POLITICIANS IN UNIFORM SURINAME'S BEDEVILED REVOLUTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00363R001403210034-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 34
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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? Politicians
in Uniform
Surinames Bedeviled Revolution
D emocracy is not alive and well in Sur. the post-coup military regime will find tena-
iname: nor. for that matter. is gross cious and difficult to dismantle.
authoritarianism. The current atmos- The stage for the events of 1980 was set
phere in Paramaribo is one of confusion. in 1973 when Henk Arron, heir to the largest
tension. uncertainty, and insecurity. On Feb- Creole party. the formidable NPS (Nationale
ruary25. 1980. an extraordinary event. alien Partij Suriname) effected a coalition that
to Surinamese experience. occured in the galvanized an uneasy alliance with a smaller
former Dutch colony. The constitutionally Creole party (PSV). the traditional vanguard
established government toppled in an unex- of the Creole left (PNR). and the largest
pected and almost blood-free coup d' etat Indonesian party (KTPI). For seven years
carried out by sixteen army non-commis- through independence in 1975 and reelec-
sioned officers. Shortly thereafter they or- tion in 1978, it worked well enough to keep
ganized themselves into the ruling National the huge East Indian and several small left
ilitary Council. The composition of this wing parties at bay.
Hcil as well as the extent of its formal The immediate problem, however, which
informal powers have been in a state of lead to the coup was with the young, non-
x. Fourteen months have since gone by commissioned officers of the military. Gov-
and well defined programs for serious and ernment,aswell as the military officer corps,
sustained social change supported by a was resistent to the NCOs repeated requests.
coherent ideology are barely embryonic. and later demands, for pay increases, in-
Except for the most basic details and the creased promotion opportunities and, above
sparest chronological markers there is no all. government recognition of a military
public consensusonexactlywhathappened. union. At the time, the constitution per-
why it happened, who is responsible. and mitted unions or, more specifically, did not
where the events are leading the recently prohibit militaryunions.TheSurinamese officer
independent country. corps, supported by the government, con-
temptuously dismissed the request. The
What Happened in Suriname? reasoningforthisdecisionwentdeeperthan
Suriname's many ethnic groups have been just military policy; the soldiers-NCOs and
both a source of pride and consternation for conscripts alike-were treated as little more
the former colony. Tourist brochures herald than a bunch of lame brain boy scouts.
the cuisine, dress. religion, arts, and folk -Me -military in Suriname has neither a
culture of the richly textured East Indian, long nor particularly distinguished history.
Afro-Surinamese ("Creole"). Indonesian, Prior to independence, a part Dutch, part
Maroon ("Bush Negro"), Chinese. American Surinamese army was administered by
Indian. European. and Lebanese/ 'Syrian Dutch officers as part of the Netherlands
mosaic. Still separated by cultural, edu- Overseas Army. Soldiers in uniform were
cational, occupational, and residential dif- rarely seen on the streets and, in fact, were
ferences. the groups provided Suriname not even called out to help the police during
with a ready social formula for recruiting the tumultuous anti-government strikes of
institutional appointments and distributing 1973. The army was organized primarily for
both patronage and services. Pre-coup poli. frontier defense while the police were legally
tics in Suriname. through the skillful mani. responsible for internal security. There was
pulation of politicians, became ethnic with no formal linkage between the pre-indepen-
iamentary democracy perceived of as dente army and government. The post-
ena for the promotion of ethnic group independence army fared little better and,
ests. Alliances and counter alliances, although it was heavily armed, it too re-
sometimes tacit. sometimes explicit, almost mained outside of the decision making
always tactical and short term. became the system. Unlike Latin American armies they
style and content of the "old politics." did not have a clearly defined role, tradition,
Actually, no one group ever held complete structure, or ideology.
power in Suriname. Power was always The year long dispute reached a head in
shared-albeit unwillingly-a fact of life that February 1980. Extraordinarily mishandled
24!CA0BBf)N r vi w
by Prime Minister Arron, the situation es-
calated to the point where one third of the
army (250 men) occupied a government
building and an adjoining park to protest the
arrest of three of their NCO leaders. Charged
with mutiny, their trial was set for February
26, 1980. The police, Arron's main weapon
against the military.. armed with carbines
and riot shields, cordoned off the court-
house. Meanwhile, a sixteen man com-
mando unit was formed under the lead-
ership of rgeants Desi Bouterse 4) anti
0 or . Reportedly, their goal was
only to free their three compatriots incar-
cerated at the police station. What hap-
pened next is best summed up by one of the
commandos: "We only wanted a union but
ended up with country."
