MBFR OPTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000400510003-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 18, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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-August 18, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE
Subject: MBFR Options
SYSTEM II
91005
Attached for NSC consideration. is a paper on MBFR
Options which has been developed by the IG on NATO
Conventional Forces and Arms Control. An early NSC
meeting on this subject is requested.
bqr Charles Hill
"MBFR Options"
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MBFR Options
Issue for Decision
NATO is now faced with the question of how to respond
formally to the latest Eastern- proposal which moves in prin-
ciple toward US requirements on verification measures. The US
needs to decide whether or not this response should be a move
in the multilateral forum on data that incorporates in some
fashion the USG position on MBFR approved by the President as a
result of the NSC meeting of May 18. Two particular consider-
ations :ire involved in this decision: (a) how to extract
further .Soviet concessions on verification; and (b) how to deal
with Allied, especially FRG, pressures to be forthcoming in
Vienna for INF reasons.
A trilateral meeting with the UK and FRG to discuss these
issues is scheduled for. September 13, and a US position is
required before then if we are to take the lead in shaping
NATO's response.
Recent Developments
- On May 18, the NSC considered whether the US should change
its long-term position that, prior to signature of an MBFR
treaty and any subsequent troop reductions in Central Europe,
both sides in-the NATO - Warsaw Pact talks in-Vienna on.'mutual
and balanced force reductions (MBFR) must reach agreement on
the number of Eastern military personnel in the reduction area
in light of Soviet hints of willingness to accept effective
verification measures.
On the basis of that NSC meeting, the President authorized
a bilateral probe to determine whether genuine and timely
progress was possible in the MBFR negotiations on the basis of
a trade-off between Western willingness to postpone data
agreement and Soviet willingness to agree to verifiable
reductions to parity. Accordingly, we told the Soviets in
mid-June that there is flexibility in the US position on data
agreement prior to reductions if the East is willing to accept
the entire package for verification which the West has
proposed, large asymmetrical reductions to parity and data
agreement at some stage.
Since then, there have been a number of significant
developments:
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Soviet reply: In a mid-July response to our probe, the
Soviets acknowledged that the US appeared interested in
overcoming the data impasse in Vienna, but suggested that
the US preconditions would only prolong the deadlock. They
also, however, indicated willingness to-consider verifi-
cation measures beyond those in the new Eastern treaty,
provided they did not become an end in themselves.
In light of these mixed.results, we will continue
bilaterally to seek to pocket any concessions and move the
Soviet position on verification still closer to our own.
New Eastern Proposal: On June 23, the Soviet Union and its
Warsaw Pact allies, in a move independent of our bilateral
probe, tabled a now draft agreement covering the third
element of their proposed three-step reduction process:
i.e., US-Soviet mutual example cuts, a freeze, and
reductions to parity. This draft agreement calls for
reductions within three years to common ceilings of 700,000
ground force personnel and 200,000 air force personnel.
This Eastern draft moved closer in principle to the Western
position on verification. The East has now suggested a set
of measures which, although highly conditioned, are more
intrusive than anything the East has been willing to accept
before, including some form of on-site inspection,
permanent exit/entry points with observers, voluntary
invitation of observers towitness reductions of "the most
substantial contingents", a continuing exchange of
information and a permanent joint commission. As they
stand, however, these measures remain inadequate; all but
one of them would not go into effect until after completion
of the reduction process, and many have other significant
shortcomings.
FRG and UK proposals: In mid-July, Chancellor Kohl and the
German Federal Security Council decided to introduce into
NATO, following trilateral discussion, a new data ini-
tiative as a response to the Eastern draft agreement, for
tabling in Vienna during the fall round. They have asked
for US concurrence. The FRG wants a significant Western
initiative in MBFR in order to enhance the
credibility of the US-FRG posture on arms control,
especially given the prospective difficulties over INF
deployments.
