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December 20, 2016
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December 5, 2007
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June 27, 1983
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Approved For Release 2007/12/05: CIA-RDP85M00364R002204260012-6 OIY PAGE. NEW REFJBLIC --~----- 27 June 1983 WHITE HOUSE WATCH ENDERS'S ENt HE REPLACEMENT of Thomas Enders as: the State Department's top policymaker for Latin America and .of Deane Hinton as ambassador to El Salvador have been , g e o portrayed as part of a move to "toughen" U.S. policy-on - pursue a high-tension policy against] atin American Coin- Central America, as a power grab by the White House' munists, and he selected Enders to help carrv out his aims national security adviser, William Clark, at the expense of , even though Enders had no prior Latin experience. (He Secretary of State George 'Shultz; ;and as a triumph of--has since become fluent in Spanish? no mean feat wnile Thardliners-such. as- U.N.: Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick': w,,,orking sixteen-hour days as a policy manager.) Haig and CIA Director William Casey over "soft" forei c originally wanted a direct confrontation with Cuba, the e service careerists. Actually the situation is both simpler- "source" of trouble in Central America, but the Adminis than all that and more complex. Personality differences played a big part in Enders's sacking. Hinton was not sacked at all. The personnel changes were not the result of a change in overall policy toward Central America, but of a determination by Clark that policy was not being effective- ly implemented. Clark has not executed .a Kissinger-style. power play, though; on the contrary, Enders was ousted as part of a plan to shift operational control of Central America policy from the White House back to State. And at State, the new Assistant Secretary for Latin America, Langhorne Motley, and the new ambassador in San Salva- dor, Thomas Pickering, are not noticeably harder-line on police' than Enders and Hinton were. State's original choice for the ambassador's job, John Ne.groponte; a ca- reer diplomat who is currently ambassador to Honduras, actually was rejected by the -White House as having too hardline a reputation in Congress. N EVERTHELESS, the Administration's policy is in- exorably becoming "tougher" as the military situa- bon in El Salvador deteriorates and that in Nicaragua im- proves. At least in the short run, the new personnel changes will . do-nothing to alter the general drift toward .it back. Clark's fellow hardliners, including Kirkpatrick, had lost:some major policy fights to Enders, but in the end they won his scalp, and that enhances their influence. One of these days -,after the 1984 election, if it can be put off until then-there may be a decisive struggle over Central America within the Administration, probably over wheth- er or not to send U.S. combat troops or large numbers of advisers to the region-to win it or stay out. At the mo- ment, it's likely. that debate will continue over how best to win while staving out and how best to handle domestic opponents of Administration policy-by conciliation and persuasion or by threat and. confrontation. Thomas Enders's friends in the State Department and enemies among Democrats on Capitol Hill find it laugh- able that he should be cast now as some kind of dove. Ten years ago, as No. 2 man in the U.S. embassy in Phnom Penh, Enders selected targets for secret U.S. bombing raids in Cambodia, earning the respectful notice of Alex? ande_r Haig, then chief of staff to President Nixon. As Ronald Reagan's first Secretary of State Hai intend d t tration instead chose quieter options. covert aid to anti- government guerrillas in Nicaragua ,and stepped-up mili- terry aid. to the government of 1-:1 Salvador. Enders supported both-and also backed a process of negotiation with leftists and pressure for human rights Teform in II- Sahvador to an extent that aroused suspicion among the Administration's hardest liners. Enders's personal and management style did not en- dear him to his adversaries. He is an imperious, icy man who at six foot-eight acts as though he is used -to looking down at other people. One State Department official said, "If Enders had done the same things he did, but had the personality of George Shultz, he'd still be here. The Rea- ganites like to sit around comfortably and talk about things. You can't do that with Enders present." Enders also is described as "extremely turf conscious," unwilling or unable to delegate authority, and disrespectful of other people's prerogatives. "The White House felt that Enders, not Shultz, was running Latin American policy," one aide. said. "Enders really didn't report to anvbodv."Il!Jheh _ Ci:A Director Casey wanted State to release new data bn Communist supply lines to El Salvador; .Enders sat on the_ -'information"-. and '-deprecated rt?_as - "warmed-over left-' military solutions. Clark, instinctively hardline, has not ` overs" He got it into his head tharSpanish Prime Minister stolen power, but he has demonstrated that he has it. 