The well planned and coordinated attacks
made on the army barracks and arsenal in
Paramaribo with a simultaneous shelling by
patrol boat of the riverside police station,
raised some doubts as to whether the
country was captured by accident Three
hundred soldiers fanned out over Para-
maribo, disarmed police, and secured stra-
tegic positions. The old government col-
lapsed. The sergeants faced their first prob-
lem. Theme did not have a central public issue
other than their own grievences around
which to build a widely acceptable rationale
for their behavior. The country did not
perceive itself in severe crisis nor on the
brink of revolution. An appropriate ideology
would be difficult to construct. For a month
following the coup the situation in Para-
maribo was in chaos.
Who's in Charge?
Rumors and conflicting interpretations flew.
Some alleged it was a coup from the "right"
spearheaded by the leader of the large East
Indian party. Others claimed high persons in
the left wing PNR were behind it as the
former leader of that party was legal council
for the three jailed soldiers and whose
followers endorsed the requests of the
NCOs. However, the general chaos of the
following month, the lack of post-coup co-
ordination, and the fact that virtually every-
body was keeping quiet and not making a
commitment argued that what had occured
was a surprize.
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?
The victorious soldiers claimed that gov-
ernment would soon be returned to civilian
hands. The Prime Minister, members of
cabinet, and high military officers fled to the
interior or left the country. After their simple
act of violence the young soldiers found
themselves without program. i eology, or
organization save an equally young arm
armed with automatic weapons patrolling
N e streets o Paramaribo. The resident of
the Republic (and former colonial governor),
Dr. J. Ferrier was retained in office. Parlia-
ment. though stripped of power. was not
suspended. The scheduled elections were
e 0ancelled and political parties prohibited.
ocial justice" for the masses was prom-
d while the military secured its position
through the arrest and detention of former
government officials.
Hampered by their political inexperience
the members o the nary ouncil turned
quickly to whom they perceived to be the
only friends they had. These tended to be
representatives of left wing parties who had
backed them in their struggle against Arron.
Foremost among this group was one of
Suriname's most savvy politicians; Eddie
Bruma, lawyer, nationalist, and former lead-
er~the leftist PNR. He was assigned the
task of assembling a group of civilians from
which the military could select and appointa
cabinet of ministers.
With the approval of the military. Dr. Henk
Chin A Sen. a respected physician, col-
eagT- ue of Bruma's during their student days
in Holland, and sympathizer of the PNR. was
appointed Minister-President (Dr. Ferrier re-
mained as President, a different post). He
had no political experience. His cabinet was
composed of carefully selected technocrats,
many of whom had spent years studying
and working in the Netherlands. Soldiers
and civilians alike had seen the metropole.
An old timer claimed: "The more I think
about this, the more I feel it is a revolution of
turn migrants."
The cabinet's composition reflected un-
eard of ethnic balance-Creole, East In-
dian, Indonesian, Chinese. white Surinamer
-a spectrum carefully scrutinized by vir-
tually all Surinamers. The elusive Suri.
namese dream and anathema to the old
po itics ,government with all groups parti-
Illustration by Juan C Urquiola
CARBBEI'J FEVIE\0/25
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seemed within reach.
shed the victorious soldiers faced a
dilemma: the were, in effect, uil of
treason. This was reso ved in a special
r tin 0 parliament, during which the
new rulers o e country were granted a
general amnesty. On March 15. 1980. the
newly formulated civilian government was
installed. It .vas to serve in the shadow and at
the pleasure of the military.
