BILATERAL DEFENSE COOPERATION NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000400530053-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: July 16, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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VLVRG I 2r
4738
THE WHITE HOUSE
July 16, 1982
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT: Bilateral Defense Cooperation Negotiations
TAB 1
Given the importance of military facilities and operating
rights in foreign countries to our worldwide military
capabilities, I believe it would be very helpful if the
Foreign Policy SIG would take stock of where we are and
where we are going with respect to bilateral defense
cooperation negotiations. Therefore, I would appreciate
it if the SIG would undertake the following efforts:
(1) Conduct an analysis of hase negotiations in recent years,
and determine lessons learned relevant to future base
negotiations. This analysis should include, inter alia,
an assessment of:
-- The precedent-setting effects of an agreement with
one country upon subsequent negotiations with other
countries.
Whether U.S. negotiating objectives have been fully met.
As it pertains to quids, a negotiating strategy based
on "best efforts" to provide security -assistance rather
than on specific commitments.
The effect of legislative restrictions on negotiating
flexibility.
Trends in maintaining operational flexibility. in the
use of foreign bases.
The relative merits of using a special U.S. negotiator
instead of a sitting U.S. Ambassador.
SECRET
Review July 16 1988
NSC review completed.
SECRET Q;t ;J ' I I
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L.7 1.:.V l1 L. 1
SECRET 2
(2) Identify base negotiations expected in the foreseeable future,
both new and recurring, and taking into account the lessons
learned from earlier negotiations, project:
-- Guidelines for a preferred general strategy for these
negotiations, to include the identification of broad
U.S. negotiating objectives.
-- Potential effects of one negotiation upon another.
-- Procedures reflecting interagency relationships,
coordination and instructions for the negotiator.
-- Special requirements, such as legislation, which
may be needed, in order to ensure that negotiating
objectives can be met.
It would be useful to complete this task by early September..
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Q.<
Wil`Tiam P. Clark
cc: The Secretary of Defense
SECRET
SECRET
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SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO FIVE BASE HOST COUNTRIES:
GREECE, PHILIPPINES, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, AND TURKEY
(in $ millions)
FY 73 - FY 83
%TAB 2
Graph 1
FY 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83*
* proposed
Note: Includes FMS,NAP,ESF,and IMET.
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Graph 2
SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO FIVE BASE HOST COUNTRIES:
GREECE, PHILIPPINES, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, AND TURKEY
IN LOANS AND GRANTS FY 73 - FY 83
(in constant 1973 $ millions)
A
4
, A
% IV*
Ab- -r
* proposed
Note: Includes FMS,MAP,ESF,and IMET.
1000
900
800
700
t 600
500
400
300
200
100
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Graph 3
SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO FIVE BASE HOST COUNTRIES:
GREECE, PHILIPPINES, PORTUGAL, SPAIN, AND TURKEY
AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL SECURITY ASSISTANCE (EXCEPT
. ISRAEL AND EGYPT)
100
90
80
70
60
1
50
40
30
20
10
FY 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
Note: Includes FMS,MAP,ESF, and IMET.
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SECURITY ASSISTANCE TO FIVE BASE HOST COUNTRIES
(in constant 1973 $ millions)
GREECE
Graph 4
250
200
150
100
FY 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 2'83*
*proposed
PHILIPPINES
FY 7 74 75
*proposed
PORTUGAL
FY 73 74 75
* proposed
250
200
150
100
Note : includes FMS,MAP . ESF . and IMET fn,- oar?h r r%ii. 4.,..,
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Graph 4 (co nt. )
250
200
150
100
74
FY 73
proposed
TURKEY
I
T
FY 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83*
* proposed
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LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TAB 3
QUIDS
Assistance provided under the current basing agreements
includes the following:
Greece
In the negotiations suspended in June 1981, the US had
promised its best efforts with no specific levels or ratios
mentioned. Provisions for defense industrial cooperation were
also included. The 1953 agreement, still in effect, did not
mention specific levels of security assistance. (The 1977 DCA,
which never entered into force, promised $140 million grant
MAP and $560 million FMS credits over four years.)