'Felitse~Gonzales could be brought into Central America Shur, more of a moderate, has vet to show that he can get diplomacy and flew off to see him without consulting anyone, leading the White House to decree that hence- forth no one travels without permission- From the standpoint.of Enders's friends at State and -elsewhere, the issues over which he was ousted transcend style and concern methods of implementing polity. They say he wanted to conduct it as quietly as possible, so as not to arouse public and congressional opposition, whereas others,-: including Ambassador Kirkpatrick, wanted to crystallize: issues and confront and defeat the opposition. , Approved For Release 2007/12/05: CIA-RDP85M00364R002204260012-6 Approved For Release 2007/12/05: CIA-RDP85M00364R002204260012-6 They say that Enders wanted the United States to maintain a negotiating "track" in order to mollify domestic and foreign critics of American policy and to put the onus for refusing to talk on the Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the leftist opposition in El Salvador. I N EARLY FEBRUARY Enders wrote a memo recom- mending a "two-track" policy of military aid and nego- tiation, an account of which was leaked by Enders's en- ernies in the White House to 7 -he Washington Post with the allegation that Enders favored talks that would lead to a coalition government ("power sharing") between right and left. in El Salvador. Power-sharing negotiations, fa- vored by many liberals as a means to stop the killing, are regarded in the Administration as a formula for eventual Communist takeover. Enders's allies deny he favored any such thing and that his February memo explicitly favored negotiations only concerning the terms for participation in forthcoming Salvadoran elections. One other official, however, says that the exact nature of the negotiations were left vague, "which is very strange for someone who has made his reputation as a crisp memo writer." about a new assignment--not. reportedly, the one he got as ambassador to Spain-but Clark told him his departure would be asked for when it was desired. CORDING to N.S.C_ officials, at no time was Clark ti. usurping the prerogatives of Shultz as Secretary of State, even though Shultz reportedly is "frustrated" at Clark's interventions in his department. N.S.C. officials, say that, unlike Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski before him-and to the displeasure of some members of his staff-Clark has resolutely refused to have his subordi- nates chair interagency committees, leaving that function to representatives of regular departments of government. . Clark is said to respect fully the delineations of authority. spelled out in N.S.C. decision directives allotting oper- ational responsibility over foreign policy to State. But when Enders was late getting things done, when Clark found that too many meetings had to be conducted in the White House., and when things didn't improve either on the battlefield in Central America or in American public opinion; aides say Clark was forced to step in. Some of Enders's foes were prepared to believe the policy to the public, the press, Congress, and world opin= worst about Enders's intentions, contending that career ion--4s an especially troublesome item for the Administra- foreign service officers as a breed are trained to "yield lion. Clark, for one, had hoped that when Pope John Paul firmly" even when vital U.S. interests are involved. Some visited El Salvador in early March and when;the-Salva- of Enders's friends suspect Kirkpatrick and others of pur- suing dark hidden agendas, too. One of them said, "Some people want an elegant defeat that can be blamed. on post- Vietnam attitudes and constraints by Congress," leading perhaps to a "who lost Central America" campaign. From.the National Security Council perspective, the is- sues leading to Enders's replacement are described not as ideological or tactical, but managerial. William Clark did not like what he was seeing in cables from Central Amer- ica and in what he was forced to include in the President's daily briefing. Beginning last fall, one official said, "It appeared that the government of El Salvador was not winning on the battlefield." Clark ordered an "intense review" conducted through several channels, including a so-called "core group," chaired by Enders and made up of officials from several agencies. The President himself be- came increasingly involved personally, especially after his. trip to Latin America in December gave him an opportuni- tv to sit in little rooms with presidents and generals and discuss chopper parts and the security situation and get a real feel for the situation on the ground." In January and February Clark brought Ambassador James Theberge up to Washington from his post in Chile to review the Central America situation. Clark sent Kirk- patrick on a fact-finding tour of Central America. Clark also had former Florida Senator Richard Stone hired as a