THE TRUTH ABOUT A NEW MISSILE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001202830031-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: June 30, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP85MOO363ROO1202830031-6
THURSDAY MORNING, 30 JUNE 1.983
CHICAGO TRIBUNE 30 June 1983 Pg. 10
The truth about a new missile
A high official in the Reagan ad-
ministration has finally let the truth
be known: The decision to deploy the
Pershing II missile, which has
strained the Atlantic Alliance and
energized the pacifist movement in
Western Europe, was a political and
military blunder.
The confessio l came from Richard
Perle, the Assistant Secretary of De-
fense for International Security,
during an off-the-record. lunch at the
Washington-based New Republic
magazine. Reporter Fred Kaplan of
the Boston Globe learned from two
people who attended that Perle ad-
mitted the missile has little military
value because of its vulnerability and
that it has been far more costly to the
alliance than it is worth. Buthe insist-
ed the U.S. should keep its promise to
deploy it.
Perle had denied the story, but un-
convincingly. Kaplan was told by an-
other administration official that
Perle had expressed the same views
at an interagency meeting last year.
Nor Is Kaplan the sort of reporter
.who would get his facts wrong. He is
the author of an excellent new book
"The Wizards of Armageddon'1
(Simon &.-Schuster), a pathbreaking
account of the evolution of American
nuclear strategy.
Perle's remarks also raise fresh
doubts about the President's commit-
ment to slowing the arms race. As an
aide to Sen. Henry Jackson (D.-
Wash.), Perle helped to kill the SALT
?II agreement, and he is now the
Pentagon's chief official on arms con-
trol. Asked at the New Republic lunch
if he regarded any past arms control
treaties as worthwhile, Perle cited
Stephen Chapman
g
it as the only possible response the
SS
only two-an 1817 agreement between
the U.S. and Britain restricting naval
vessels on the Great Lakes and an
1899 international agreement banning
the dropping of bombs from airborne
balloons.
What Perle admitted about the Per-
shing II is nothing more than what
the administrations critics have said
all along. An intermediate-range mis-
sile to be based in Europe, it provides
no deterrent or war-fighting capacity
that isn't provided by existing
weapons. But it suffers from defects
that they lack.
The greatest of these is its vulnera-
bility. Being close to the Soviet Union,
the Pershing II would be able to hit
targets inside its borders quickly and
accurately. Unfortunately, being close
to the Soviet Union, it could be hit by
the Soviets quickly and accurately.
Unlike land-based ICBMs, it can't be
"hardened" against attack. Unlike
submarine-based missiles, it isn't im-
mune to detection.
What all this means is that, as
Perle noted, the missile has only du-
bious military value. What he appar-
ently didn't mention is that it is also
marginally destabilizing. A vulnera-
ble weapon is, almost by definition, a
first-strike weapon. If ' it were not
used first-if it were held back for
retaliation against a Soviet attack-it
would probably be destroyed. Even if
it weren't, some of its likely targets,
like ICBMs, would have disappeared.
Military utility has never been one
of the missile's strong points. The
Rea an administration has portrayed
- .en-
Soviet deployment of new
siles aimed at Europe. There are two
flaws in this depiction-one historical
and one military.
The historical flaw is that the deci-
sion to deploy the Pershing was made
to demonstrate an American commit-
ment to NATO. West German chan-
cellor Helmut Schmidt, worried that
the U.S. might sacrifice Western Eu-
rope to a Soviet invasion rather than
start a nuclear war, got it in an
attempt,to bind America more closely
to it allies. The missile was offered as
proof that we are prepared to use
nuclear weapons to stop a convention-
al attack-which we probably aren't
and certainly shouldn't be.
The military flaw is that the SS-20s
don't change the military balance in
Europe. The Soviets have had the
means to incinerate the NATO coun-
tries since the 1950s. These missiles
boast greater accuracy and explosive
ppoower, but the improvements are
largely superflous.
Moreover, the U.S. already has an
ample force to deter the Soviets from
using their missiles-and to retaliate
should deterrence fail. The Pershing
II adds nothing except vulnerability:
But the administration still insists
on deploying it. As his remarks inad-
vertently revealed, even Perle and his
compatriots know that the Pershing,2
will gain us nothing, while requiring
considerable political and financial
expense. In this case, however, the
Reagan administration lacks the
courage of its convictions.
Approved For Release 2007/11/19: CIA-RDP85MOO363ROO1202830031-6