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December 20, 2016
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December 5, 2007
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June 27, 1983
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Approved For Release 2007/12/05: CIA-RDP85M00364R002204260007-2 They sav that Enders wanted the United States to maintain a negotiating "track" in order to mollify domestic and foreign critics of American policy and to put the onus for refusing to talk on the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the leftist opposition in J Salvador. I N EARLY FEBRUARY Enders wrote a memo recom- mending a "two-track" policy of military aid and nego- tiation, an account of which was leaked by Enders's en- emies in the White House to The Washington Post with the allegation that Enders favored talks that would lead to a coalition government ("power sharing") between right and left in El Salvador. Power-sharing negotiations, fa- vored by many liberals as a means to stop the killing, are regarded in the Administration as a formula for eventual Communist takeover. Enders's allies deny he favored any such thing-and that his February memo explicitly favored negotiations only concerning the terms for participation in forthcoming Salvadoran elections. One other official, however, says that the exact nature of the negotiations. were left vague, "which is very strange for someone who has made his reputation as a crisp memo writer." Some of Enders's foes were prepared to believe the worst about Enders's intentions, contending that career foreign service officers as a breed are trained to "yield firmly" even when vital U.S. interests are involved. Some of Enders's friends suspect Kirkpatrick and others of pur- suing dark hidden agendas, too. One of them said, "Some people want an elegant defeat that can be blamed on post- Vietnam attitudes and constraints by Congress," leading perhaps to a "who lost Central America" campaign. From. the National Security Council perspective, the is- sues leading to Enders's replacement are described not as -ideological or tactical, but managerial. William Clark did not like what he was seeing in cables from Central Amer- ica and in what he was forced to include in the President's daih' briefing. Beginning last fall, one official said, "It appeared that the government of El Salvador was not winning on the battlefield." Clark ordered an "intense review" conducted through several channels, including a so-called "core group," chaired by Enders and made up of officials from several agencies. The President himself be- came increasingly involved personally, especially after his. trip to Latin America in December gave him an opportuni- tv to sit in little rooms with presidents and generals and discuss chopper parts and the security situation and get a real feel for the situation on the ground." In January and February Clark brought Ambassador James Theberge up to Washington from his post in Chile to review the Central America situation. Clark sent Kirk- patrick on a fact-finding tour of Central America. Clark also had former Florida Senator Richard Stone hired as a State Department consultant for congressional relations and public diplomacy. And about the same time, Enders's memo was leaked. Enders approached Clark and asked about a new assignment not. reportedly, the one he got as ambassador to Spain-but Clark told him his departure would be asked for when it was desired. rCCORDING to N.S.C. officials, at no time was Clark I. usurping the prerogatives of Shultz as Secretary of State, even though. Shultz reportedly is "frustrated" at Clark's interventions in his department. N.S.C. officials say that, unlike Henry Kissinger and Tbigriiew Brzezinski before him-and to the displeasure of some members of his staff-Clark has resolutely refused, to have his subordi. nates chair interagency committees, leaving that function to representatives of regular departments of government. Clark is said to respect fully the delineations of authority spelled out in N.S.C. decision directives allotting oper- ational responsibility over foreign policy to State. But when Enders was late getting things done, when Clark found that too many meetings had to be conducted in the White House, and when things didni t improve either on the battlefield in Central America or in American public opinion; aides say Clark was forced -to step in. "Public diplomacy" that is, the selling of American policy to the public, the press, Congress, and world opin- ion-is an especially troublesome item for the Administra- tion. Clark, for one, had hoped that when Pope John Paul visited El Salvador in early March and whenthe-5alva doran government announced a speedup in holding elec- tions this year, Congress would somehow be inspired to vote the additional military aid- that the President had requested. This didn't happen, and it was decided that the President should address a joint