However. a consensus was not yet for-
mulated. The military leadership and their
civilian counterparts knew only that "things"
had to change. but not how. or how much. A
minority in the National Military Council
argued for radical change. They perceived
the constitution and the continued presence
of President Ferrier as a brake on what was
now being called the revolution and, at
worst, a vehicle for the return of the old party
politics.
The military did not isolate itself from the
watchful, cautious citizenry. For days after
the coup long lines of aspiring advisors
queued up outside the heavily fortified bar-
racks. For the less aggressive, the soldiers
hung an "idea box" outside the camp gates.
In addition to seeking public endorsement
t ilitary picked up information on
of sexual infidelity, malicious gossip,
Aw. and personal misfortune. Suriname
again demonstrated its uniqueness: a mili-
tary junta with a suggestion box, But, this
gesture should not be misunderstood. First,
it was a naive attempt by a frightened and
inexperienced group to maintain and pro-
mote "good will" with the citizenry. There
was. at this stage. a genuine desire to be
liked and respected by the public. Also, they
wanted, in their simple way, to communicate
with the public outside of the old traditional
structures of ethnic political party organs.
Neither wish would come true. The military
had created a wild west atmosphere in
Suriname where normal rules did not apply
to those in army uniform. Earlier cases were
ludicrous: soldiers in jeeps not obeying
traffic policemen or speeding the wrong way
up a one way street. A dignified old man told
me: "Ach, they are young boys playing big
men-but they have the uzi's."
Though the coup was promoted as a
revolution it would be months before h
concept was defined. The first of Para-
maribo's many 'public" secrets emerged:
the loose coalition of military and civilian
"centrists" faced the task of keeping the far
left and the ultra-right at bay-even though
the support of both these groups cut across
nd civilian arms of government. A
ve middle had to be secured;
d so much in its own ideological
terms as in opposition to "extremist" views.
Thus a balancing act began: concessions to
the e avors o e nq t, w i e keeping the
center, itself in a state of flux, moving
forward-or, at east unctioning. The young
26/CARBBCAN FEVIEW
soldiers were involved in the politics of being
above politics. The delicate art of court
dancing had begun.
May Days and Counter-Coup One
On May 1, 1980, Minister-President Chin A
Sen publicly announced his "Government's
Declaration" which proclaimed the "first"
Republic of Suriname dead and the birth of
the "new" Republic. His detailed program,
which did not once mention the word
"socialism" emphasized "social justice" and
fairness: increased educational opportuni-
ties, expanded medical care and facilities,
"We only wanted a union but
ended up with a country."
rights for married women, increased oppor-
tunities for the poor, government health
insurance, old age pensions, a workable
irrigation and drainage system, a coherent
national development scheme, a non-
aligned foreign policy, elections in 1982,
and the weeding out of those old bogey
men, corruption and malaise. Dr. Chin A
Sen proscribed a mild treatment, which for
the "moderates" is still being used as the
prototype for change. With typical Suri-
namese pride and pragmatism the Minister-
President seemed to be telling the public
"fair is fair and in your heart you know its
right." Many, however, accused Chin A Sen
and his allies of delivering too little, too late.
Nor was the military dragging its feet
Early after the coup they set out to "clean
up the bureaucracy. he soldiers ordered
at eac civi ervan wou e a i eesk
prompt y a a eginning o eac a ,not
disappear over rea an say on rou h
the entire work. da . Common criminals
were brought to the army base and sum
marily flogged; the streets were cleaned
daily: garbage was picked up three times a
week; buildings were repainted; and motor-
cyclists were instructed to wear helmets.
The workin class rulers wanted to see
things organized neatly and done with dis-
c~ lined, mechanical efficiency. Tropical cal-
vinists, they made the old co onial system
run efficiently. However, robust talk about
the "new moral order" took place in a
structural and ideological vacuum. Uncon-
vinced, the bulk of the citizenry at best gave
the military the "benefit of the doubt." The
old Surinamese cynicism was reemerging
and would be reinforced by the mysterious
and, as yet, unclear events of May.
