THE ROLE OF PFIAB IN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000300350032-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2007
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: October 28, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
October 28, 1982
THE ROLE OF PFIAB IN AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE
"There is hereby established within the White House
Office, Executive Office of the President, the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board." So reads Executive
Order 12331, signed by President Reagan on October 20th,
1981, reestablishing an institution which had served five
Presidents from Eisenhower to Ford.
The four-year hiatus brought about by President Carter's
decision to terminate the Board in 1977 has left a gap in
the Intelligence Community's awareness and understanding of
what the PFIAB is and what it does. Hopefully, today I can
refresh the memories of those who previously knew of PFIAB,
as well as provide an introduction to those not as familiar
with its history.
The genesis of PFIAB goes back to the first Eisenhower
Administration. There were three main factors which contributed
to the first Board's creation. First, in 1954, President
Eisenhower requested a study of America's technological
capabilities to meet its future problems. In particular,
the President was concerned with the possibility of a surprise
attack by the Soviet Union on the United States. A group
called the Technological Capabilities Panel, or TCP, was
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established and chaired by Dr. James Killian, President of
MIT. The primary goal of the Panel was to investigate ways
of avoiding surprise attack, and to accomplish that goal,
they initiated a searching review of weapons and intelligence
technology.
The TCP, staffed by over 40 scientists and engineers,
after several months of work, presented its report to the
President at a meeting of the National Security Council.
A subcommittee of the TCP for intelligence issues, headed
by Edwin Land of Polaroid, was responsible for one of the
major sections of that report. In part, they stated, in
words that are as true today as they were then;
"We must find ways to increase the number
of hard facts upon which our intelligence
estimates are based, to provide better
strategic warning, to minimize surprise
on the kind of attack and to reduce the
danger of gross overestimation or
gross underestimation of the threat."
Among the proposals for improvement made by the TCP's
Intelligence Subcommittee was the concept of the U-2 system.
The members had learned of the proposed airplane, which, at
the time, was the victim of Air Force bureaucratic indifference.
They quickly saw the potential for intelligence collection,
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especially when combined with revolutionary photographic
abilities envisioned and conceived by Edwin Land. The
subsequent contributions of the U-2 to U.S. intelligence need
no elaboration for this audience.
The contributions made by the TCP made a great impression
on Eisenhower who described its work as "splendid" and
"outstanding". The Panel demonstrated to him the advantage
of having a group of capable, objective people, with no
constituencies to protect within the government, to review
issues relating to national security.
The second major factor which contributed to the Board's
inception was the establishment in 1955 of a government
commission chaired by former President Herbert Hoover to
review the operations of the Executive Branch of Government.
Of the several task forces created by the Hoover
Commission to carry out its mission, one was chaired by
retired General Mark Clark and was requested to study and
recommend changes in U.S. intelligence operations.
The Clark Task Force found that while there was "no
abuse of power by the CIA or other intelligence agencies,"
there were inadequacies and weaknesses. The Task Force
submitted recommendations to the Hoover Commission, one of
which was that the President should create a "small, permanent,
bi-partisan commission composed of members of both Houses of
Congress and other public-spirited citizens." This commission
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would make periodic surveys of the organization, functions,
policies and results of the government agencies handling
foreign intelligence operations.
The full Hoover Commission agreed with the Task Force's
basic premise of creating a review group, but disagreed with
the proposed structure. In the Commission's view, mixed
Congressional and citizens committees were useful only when
investigating specific problems. There was also a question
of how well a President could work with a committee containing
Members of Congress. Therefore, the Hoover Commission Report
of 1955 recommended that the President appoint "A committee
of experienced private citizens, who shall have the
responsibilities to examine and report to him periodically
on the work of government foreign intelligence activities."
But the Hoover Commission further recommended that the
Congress should consider establishing a Joint Committee on
Foreign Intelligence, along the lines of the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy.
Which brings us around to the third major element involved
in the creation of the PFIAB. On the heels of the Hoover
Commission Report, there were steps afoot in Congress to
establish an intelligence oversight committee. The prospect
of a Congressional committee making formal investigations
into intelligence activities was not at all appealing to
President Eisenhower, and he was not the only one unhappy
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with the idea: then-DCI Allen Dulles was said to be aghast
at the thought of a Congressional committee poking into his
business.