Philippines
As an adjunct to the 1979 MBA amendment, the United States
agreed in a letter to make its best efforts to provide $250
million in FMS credits, $200 million in ESF, and $50 million
in grant MAP during FY 80-84.
Portugal
Under the 1979 arrangements, the United States promised
to provide $80 million in ESF during FY 80-83, to be used for
development assistance in the Azores.
Spain
In the 1982 agreement, the United States promised only its
best efforts to provide security assistance to Spain, with no
specific amounts mentioned. The agreement also included an
annex on defense industrial cooperation. (Under the 1976
treaty with Spain, the United States agreed to provide $600
million in FMS credits, $75 million in grant MAP, and $35
million in ESF during FY 77-81.)
Turkey
In the 1980 DECA, the United States promised only its
best efforts to provide security assistance to Turkey with
no specific amounts mentioned. A defense industrial coopera-
tion annex was also included. (The 1976 DCA that never en-
tered into force had specified $1 billion over four years.)
9/13/82 9A/B2
LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
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TAB 4
CONFIDENTIAL
1976 DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT (DCA) WITH TURKEY
Negotiating Environment. Following Turkey's occupation
in 1974 of the northern part of Cyprus in reaction to the Greek-
instigated coup on the island, Congress suspended military as-
sistance and sales to Turkey. In response, Turkey renounced
the bilateral Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) and sus-
pended all US military activities not directly related to NATO.
General Objectives. Our minimum objective--which we at-
tained--was to preserve our basic security relationship, of
which our facilities were a central but not necessarily essen-
tial element. Although the agreement did not enter into force,
it gained us the time necessary for mending the bilateral re-
lationship, fortuitously aided by the succession of another
government better able to compromise with us. Our secondary
objective, which we were unable to achieve, was a return to
the operating conditions of the status quo ante.
Facility Rights. The Turks insisted on increased control
over our activities, including a change from what were effec-
tively US bases under US command to US facilities on Turkish
bases under Turkish control. The Turks were serious in their
intent to limit our activities to NATO-related operations, al-
though in practice this affected only aircraft operations.
Operating Rights. Transits and overflights were largely
subsidiary issues since they were to be addressed in an annex
to be negotiated later. Following our major use of Turkish
facilities for the resupply of Israel during the Six-Day War,
Turkey has insisted upon considerable restrictions on US tran-
sits, especially those to areas of conflict (e.g., Middle East).
The 1976 agreement continued these restrictions on transits.
Quids. The US agreed to provide Turkey $1 billion in se-
surity assistance over the the planned four-year life of the
agreement. By 1978-79, Turkey was in such straits that other
Western nations had to mount a large rescue effort to enable
it to avoid an economic collapse, a rescue necessary to pre-
serve Turkey both as a NATO ally and as a westward-looking
modernizing country. Consequently, continuing economic aid
became imperative on its own merits, whether or not connected
with a defense agreement. Political quids were Turkish com-
mand over the facilities--we nonetheless retained command and
control of the US forces and their assets--and more restric-
tive language throughout the agreement.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
-2-
SOFA. Turkish efforts to gain rigid control over US im-
ports were a greater problem than attacks on the NATO SOFA as
such. Dealing with narcotics offenses by US military personnel
was extremely troublesome due to the severity of Turkey's nar-
cotics laws. The overall Turkish goal, with which we cooper-
ated, was to increase markedly the bases' contribution to the
local economies. We achieved our minimum objective of retain-
ing control over the living standard of American personnel but
the actual implementation of the importation procedures out-
lined in the DCA would have been far more cumbersome than those
under the old DCA.
General Comment. Experience with the old DCA, however, in-
dicated that the state of our bilateral relations had greater
impact on actual practice than did restrictive language in the
agreement itself, which was frequently stretched even before
the Cyprus problem.
11/3/82
8 A/B 3-4 .
CONFIDENTIAL
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