REGROUP TO CHECK THE SOVIET THRUST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R002204270013-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: April 22, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2007/12/19: CIA-RDP85M00364R002204270013-4
ARTICLE APPEA:?.::
ON PAGE 2
WALL STRFFT JOURNAL
22 APPIL 1983
Regroup to Check the Soviet Thrust
By WILLIAM J. CASEY
The effects of American defeats in Viet-
nam and Iran undermined the confidence
of U.S. friends and allies in the Third
World (and Europe and Japan) and en-
sured that the Soviet Union would see in
the Third World its principal foreign-policy
opportunities for years to come.
The Soviets themselves suffered set-
backs in the 1960s and early '70s in the
Third World. They suffered one setback af-
tef-another in Africa. They saw their hopes
in Smith America dashed by the overthrow
of Salvador Allende in Chile and they were
humiliatingly expelled from Egypt in 1972.
When they. turned again to the Third World
I in 1975, itas with a strategy designed to
minimize the chance of a repetition of
those setbacks. The strategy, enriched and
strengthened over several years, is realis-
tic and calculated to exploit effectively
both events and opportunities.
First, shown the way by Castro in An-
gria,- the Soviets helped him consolidate
the radical power of the MPLA there, cre-
ating a government dependent on Soviet
and Guban support for survival. This was
followed by the dispatch of thousands of
C:ubar. troops to Ethiopia. Unlike Sadat,
neither the MPLA nor Mengistu could af-
ford to order the Cubans and Soviets out.
In, the new strategy, the principal,
obviqus role in Third World countries
wouia be played by another Third World
state-Libya, Vietnam, Nicaragua. No su-
perpower would be seen to be guiding or
arming or directing the radical forces at
work; the host government would be main-
tained by foreign advisers and troops who
couldn't be expelled in the event of a
change of heart. Additionally, it was a
strategy that made (and makes) any di-.
rect response by the West appear neo-im-
perialistic.
Second, when radical governments
came to power, the Soviets directly or
through their surrogates helped establish
an internal-security structure to ensure
that any challenge from within would be
stamped out. There would be no more Al-
lendes. Sometimes it worked, as in Ethio-
. pia and Angola, and sometimes there was
not enough time, as in Jamaica.
Third, the Soviets supplemented these
tactics with their more traditional offer-
ings, such as technical and political train-
ing in the U.S.S.R., the rapid supply of
weapons and the use of propaganda and
subversion to support friends or help desta-
bilize unfriendly governments.
Launching Its Own Forces
Fourth, where a vacuum existed or the
costs and risks were low, the U.S.S.R.
proved still willing to launch its own forces
at targets on its periphery-Afghanistan,
and perhaps elsewhere when and if cir-
cumstances seem right.
Fifth, the Soviets advised new radical
regimes to mute their revolutionary rheto-
' ric and to try to keep their links to Western
commercial resources, foreign assistance
and international financial institutions.
Moscow's ambitions did not cloud recogni-
tion that it could not afford more economic
dependents such as Cuba and Vietnam.
This strategy has worked. A Soviet Un-
ion that had found itself in 1972 without
major successes-except for the survival
of the Castro regime-and with many fail-
ures in the Third World after two decades
of effort could count the following achieve-
ments by the end of 1982:
? Victory in Vietnam ?. and Hanoi's con-
solidation of power in all of Indochina.
? New radical regimes in Ethiopia, An-
gola and Nicaragua.
? Possession of Afghanistan, a Russian
goal for over a century.
? Cuban control of Grenada (and new
military facilities there for support of fur-
ther subversion).
? An active insurgency in El Salvador,
where U.S. support of the elected govern-
ment has rekindled old Vietnam memo-
ries.
? Nicaraguan support of revolutionary
violence in Honduras and Guatemala, as
well as El Salvador.
? U.S. expulsion from Iran, which,
though not through any Soviet action, rep-
resented a major strategic gain for the
U.S.S.R.
? Rapid progress toward Cuban control
of Suriname, the first breakthrough on the
South American continent.