Aware of the value of outside advice, armed with a formal
recommendation from the Hoover Commission and anxious to
preclude Congressional involvement in intelligence activities,
President Eisenhower announced on January 13, 1956, that he
was creating a new group to be first known as the Board of
Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, and in a few
years to be rechristened the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. In a stroke, the President had institutionalized
the kind of advice he had received from the Technological
Capabilities Panel and he had protected himself from Congress.
Members of this new Board were to be appointed "from
among persons of ability, experience and knowledge of matters
relating to the national defense." Eisenhower named eight
people to the Board, with James Killian appointed Chairman.
The President was genuinely concerned with the weaknesses
in the intelligence system, and he saw the Board as a means
to bring about improvements. An early message captures the
flavor of Eisenhower's interest:
"While the review by your group would be
concerned with all Goverment foreign
intelligence activities, I would expect
particular detailed attention to be
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concentrated on the work of the Central
Intelligence Agency and those intelligence
elements of key importance in other depart-
ments and agencies. I am particularly
anxious to obtain your views as to the
overall progress that is being made, the
quality of training and personnel, security,
progress in research, effectiveness of specific
projects and the handling of funds, and general
competence in carrying out assigned intelligence
tasks."
President Kennedy allowed the Board to remain inactive
for the first four months of his new Administration, in fact
believing candidly that it was a "bureaucratic obstruction
to a vigorous, activist foreign policy."
Then, in April of 1961, came the Bay of Pigs debacle, a
severe wound to the young President and his young Administration.
Soon after the failed invasion, Kennedy summoned Clark
Clifford to the Oval Office. In a recent conversation,
Clifford recalled that he had never seen Kennedy look so blue,
so dejected. After bidding Clifford to sit down, the President
got right to the point: Kennedy said, "I made an erroneous
decision, based on mistaken facts, due to faulty intelligence."
Pausing for a moment, the President looked at Clifford and
said, "I think I could not survive another disaster like this."
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Distressed over the breakdown of the system in the Bay
of Pigs incident, President Kennedy decided to reconstitute
the Board which he had only so recently eschewed as an
obstruction.
Kennedy christened the old Eisenhower Board with its
present name, and two years later, when Killian resigned for
health reasons, Kennedy named Clark Clifford as Chairman.
In the aftermath of such a major debacle, Kennedy felt
there was a crying need for an overall investigation of this
country's foreign intelligence activities. He wanted
suggestions for improving and reforming the Intelligence
Community. The PFIAB was to be one of his main instruments
for change, and Kennedy made it known that anything the Board
wanted, they should have. This was as a result of the Board's
experiencing problems in getting information it needed due to
CIA recalcitrance.
PFIAB undertook a number of activities during Kennedy's
tenure. Over 53 recommendations were forwarded to him on
such issues as the reorganization of defense intelligence,
development of new photographic reconnaissance capabilities,
the application of science and technology to intelligence,
and tighter policy coordination for covert action programs.
But in Clark Clifford's opinion, PFIAB's greatest impact was
not so much in its specific recommendations, but in serving
notice to the Intelligence Community that the President
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would be told on a regular basis just exactly what was going
on in intelligence. As a result, a greater effort was made,
more thought was given to various programs, and the whole
intelligence product was improved.
When Lyndon Johnson became President he decided to keep
the PFIAB intact and functioning with its same membership.
The Johnson Board submitted 16 composite recommendations
ranging from problems of intelligence collection and analysis
in Southeast Asia, management of satellite reconnaissance
systems, and the development of sophisticated data storage
and retrieval systems.
Then another election and another President. Half the
members of Nixon's first PFIAB had served previously on
Eisenhower - Kennedy - Johnson Boards, reflecting the value
which was placed on continuity and bipartisanship. Maxwell
Taylor served as Chairman until 1970 when he was replaced by
Admiral George Anderson, Former Chief of Naval Operations.
One of the most important developments in the Nixon era
was a request by the President for the Board to make an
annual assessment of the Soviet and Chinese strategic threats.
Mark this request, because it was to have a profound effect
on PFIAB at a later date.
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Nixon's request was precipitated by the debate then
underway over the proposed deployment of the Safeguard Anti-
Ballistic Missile System. PFIAB commenced an exhaustive
study of the strategic situation, utilizing all the raw data
available within the Intelligence Community, and delivered
its report to the President in late 1969.
