MORE MILITARY AID FOR TURKEY WILL HELP KEEP RUSSIA AT BAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R002204240019-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2008
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: March 28, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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More military aid for Turkey will help keep Russia at bay
The headlines about the Reagan Administration's anxiety
over Central America and over deployment of NATO nuclear
missiles in Germany have overshadowed a critical mid-March
decision on Capitol Hill concerning military aid to Turkey. The
Administration has boosted the military-aid request for Tur-
key's 500,000-member army to $755 million this year from
$546.9 million in 1981 to keep Ankara's largely Korean War-
vintage weapons from rusting into total obsolescence.
The Turks, with their reputation for prowess in combat and
their historical role as a strategic wall of resistance against
Russian penetration into the Mediterranean, are crucial to
Washington's worldwide strategy. Yet turning Turkey into a
major player in halting So~~iet imperialism has been stymied
by hostile congressional reaction. This is largely because of
friction between Turkey and Greece and the eh-traordinary
power of the Greek lobby in Congress. Given the relatively
smaller number of Greek-Americans-an estimated 3 mil-
lion-this bloc is as potent as the Jewish lobby for Israel.
The Pentagon is limited by the demand by congressional
friends of Greece that $7 must be given to Athens for every
$10 for Ankara. This year the argument is compounded by
events in Athens, where Socialist Prime Minister Andreas
Papandreou has been using U. S. NATO bases in Greece as a
whipping boy. Despite pre-election threats to quit NATO and
protestations that Greece has no enemies and therefore does
not need the alliance, Papandreou's real demands appear to
be price and face-saving control over the bases. Because of
the large aid request for Turkey, the 7-10 ratio weakens
Washington's negotiating position with Athens and may re-
sult in high payments for the Greek bases.
Pivot point More than ever, the U. S. needs Turkey as an
effective member of NATO. With the fate of U: S. nuclear
missile deployment in Western Europe still in some doubt,
despite the German consen*atives' victory in early March
(BVV-Feb'. 28), Turkey's geographical. position as the logical
pivot on NATO's southeastern flank becomes more vital. An
effective Turkish military, particularly with the high-perfor-
mance fighter aircraft written into this year's U. S. budget,
would present Moscow with what militar3~ strategists call a
tour azi~~zuts dilemma-a threat from all directions.
Poised on the Soviet Union's southern border, Turkey could
'act as a deterrent not only to any Russian movement toward
NATO , in central Europe but also to any thrust into Iran
through the Caucasus Mountains. Furthermore, although the ,
military regime that took power in 1980 has been hesitant
about appearing to pull American-or Israeli-chestnuts out
of Mideast fires, Ankara will permit the upgrading of three
airfields in eastern Turkey. The fields would be under a NATO
.flag, but Ankara has agreed that in a major crisis they could
serve as bases for the U. S. Rapid Deployment Force, the
mobile deterrent to any Soviet threat or locally inspired desta-
bilization in the Persian Gulf oil fields.
Washington also needs Turkey for its unique role in the
Islamic world. Although right-wing politicians have flirted
with Islamic fundamentalism in the past, the army sees itself
as the guardian of the tradition of secular nationalism begun
under Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s, a model for the whole
post-World War II anticolonial movement (BW-Dec. 21,
1981). Growing clashes between right-wing fanatics and Com-
munists and leftists were one reason the military took over.
Turkey is, in fact, the only Mideast nation that has relations
with all countries in the area. Its Kemalist foreign policy has
enabled Ankara to maintain low-level diplomatic relations
with Israel while at the same time making socialist Iraq its
No. 1 trading partner last year. Turkey wants to play a
greater role in pacifying the region, and a strengthened mili-
tary establishment could help.
Cyprus' future. Like most U. S. foreign policy problems,~howev-
er, the relationship with Turkey is not simple. State Dept.
analysts may have a point when they say that, whether
Washington likes it or not, Turkey and Greece must be seen
as a single strategic unit. The two countries' histAric animos-
ity flared into a major crisis when Ankara's troops invaded
Greeks threatened to unite with Athens. Only by minimizing
the animus can the U. S. take advantage of Turkey's poten-
tial. Yet there is little hope of an immediate settlement in
Cyprus. Moreover, boundary disputes in the Aegean Sea aris-
ing from rival claims on an archipelago constantly exacerbate
the Athens-Ankara relationship. NATO naval maneuvers in the
area had to be abandoned recently. Offshore oil drilling rights
also are an issue.
Despite the domestic political risks, Turkey's growing im-
portance to U. S. strategy is forcing the Reagan Administra-
tion to confront the issue. Staunch American defense of the
military regime against criticism from other r~4T0 partners
has strengthened Ankara-Washington ties. This U. S. policy
has proved justified, at least in the short term. West Germa-
ny-which had been in the forefront of opposition to the
military government's policies-recently transferred $160 mil-
lion in nonmilitary aid. Furthermore, a $54 million slice of
military aid automatically went ahead this January without a
ripple. Japan, France, and Britain, which had been waiting for
the Germans to make their decision, are expected now to
move ahead with their aid packages. ^
s2 EUSINESS WEEK: Approved For Release 2008/07/22 :CIA-RDP85M00364R002204240019-1 '~ OUTLOOK