALLENGE IN THE THIRD WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001102430021-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 16, 2008
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: April 8, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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8 April 1983
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Meeting The Soviet Challenge in the Third World
1. A Little History
Somehow Americans thought their first loss of a major foreign war-Vietnam-
would have no important consequences, especially inasmuch as it was accompanied by
detente with the Soviet Union and the opening to China. Yet it was in fact a major
watershed in post World War 11 history, especially as it coincided with other historic
developments:
The collapse of Portugal's colonial empire in Africa; the last such in the Third
World.
A return to the international stage of Cuba's Castro. in 1975, willing, for
internal reasons, to send Cuban soldiers abroad in large numbers to defend
revolutionary regimes and radicals determined to consolidate their power.
Immediately after the US expulsion from Saigon, the US Senate confirming for
all the world America's withdrawal from the Third World by its defeat of a
pittance of aid for Western supported forces in Angola, and the accompanying
Clark Amendment.
Soviet determination, initially at Castro's prodding, to seize the opportunity
presented by the US defeat in Asia and resulting American abhorrence of
involvement in the Third World.
A revolution in Ethiopia, bringing to power the radical Mengistu.
And, a wavering and misguided policy by the Carter Administration on human
rights, and key allies that played a major role in revolutions in Iran and
Nicaragua.
The effects of American defeats in Vietnam, Iran, and Nicaragua-and the coming
to power of bitterly antagonistic and aggressive, destabilizing governments in all three
countries-undermined the confidence of US friends and allies in the Third World (and
Europe and Japan) and ensured that on opportunistic Soviet Union would see in the Third
World its principal foreign policy opportunities for years to come. A Soviet strategy
evolved in the mid-I 970s that built on historic events and opportunities and combined
them into an approach to the Third World that, even should the US decide to compete,
would help frustrate an effective US response.
II. The Soviet Strategy
The Soviets themselves suffered setbacks in the 1960s and early 70s in the Third
World. They suffered one setback after another in Africa. They saw their hopes in South
America dashed by the overthrow of Salvador Allende in Chile and were humiliatingly
expelled from Egypt in 1972. When they turned again to the Third World in 1975, it was
with a strategy designed to minimize the chance of a repetition of those setbacks. The
strategy, enriched and strengthened over several years, is realistic and calculated to
exploit effectively both events and opportunities.
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First, shown the way by Castro in Angola, they helped him consolidate the
radical power of the MPLA there, creating a government dependent on Soviet
and Cuban support for survival. This was followed by the dispatch of thousands
of Cuban troops to Ethiopia, where in his turn Mengistu became dependent on
their support. Unlike Sodat, nether the MPLA nor Mengistu could afford to
order the Cubans and Soviets out. The cornerstone of the new Soviet approach
then was the use of Cuban forces to establish and sustain the power of
"revolutionary governments." The tactic of using Third World radical states
as "surrogates" in the Third World would subsequently involve assisting
Vietnam's conquest of the remainder of Indochina, Libya's designs in Chad and
plotting against Sudan, the PDRY's aggression against Oman and the YAR,
Algeria's support of the Polisario Front, Cuba's nurturing of revolutionary or
radical regimes in Nicaragua, Grenada, and Suriname, and its support of the
insurgency in El Salvador. All hod one feature in common-the principal,
obvious role in Third World countries was played by another Third World state;
no superpower was seen to be guiding or arming or directing the radical forces
at work; no numbers of white faces interfered in the internal affairs of Asian,
African, or Latin countries; and wherever possible the host government was
maintained by foreign advisors and troops who could not be expelled. It was a
strategy that made (and makes) any direct response appear neo-imperialistic,
and a change of heart by the host government difficult if not impossible.
Second, when radical governments came to power without the aid of foreign
troops, as in Nicaragua or Suriname, the Soviets directly or through their
surrogates helped in the establishment of an internal security structure to
ensure that any possible challenge from within would be stamped out. There
would be no more Allendes. Sometimes it worked-as in Ethiopia, and
sometimes there was not enough time-as in Jamaica.
Third, the Soviets continued to supplement these tactics with its more
traditional offerings, such as technical (and political) training in the USSR; the
rapid supply of weapons to regimes which either felt threatened or wished to
use them for aggression; and, of course, the use of a wide range of active
measures (covert action) to support friends or help destabilize unfriendly
governments.