On several occasions, at Nixon's direction, the Board
served as an ad hoc investigative unit for important issues,
including a study of the use of Cambodian seaports to supply
North Vietnam, a review of the controversy surrounding Chile,
and a report describing how to maintain a Naval capability
second to none.
When Gerald Ford became President, he initially retained
the Board as it existed at the time of President Nixon's
resignation. But, following Watergate, the Intelligence
Community began its own long nightmare of press exposes,
committees, hearings and commissions to deal with allegations
of misbehavior and abuse of power.
Therefore, President Ford created a new group, a three-man
Intelligence Oversight Board (IOB) whose job it would be to
review intelligence issues for questions of legality and
propriety. They would make sure that further misbehavior
would be brought to the President's attention.
In a further effort to strengthen U.S. intelligence,
President Ford announced on March 9, 1976, that he was
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expanding the membership of PFIAB to 16 people and named
Board member Leo Cherne as Chairman. Mr. Cherne was also
appointed to be a member of the IOB, Chaired by Ambassador
Robert Murphy.
In announcing the changes to the PFIAB, President Ford
"By strengthening the Board as I have done
today, and by giving the Board my full
personal support, I fully anticipate that
the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board will
continue its indispensable role in advising
me on the effectiveness of our foreign
intelligence efforts."
Those were not just idle words. In a dramatic illustration
of the President's valuation of PFIAB, he ordered his staff
to immediately notify the Board Chairman whenever there were
important developments or emergencies related to intelligence.
I think it's worth noting that one of the people named
to the expanded Board was William Casey. Bill Casey is the
first DCI who was previously a member of the PFIAB. His
tenure on the Board was a case study in the kinds of
contributions that PFIAB members make. He joined the Board
at a time when it had become active in focusing increased
attention on the need for improved economic intelligence.
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Bill picked up those issues and helped to carry them to a new
level of importance within the Intelligence Community. The
result of his work did, in fact, codify all the main thrusts
required for sharply improved and better structured economic
intelligence. One of the immediate outgrowths of those efforts
was the establishment of a sub-Cabinet mechanism, the Economic
Policy Board chaired by Secretary of the Treasury Bill Simon,
to provide regular and continuing exchanges between economic
intelligence producers and users.
PFIAB has had some interesting and remarkable achievements
in each of the Administrations with which it has been
associated. But it was during the Ford Administration that
the Board became involved in what was perhaps the most
contentious issue in its twenty-year history. That issue was
the proposed competitive analysis for national estimates,
better known as the A Team - B Team Study.
As I've noted, at the request of the President, PFIAB
had been making annual assessments of the Soviet threat since
1969. Over the years, the Board had been troubled at the
degree of divergence between its own analysis and that which
was contained in the National Intelligence Estimate. The
Board was concerned that in order to produce the NIE,
differences were blurred to achieve a consensus. This resulted
in a "euphoric expectation" of Soviet behavior not warranted
by the facts. The PFIAB agreed that the short-term estimates
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-- for one year or two years -- were supported by the facts,
but for the longer term, the NIE results were overly reassuring.
To redress those weaknesses, the Board pressed for several
years for improvements and corrections in the estimates
process. Finally in August, 1975, PFIAB Chairman George
Anderson wrote a letter to President Ford proposing that Ford
direct the National Security Council to authorize a "competitive
analysis" of the intelligence on Soviet intentions and
capabilities. The idea was to establish a separate team of
analysts, expose them to the same data and information that
CIA analysts received, and then allow them to reach their own
conclusions.
Then-DCI William Colby strongly resisted the PFIAB
suggestion, arguing that reformed procedures for drafting
NIEs at the Agency would answer the Board's concerns. At the
time, President Ford agreed with the DCI. PFIAB then suggested
an alternative: choose two or three issues and perform a ten-
year retroactive review to see how accurate previous estimates
had been. That proposal was agreed to, and the Agency
commissioned the requisite study. The results were most
disturbing. The track record study was so condemnatory of
the performance of the Community over a period of ten years
on the three issues which had been selected, that clearly
something had to be done.
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The Board renewed its call for a competitive analysis in
April of 1976, when George Bush was serving as DCI. Faced
with the results of the track record study, Bush agreed with
PFIAB that a competitive analysis should be performed.