session of Congress to request the money. At the same time, Clark decided that Enders had to go. In the process of debating what should be in Reagan's April 27 speech. Kirkpatrick urged a "Mar- shall Plan" -a large economic and humanitarian aid pack- age for the region. Enders opposed it on grounds that. Congress would never approve the money. Enders won the point, but fueled Kirkpatrick's hostility. One should not weep too long over Torn Enders. Spain is a choice post-a pleasant place to Eve and increasingly important as a forthcoming member of NATO and the Eu- ropean Common Market. Getting fired after a policy dis- pute with hardliners probably has cleansed Enders's repu- tation of its Cambodia bombing stain, and when Democrats or moderate Republicans come back to power, he might even be on the short list for the highest-ranking career post in the State Department,. the undersecretarv- ship for political affairs currently held by Lawrence Eagle- burger. In watercooler handicapping around the State De- partment, Enders has three principal rivals for that post- Ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis, former Ambassador to Venezuela William Luers, and former Ambassador to Ni- geria Thomas Pickering. Luers had 'wanted Spain, but Enders got it instead, and Pickering is headed off to El Salvador,'a dangerous place to both persons and careers. Approved For Release 2007/12/05: CIA-RDP85M00364R002204260007-2 Approved For Release 2007/12/05: CIA-RDP85M00364R002204260007-2 According to both State Department and White House officials, Enders's replacement by Langhorne Motley was designed to restore operational control over Central America policy back to State. Motley, an Alaska Republi- can who grew up in Brazil and had been Reagan's ambas- sador there, is regarded as an effective diplomat and politic cal operator and was supported for the Enders job by both Cary, and Shultz. During the time it takes Motley to staff up the Latin America bureau--Enders, doing most of the bureau's work himself, was short of deputies-Eagle- burger is to oversee Latin policy for Shultz. The replacement of Deane Hinton as ambassador to El Salvador this summer had been slated for months. Hinton once ran afoul of the White House for openly attacking human rights abuses in El Salvador, but he is generally regarded as having performed courageous service under enormous pressure. Because State wanted Negroponte to replace Hinton, Shultz reportedly recommended a "daisy chain" of diplomatic changes in Central America to the White House, including also the ambassadors to Costa Rica and Guatemala, who also were due for rotation. The White House vetoed Negroponte because it feared- his confirmation hearings would turn into "a circus." Negro- ponte often is accused of masterminding the U.S. "secret war" against Nicaragua from his embassy in Honduras. T HE ENDERS STORY was about to leak, so Shultz announced it aboard Air Force One on the way to the Williamsburg summit:. Then Hinton's departure- was leaked along with-the misinformation that he would be replaced by a retired admiral, Gerald Thomas, currently ambassador to Guvana_.Days before, actually, Thomas had been contacted about a new post and said that he would do as the President asked, but preferred Kenya to -M Salvador. Because of all the-leaks and because some unidentified White House ignoramus maligned the entire foreign service in a crack to The Washington Post that "you don't handle Central American policies with tea and cum- pets on the diplomatic circuit," it was decided to hold up on announcement of other embassy replacements. N.S.C. aides like to represent Clark as mainly a loyal servant of Ronald Reagan, but others in the Administra- tion say he has acquired views of his own. One State Department official points out that Clark's wife is a refu- gee from Czechoslovakia and that his attitudes toward communism reflects hers. "Clark and Reagan have similar views, not backed by much information," one Adminis- tration official said. 'Deane Kirkpatrick adds information and they all reach the same conclusion': that a Soviet- backed, Cuban-assisted effort is underway to overthrow the governments of Central America, and that because of the history of the region, the poverty and injustice, there is. a great opportunity for this. They think it is central to U.S. interests that this not happen and they are not going to let it happen." How far will the United States go? The Reagan Adminis- tration's formal policy-and obvious hopes that large numbers -of U.S. advisers or combat troops will not be' necessary. Scenarios are being discussed at lower levels, though, under which one-oreheother -ignt-be needed- Oneisanin,n,;r+entcollapsein ElSalvador. The.otherisan imminent victory by anti-Sandinista rebels in Nicaragua which Cuban troops-were-called in to prevent. The United States-could counter-such:a znovelbyair-sea blockadeas well as insertion of troops. it is impossible to know for sure