Fourth, consistent with Russian expansionist policy of a thousand years, where
a vacuum existed or the costs and risks were low, the USSR proved still willing
to launch its own forces at targets on its periphery-Afghanistan, and perhaps
elsewhere when and if circumstances seemed right.
Fifth, the Soviets advised new radical regimes to mute their revolutionary
rhetoric and to try to keep their links to Western commercial resources,
foreign assistance, and international financial institutions. Moscow's ambitions
did not cloud recognition that it could not afford more economic dependents
such as Cuba and Vietnam.
This strategy was intended to achieve three principal Soviet objectives in the
Third World:
- The further spread of Communism in countries on the path of Soviet-
style Socialism. However much Western commentators may assert the
death of ideology among Soviet leaders, there is a genuine ideological
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conviction that this is an historical imperative and that the future of
Communism and its eventual victory depends on success in the Third
World, a thesis put forward by Lenin himself.
To achieve great power ambitions, including access to port facilities,
airfields, and intelligence and reconnaissance installations; to obtain
allies and friends whose support in international politics is assured;
gain access to raw materials and markets and obtain hard currency
customers for Soviet goods and weapons; and to acquire influence and
power over dependent states.
Finally, to divert and distract the United States through many
simultaneous challenges-some pinpricks, some major; to exploit
lingering repugnance in the US to Third World engagements and to
build on resulting controversy to complicate other foreign policy and
national security initiatives, including defense programs; and to deny
the US access to facilities abroad such as the USSR itself seeks.
The centrality of the Third World in Soviet foreign policy is suggested by the fact
that Moscow has chosen to allow its relationship with three successive US
Administrations to deteriorate in substantial measure because of its refusal to moderate
its aggressive pursuit of Third World opportunities, principally in Angola (Ford); Ethiopia,
Nicaragua, Afghanistan (Carter); and Central America (Reagan).
Ill. The Soviet Balance Sheet
A Soviet Union that had found itself in 1972 without major successes and with many
failures in the Third World after two decades of effort could count the following
achievements by the end of 1982, ten years later:
Victory in Vietnam and Hanoi's consolidation of power in all of Indochina.
New radical regimes in Ethiopia, Angola, and Nicaragua.
- Possession of Afghanistan, a Russian goal for over a century.
Cuban control of Grenada (and new military facilities there for support of
further subversion).
An active insurgency in El Salvador where US assistance had rekindled all the
old Vietnam memories at home.
US expulsion from Iran, which, though not through any Soviet action,
represented a major strategic gain for the USSR.
Rapid progress toward Cuban control of Suriname, the first breakthrough on
the South American continent.
Pro-Western regimes under siege in Chad and the Sudan.
Beyond these successes, the Soviets could see opportunities, actual or potential, to
achieve its objectives in many other places:
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- Success in Ell Salvador would likely bring gains in Guatemala, Costa Rica, and
Honduras, perhaps then opening the way to creating problems for the US in
Panama and even Mexico.
- Habre in Chad and Nimieri in Sudan both are vulnerable and the fall of both,
but especially Nimieri, seems only a matter of time. -
- Mozambique on the verge of requesting Cuban forces to fight the South
African sponsored insurgency.
- Zimbabwe on the brink again of civil war, perhaps offering an opportunity to
make gains lost by Mugabe's victory.
- A big prize, Zaire, continues to tantalize, the Soviets aware that Mobutu
cannot lost indefinitely and that a struggle will follow his departure.
- Long-time Soviet support for SWAPO, promising opportunity in Namibia either
by its inclusion in a government or by civil war.
- Insecure regimes in both the Seychelles and Mauritius interested in expanding
contacts with the Soviet Union.
- Zia's regime in Pakistan growing weary of the burdens of supporting the
Afghan insurgency and confronted with mounting internal problems.
- In Asia, prospects less bright but the insurgency in the Philippines worth
watching and potentially a major breakthrough in the region.
Against these successes and opportunities, the Soviets had to count:
- A still weak position in the Middle East.
- Failure to make any headway with the Iranian regime.
- US aid to the Salvadoran regime, Habre, and Nimieri.
- The regional strength of ASEAN and general internal stability of its members.
- Vietnamese inability to crush the Kampuchean resistance totally, and
- Soviet inability to crush the Afghan resistance.