Once their idea had been accepted, the Board withdrew
and allowed the CIA to manage the entire process, including
the selection of outside analysts. The regular NIE drafting
process was already underway, and the Intelligence Community
analysts working on the NIE became known as the "A Team."
The competing group of outsiders was dubbed "B Team." It
was composed of the following: Professor Richard Pipes of
Harvard, who headed the group; General Daniel Graham, former
Director, DIA; General John Vogt, former Director of the
Joint Staff; William Van Cleave, former SALT Delegation
member; Thomas Wolfe, RAND Corporation analyst; General
Jasper Welch, USAF; Paul Wolfowitz of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency; Ambassador Seymour Weiss of the State
Department; and Paul Nitze, a veteran of government
service. This distinguished group produced a very strong
critique of the failures of U.S. intelligence to predict and
analyze the scope of the Soviet strategic developments.
When both Teams had completed their reports, they appeared
before PFIAB to argue their respective positions. Through
that interaction, it became clear that the A Team had given
certain factors inadequate weight. The B Team clearly
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demonstrated that the Intelligence Community had failed to
predict the scope of Soviet strategic deployments in the
1960s and early 1970s. Many of the B Team's views were
subsequently reflected in the NIEs which were produced after
the debate.
The A Team - B Team experiment was a major accomplishment
for the PFIAB. It is, therefore, most ironic that the issue
which gave the Board one of its greatest successes also sowed
the seeds for its own destruction.
Now, it is important to remember the timing: while the
A Team - B Team debate was underway, we were in the middle
of the 1976 Presidential election which resulted in a new
Administration taking office. The new NIE, which incorporated
many of the conclusions drawn by the B Team, was presented to
the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) for review in
late December. Unfortunately, within a few days, information
about the NIE and the A Team - B Team story leaked to the
press. The leak, the source of which was never uncovered,
provoked a great deal of publicity, some of it very unfavorable,
about the recent competitive analysis.
Within the new Carter Administration, there were several
forces hostile to the Board, and the publicity PFIAB received
from the estimates story only served to aggravate things.
Against arguments from the Board, as well as from other
supporters within the Administration, President Carter decided
to terminate PFIAB.
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PFIAB was gone, but not forgotten. During the Carter
Administration, an amendment was introduced in the Senate by
Malcolm Wallop, which would have created an Intelligence
Advisory Board composed of members appointed by the President
and the Congress. Additionally, the Association of Former
Intelligence officers adopted a resolution at their 1980
convention calling on the President to reestablish PFIAB.
It's interesting to note that even after abolishing
PFIAB, President Carter, on at least one occasion, felt
compelled to employ a PFIAB-like mechanism for intelligence
review. With respect to the Soviet brigade in Cuba, Mr.
Carter convened a group of 18 or 20 people for a day to
evaluate the situation, a role which PFIAB could have assumed
had it still been in existence.
A key milestone in the rebirth of PFIAB was the 1980
Republican Party Platform, drafted at the National Convention,
which included a plank pledging to "reestablish the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, abolished by the Carter
Administration, as a permanent, non-partisan body of
distinguished Americans to perform a constant audit of national
intelligence research and performance."
On assuming the Presidency, Ronald Reagan redeemed that
pledge, announcing almost exactly one year ago today the
restoration of PFIAB.
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I have provided this historical overview in order to give
you some understanding about the various contexts in which
PFIAB has operated. But explaining all those events still
does not really address the question of why PFIAB exists.
Why, with all of the committees, panels, groups and boards
within the Intelligence Community, does there need to be a PFIAB?
The short answer is because the Board has value -- value
first and foremost to the President. One President called it
the most important Board in Washington. And as a result of
serving the President, there is value to the Intelligence
Community and value to the public.
The Board exists because Presidents have found that they
need a continuing source of outside advice on foreign
intelligence which is provided to them by men and women of
experience and integrity in whom they can have complete trust.
PFIAB is the President's Board, serving solely at his
discretion. It is not involved in the day-to-day operations
of intelligence, nor is it immersed in the conflicts,
differences and rivalries which are an inescapable by-product
of any huge organization.
The Board members, many of whom were former intelligence
consumers in their own careers, are free to make independent
judgments as to whether the intelligence needs of the President
are being served.
