SIG ON TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000400580023-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 2, 2007
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: April 7, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/11/02 : CIA-RDP85M00364R000400580023-3
SECRET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
7 April 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director fpr Intelligence
THROUGH Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM Jan P. Herring
National Intelligence Officer for Science & Technology
SUBJECT SIG on Transfer of Strategic Technology
TIME & PLACE 2:30 PM, Friday, 8 April
Room 7219, Department of State
Agenda Items of Interest
1. Copy of Agenda is attached (Tab A).
2. Interim Progress Reports (Item II on Agenda)
Progress reports will be passed out at the meeting.
-- Under Secretary Schneider, usually, does not discuss progress
reports. However, he might raise recent DCT rennrt
Cone separately trom the SIG study associated with
Follow-up Action Plan. You should know that the D report was
stimulated by Lionel Olmer at Commerce and the DCI wanted to
"energize" his Cabinet counterparts to take some action on illegal
losses. The DCI paper was prepared by CIA, NSA, and Commerce --
the Agencies with ORCON control over the relevant intelligence --
with no Community coordination. The SIG study that provided the
basis for Follow-up Actions Plan was prepared by TTIC and was fully
coordinated by the IC. The main difference is that the SIG/TTIC
study looked at all forms of transfers, legal and ille2al
provided a "balanced" view The
DCI paper looked at illegal rans er activities over the last two
years and takes a US view.
-- A copy of the Status Report on Intelligence Studies (Item F)
is attached (Tab C) for your information.
25X1
2OA"I
Approved For Release 2007/11/02 : CIA-RDP85M00364R000400580023-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/02 : CIA-RDP85M00364R000400580023-3
SECRET
3. Items for Discussion and Decision
A. A copy of the proposed SIG Work Program for NSSD 1-83, on US
Technology Transfer Policy, is attached, Tab D. A copy of the NSSD
itself is also attached at Tab E.
-- You should read the study plan over to get a sense of how the
SIG effort is organized.
-- Its about time this effort was begun. I am not at all sanguine
that the SIG study will accomplish the NSSD's objectives; just too
many pieces of turf and too much ignorance on the true nature of
the technology transfer problem. Also Congress is into the act now
through the renewal of the Export Administration Act.
~ho you designated, will represent the DCI in
the SIG sponsored effort. He will identify appropriate IC personnel
for each of the NSSD's three working groups.
-- As a core group member, I will be cochairing the Working Group
on Organization with Gus Weiss. This is probably the hoaryest
assignment of the three groups since organizations and their turf
has a principal role to play. He briefed the President on the NSSD
for Judge Clark and now feels a personal commitment to the effort.
-- Even though it sounds about right, the target date of 31
October 1983 is probably optimistic.
B. CoCom Progress Report and Modernization Plan
-- Efforts to strengthen and modernize CoCom will be a principal
agenda item for the HLM in Paris now scheduled for 28-29 April.
The US will explain its rationale for key proposals in the CoCom
List Review; i.e., computer hardware and software, communications
switching and robotics and press for approval of other items close
to agreement
-- Other items include better export control enforcement and
harmonization of licensing procedures to prevent third country
diversions, upgrading the CoCom Secretariat, agreement for a
Military Subcommittee in CoCom, and for serious study in the CoCom
Ad Hoc Group on controls on oil and gas equipment and emerging
technologies as part of the La Sapiniere East-West trade studies.
As you know, TTAC and the IC are supporting all these endeavors
through appropriate interagency mechanisms.
C. Missile Technology Controls
-- A copy of the SIG Report on the topic is attached, Tab F.
OSWR has also prepared some background information for you on CIA's
role in this effort. It too is at Tab F.
2
SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/11/02 : CIA-RDP85M00364R000400580023-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/02 : CIA-RDP85M00364R000400580023-3
D. Proposed Agreement with India
-- We have no SIG information on the topic as yet.
-- A background piece on the technology transfer situation is
attached at Tab G. We briefed Ambassador Barnes on this problem
when he was at Headquarters last summer
4. Other Business
A. Distribution of Final Visa Controls Paper
-- The only sticking point to completing this business has been
INR's (Dean Howells) battle to keep the DCI from being listed as a
possible appellant in the event that an IC organization disagrees
with a State visa decision. Even after working out reasonable
alternative language (See Tab H) with INR, Justice, and Schneider's
office, Howells threatened to take the issue to the Secretary of
State and derail the whole visa policy effort. The issue was only
cleared up when Under Secretary Schneider called Hugh Montgomery
and told him to get off the issue. (Interestingly, Howells had not
even informed Montgomery of his efforts.)
-- This new policy on visa controls, i.e., denial of visas to
Communist country S&T visitors on grounds of possible technology
loss, is viewed by Schneider (and Buckley's) Staff as a major
achievement and will be highlighted at the forthcoming High-Level
CoCom meeting.
-- The use of this visa control policy will also put greater
pressure on the TTIC's Sub-Committee on Exchanges (COMEX) to
produce complete and objective assessments on proposed Communist
S&T visitors and students since State visa denial actions depends
heavily on TTIC/COMEX inputs.
Suggested
Item
B. European allies crack down on Soviet technology Acquisition Efforts
-- You may wish to mention that CIA's effort to enlist the help
of allied intelligence services abroad is helping stem the loss of
US and Western technology to the Soviet Bloc is beginning to pay
off. (See background information at Tab I.)
-- Our effort, begun in December 1981,
has been directed at the internal securi and intelligence services
of some 15 countries e have worked with them
to both understand the nature of the threat to Western technology
and develop appropriate operations to counter that threat.
25X1
LJ/\ I
Approved For Release 2007/11/02 : CIA-RDP85M00364R000400580023-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/02: CIA-RDP85M00364R000400580023-3
-- Including the recent expulsions in France, Spain, and the UK,
the Europeans have expelled 66 Soviets since mid-December, many of
whom were involved in overt and clandestine collection of S&T
intelligence. (That means Europeans 66, US "0".)
-- Although we believe this European effort is having its affect --
reports indicate a serious Soviet concern about this trend and
some KGB residencies have been instructed to stand down on operational
activities -- a good deal more needs to be done:
This will require a joint
counterintelligence and export enforcement effort on their
parts, something that we are working toward now with US
enforcement organizations.
an P. Herring
Attachments
As Stated
Approved For Release 2007/11/02 : CIA-RDP85M00364R000400580023-3
 Approved For Release 2007/11/02 : CIA-RDP85M00364R000400580023-3
Approved For Release 2007/11/02 : CIA-RDP85M00364R000400580023-3