Specifically, the FRG proposes that the Allies agree to
postpone data agreement until after initial, verified US -
Soviet reductions. The condition would be that cooperative
verification measures would then be implemented in order to
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verify a non-contractual commitment by all direct
participants (US, UK, FRG, Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada,
USSR, GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia] not to increase their
forces in the reduction area. Until this verification
process yielded agreement on the size of those forces,
there would be no further Western reductions.
The British, although preferring to maintain the strong
current Western data position, have recently responded to
the US--USSR bilateral effort and to building FRG political
pressures by proposing a new scheme of their own which
would also postpone formal data agreement until after
initial US-Soviet reductions, but would use ilestern data
for the purpose of establishing numerically expressed
ceilings on US and Soviet forces remaining after reduc-
tions. The UK proposes larger first step reductions of US
(25,000) and Soviet (60,000) forces on the grounds that
such a reduction would be justified on its own merits,
regardless of the ultimate outcome of follow-on
negotiations.
Congressional interest: The Congress is showing increased.
interest in MBFR because of the high level of political
interest this year, in arms control and the growing
Congressional intent to limit US force levels in Europe in
the absence of greater Allied contributions. The House
Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Intelligence
Committee are planning hearings on MBFR in September.
To the extent that the Vienna negotiations still have L'.
credibility as a realistic alternative to self-imposed
troop cuts, it would be desirable to go into these hearings
with an agreed US position on how we wish to proceed with
MBFR in meeting Congressional concerns.
Timing
The VIestern Allies should determine their response to the
Eastern draft treaty by the opening of the next t4BFR round on
September 29 or very soon thereafter. This would also be the
most favorable moment for tabling a new Western initiative,
should we wish to do so, since it would come at a time of
sharpened public interest in arms control in Europe and
heightened public concerns over INF deployment. It would also
coincide with the tenth anniversary of the MBFR talks.
The key dates would therefore need to be close to the
following:
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Early September - Decision on US position and transmittal
to FRG and UK for their preliminary
reaction prior to-trilateral meeting.
September 13 - Trilateral- meeting scheduled in London.
September 19 - Suggested Western response tabled in NATO.
September 29 - Scheduled opening of fall MBFR round in
Vienna.
October 3 - NATO transmits response to Western negotiators
in Vienna.
October 6 - West responds formally in the MBFR negotiations.
The Options
The IG has identified three basic options for a NATO
response to the Eastern draft treaty:
1) Stick to our position that data agreement is a
prerequisite for initial US-Soviet reductions but modify the
Western position on non-data issues.
2) Postpone data agreement until after treaty signature but
before reductions.
3) Postpone data agreement until after initial US-Soviet
reductions.
k
These options differ principally with respect to the timing
of a data agreement. All options include the same package of
verification measures, which would be agreed before treaty
signature. There are some differences, as noted below in the
description of each option, with respect to when the
verification measures would be implemented.
The options are discussed below.
On,-ion 1: Stick to our position that data agreement is a
nrereauisite for initial US-Soviet reductions but modify the
;;es-ern position on non-data issues. We would press the
East for further improvements in their proposed verification
:easures, perhaps by expanding informal talks on Associated
?:easures, and seek to maintain the focus on the Western draft
treaty of July 82. Under that draft treaty, implementation of
all the verification measures would begin at the same time as
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initial reductions. We could also begin a carefully controlled
discussion of armaments by adopting a flexible formula offered
by the UK at the last Trilateral in Bonn.
Discussion: The current Western position has long been a.
defensible and coherent one. Changing our data position would
.carry the risk of eroding the West's present strong substantive
position on the need for verifiable asymmetric reductions to
parity. MBFR does not at present have high visibility with
European publics; however, concrete signs of progress could
lead to pressure in Western Europe to compromise essential
Western goals in MBFR in order to bring about quick reduc-
tions. If even a partial agreement were actually reached,
pressures on Western defense budgets and force modernization
programs would intensify. Moving forward on issues other than
data, such as armaments, could not be characterized by the
Soviets as "unforthcoming," nor by our Allies as "stonewalling."