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Since the PFIAB is not confronted with the relentless
operating pressures facing the regular intelligence bureaucracy,
it has the time to consider broader questions and issues. In
effect, the Board has the opportunity to "see the forest and
the trees."
PFIAB's greatest strength lies in the knowledge,
capabilities, and judgment of its membership. The Executive
Order reestablishing the Board calls for members to be
appointed "from among trustworthy and distinguished citizens
outside the Government who are qualified on the basis of
achievement, experience and independence." Indeed, the names
of PFIAB members constitute a veritable "Who's Who" in American
government, business and academia. Besides those whose names
have already been mentioned, other PFIAB members, past and
present, include Robert Lovett, Joseph Kennedy, Nelson
Rockefeller, George Shultz, Edward Teller, James Doolittle,
Gordon Gray, Edward Bennett Williams, William Baker, Clare
Boothe Luce, Frank Borman, and John Connally.
However, to be frank, in the past the Intelligence
Community, in general, and the DCI, in particular, have
viewed the PFIAB with some trepidation. Perhaps it's best
expressed as a resentment of having someone looking over
your shoulder. Moreover, by the very fact of its existence,
the Board imposes an enormous discipline on the Intelligence
Community. But I don't view this situation as harmful.
PFIAB can be likened to a doctor's medicine: You don't have
to like the taste to know that it's doing you some good.
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Bill Casey made some very appropriate remarks in one of
his first speeches as DCI:
.....the time has come to recognize that
the Intelligence Community has no monoply
on truth, on insight, on initiative in
foreseeing what will be relevant to policy.
In serving the President, the Board also serves the
Community. If the President, because of PFIAB's reports and
recommendations, is more confident about the Intelligence
Community, then the Community and their product will have a
higher value in the councils of government.
In general, the CIA and other components of our intelligence
apparatus have performed a magnificent job in effectively
serving the needs of our leaders and policymakers. But from
time to time, there have been instances where, because of its
expertise and full access to information, the Board has been
able to make recommendations to the President that were not
forthcoming from the Intelligence Community. Usually the
effect of those recommendations has been to strengthen and
improve this nation's intelligence capabilities.
Finally, the Board has value to the public at large by
providing reassurance that there is a group of experienced,
independent outsiders reviewing the intelligence process.
One of the key elements in our system of government, the one
we have all learned in our grade school civics classes, is the
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idea of checks and balances. By necessity, intelligence
work is exempt from the traditional mechanisms by which we
limit power in this country. But those exigencies have not
placed intelligence so far outside normal channels that no
controls are possible. PFIAB fills the need as one of the
checks by reviewing intelligence activities and keeping the
President informed.
For all of these reasons, Presidents, past and present,
have valued the PFIAB. Each President has viewed the Board
differently and utilized it in different ways. The Board has
served at the very least to give the President an opportunity
to ask for another opinion, to discuss issues that concern
him with people willing to tell a President of the United
States things that others might not be able or not want to
say. There is no substitution for such advice.
Over the years PFIAB has not sought attention or publicity
for its activities. Most public mention has concerned the
bare facts of executive orders establishing the various Boards
and announcements of the memberships. Beyond the knowledge
that the Board exists, there has thus been little information
about PFIAB's goals, accomplishments and effects of its
advice. I would like to lift the curtain.
In the abstract, PFIAB's goals are as follows:
1. To identify deficiencies in collection, analysis
and reporting of intelligence.
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2. To eliminate duplication and waste.
3. To insure that major programs are responsive to
clearly perceived needs.
4. To develop up-to-date technological expertise.
5. To examine allegations of intelligence failures
or major breaches in U.S. intelligence security.
When advice to the President has been rendered and
accepted, its effects have at times been:
1. To influence the composition of the intelligence
community.
2. To improve the development of major intelligence
3. To determine the degree of emphasis given to
In its twenty-plus year history, PFIAB has made over 200
specific recommendations to Presidents concerning almost
every aspect of U.S. intelligence. One would be hard-pressed
to think of a major issue in that time that at some point
had not received the Board's imprint.
To give you an idea of some of the specific PFIAB
accomplishments other than those previously discussed, I
would like to review a few of the more notable cases the
Board has dealt with.
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Despite its many successes, PFIAB, like any other
organization, has its shortcomings and has had its share of
critics. Perhaps many of you in the audience before today
were more familiar with the criticisms than with the positive
accomplishments.