In early May an alleged counter-coup (the
so called "right wing Ormskirk coup")
brought the first serious tremors of fear to
the country. Rumors flew through Suri-
name's "mouth newspaper" that an armed
invasion force of 200300 Surinamese.
Dutch, European, and Moluccan mercen-
aries had landed in neighboring French
Guiana from Europe. Other than military
press releases there is no concrete i
to indicate that any such landing or planned
invasion ever occured. Only Ormskirk and
ano er person in his company were cap-
tured" in Suriname. Letters in their posses-
sion, and addressed to several Surinamers,
incriminated them and their "intentions."
Copies of the letters were never made
public. Ormskirk was beaten to death and
those persons to whom the letters were
addressed were jailed, seriously mistreated,
tortured, and suffered permanent physical
damage at the hands of the leading figures
in the military. By June, those in detention
were turned over to the civilian authorities
and provisionally released. A former officer
in the Surinamese army who had refused to
join with the original commandos, and now
resident in Holland, was accused of collab-
oration and sentenced in absentia.
The alleged May counter-coup threw in-
ternal military cleavages into sharp relief.
Ideological and Personal factions a[veare d.
Sergeants Sital and Miinals, participants in
the original commando group, ranking
member of the National Military Council.
and sympathizers of the leftwing Volk Partij
(People's Party were known to be dissatis-
fied with the pace of the "revolution," They
had a following in the army and allies in and
out of civi ian government. Any furtherance
of their ambitions would be at the expense
of former Sergeant Bouterse. Commander-
in-Chief of the Army and self -promoted
the rank o Major. 1-1
rta and jnals were known to be im-
pressed with the Cuban and Grenadian
revolutions and decried the events in Suri?
name as "conservative." Suriname sent a
delegation to Nicaragua in July 1980 to
attend the celebrations for the anniversary
of that country's revoluton. Sital was there
and in a meeting with Fidel Castro was
reportedly encouraged to promote the re-
volutionary struggle. Conflict with Minister-
President Chin A Sen and denunciations of
Major Bouterse followed as Sital. Mijnals
and their civi ian allies (members o ara ical
spin off of the V)lks Partij ca ling itself the
evolutionaire Volks Partij cal a for Cuban
advisors, nations iza ion o ma or in ustries
and a real- revolution in Suriname.
Trouble on the Left: The August
Counter-Coup
Early in August 1980 a group of seven ci-
vilians and soldiers allied with, Sital and
Mijnals gathered at a hotel ou si a ra
man o. hey c aime yy me on
id scuss and evaluate events since February
25. One week after their meeting they were
arrested, jailed without trial and charged
with formulating a "left wing" coup.
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ajor Bouterse then cleaned house and
de imse unquestionably the most
powe ul man in Suiname. Issuing the rrst
of what were to become a number of
decrees (Algemeen Decreet A). signed only
by himself. he declared a renewed state of
national emergency. abolished the consti-
tution. sacked President Ferrier. promoted
MinisteLPresident Chin A Sen to President
and Chief Executive, and installed the
tarvythority" (Het litave Gezai)-com?
posed of himself and two other sergeants -
as an integral and official part of the gov.
erring machinery. Government powers
.nce that time have been jointly exercised
civilian authorities appointed by the
:'itary, t e newly organized Military Au-
;crity, and the National Military Council.
.. a division o orma and informal power
`etween these three groups, and within
,.em. is opaque. changeable. and un-
ietme .
Bouterse claimed that his actions gave
the "revolution" a "new start." Others were
less generous, pointing out that he only
succeeded in anchoring the ship of state
dead in the water between the "left" and the
"right " By dismissing President Ferrier and
abolishing the constitution, any return of the
" parties and politicos by electoral means
n s squelched. By landing a blow to Sital
d Mijnals he was rid of his ideological
adversaries and power competitors. Al-
though his personal power was immense he
.-w a great deal of strength from the so,
--lied moderates in military and civilian gov-
-r nment. The "center" held, yet it was more
a "mathematical center" than an ideo-
logical one: left is cancelled out, right is
cancelled out, and the center is what re-
mains.