On the other hand, holding fast to our current data
position would most likely continue the stalemate on the
central issues, in the absence of private Soviet indications to
the contrary. Potential moves on-minor issues would, by
design, be cosmetic in nature, and would therefore provide no
incentive for the East to move further on verification.
Proceeding with this option would probably mean sacrificing an
opportunity this year to enhance our public posture on
conventional arms control, arid in light of demonstrations of
apparent Eastern flexibility on the central issue of
verification, the Alliance could be faced with a difficult
public relations problem. Some of our Allies could conclude
that the US is not serious about conventional force reductions,
with potentially serio':!s negative repercussions for INF
deployments. Such a clear deadlock in MBFR after 10 years of
negotiations could finally kill any future utility of these
talks toward countering Congressional pressures for unilateral
US reductions. Signs of progress in the negotiations, however,
could encourage both the Congress and European parliaments to
at least maintain current force levels and modernization plans
until a verifiable mutual reductions agreement is reached.
Option 2: Postpone data agreement until after treaty
signature but before reductions. We would maintain the present
Western approach of seeking agreement on staged reductions to
parity, plus a package of on-site verification measures.
However, instead of insisting that both sides reach data
agreement on existing force levels as a prerequisite to signing
an MBFR treaty, we would agree to postpone data agreement until
after treaty signature. In exchange, the East would have to
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agree to implement a package of verification measures
acceptable to the West before there were any reductions.* If
following mutual inspection of each other's force levels, data
agreement were reached, then reductions-in stages, separated by
further verification, would follow.
Discussion: Such a proposal would place the Soviets on the
defensive forcing them to go on the record as opposing
verification rather than clAiming that the West is using
inflated intelligence figures to block progress or seek unfair
advantage. At the same time, it would enable us to hold the
Soviets to account, since no reductions would take place unless
agreement on force levels were forthcoming. This is important
because political and financial constraints would prevent the
re-introduction of forces withdrawn in, any initial U.S./Soviet
reductions phase, regardless of whether -- as is likely --
agreement on force levels was not reached subsequently. It
would also guard against any "slippery slope" pressures from
Allies and Congress either to follow up on initial dataless
reductions with more of the same on the grounds that the
approach used for phase one was "working" in the sense of
bringing down manpower levels, or to move on to stage three
genera]. reductions despite inadequate verification of force
levels. The FRG's problems with filling the ranks of the
Bundeswehr will be a special stimulus for German pressure in
this regard. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that
following initial U.S./Soviet reductions, Allies will be
under considerable political pressure to follow suit and thus
demonstrate equal. commitment to arms control.
On the other hand, while this option postpones data
agreement until after treaty signature, it does n,-)t change the
Western position that agreement on starting force levels is
required before any reductions are taken. For this reason,
this option would be viewed by our Allies, the East, and the
knowledgeable press and public as only a cosmetic modifi-
* The aim would be to confirm the size of current levels
t'-,rough mutual inspection of each other's forces and data
exchange, rather than (as heretofore) through a data discussion
confined to assertions and counter-assertions about numbers.
inspection, through random sampling of Eastern units, would
provide useful additional evidence (though not absolute proof)
to support Western intelligence estimates of Eastern strength.
This evidence could put pressure on the East either to agree to
Western data, or to bring reality into line with its claims by
unilaterally reducing its forces before inspection came into
effect.
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cation. Whatever debating points it might temporarily give
the West, a strong public case could be made that the West
was simply postponing the current data dispute without any
serious attempt to find a way out of that dispute, and in the
process, was also further delaying any possible reductions.
This option would therefore not meet FRG interests in a
significant initiative on data. The East would immediately
dismiss this option, arguing that it is another Western effort,
and a highly intrusive one, to prove its own data. This option
therefore would not provide any potential for gaining further
Eastern concessions or for moving the talks forward. Finally,
if no agreement were reached over the next round or two, the
Soviets could "pocket" Western acceptance in principle of data
postponement.
