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December 21, 2016
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June 11, 2008
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October 26, 1983
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The Director of Central Intelligence Nbshr.xLDC.2o~oa TAB E Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590008-5 INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT 26 October 1983 GRENADA: THE CUBAN FACTOR Prior to yesterday's invasion, the Cuban contingent in Grenada was believed to comprise at least 400 personnel consisting of the following elements: a construction brigade housed at the Point Salines Airfield (350 personnel) -- a military advisory mission headquartered about a mile north of Point Salines (10 to 12 advisors) -- the Cuban Embassy staff and guard force located in southeastern St. Georges (at least 15) civilian technicians and advisors (including 25 medical personnel and 15 technicians at Radio Free Grenada) This does not include any forces that may have been aboard a Cuban Naval at Port St. been Gused to eorges transport Academy trainan{rooship, carrier Vietnam wasranchoredwhich cargo and as troop 25X1 25X1 til a u an workers at the airfield were safe and in their barracks. These men include many military reservist - come of whom may have had combat experience in Angola or Ethiopia. indicated they were armed and may have been formed into squaas or . Cuban Colonel Pedro island only the vedfn Monday, atatheaairportadio Havana who Tortola Comes, t rkers wo char yesterday to charge o be s Interagency Intelligence Assessment was requested by the National Security Council Staff. It was prepared under the of ee hl25X1 National Intelligence Officer for Latin America by Office of African and Latin American Analysis, CIA. The Assessment was coordinated at the working level with the Central Intelligence the National Security Agency, A gency, Agency, the Defense Intelligence s and the tobert1983 wassused.inItherpreparationloflthis Assessment. an 2_fOctober SECRET Copy No. 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/11 : CIA-RDP85M00364R001502590008-5 ---- Approved For Release 2008/06/11: CIA-RDP85M00364R001502590008-5 SECRET The Cuban military advisory contingent is evidently larger 11 nrevinusly estimated and could number as many as 100. Reporting fighting at the Point alines Airfield, firing on US helicopters with small arms and a machine-gun, and making a stand against a ground assault near.the fuel tanks north of the airfield. The Cubans who reportedly were encountered at Pearls Airfield and at the Radio Free Grenada site nor t. Georges may have included advisors from the military mission as well. The Cubans could have landed some additional forces from the Vietnam Heroico without our knowledge but we know that it loaded sugar, 500 tons of cement and other cargo in Mariel harbor before departing Cuba for Grenada on 1 October. There are accommodations on the ship for 240 personnel when carrying cargo. The cargo manifest and destination were declared on 29 August and it took one month to complete the loading. We believe that the cargo was delivered, suggesting that no more than 240 additional Cuban personnel could have been transferred to Grenada. bThe efore itheacoup. e We ha two reports of landings, but none have been confirmed, On the other hand, a US field commander es ma e Grena a were facing the equivalent of two well-armed and well-trained Cuban dditional forces light infantry battalions, which could indicate that some a were inserted. A report yesterday that tanks and armo carriers were located near Pearls Airfield was-not corroborated and CINCLANT Intelligence has disavowed the rupor The stiffness of the resistance thus far can be attributed to the following factors: Colonel Tortola's effective command of Cuban personnel on the island. -- The Cubans had warning of the likelihood of landings and had time to andaction. the advantage probably of had caseoofdefensive arm andforsdeployment themselves a plan knowing the terrain. Heavy, accurate anti-aircraft fire from known Grenadian Army positions downed or disabled the majority of the Black Hawk transport helicopters early in the action, severely reducing the mobility of US forces in the St. Georges-Point Salines area. The only road leading from the airfield north toward St. Georges goes right past both the Cuban workers housing area and their military mission headquarters, where 300-400 armed Cubans were concentrated. indicated the Army had brougnt inforcements to this general area by truck. Approved For Release 2008/06/11: CIA-RDP85M00364R001502590008-5 Approved For Release 2008/06/11: CIA-RDP85M00364R001502590008-5 The strongest units of the Grenadiah Army -- at Fort Frederick and in, the Frequente-Grand Anse area north of the airfield -- have probably been stiffened by Cuban advisors. We believe that the arrival-last night of additional helicopters and troops of the 82nd Airborne at Point Salines, the reported Marine armored force landing north of St. Georges, and continued heavy supression of anti- aircraft and artillery positions in the Fort Frederick area will lead to a collapse of organized resistance today. POSSIBLE CUBAN DIVERSIONS As President Fidel Castro has publicly admitted, the Cubans are incapable of reinforcing their forces in Grenada. Nor are they likely to risk a direct attack on US Naval forces off Grenada. Cuba's two FOXTROT submarines were observed in port on Monday. Castro, however, may be angry enough to order sabotage against US forces, bases, or embassies elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin or in the continental United States, using surrogate forces or Cuban operatives employed in such a manner to provide plausible denial. While some e do not believe Havana can create isolated Cuban retaliatory acts may occur, w d a. any diversion sufficient to alter the outcome in Grena Approved For Release 2008/06/11: CIA-RDP85M00364R001502590008-5 25X1 25X1 Approved For Release 2008/06/11: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590008-5 crrRFl1 ~~ ANNEX PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY ARMY (PRA) Commander: General Hudson Austin Size Equipment Comment 1,000 - 1,200 AK-47s, RPGs, heavy machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles, BTR-60 and BRDM armored personnel carriers, ZU-23, ZPU 4 AA batteries, and field artillery. Headquarters at Ft. Rupert with camps near St. Georges and at Calivigny. Groups of junior officers NCOs trained in Cuba. Some Cuban advisors on island provide basic training. Officer Corps probably loyal to Austin. People's Revolutionary Militia (PRM) Commander: Winston Bullen (deceased) 2,000-4,000 AK-47s, small arms, possible heavy machine guns and light artillery Created by Bishop as his personal security force. Several hundred members reportedly trained in Cuba. The Militia reportedly was disarmed last week by PRA with Bullen subsequently executed. Loyalties unknown. Grenada Police Service (GPS) Commander: Major Ian St. Bernard 300-500 Small arms. Consists of Prison Service, Coast Guard Immigration Service, and. has four small Coast Guard. Some police British patrol boats received training, including provided by Libya. political indoctrination, in Cuba. Approved For Release 2008/06/11: CIA-RDP85M00364R001502590008-5 Approved For Release 2008/06/11: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590008-5 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY STATEMENT 26 October 1983 ATTACHMENT TO GRENADA: THE CUBAN FACTOR At approximately 0130 hours on 26 October, Cuban President Castro made a public statement and answered questions from the press in Havana. When asked how many Cubans are in Grenada, Castro responded that there were more than 700, including s mtruction wnrkprc- At 0945 an 26 October- we rprpivpfl 7 7 stating that the Cuban Foreign Ministry was i n f o r m i n g its Missio ns overseare areapproximately 1 000 Cubans in Grenada. The credible range. Previous reporting has indicated a basic complement of 350 to 400 construction workers, although approximately 200 additional workers were introduced late last year -- presumably to replace construction workers already there -- but we were never able to confirm their return to Cuba. If they did not return to Cuba, this would account for much of the discrepancy with our previous estimate of 350 construction workers. Vietnam Heroico could have brought in - 300 more personnel, accounting for the remainder of the discrepancy. In view of the conflicting reports and the lack of good independent information, we estimate that as many as 1,000 Cuban personnel could be in Grenada, although an estimate of 400 to 700 still appears to be a more CC I% D C Approved For Release 2008/06/11: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01502590008-5