Nevertheless. definitions of socialism were
rampant. "Socialism isn't communism. is
it?" was a regularly asked question. Sighed
an elderly woman who was active in pre-
coup politics. "Socialism means punishing
us and making strangers come live in my
house." A teenage entrepreneur selling
crushed ice cones wanted to expand his
operation to two push carts, one of which his
brother could operate, but was afraid be-
cause "government will take it away from
me if I have more than one." One local
intellect with access to the mass media
defined socialism as "loving people." capital-
ism as "loving money." and communism
as "not loving anything." The propaganda
mill was churning but not delivering.
Businessmen compained that people
vere not bu in extras and durables and
ey were afraid to invest or expand. Money
as em secreted out of the
taken out of banks and circulation and
hidden. A poor woman in one of Para-
maribo's low status neighborhoods bought
canned food and hoarded it because a
young conscript soldier told her"something
is going to happen." A highly placed finan-
cial official told me in reply to a question
about foreign investment, "The outside
world is being very patient with us; I just
hope we don't collapse internally."
Trials and Tribulations
On September 9 a decree was issued call-
ing for the establishment of a "Special Tri-
bunal" to deal with crimes of corruption urn
the former government and the offend.
ers who were involved in the alleged left
coup of August The hapless Arron, arrested
and released, was rearrested for trial. It was
"The more I think about
this, the more I feel it is a
revolution of return
migrants."
not clear exactly what the charges would be
and certain civilian officials were critical of
the move. Renewed publicity, it was felt,
would serve only to open old wounds-
never really conclusively dealt with. In fact,
Arron never was tried by this special bod
an remained in jail until his latest release in
e rua reo a unnamers, espe-
cia y those members of the former party
headed by Arron felt that the treatment
given him was a personal attack on them.
They were after all, the thousands and
thousands of them, the "old politics" and
were proud of it.
On December 11, the participants in the
alleged left coup, who had been in jail since
their August arrest, were given sentences of
up to two years in prison. Graffiti by their
sup orters appeared on walls and roadwa s:
ree Sital," "Free Miinals." Concerned citi-
zens found the Tribunal objectionable be-
cause of its retroactive and vague definitions
of corruption and establishment by decree.
The profound sentiment among many Suri?
namers was fright. There was, they felt, no
law in the land save the caprice of the
military.
Earl 1981 and the "revolution" was
bogged down; cynics referred to it as the
"a&ministrative revolution." old politician
told me: "Politics in Suriname is still a game,
still a game. But this time there is no way
out." A young cabinet minister said; "Do
you know what we are up against? Time is
running out and we have to change Suri-
name from a foreign owned plantation
composed of laborers to a country com-
prised of citizens." In his dismay he re-
counted the story of having the locks
changed on his office door. Six government
workers came; five played cards, smoked
cigarettes and supervised. The military was
grov'na frustrated and, under increasing
pressure to deliver, expected sabotage when
even a most e a orate of long term pro-
crams were not comp e e immediately
They held doggedly to the belief that all
problems can be overcome if the right
orders are given.
In an effort to promote the revolution and
"change N e mentality" of the masses,_'Peo-
ple's Committees" (Volks Comites) were
esta is ed by the military and administered
directly by the National Military Council.
They were designed to act as a communi-
cation device between grass roots grou s
and the Military Council. ev function to
promote development and politicize the
masses. Although no particular ideological
model was used, conservatives denounced
the innovation as a marked swing to the left.
Supporters of the old political parties-
themselves already highly politicized!-dis-
missed the Volks Comites with a sharp hiss
of the teeth and critique that "young boys
are telling us what to do." Ridicule, a time
honored weapon was applied to the new
military. When an older woman was asked
about the degree of neighborhood partici-
pation in a local Committee she replied,
"People aren't stupid. If they want to pave
our streets, install electricity, or throw a
block party, we'll take it But they will never
pull the beliefs from our hearts."