As I have mentioned, many of the past DCIs have not been
happy with the Board. Until the advent of Congressional
oversight committees, we were viewed as a lesser of two evils.
Those attitudes undoubtedly had an impact on how the rest of
the Community saw the Board.
Outside critics have accused the Board of being an
ineffective watchdog, a role to which the Board never aspired
and a role which it was never intended to fulfill. The IOB
has been responsible for watchdogging the Community since its
inception in 1976.
The Board has also been criticized for being composed of
part-timers who are not intelligence experts or specialists.
But what that particular criticism calls a weakness is, in
fact, one of PFIAB's great strengths. As I have mentioned,
the Board is composed of people outside the government with
no stake in the system other than to serve the President. If
the Board was full-time or had closer connection with the
Intelligence Community, that would only compromise the
objectivity necessary to the performance of its role. And as
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far as the question of expertise is concerned, just try to
argue about weapons systems with Dr. John Foster, or
telecommunications with Dr. William Baker, or law with Leon
Jaworski, Esquire!
Admittedly, given that the positions are part-time and
filled with people who are very busy with their own lives,
the Board will only be as effective as the time and effort
that the members put into it. But based on the past record
of success, more than sufficient effort has been devoted to
the Board's work.
Four years is a very long time. A great deal of the
institutional memory and continuity of PFIAB was irreparably
lost when the Board was abolished. Because of the time gap,
this Board has had a lot of obstacles to overcome in making
up lost ground--everything from comparatively minor problems
such as regaining our secure conference room to important ones
such as reearning our spurs of credibility with members of
the Intelligence Community.
As has been the case with previous PFIABs, we are charged,
in the words of the Reagan Executive Order, with assessing
"the quality, quantity, and adequacy of intelligence collection,
of analysis and estimates, of counterintelligence, and other
intelligence activities."
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To carry out that mission, we have assembled the largest
membership in the Board's history. Currently, PFIAB has 19
members and is broken down into six functional task forces.
They are: Analytical and Political; Counterintelligence,
Human and Covert; Economic and Natural Resources; Organization,
Management and Personnel; Strategic and Military; and Science,
Technology and Communications. Topics for consideration are
assigned to these task forces for background work and then
their reports are submitted to the full Board.
PFIAB has a very small staff made up of four professionals
and two support personnel with offices in the Old Executive
Office Building. The staff serves to provide research and
other back up to the task forces and full Board, as well as
handling various administrative tasks. In addition, we are
able to hire outside consultants as the needs arise.
The issues we deal with can be raised by the President,
of course, individual Board members and the staff, the National
Security Advisor, and also by the DCI and others from within
the Intelligence Community.
We employ a variety of means to deal with the issues
that are raised. There are meetings with intelligence
officials and other senior government officers, substantive
briefings from experts, both inside and outside the Community;
visits to installations; "fact-finding" trips, both at home
and abroad; and, of course, employment of the considerable
skills, backgrounds and knowledge possessed by our members.
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The Board makes a semi-annual report to the President,
as required by Executive Order, dealing with the various
issues we have had under consideration. In addition, we
report periodically on issues of special concern.
President Reagan has been most interested in our work,
and our record of meetings with him would bear that out. The
full Board has met with him twice in the past 10 months and
the Vice-Chairman and myself have met with the President on
several occasions.
Event though we have only been back in business for a
short time, this Board has been actively involved in a number
of topics.
I strongly believe that the role of intelligence has
become more important today than ever before. The United
States faces a number of challenges to its security and well-
being, from the financial problems of Third World economies
to the hard target kill capabilities of Soviet reentry
vehicles. As the challenges have grown and as the dangers
have proliferated, the margins for error which we enjoyed in
the past have been concomitantly reduced. How well the U.S.
addresses these challenges and dangers will depend in large
part on the strength and vitality of our intelligence
capabilities.
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Since President Reagan has taken office, he has supported
and worked for a number of measures to upgrade and improve
American intelligence, including the passage of "Gray-mail"
legislation, the "identities law" and the recent Foreign
Missions Act. I count the reestablishment of a strong,
capable Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as another one of
the important steps the President has taken to vitalize
America's intelligence efforts.
I'm proud of the accomplishments that PFIAB has achieved
in the past, and I'm confident that we can make a valuable
contribution in the future.
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