Option 3: Postpone data agreement until after initial
US-Soviet reductions. The FRG, the UK, and US delegation
proposals are all based upon this approach.
The version proposed by Ambassador Abramowitz would
postpone data agreement until after initial US-Soviet
reductions, provided the Soviets agreed in advance on the
framework for the overall process of reductions to parity.
T'nis process will include all the essential elements of
associated measures, including the format for data exchanges,
which will facilitate effective verification of reductions and
-limitations at each..stage. Building upon the FRG and UK
proposals, the major elements of this process would be the
following:
-- First step: a verified withdrawal of 13,000 US ands '
30,000 Soviet troops;
-- Second step: a verifiable, time limited no-increase
commitment; data agreement to be reached during this period;
-- Third step: verified reductions to parity within
three years.
This permits initial US-Soviet reductions before requiring
agreement on data, a publicly perceptible change in the basic
Western position on data. As such, it would provide a
convincing public demonstration of US and Allied negotiating
flexibility and seriousness, and thus meet FRG interests. By
indicating flexibility on an issue on which the East puts a
premium -- immediate reductions without prior agreed data --
the West is in a position to press for further Eastern
flexibility on issues of importance to the West. At the same
because this option would require that all basic elements
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be worked out in advance of initial US-Soviet reductions, we
would not be "giving away" our data position. Requiring data
agreement before further reductions to parity took place will
also be very difficult for the East to accept.
On the other hand, if stage two did not produce agreement
on force levels following- initial US-Soviet reductions, the US
would have withdrawn 13,000 troops which it might be politic-
ally impossible to return. If the desired public impact were
not achieved by our initial *tabling of the proposal in Vienna,
increased pressure by some of our Allies -- and perhaps our own
Congress -- could lead to first stage mutual reductions before
a satisfactory arrangement for verifying the next stage had
been agreed to. This proposal would probably also be rejected
by the Soviets, since they would have to agree in advance to
measures to verify their force levels in the area before any
follow-on reductions (e.g., FRG reductions) would take place.
Should the Soviets agree to verifiable first stage reductions
and to the West's set of verification measures, post-reduction
data agreement might be difficult to achieve even with the aid
of these verification measures. The longer the proposal lay on
the table, regardless of Soviet performance, pressures in
Congress and in Western Europe for further reductions might be
strong and hard to resist, and the Soviets might feel they
would be able to impede effective verification once reductions
had begun. Finally, if no agreement were reached over the next
round or two, the Soviets could "pocket" Western acceptance in
principle of data postponement until after initial reductions
and a no increase stage had occurred.
Verification
An MBFR agreement to reduce and limit manpower presents
difficult verification problems. Because Intelligence has no
direct means of counting men, its monitoring methods focus on
unit structure and personnel strength estimates. These in turn
are strongly affected by assumptions concerning Eastern
manpower policies and practices for which only fragmentary
evidence exists. Intelligence has high confidence in its
ability to detect promptly violations involving changes in
force structure that would threaten NATO security, but has low
confidence that it could detect promptly marginal violations up
to several tens of thousands in manpower alone.
Historical experience argues against concluding treaties,
such as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, containing complex and
largely untested verification measures before reaching a full
understanding among the parties on the precise nature of these
measures and their relationship to treaty compliance.
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See Annex I of this paper for a discussion of the MBFR
verification problem.
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Verification Annex to the MBFR?Options Paper
Summary '
This brief assessment of US MBFR monitoring capabilities
concludes that Intelligence could promptly detect and report
violations large enough to pose significant threats to NATO security
in Central Europe. While negotiated verification measures would-
allow for high confidence in judging the fact and size of Soviet
withdrawals and at least moderate confidence in East European
reductions, they would only modestly enhance existing unilateral
capabilities for monitoring residual ceilings. They should not be
expected to ensure detection of all potential Eastern violations,
especially marginal ones.
intelligence would expect to continue to monitor large combat
units with moderate to high confidence but, even with the full
package of associated measures, it would have low confidence in its
ability to estimate manpower in non-combat elements that make up
some 25 percent of Pact ground forces. Even though on-site
inspection could help confirm the structure of individual units,
estimates of Pact manpower strengths would continue to be based
largely on indirect methods.- The -measures -would enhance Western
confidence of detecting and confirming potential.ceiling violations
thate would threaten-Western security, but any MBFR agreement based
on manpower seems likely to require that the West accept certain
measure of uncertainty about strict Eastern compliance.