State Deparrmerrt consultant for congressional relations and public diplomacy. And about the same time,. Enders's memo was leaked. Enders approached Clark and asked doran government announced a speed-up in holding elec- tions this year, Congress would somehow be inspired to vote the. additional military aid- that the president had requested. This didn't happen, and it was decided that.the President should address a joint session of Congress to request the money. At the same time, Clark decided that Enders had to go. In the process of debating what should .be in Reagan's April 27 speech. Kirkpatrick urged a "Mar- shallPlan"-a large economic and humanitarian aid pack- age for the region. Enders opposed it on grounds that Congress would never approve the money. Enders won the point, but fueled Kirk-Patrick's hostility. One should not weep too long over Tom Enders. Spain is a choice post--a pleasant-place to live and increasingly important as a forthcoming member of NATO and the Eu- ropean Common Market. Getting fared after a policy dis- pute with hardliners probably has cleansed Enders's repu- tation of its Cambodia bombing stain, and when Democrats or moderate Republicans come back to power, he might even be on the short list for the highest-ranking career post in the State Department, the undersecretarv- ship for political affairs currently held by Lawrence Eagle- burger. In watercooler handicapping around the State De- partment, Enders has three principal rivals for that post- Ambassador to Israel Sam Lewis, former Ambassador to Venezuela William Luers, and,former Ambassador to Ni- geria Thomas Pickering. Luers had -wanted Spain, but Enders got it instead, and Pickering is headed off to El Salvador, a dangerous place to both persons and careers. Approved For Release 2007/12/05: CIA-RDP85M00364R002204260012-6 Approved For Release 2007/12/05: CIA-RDP85M00364R002204260012-6 According to both State Department and White House officials, Enders's replacement by Langhorne Motley was designed to restore operational control over Central America policy back to State. Motley, an Alaska Republi- can who grew up in Brazil and had been Reagan's ambas- sador there, is regarded as an effective diplomat and politi-- cal operator and was supported for the Enders job by both Clark and Shultz. During the time it takes Motley to staff up the Latin America bureau-Enders, doing most of the bureau's work himself, was short of deputies-Eagle- burger is to oversee Latin policy for Shultz. The replacement of Deane Hinton as ambassador to El Salvador this summer had been slated for months. Hinton once ran afoul of the White House for openly attacking human rights abuses in El Salvador, but. he is generally regarded as having performed courageous service under enormous pressure. Because State wanted Negroponte to replace Hinton, Shultz reportedly recommended a "daisy chain" of diplomatic changes in Central America to the White House, including also the ambassadors to Costa Rica and Guatemala, who also were due for rotation..The White House vetoed Negroponte because it feared his confirmation hearings would turn into "a circus." Negro- ponte often is accused of masterminding the U.S. "secret war" against Nicaragua from his embassy in Honduras. THE ENDERS STORY was about to leak, so Shultz announced it aboard Air Force One on the way to the Williamsburg summit. Then. Hinton's departure:- was leaked along with- the misinformation that he would be replaced by a retired admiral, Gerald Thomas, currently ambassador to Guyana-.Days before, actually, Thomas had been contacted about a' new post -and said that he would do as the President asked, but preferred Kenya to 7E1 Salvador. Because of all the -leaks and because some unidentified White House ignoramus maligned the entire foreign service in a crack to The Washington Pcst that "you don't handle Central American policies with tea and crum- pets on the diplomatic circuit," it was decided to hold up on announcement of other embassy replacements. N.S.C. aides like to represent Clark as. mainly a loyal servant of Ronald Reagan, but others in the Administra- tion say he has acquired views of his own. One State Department official points out that Clark's wife is a refu- gee from Czechoslovakia and that his attitudes toward communism reflects hers. "Clark and Reagan have similar views, not backed by much information," one Adminis- tration official said. 'Deane Kirkpatrick adds information and they all reach the same conclusion: that a Soviet- backed, Cuban-assisted effort is underway to overthrow the governments of Central America, and that because of the history of the region, the poverty and injustice, there is a great opportunity for this. They think it is central to U.S. interests that this not happen and they are not going to let it happen." How far will the United States go? The Reagan Adaeinis- tration's formal policy-and obvious hope-is that large numbers of U.S. advisers or combat troops will not be. necessary. Scenarios are being discussed at lower levels, though, .under which one?or the