On a propaganda trip to the rural district
of Coronie to promote a local Committee,
the military leadership resorted to promising
abundant development money if the Coro-
nians would lend their support Music,
dancing, food, drink, speechifying, gossip,
promises, and private deals followed. In-
deed, this was politics. In a cloud of dust the
military went back to Paramaribo leaving the
Coronians to go about their business. The
old Suriname adage seemed to be holding
true: "Winti wai, land pai" (The wind blows
and the government pays).
Meanwhile, President Chin A Sen was
mustering civilian and public support by
promoting his "Government's Declaration,"
first delivered in May of the preceding year,
through a "meet the people" campaign. He
met with members of religious communi-
ties, commercial organizations, and labor
unions. The Doctor, separate from the mili-
tary, seeme to be p iecin toge
or the civilian government as the "last best 1. A hope. ground swell of national support
aT3 not greet the military chiefs at the first
aniversary of the revolution. Major Bouterse
was booed by high school stude- nts '1'fie
streets o ramaribo crackled with the
news that a young woman stood up to him
and implored "When will you let us have our
freedom back?" Major Bouterse and his
allies in the military were sailing on unsettled
waters.
It is possible that the military anticipated a
glum reception for just prior to the celebra-
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furiname,
;, ? ime Minister Arron, who had
r,;on since late 1980. was
_ni. Deliberations followed
;i tarv high command and
._rship of Arron's old Creole
the East Indian block The
suggest that the military
!,s support and that it was
parties through their ma-
n. who could deliver it. The
?,urrrd from making a com-
bservers claim. would link
,)up or force them to declare
Box and
Coup Three
the military command made a
.e to the left and released from
?ts Sital. Mijnals and a compa-
who were involved in the alleged
of August Public respect for law
.v low. On his release. the excited
;mounced that the socialist re-
%. ould advance without compro-
ently if need be. Another a e of
swept Paramaribo and spectres of
- and radical olitics nicked many.
;h y placed official. dissappointed
outburst claimed. "The careful
Chin A Sen over the past year
rnming up support for his 'Govern-
s Declaration') was destroyed by that
outburst"
he three released NCOs were returned
t uir positions in the army. ewspaper
T 5tographs showed them in comradely
i!:rver with their ex-jailors. Press confer-
??:,ces were quickly organized and Major
:$~)uterse tried to calm the citizenry. "The
'ratter is in hand and it is business as usual."
this was not comforting news. Highly placed
Observers involved in the administration of
;ustice explained that the release was for
tactical reasons only. With growing dissen-
ticn among groups impatient with the time
table of the revolution and opposed to the
course of events. the release ot bital and
Mijnals was a sop less they become martyrs.
In the space of one month a mr itary
high command had released Arron, personi-
tion of the old guard and its politics; and
W ewed its contract with Sital and Mijnals.
itary vanguards of the "radical" left re-
volution. The civilian government seemed
to be holding firm in support of President
Chin A Sen's Government Declaration of
May 1980. Like the military, they too agree
that the old patronage structure which
flourished under parliamenary democracy
was unacce
rablo
p
The military-civilian center had its dancing
partners strung out far to the left and right. In
the grossest of terms the conservatives
included the police, still smarting from the
embarrassment of the coup: large labor
unions tied to the civil service and big
business: religious organizations; the busi-
ness and commercial community; and the
remnants of the old ethnic-based political
parties. The "far left" numbered the released
seIgeantsan eir o owersamon certain
groups in e military, a radical spin off of a
former a 'st party, an support ers in one
large a or union. Thep ic, growing in-
They held doggedly to the
belief that all problems can
be overcome if the right
orders are given.
creasingly outspoken, aligned publicly with
no one.
riname's third alleged counter-coup oc-
red in mid-March and ended in the
death of one soldier and the serious wound-
ing o anoer. The accused organizer was a
sergeant and a member of the original coup
commando unit Counter-coup three was
denounced by the military leadership as
1. rightest ' Fleshing out the spare details
o -ffe-re in the censored press, the rumor mill
drew its own conclusions. "The leader was
self-seeking and wanted to sieze power for
himself." "He was supported by the local
business community.-' It was an attempt by
the Chinese merchant community ...." One
explanation proposed that it was not a
counter-coup at all. Rather, the alleged leader
of the alleged coup was trafficking in nar-
cotics, did not pay his bills on time, and was
killed by angry dope merchants. The press
did not provide clarification. Disbarred from
jounalistic investigation, they fed the public
what they were fed.
