EUROPEAN PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF INF

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R001903760017-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2007
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: May 19, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/12/18: CIA-RDP85M00364R001903760017-1
Fo-reign Opinion awe
United S!ates Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547
May 19, 1983
Current opinion poll data call into question some common
beliefs framing the debate about INF issues.
BELIEF: Europeans are preoccupied with INF.
o Salience: INF is the most important international concern
for Europeans, but it has considerably lower salience than
various domestic issues across all countries.
Concerned
(Approximate ranges)
--
Unemployment .......
65-75%
--
Crime/safety.......
30-40%
--
Inflation..........
30-40%
-- Social services....
10-20%
-- S?]ar threat .........
10-20%
-- INF deployment.....
10-20a (FRG & Netherlands = 20%)
Not surprising, INF' has most salience among the better
educated.
o Attention: Only 10-20% in any country follow INF. issues
in the media "very closely."
o Actions taken: Most people have "done nothing" to show
their position on deployment: 70-80% in Italy, the U.K.,
and Belgium; 60%-range in the Netherlands and FRG.
Actions taken (10-20% range) include: persuade others,
vote for appropriate candidates, sign petitions.
Only in the Netherlands does an appreciable proportion of
people claim to take part in demonstrations: about 10 per-
cent of the general public and 25 percent of the better
educated.
BELIEF: Europeans are "paralyzed" by the fear of war.
o Near-term: Most (70-80%) discount the likelihood of an
actual Soviet attack in the near future. And pluralities
(50%-level) are unconcerned about Soviet political intimi-
dation.
o Long-term: Most (60-80%) "can't really believe" that
nuclear war could happen.
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BELIEF: The USSR has nuclear superiority in Europe.
o INF Monopoly: Only 10-200 know that the USSR has a
monopoly of "land-based medium-range nuclear missiles."
So, there remains great confusion and ignorance (80-90%)
of the missile imbalance. This has not changed. much from
past surveys.
There are various incorrect perceptions. Most commonly,
two-thirds (65%) think that both the NATO countries of
Western Europe and the Soviet Union have medium-range
nuclear missiles "on their soil." Accordingly, INF de-
ployment is probably seen by most as enhancing an exist-
ing capability.
o British-French Missiles: When told about the British
and French missiles, majorities (55%-level) know that
the missiles are for national defense, except in the U.K.,
where people are divided (40%-level) about whether the
missiles are for NATO's defense or national defense only.
o Nuclear Strength: Only the British (50%)-see the USSR
"ahead" of the U.S. on "nuclear missile strength in Europe."
Elsewhere, Europeans are about as likely to see the
U.S. and USSR as equal (35-40%) as to see the USSR ahead
(35-40%). Few anywhere see the U.S. strongest (15%-level).
o Whose Interests: Europeans are only marginally more likely
to see INF deployment as serving the mutual interests of
the U.S. and Western Europe (35-45%) than to see INF mainly
serving U.S. interests (30-35%).
Only a few think that INF deployment is mainly in the in-
terests of Western Europe.
o Deterrence: The British tend to see INF as a deterrent
force (45%-to-20%).
Elsewhere, opinion is split in the FRG and Netherlands
(30%-level) and in Italy and Belgium (40%-level) over
whether INF "would help prevent" or would "increase the
risk" of war.
This is no real change since last fall.
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BELIEF: Soviets have become the "party of peace."
o Military Motives: Most people continue to see both the
U.S. 60%-level and the USSR (70-80%) as seeking military
superiority over each other. This is no real change from
earlier findings.
o Peaceful Intentions: Europeans are somewhat more likely
to say recent "policies and actions" of the USSR are con-
tributing to the "risk of war" (40-60%) than to say the
same of the U.S. (40-50%). However, the U.S. has gener-
ally fallen in perceptions of its peaceful intentions.
o Sincerity: At the same time, the U.S. standing has gener-
ally improved everywhere in European perceptions of its
sincerity in arms negotiations (45-60%).
U.S. sincerity is the prevailing perception in three
countries, whereas the Italians remain divided (45%-level)
and the Belgians tend to see the U.S. as not making a
genuine effort in negotiations (55%-to-45%).
`Although the U.S. does better than the Soviet Union in all
countries, perceived Soviet sincerity has improved in the
FRG, where people are now divided at the 35%-level. The
USSR has dropped considerably in the Netherlands, where
people also are divided now at the 35%-level.
Majorities (65%-level) in the other countries see the USSR
as insincere in negotiations.
o U.S. Arms Proposals: Uncertainty governs public knowledge
of the various arms proposals. However, when U.S. sponsor-
ship is identified, majorities everywhere (55%-75%) "favor"
President Reagan's recent proposal that both.sides station
"roughly the same number" of missiles in Europe.
Prepared by:
G. Hursh-Cesar
485-2968
N-5/19/83
Approved For Release 2007/12/18: CIA-RDP85M00364RO01903760017-1