READINESS TO RESPOND TO A CRISIS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 20, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4
DDCI`w:
_EXDIR
DjICS,
NI
WMIS-11 11
C/. NE.'SAADDO.
USPENSE
NSC review completed.
r~{ h 5 5T +4-'~.r qty. 4 Y y w. i ,' e~; j x ,r '~^st t~.
6 4
}~ ds .. ~ ~., ~ 3~Ye-...:.fY'ri. ..e:`.rJ_.. 3krt'?._{ i/:_..n ?W~n~ ~~av '4~~*jyy ~ ~~ _w J7 t5
Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4
 Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4
 Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4
Tu r O-LLI L I SYSTEM II
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE
October 20, 1983
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE LAWRENCE S. EAGLEBURGER
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
THE HONORABLE FRED C. IKLE
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
THE HONORABLE JOHN C. MCMAHON
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VADM ARTHUR S. MOREAU, JR., USN
Assistant to the Chairman, JCS
SUBJECT: Readiness to Respond to a Crisis in the Persian
Gulf (S)
Current developments in the Iran-Iraq War and recent public
threats from Iran dictate.an urgent review of our readiness for
contingencies in the Persian Gulf. The impending transfer of the
Super Etendard aircraft to Iraq, the transit of the Iran MEEAD to
Iran and the forecast Iranian offensive underscore the urgency of
this review. In addition to the issues of readiness, we should
also focus on whether the current environment in the Gulf
provides opportunities for accelerating certain long term
presence requirements important for enhancing our position in the
region more generally. (TS/S)
To provide better focus for the interagency process, the NSC
staff has prepared a set of questions for your consideration.
(C)
We intend to call a Crisis Pre-Planning Group (CPPG) together in
the very near future and have tentatively scheduled a meeting for
Monday, October 24, 1983, at 3:00 p.m. It is important that the
group have responses to the attached questions before we meet. To
that end, it would be appreciated if the designated Department or
Agency could distribute their written responses to CPPG members-
directly and on an "Eyes Only" basis by COB Saturday, October 22.
(S)
'John M. Poinde ter
/Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
CC: Donald Gregg CIA TS 830193
TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE Copy
("l py (VI... 7 Q1
TfD ccr,cWT
Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4
 Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4
Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4
 Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4
%s1L..~i r6... 1 5xba-EM II
91219
KEY QUESTIONS AND ISSUES CONCERNING
READINESS TO COPE WITH A CRISIS IN THE
PERSIAN GULF (U)
I. Intelligence Issues (DCI)
A. What are the plausible warning indicators of impending
Iraqi air attacks on:
- Terminal facilities at Kharg Island?
- Tankers bound for Iranian ports and facilities? (S)
B. Is it our judgement that the forecast Iranian offensive
in the MERAVAN district is likely to trigger Iraqi air
strikes on Iranian transshipment facilities and shipping-
bound for Iran? (S)
C. What is the current IIAF order of battle and what is our
estimate of the types and numbers of tactical aircraft that
might be diverted to:
- Air strikes against Gulf Arab oil facilities?
- International shipping bound for Gulf Arab ports? (S)
D. What is the current IIN order of.battl-e and how do we
assess Iran's capabilities for seaborne attacks against
international shipping in the Gulf? (S)
E. What are the plausible warning indicators and likely
warning time of impending Iranian air attacks on Gulf oil
facilities or international shipping in the Gulf? (S)
F. What is our assessment of Iran's capabilities to mount
sapper attacks against Gulf oil facilities:
- In Saudi Arabia?
- In Kuwait?
- In Bahrain?
G. What is.the likelihood of Iranian-incited subversion by
Shia groups in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere? (C)
H. How quickly could Iran procure, assemble and make ready
a substantial number of naval mines? (S)
I. Are we confident of our capabilities to monitor Iranian
mining capabilities? (S)
J. Could heavy artillery be positioned on Larak and Qeshm
(or lesser) islands so as to pose a significant threat to
tanker traffic in the northern traffic separation scheme of
the Strait? (S)
K. What is our assessment of indigenous Gulf Arab defenses
to:
03PY OF
D ~T JA
Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4
 Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4
6' 6 ',i 1 2
- Protect production and terminal facilities against
Iranian air attacks?
- Defend shipping in the Gulf against Iranian air and
seaborne attacks? (S)
- Cope with Iranian sapper attacks against critical
facilities? (S)
II.. Diplomatic and Political Considerations (State)
A. What are the considerations which bear on the timing of
our decision to approach Gulf Arab states on coordinated or
combined measures to cope with Iranian threats:
-
To
Gulf ports and oil facilities?
-
To
international shipping in
the
Gulf?
-
To
international air traffic?
-
To
close the Strait of Hormuz?
(S)
B. What might we do in the immediate future to increase the
visibility of our political and military cooperation with
key Arab States? (S)
C. How should we deal with Iraq? (S)
D. What considerations bear on decisions to collaborate
more directly (and more visibly) with our key allies? (S)
III. Military Judgements (DoD)
A. Is our current (and planned) naval posture in the
Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea deemed adequate and proportion-
ate to the threat? (S).
B. Have we reviewed applicable operation plans for the most
likely contingencies involving likely Iranian threats and
are they deemed adequate? (S)
C. Are current force closure times commensurate with the
warning time we are likely to have of:
- Mining threats?
- Air attacks on shipping?
- Seaborne attacks? (S)
D. Does the current situation argue for the early deploy-
ment of a USCINCENT FHE? (S)
E. Have we undertaken military consultations with key
allies on possible joint or coordinated responses to'various
Iranian threats? (S)
~ v' 6 I L.
SECRET.
Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4
 Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4
F. What considerations bear on the initiation and timing of
such consultations?. (S)
is
Approved For Release 2008/11/25: CIA-RDP85M00364R000600850002-4