THE READINESS OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R000600970012-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 19, 2008
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: REPORT

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THE READINESS OF SOVIET
NAVAL FORCES
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In the past 20 years, the Soviet Navy has acquired an impressive
inventory of modern materiel as it has evolved from a coastal defense
force into a navy with global missions. Modern surface ships,
submarines, and aircraft have significantly increased its capabilities
over this period. Nevertheless, we have found personnel and materiel
deficiencies that impair its readiness to fight a major war with NATO.'
The readiness policies of the Soviet Navy have a substantial impact
on its ability to fight a major war, and for NATO's warning of war:
- The Soviet Navy is operationally postured to fight a short,
intense war, and its potential for "first salvo" operations in
waters near the Soviet Union has been maximized at the expense
of its capabilities for sustained operations.
- The Soviet Navy, consistent with the readiness policies of the
General Staff, anticipates a "period of tension" before a major
conflict in which it would raise the readiness of its forces.
Without such warning, the Soviet Navy would be ill prepared to
fight a major war. Extensive and extraordinary precleployment
and other preparations of Soviet naval units would probably
provide NATO with a wide range of indications that the USSR
was preparing for war.
- Geography will continue to be a major factor in Soviet naval
operations. Forces at sea in the Atlantic, Pacific, and
Mediterranean risk isolation, and those in some home fleets risk
being bottled up, causing the Soviets to emphasize predeploy-
rnent and early alert.
Readiness
This assessment presents four perspectives on Soviet naval readiness:
An analysis of the determinants of readiness.
- An examination of the readiness of principal ship types.
' The directors of the Intelligence agencies of the Department of Defense believe that the overall thrust
of this nwrtiorandurn is too negative. Their views are detailed at the end of the Executive summary, on
page xxv.
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- A discussion of the readiness of the forces to accornplish the
major missions of the Navy in wartime.
- The outlook for naval readiness through the 1980s.
We have treated readiness as a function of the availability of' ships and
naval aircraft to conduct combat operations under varying stages of
alert and of what the Soviets term combat effectiveness-the aggregate
of crew proficiency, adequacy of materiel, and quality of support
(including maintenance, other aspects of sustainahility, and command,
control, communications, and intelligence).
Availability
The Soviet Navy's approach to readiness, consistent with that of
other Soviet armed forces, stresses conservation of resources to generate
maximum force for the initial phase of operations in a general war.
Normally, about 10 percent of major surface combatants an
submarines are immediately available
summarizes our estimate Q of availability,
s owing the number of submarines and surface combatants that could
be prepared for operations within specified periods after receiving an
alert notice. We believe that this sample is representative of the normal
peacetime availability of Soviet naval units.
Combat Effectiveness
We can assess with confidence the performance potential of Soviet
naval ships or aircraft on the basis of what we know of their design. But
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whether- the potential of that naval materiel would actually be realized
in wartime depends upon:
- Personnel proficiency.
- Reliability and maintainability of the equipment.
- Sustainability.
- Command, control, communications, and intelligence.
Our judgments concerning these must necessarily be less sure,
depending as they do on more diffuse and arnhiguous evidence. To
assess available evidence on the subject, we pursued an analytical
examination of the above determinants. We also conducted a Delphi
survey' of selected Intelligence Community analysts in order to gain a
different perspective.
In the survey we systematically polled analytical opinion on how
effective Soviet naval units would be in executing specific wartime
missions, given 25 days' alert of impending combat. There was
consensus that the Soviet naval units available for use in the early stages
of a war could develop about 75 percent of their potential, performance
being adversely affected chiefly by lack of training and operational
experience, other personnel shortcomings, and equipment deficiencies.
Whatever the merits of the Delphi survey, we placed greater weight on
our more rigorous analytical assessment which presents a detailed
inquiry into the determinants of readiness summarized below.
Personnel Reatdiness. Serious personnel problems have attracted
the attention of both the naval and the national leadership. The Navy
has a large professional officer corps and a small cadre (about 8 percent
of personnel) of warrant officers and extended-duty servicerrien
(volunteers who reenlist beyond the required three-year term), but
depends on conscription for about 75 percent of its manpower. The
conscript reenlistment rate is low-probably less than 5 percent and
perhaps as low as I or 2 percent-and the continuous influx of
inexperienced personnel places a heavy burden on the Navy's training
programs. Fucause so few conscripts reenlist, there is always a shortage
of experienced and skilled enlisted personnel for lower level supervisory
and technical positions. Soviet naval conscripts aboard ship serve three
years, as opposed to two years for those serving ashore.
We have observed marked command concern about drunkenness,
poor discipline, and other evidence of low morale, particularly at the
Poe ageni y reservathins on the 71/f t3 re and