SOVIET-MIDDLE EAST POLICY ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001202720012-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: January 17, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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' THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
NIC 419-83
17 January 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Charles E. Waterman, NIO/NESA
SUBJECT: Soviet-Middle East Policy Issues
1. The attached is a summary of my speculative thinking about what
the Soviets may be up to strategically, as exemplified by the SA-5
deployment in Syria. In short, they may wish to obtain for themselves many
of the capabilities for influence on both sides of the conflict that the US
currently enjoys. This means enhancing the intensity, durability, and
quality of their direct military involvement with Syria; opening a
meaningful dialogue with Israel; and increasing their acceptability to
moderate Arabs. These goals are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
2. Intensifying US-Israeli difficulties over Palestine and the Arabs
generally would enhance the feasibility of a Soviet-Israeli dialogue.
3. I can think of no other consistent explanation for the SA-5
venture in Syria, which on the surface could be self-defeating for the
Soviets.
Attachment:
Summary
This Memo is classified
SECRET in its entirety.
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Charles E. Waterman
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Attachment to NIC 419-83
Soviet-Middle East
Soviet strategic thinking in the Middle East revolves to a large
extent around the desirability of reasserting a major role in the
area. They presumably envisage the current American position as
overwhelmingly predominant, and ascribe this situation to the
following factors:
1) The military dominance of Israel over Soviet client states.
2) The area perception and reality that the US maintains the
major relationship, and accordingly the only potential
influence, with Israel.
3) Deep rooted US economic and, to some extent, cultural
affinities and ties with area states.
About "1" and "3" the Soviets can do little. About however,
they may envisage transforming current realities as follows:
1) By direct, consistent, and forceful operational military
involvement with Syria, the Soviets would become a factor to
be reckoned with in Israeli thinking. The W-5 deployment,
probably with Soviet manning and obvious potential for
Israeli preemptive action, is not explainable in other
terms. Should the SA-5's be destroyed -- with both Soviet
..and Israeli casualties -- the Soviets would probably respond
with deeper direct involvement. Our institutional thinking
has been this would include pilots, more air-defense
personnel, and possibly an air-mobile regiment. None of
.these moves would dramatically change the balance of power
equation. Over time, however, given Isrli definitions of
the need for de
i
i
c
s
ve superiority -- and intense concern for
casualties -- the Soviets would become a force which could no
longer be neglected. They would pose a direct threat to
Israeli freedom of action in Lebanon, Syria, and in the air
generally.
If by consistent force and their unequivocal role as Syrian
protector, the Soviets arrive at a position demanding Israeli
attention and concern, the Israelis and Soviets could also,
under these circumstances, become to the Israelis something
similar to what the US is to the Arabs -- the source of
potential pressure on their regional enemies or enem
Whil
y.
e
ultimately the US-Israeli relationship would inherently
remain the dominant one, I am struck by the possibility of ad
hoc accommodations on matters of mutual interest. The
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following quote is from a 1981 Tel Aviv University Center for
Strategic Studies memo entitled "The Feasibility of a Soviet-
Israeli Dialogue":
"..even in a situation of contradiction of interests,
there is room for contact between the two sides. ...it
could emanate from ad hoc political situations in which
they found themselves on the same side of the fence. It
appears today that the Soviet Union and Israel have a
common interest in promoting such contacts, and allowing
them to become a constructive dialogue when the time
arises, especially if the US-PLO relationship undergoes
any marked improvement. ...Were the leadership in each
capital to recognize the potential that such a step could
bring them in the realm of realpolitik, this could
occur. The USSR would then become less dependent on its
fickle Arab allies, while Israel could learn the lesson
constantly preached by other pro Western countries, such
as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, that have used the threat of
the Soviet alternative as bargaining chips vis-a-vis the
West, even if Israel's position is indeed more delicate in
the current American political arena."
3) Andropov may conceive of the Soviet "ticket" for entry into
the Middle East power game as just that -->t ,-become
sufficiently troublesome militarily, potentially useful
diplomatically, and flexible policy-wise -- to be attractive
to the Israelis as an additional interlocutor. If true, we
should anticipate discreet-Soviet gestures. towards the
Israelis (or vice versa), backed by enhanced Soviet power
status in Syria -- over the next year or so. Concomitantly,
the US would be forced to take the Soviets fully into account
in future political processes.
Several other factors affect this situation:
1) The Israelis, feeling US pressure on Palestinian issues, may
be in a mood to reciprocate a discreet Soviet move for
meaningful contact. There has been recent Israeli press
speculation, apparently not officially inspired, about an
official resumption of relations. Both Israelis and Soviets
have an interest in defeating the Reagan initiative.
2) The Soviets are being entirely "correct" in their action vis-
a-vis the Arab moderates. They have, for instance, publicly
endorsed whatever arrangement the PLO and Jordan may evolve
on Palestine.
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3) On Iraq, previous Soviet hesitancies to supply weaponry have
largely ceased. This would appear consistent with an
attempted reassertion of eminence in the Arab world.
Although technically correct, relations with Iran's
establishment are getting worse, not better.
-- In summary, it is possible Soviet planning is designed to change
the Middle-East equation, as follows:
1) Establish themselves as a consistent military guarantor of
Syria, with direct military involvement, and capable of
inflicting significant casualties on Israeli forces used to
neutralize them.
2) Having done so, establish a dialogue with Israel, based on
Soviet preeminence in some Arab circles. Specifically, its
capability of influencing policy in Syria, with the PLO, and
in Iraq would be attractive to Israel. Exploit Israeli-US
friction over Palestine and Lebanon to the hilt in doing so.
3) Continue to stake out basically reasonable positions in line
with the Arab consensus on issues such as Palestine - and
perhaps succeed in establishing relations with Saudi Arabia.
In general, reemerge as a power capable of influencing: a)
Israeli actions by steady force; b) Arab actions by direct
military support and politically supporting stances.
-- If such a Soviet policy were successful, we may see the following
within a year's time:
1) A solidified military position in Syria which, by steadily
inflicting casualties, has rendered Israeli aggressive
military activity against Syria futile - short of all-out
war.
2) A Soviet dialogue with Israel, based on Soviet capabilities
to influence certain Arab states, Israeli reaction to
unwelcome US pressures, and increasing direct Soviet military
presence.
3) A move towards establishment or strengthening of relations
with moderate Arab states. This would include solidifying
its arms supplier relationship wtih Iraq.
If these developments occur, the Soviets could no longer be ignored
by us as a factor in the Middle East equation.
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