? Pro-Western regimes under siege in
Chad and the Sudan.
Beyond these successes, the Soviets
could see opportunities, actual or potential,
Any effort to counter
the Soviets in the Third
World will fail unless Con-
gress is a party to the execu-
tive's thinking and plan-
ning-all along the way.
to achieve their objectives in many other
places.
The U.S. needs a realistic counter-strat-
egy. Many components of that strategy
also are familiar, though they must be ap-
proached and linked in new ways. The
measures needed to address the Soviet
challenge in the Third World have the ad-
ditional appeal that they represent also a
sensible American approach to the Third.
World whether or not the U.S.S.R. is in-
volved :
1. We have too often neglected our
friends and neutrals in Africa, the Middle
East, Latin America and Asia until they
became a problem or were threatened by
developments we considered hostile to our
interests. The Third World now buys 40%
of our exports; that alone is reason enough
to pay greater attention to'the problems of
the less developed countries (LDCs) before
we confront coups, insurgencies or instabil-
ity. The priority of the Third World in our
overall foreign policy must be raised and
sustained. The executive branch must do
more to educate the public, the Congress
and Third World governments about Soviet
strategy in the LDCs generally.
2. The U.S. must establish priorities in
major commitments. President Nixon
wanted to rely on key regional states as
bulwarks for stability and peace. There
are some dangers in this approach (Iran
was to be the key state in the Persian
Gulf), but it is generally sensible. If our
early help fails to prevent serious trouble,
for which countries are we prepared to put
our chips on the table? We should choose
ahead of time and in consultation with key
members of committees of Congress so
that their support at crucial moments is
more likely. Great losing battles for for-
eign military sales and economic assis-
tance, played out on the world stage and at
critical times, represent devastating set-
backs for the U.S. with ramifications going
far beyond the affected -country.
We Need a Constant Policy
3. We must be prepared to demand
firmly but tactfully and privately that our
friends observe certain standards of be-
havior with regard to basic human rights.
It is required by our own principles and es-
sential to political support in the U.S.
Moreover, we have to be willing to talk
straight to those we would help about is-.
sues they must address to block foreign ex-
ploitation of their problems-issues such as
land reform, corruption and the like. We
need to show how the Soviets have ex-
ploited such vulnerabilities elsewhere to
good effect to make clear we aren't.
preaching out of cultural arrogance but
are making recommendations based on ex-
perience.
QN =, V -UP D
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We need to be ready to help our
friends defend themselves. We can train
them in counterinsurgency tactics and up-
grade their communications, mobility and
intelligence services. We need changes in
our foreign-military-sales laws to permit
the U.S. to provide arms more quickly. We
also need to change our military procure-ment policies so as to have stocks of cer-
tain basic kinds of weapons more readily
available.
5. We must find a way to mobilize and
use our greatest asset in the Third World-
private business. Few in the Third World
wish to adopt the Soviet economic system.,
Neither we nor the Soviets can offer unlim-
ited or even large-scale economic assis-,
tance to the LDCs. Investment is the key to
economic success or at least survival in
the Third World and we, our NATO allies
and Japan need to develop a common
strategy to promote investment in the
Third World. The Soviets are helpless to:
compete with private capital in these coun-'
tries.
6. Finally, the executive branch needs
to collaborate more closely in the setting of
strategy with key members and commit-
tees of Congress. Too often opportunities to
counter the Soviets have been lost by
clashes between the two branches. The in-'
dependent stand of Congress is a fact of
life, and any effort to counter the Soviets
in the Third World will fail unless Congress
is a party to the executive's thinking and
planning-all along the way. Support for a
Third World policy must be bipartisan and
stable.
Without a sustained, constant policy ap-
plied over a number of years, we cannot
counter the relentless pressure of the
U.S.S.R. in the Third World. It is past time
for the American government-executive
and Congress-to take the Soviet challenge
in the Third World seriously and to develop
a broad, integrated strategy for countering
it. It will be the principal U.S.-Soviet bat-
tleground for many years to come.
Mr. Casey is director of the Central In-
telle`gence Agency.
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