General Intelligence Monitoring Capabilities
1. The selection of manpower as the basis for MBFR poses
verification difficulties that are much more severe than any
associated with strategic forces arms control. This is because
intelligence has no direct means for counting Warsaw Pact military
personnel and must therefore estimate manpower totals by inference
from force structure. As a result, there is some imprecision
inherent in these estimates.
2. With associated? measures -in place, however, Intelli-
cence could monitor promptly and with high confidence the withdrawal
of larae Soviet combat units from the reductions area. It would be
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confident that most of the men and major weapons associated with'the
units hack-been withdrawn, but some uncertainty might persist
indefinitely as to whether marginal cheating on disposal of men or
weapons had occurred. It could have only moderate confidence in
monitoring the disbandment of indigenous Eastern units, and there
only if their equipment were removed, mothballed, or scrapped. --
Intelligence would have low confidence in its capacity to monitor--
reductions of indigenous manpower and equipment not in units.
3. In the post-reductions phase, there is high confidence that
Intelligence would promptly detect the formation of large Soviet
combat units. It would be difficult, however, even with associated
measures, to make a prompt assessment of the net effect of such an
action on over-all troop levels if the activity involved only one of
two such units. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult to
detect, especially in the short term, a covert, incremental
introduction of Soviet troops distributed among units already
existing in the area unless increases were very large. Even large
increases could take months to demonstrate conclusively with high
confidence;, Increases by indigenous forces could be even more
difficult to detect than Soviet increases.
The Value of Associated Measures
4. Associated measures would modestly enhance our monitoring
capability. They would be most helpful for monitoring reductions;
probably less helpful, although still valuable, -for monitoring
post-reduction ceilings. Each-of the verification measures
currently proposed by the West is assessed below according to its
potential contribution to monitoring Eastern troop level's:
5. Inspection. An inspection system which provided for
periodic direct access to Eastern military units would improve our
ability to monitor MBFR reductions and limitations by:
-- helping clarify the structure of residual
Eastern forces upon which our manpower
assessments are based;
-- helping confirm that preannounced Eastern
reductions occ-erred -in fact;
-- engaging the East in a verification arrangement
that would increase the perceived risk of detec-
tion of marginal cheating for the sake of small
gains in military advantage.
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3 `.,.
6. -An inspection measure will contribute most heavily to. the
assessment of Eastern force structure. It could help improve
further the Intelligence Community's fairly good understanding of
the structure of large Eastern combat formations -- especially
divisions - which comprise more than half of Eastern ground forces
manpower. More importantly, it could help: define elements of the-
Eastern force structure which currently are invisible or at best
vaguely defined, such as certain rear services units and
organizations. An inspection system would not, however, enable
intelligence to by-pass the estimative process and obtain direct
accountings of the manpower strengths of Eastern forces. The degree
of intrusiveness required even to attempt this would likely be
non-negotiable and reciprocally unacceptable.
7. Information Exchange. The Western proposal for an exchange
of information is potentially the most important of the cooperative
verification procedures proposed by the Wept. This measure would
require the.East periodically (e.g., annually) to provide detailed
information-on the structure and manpower strength of its forces in
the MBFR area down to the level of small units. Such an exchange
would give us a detailed Eastern statement of its forces against
which intelligence could more easily direct its monitoring
resources, including any inspections, and would be a baseline
against which compliance challenges could be made.
8. Entry/Exit Points and Prior Notification. The West also
proposes that all Soviet forces entering an leaving Central Europe
be required to pass through designated entry/exit points permanently'
manned by Western observers, and that prior notification