It is as difficult now as it has been over the
past year to identify "who is in control."
Power has fragmented within and between
the military and civilian governments. The
situation in April 1981 was tense as the
military realized that its position had been
weakened. Mused one official, "We are on
the brink of a power vacuum, and if those
boys [the army[ are pushed too far they may
come out shooting."
The public is cautious and watching like
"cats looking from the trees.' Military lead-
ership seems to have underestimated the
talent and flexibility of its countrymen and
women. Surinamers are hard to fool and
behind their friendliness, generosity, and
military, all young and many from the
working and lower classes, who miscalcu-
lated the values of the bulk of the population.
"They don't respect people," decried a
middle age woman. The ultimate Suri-
namese denunciation. Another person, a
hardline supporter of an old political party,
said "Look, they have done some good
things; people go to work on time; I can
always find a civil servant at his desk; welfare
payments come on time now and corruption
is under control. So why don't they go back
to the barracks now?"
Patience with the situation has been all
but lost by everyone regardless of their
position. Many have suggested that a greater
freedom of public criticism would have lead
to more restraint by the military with res
to the v e r y excesses a rove the puolrc
away tom em. By mu ing the press, the
so lets i no more than assure that the
public would distrust them.
What Next?
Suriname is a small scale society. Nearly 70
percent of the population lives in and around
densely packed Paramaribo. "If the day
"
one can
comes, will the soldiers shoot?
legitimately ask. A usual reply is "Do you
think one will shoot the others uncle or
brother?" Most people realize the damage
that would be done to the fabric of Sur
ti'4
urst nce and bloodshed. Since the
980 coup less than ten people have lost
their lives; there have been no official exe.
cutions. Civil war is widely dismissed as
impossible. Nevertheless, serious problems
remain. A constitutional government was
overthrown. Admittedly, the political system
was held together with patronage, cro-
nyism, and a "buddy system" (vriendjes
politiek) designed to redistribute wealth and
prestige up and down the hierarchy and
across networks of alliances. However, the
old regime provided the citizenry with a
framework of law and guarantees.
There is a "state of emergency' in Suri-
n~a ne? Although there are no exact re-
strictions on mass media the country's
strong tradition of an uncensored press has
suffered. Various military and, later, civilian
authorities have taken it upon themselve
instruct editors not to publish anything
concernin the ovemment without first
c ecking with t em. The mandate is as
vague as it is all encompassing. Foreign
jounalists have been intimidated, jailed, and
forced to leave the country. Suriname edi-
tors have been arrested, detained, and, on
several occasions, beaten.
By mid-1980 well documented cases of
arbitrary arrest; indefinite detention; denial
discipline and a strong sense of what is ported. A pattern is hard to establish; some
"fair." Strangely enough it was the new cases involve persons thought guilty of
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three alleged counter-coups, and politicians
accused of corruption. Some cases were
simply the personal vendettas of individual
soldiers.
The most controversial decree, and the
one that drew the most adverse international
attention called for the creation of a "Special
Tribunal" to deal with the allegedly corrupt
practices of the pre-coup government. Justi-
fication was that such offenses were not
covered adequately by conventional crimi-
nal law. However, the definitions of the
offenses are objectionable on the grounds
of their vagueness and retroactivity. For
example. the decree which established the
Tribunal also defines corruption as behavior
or activitywhich violates "generally accepted
ethical and moral norms of society. whether
or not made punishable in the Criminal
Code or any other law" (Decreet B-9).
