TALKING POINTS ON THE LEBANESE SITUATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000400510044-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: April 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 44
• Publication Date: June 21, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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21 June 1983
Talking Points on the Lebanese Situation
The Lebanese situation has reached a state of serious Impasse which
directly threatens the fulfillment of most US goals both for Lebanon and for
the region. This impasse contains the seeds of another serious round of
fighting between Syria and Israel -- with implications of superpower
involvement. This situation will probably not improve and will move in
directions undesirable to US interests and policy goals.
Syria
Assad has handled Syrian moves with extreme skill, placing himself
foursquare in the center of the action, holding most of the cards and sought
out by all parties seeking a solution. This is itself a prime goal of
Assad: to establish the leadership position of Syria in the Arab world.
Assad now enjoys virtual veto power over any diplomatic initiatives.
Syria is not likely to withdraw from Lebanon as part of any agreement
relating to the Lebanese-Israeli accords. By remaining in Lebanon Assad
maintains his central role in the Lebanese crisis, supports Soviet interests,
gains dominance over the PLO and maintains Syria's image as the sole supporter
of the Arab cause. His only incentive to withdraw is fear of Israeli attack.
The Soviet Union is clear in its support to Syria
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support to Syria as
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suggest that the
on Lebanese soil
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as opposed to a .direct attack upon __S~~ian soil. In any case, t erne iss-no
question that Soviet support has emboldened the Syrians and given them a sense
of confidence that they now possess major new resources in any air battle with
Israel. Syria is probably taking the policy lead, however, and is not simply
acting in response to Soviet behest. Even without the USSR Syrian behavior
would be similar, although less confident if it lacked the weapons recently
provided by the Soviets.
suggests blanket Soviet
long as Syria does not attack Israel first.
Soviets would be cautious to distinguish be ween a sc rmis
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Syria in the meantime is able to watch Israeli troops suffer regular
casualties from Lebanese and Palestinian guerrilla and terrorist groups.
Syria believes that Israel is therefore now on the defensive, facing political
problems at home, and under some pressure to redeploy from the present
confrontation. Although Syria welcomes these attacks, they do not spring all
from Syrian direction. The greater part of Israeli casualties have been
sustained in the south -- from Lebanese rather than Palestinian elements.
Israel
Israel is thus faced with a dilemma. Begin is sensitive to political
charges that a Peace for Galilee offensive has not made most of the gains
originally sought by Israel and that casualties continue without hope of
relief. Labor has skillfully seized the initiative to call for phased but
complete -- unilateral withdrawal. Labor thereby appeals to those who wish to
see Israel extricate itself from the Lebanese morass while suggesting that
Begin has gained almost nothing through his campaign. By taking this
position, Labor has ironically made it much more difficult politically for
Begin's government to accept the concept of complete unilateral withdrawal
without seeming to accede to Labor's position on the war.
Israel looks to the US to bring about a Syrian withdrawal. If this is
not possible, Begin will almost surely undertake a partial withdrawal to
placate his critics and in the hope that casualties will be reduced. In fact,
however, there is serious doubt that casualties will be.reduced within a new
south Lebanon enclave since the population there -- mainly Shia -- will
continue to employ terrorism against Israeli troops. Begin in any case is not
likely to unilaterally withdraw prior to his visit to Washington so as not to
upset his dramatically improved relations with Washington. Israel's decision
is likely to be made within the next 8 to 12 weeks.
Lebanese Domestic Scene
A partial withdrawal by the Israelis would be a critical test of
President Gemayel's ability to expand the Lebanese Government's area of
control. The prospects for renewed factional fighting remain high and would
increase, particularly among the Druze and Christians who have been battling
for control of the Shuf and Alayh districts.
-- The Druze are particularly leery of the ability of the Lebanese
Armed Forces to control the region. Some fear that the LAF would
provide support to the Phalange-dominated Lebanese Forces militia.
-- Unless Gemayel works out an agreement beforehand between Druze and
Christian leaders for a peaceful deployment the LAF will be hard
pressed to contain new outbreaks of violence. If serious fighting
develops, the LAF might break down along confessional lines as it
did during the 1975-76 civil war.
Unrest among the Shia population in the south will continue as they
increasingly fear that Beirut does not care about their fate and will
sacrifice them to a permanent Israeli occupation. The Shia are likely not
only to continue attacks against Israeli forces but against the Gemayel
government as well which it blames for the continued Israeli presence.
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Israeli efforts to reorient south Lebanon's trade patterns away from Beirut
and toward Israel increases the southerners' fears about Israeli intentions.
An Israeli withdrawal is likely to have little impact on the situation in
Syrian-controlled Tripoli. The current violence there appears to be part of
the continuing struggle between Syrian-backed Alawites on the one hand and a
melange of Sunni fundamentalists, Lebanese nationalists, Iraqi Baathists, and
Palestinians on the other.
-- Syria, however, has frequently sparked civil disorder in Tripoli to
exert pressure on the Lebanese government.
-- With Gemayel preoccupied in the Shuf and Alayh areas, Damascus might
again heat up the situation in Tripoli to demonstrate the costs of
ignoring Syrian interests.
At the present, Lebanon looks to the US for a way out of the present
impasse and considers the US, as architect of the accords, as responsible for
its outcome. It has no realistic propoals to bring about Syrian withdrawal
but ultimately could be tempted to instigate war between Syria and Israel in
the hopes that it would lead to the punishment and departure of Syrian forces
in Lebanon.
If Gemayel cannot gain Syrian withdrawal, he will be faced with semi-
permanent occupation of south Lebanon, Syrian control over the Bekaa and much
of the north, and his credibility as a national leader will be severely
damaged. He will be increasingly tempted to look to a "Maronite state" as a
solution to the de facto partition of the country. Such a state would look to
the US and/or Israel for support against Syria, creating a pattern for civil
war which would resemble the anarchy and bloodshed of the 1975-1981 period.
The Palestinians
Israel, of course, entered Lebanon to expel the PLO. An Israeli
withdrawal to the Awwali river could provide the PLO with new opportunities to
revive some of its influence in Lebanon. The Palestinians would be pleased
with such a step.
-- They would portray the move as a "victory" for the Lebanese and
Palestinian guerrillas that have attacked Israeli forces.
-- The Palestinians would view a partial withdrawal as a step toward
permanent, de facto partition of Lebanon that would leave them free
to remain inn northern Lebanon and even expand their presence there.
The Palestinians would continue efforts to mount operations against the
sraelis.
-- An Israeli withdrawal to better defensive positions behind the
Awwali would make operations in western Lebanon more difficult, but
Israeli forces in the Bekaa would remain at risk.
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-- The Palestinians' efforts to infiltrate through the area evacuated
by the Israelis, moreover, would increase the risk of clashes with
whatever forces filled the vacuum.
The Soviets
Future Soviet strategy will be aimed at:
-- Maintaining Syria's resolve not to acquiesce to a US-sponsored
agreement for peace in the region.
-- Rallying a leftist coalition of PLO, Syrian and Lebanese leftist
forces against the agreement.
-- Maintaining Soviet military support to Syria.
-- Attempting to forge a cooperative relationship between Syria and
Iraq along earlier rejectionist lines -- although such agreement
currently seems rather remote.
-- Seeking to avert hostilities between Syria and Israel while keeping
tensions relatively high.
The Soviets, however, realize they have in effect ceded much of the war-or-
peace decision to Syria's own initiatives and are therefore likely to prefer
the status quo to a policy involving a high risk of war.
Graham E. Fuller
NIO/NESA
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