INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING FOR NSC MEETING ON MIDDLE EAST 21 JUNE 1983
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP85M00364R000400510043-8
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
2
Document Creation Date:
January 4, 2017
Document Release Date:
April 14, 2008
Sequence Number:
43
Case Number:
Publication Date:
June 21, 1983
Content Type:
REPORT
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP85M00364R000400510043-8.pdf | 56.21 KB |
Body:
Approved For Release 2008/04/14: CIA-RDP85M00364R000400510043-8
21 June 83
Intelligence Briefing for NSC Meeting on Middle East
21 June 1983
Israel
- Domestic pressure for partial withdrawal - Israeli casualties up over
500 - almost at Vietnam level on proportion basis - Begin down in polls
somewhat. Labor calling for phased but complete unilateral withdrawal.
Unlikely Begin would withdraw unilaterally prior to visit here. Partial
withdrawal not likely to significantly reduce casualties - most from Shias
in south.
- Partial withdrawal would be critical test of Gemayel's ability to
control Lebanon - likely to review factional fighting among Druze and
Christians - Lebanon doesn't want partial withdrawal without assurances that
it will lead to full withdrawal and that area vacated can be policed by
Lebanese army and multinational force.
- Israeli withdrawal would encourage PLO - claim credit for guerrilla
activity and expand presence in north and increase attacks on Israeli-PLO
and Syrians increase aid to Druze and infiltration thru Shrif (sp?) into
Israeli security zone.
Syria
- Syria will see Israeli withdrawal as triumph for their hard line -
perception in Arab world that Israelis have pulled back and Assad will be
portrayed as in the ascendency.
- We see Assad as firml against Lebanon-Israel agreement. Encouraged
by support of Soviets
Soviets
- Will go all out to frustrate any US-sponsored agreement for Middle
East peace - maintain military support to Syria even in face of attack by
Israelis - will try to avert hostilities while keeping tensions high -
attempting to bring radical forces in area together - supporting unity
within PLO, therefore Arafat, and trying to bring about rapprochement
between Syria and Iraq - and are working for better Syrian-Jordanian relations -
but there are limits to what they can accomplish in this. We see the Soviets
as more determined than ever to get piece of action in Middle East. peace process.
Approved For Release 2008/04/14: CIA-RDP85M00364R000400510043-8
Approved For Release 2008/04/14: CIA-RDP85M00364R000400510043-8
In Sum:
- Israelis unlikely to withdraw before Begin visit.
- This provides another month to assess Syrian intentions and
Approved For Release 2008/04/14: CIA-RDP85M00364R000400510043-8