Punishments provided tend to be different
from and more serious than those allowed
by ordinary law. Procedural matters, such as
organizing council, were made difficult for
the defense; while unlimited detention ex-
crimes. individuals involved in the
tensions ("...in the interests of public or-
der...") could be ordered by the prosecutor.
However, there is a tenden in recent
develop nents, especially among those ci-
cans concerne wTVi t the a minis ra on o
vt
bus ce o rees a is rue law an air
treatment. Most say this feeling always was
present but that in 1980 the civilians were at
too much of a disadvantage to do anything.
Gross abuses are slowly becoming a matter
of the past. These positive short term gains
are important, although well informed ob-
servers caution that in spite of an improving
situation, they are concerned with the ab-
sence of legal or other guarantees to secure
their victories and guard against future
excesses.
"Suriname is not El Salvador' stated a
current cabinet minister and indeed it is not.
There is no gunfire on the streets nor civil
war in the countryside. Death squads do not
carry off and assassinate opposition fac-
tions. In many ways the ideological battle-
lines have not et ch talized in Suriname
an one can never be too sure who is
ig ing who. Nevertheless, ere is the
widespread fear that the Uzi may be the one
abiding symbol that characterizes this trou-
bled era. A short lived stage play in Para-
maribo pose a ques ion a one u
have a Uzi (brother zi can you eve et
rid of him?
Suriname suffers from a paralysis of
leadership. The sergean ave gra a
Uge' r byte tail and are hanging on for dear
life. The position of the civilian government
is at best precarious. u is uncertainty has
not een diminishe by the reports of three
counter-coups. Surinamers have seen bad
times before and it has not lessened their
patriotism. They realize that there will be no
easy answers this time either.
0
Gary Brana-Shute teaches anthropolog;T AT
Florida International University. His co-edited
book Crime and Punishment in the Caribbean
has recently been published by University of
Florida Presses. He is also the author of on The
Comer: Male Social Life in a Paramaribo Creole
Neighborhood published by van Gorcum of the
Netherlands.
PAPA Gives Birth
Under the auspices of the
Department of Cultural Affairs of
the Organization of American
States, the first meeting of editors
of periodicals dedicated to Latin
America and the Caribbean was
held in October at the OAS
Headquarters in Washington. As
a result of the meeting an organi-
zation provisionally named the
Panamerican Periodical Associa-
tion (PAPA) was formed.
The goals of PAPA are twofold:
On the one hand, there are the
general ends of creating mutual
understanding among the Ameri-
cas; articulating the culture and
ideals of Latin America and the
Caribbean: promoting intellectual
and scholarly research about and
for the Americas; advocating
freedom of expression in the
articulation and publication of
ideas about the area; and, devel-
oping the institutional and finan-
cial support for the articulation,
development, and publication of
such ideas.
On the other hand, there are
specific goals of furthering the
ends of each of the member publi-
cations; fostering editorial excel-
lence in the dissemination of their
ideas; improving the develop-
ment, readability, and placement
of editorial manuscripts and
materials: bettering the design
and presentation of these mate-
rials; facilitating their technical
reproduction; locating, soliciting,
and developing proper publics
for them; promoting knowledge
of their availability: serving these
ends by establishing such mech-
anisms as an editorial clearing
house; cooperative relationships
concerning mailing, distribution,
and indexing; syndication ser-
vices, etc.
Officers of the organization for
the first year of activity are: Barry
B. Levine, editor of the Caribbean
Review, president: Dolores
Moyano Martin, editor of the
Handbook of Latin American
Studies, and Sabi Sosnowsky.
editor of Hispamerica, vice-
presidents; Celso Rodriguez,
assistant editor of the Inter-
American Review of Biblio-
graphy, secretary-treasurer.
Alfredo A. Roggiano, editor of
Revista Ibero-americana, and
John P Harrison, editor of the
Journal of Inter-American Stud-
ies and World Affairs, advisors.
Further information may be
obtained by writing Barry B.
Levine, Caribbean Review, Flor-
ida International University,
Miami, FL 33199.
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