All in all, the balance sheet is strongly favorable and encouraging to the Soviets.
The opportunities for and ease of destabilizing regimes and exploiting economic and
social problems promise continued high priority of the Third World and intense Soviet
involvement and success in the Third World in the last decade and a half of the century.
IV. A US Counterstrategy: The Realities
Three successive Presidents have tried to grapple with the Soviet offensive in the
Third World. While their actions have at times increased the costs to the Soviets and
their surrogates, in only one instance-Chad-have they succeeded fully in blocki
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A US counterstrategy in the Third World needs to be based on domestic and foreign
realities:
The Vietnam Syndrome is a reality; the Congress will not support or allow the
use of US combat forces in the Third World. As El Salvador has shown, even a
training role is suspect.
Nearly every Third World government, friend or foe, is authoritarian and can
fairly be accused of repression, corruption, and failure to observe democratic
procedures and basic human rights. Thus, few if any countries we seek or need
to help will meet the standards of behavior set by many in Congress and the
media.
The US cannot provide sufficient economic assistance to every friendly
government which faces destabilizing economic problems susceptible to
foreign exploitation.
- It will be difficult to develop political support in the US to help most Third
World countries threatened with destabilization or insurgencies. The Soviet
hand will be ambiguous at best and the benefit to the US of maintaining or
restoring a friendly goverment will often be difficult to demonstrate
concretely. This will be especially true of small countries like Suriname,
Grenada, or Mauritius; of some large ones like the Philippines where
insurgencies will be regarded in the US with some accuracy as the consequence
of repression and corruption (a view that will be fostored by emigre
activities); and of many countries remote to Americans like Chad, Zaire,
Mozambique, and Namibia.
- Overt US intervention-political, military, or economic-will be castigated
abroad as neo-imperialism, as motivated by US economic interests and the
like. It will appear to be both bullying and racist.
V. A US Counterstrategy: What is to be Done?
Soviet ambition in the Third World is not exactly a new problem, even though the
tactics are in some respects. Thus, while the US is in need of a new strategy, many
components of that strategy also are familiar, though they must be approached and
linked in new ways. What follows is a number of steps to address the Soviet challenge in
the Third World. They have the additional appeal that they represent also a sensible
American approach to the Third World whether or not the USSR is involved.
1. As stated above, the Third World has (and has had for years) a central priority
place in Soviet foreign policy. If for no other reason than this, the US must begin to take
the Third World and its problems seriously. We have too often neglected our friends and
neutrals in Africa, Latin America, and Asia until they become a problem or are
threatened by developments we consider hostile to our interests. The Third World now
buys 40 percent of our exports; that alone is reason enough to pay greater attention to
the problems of the LDCs before we confront coups, insurgencies, or instability that
affect us adversely. Except when we confront a situation we consider dangerous to
ourselves, the Third World has been a very low priority. This has resulted in a case by
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case, fragmented response to Soviet and Cuban actions. The priority of the Third World
in our overall foreign policy must be raised and sustained.
2. The Executive Branch must do more to educate the public, the Congress, and
Third World governments about Soviet strategy in the LDCs generally. This requires low-
key, factual briefings and meetings on a sustained basis-keeping people up to date on
developments and sharing as much of our intelligence as we safely can. One or two
media campaigns or Presidential speeches are not the answer. A continuing information
program designed to inform and tie together developments in areas widely distant is
needed and must be pursued intelligently over a long term.
3. The US Intelligence Community, and especially CIA, must continue to give
priority to learning more about developments in the Third World and creating analytical
methods to provide early warning of economic, social, and political problems that
foreshadow instability and opportunities for exploitation by the USSR or its allies. Policy
agencies should then use this information in developing approaches to LDC governments
that are aimed at dealing with these problems promptly (though the solutions may take
years) when the cost often will be modest. We should serve as a clearing house of
information useful to threatened countries, for example, seeing to it that lessons learned
in successful anti-insurgent campaigns in Malaysia and Thailand are brought to the
attention of the El Salvador and Philippine Governments.
4. The US can provide some help to many countries (and does) but must establish
for itself priorities in terms of major commitments. President Nixon wanted to rely on
key regional states as bulwarks for stability and keeping the peace. There are some
dangers in this approach (Iran was to be the key state in the Persian Gulf), but it is
generally a sensible strategy. If our early help fails to prevent serious trouble, for which
countries are we prepared to put our chips on the table? We should address this ahead of
time so that we do not expend political and other assets on places of marginal
importance because we must decide such matters in haste and locking perspective. Also,
we should choose in consultation with key members or committees of Congress so that
their support at crucial moments is more likely. Great losing battles for FMS, economic
assistance, and the like--as for Angola and El Salvador-played out on the world stage
and at critical times represent devastating setbacks for the US with ramifications going
for beyond the affected country. Even politically bloody success-e.g. Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan-can result in the costs outweighing or offsetting the gains.
5. We must be more demanding in private of those who seek our help. Public
criticism of sovereign governments may spiritually satisfying but it is the surest way
to policy failure. The human rights campaign in the first two years of the Carter
Administration is a case in point. By the some token, the very great numbers of Jews
permitted to emigrate from the USSR between 1971-1976 as a result of private pressure
from the US demonstrates that we can affect the behavior of even our adversaries. We
must be prepared to demand firmly but tactfully and privately that our friends observe
certain standards of behavior with regard to basic human rights. It is required by our
own principles and essential to political support in the US. Moreover, we have to be
willing to talk straight to those we would help about issues they must address to block
foreign exploitation of their problems-issues such as land reform, corruption, and the
like. We need to show how the Soviets have exploited such vulnerabilities elsewhere to
good effect to make clear we are not preaching out of cultural arrogance but are making
recommendations based on experience elsewhere. We should also point out how policies
in other areas, such as nuclear proliferation, undermine Congressional support. In sum,
we have a right and a responsibility to condition our support-but must do so in ways that
make it possible politically for the recipient to comply.
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6. We must press for changes in our foreign military sales laws to permit the US to
provide arms more quickly to friends in need and to do so without hanging out all their
dirty linen for the world to see. It does not serve any rational purpose to humiliate those
whom we would help. We also need to change our military procurement policies so as to
have stocks of certain basic kinds of weapons more readily available. Telling a requestor
we can get him a weapons system in several months or even two or three years from now
is not satisfactory when he wonders whether he will be in power in six weeks. Nor is it
satisfactory to be forced to take weapons out of the inventories of our own forces.
Finally, we need to be tougher with requestors when they seek weapons-such as F-16s-
for prestige but their military needs and economic well-being would be better served by
less sophisticated, less expensive weapons.
8. We must find a way to mobilize and use our greatest asset in the Third World-
private business. Few in the Third World wish to adopt the Soviet economic system.
Neither we nor the Soviets can offer unlimited or even large-scale economic assistance
to the LDCs. Investment is the key to economic success or at least survival in the Third
World and we, our NATO allies and Japan need to develop a common strategy to promote
investment in the Third World.,The Soviets are helpless to compete with private capital
in these countries. The US needs to explore incentives to encourage the private sector to
play a greater role in the LDCs, especially in countries of key importance.
10. Finally, the Executive Branch must collaborate more closely in the setting of
strategy with key members and committees of Congress. Too often opportunities to
counter the Soviets have been lost by clashes between the two Branches, often by last
minute, poorly thought out or poorly explained initiatives from the Executive. The
independent stand of Congress is a fact of life, and any effort to counter the Soviets in
the Third World will fail unless the Congress is mode a party to the Executive's thinking
and planning-all along the way. This is anathema to Constitutional purists in the
Executive who see foreign policy as the necessary preserve of the Executive (and I am
one of those), but it is reality and if we do not accommodate to it we will have no
success against the Soviets in the Third World. In the some vein, support for a Third
World policy must be bipartisan and stable. The flip-flops and zig-zags of the past eight
years have led to confusion and uncertainty among our friends and neutrals who doubt our
constancy and our reliability. It may be naive to call for this at this point in our history,
but without a sustained, constant policy applied over a number of years, we cannot
counter the relentless pressure of the USSR in the Third World.
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As I warned, none of these measures are new. What would be new is linking them in
a well-thought out strategy applied with consistency and keeping in mind that they are
all related and must be applied as a package. Above all, it is past time for the American
Government-Executive and Congress-to take the Soviet challenge in the Third World
seriously and to develop a broad, integrated strategy for countering it. It will be the
principal US-Soviet batt leground for many years to come.
/Robert M. Ca es
Deputy Director ford telligence
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