MEETING THE SOVIET CHALLENGE IN THE THIRD WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R002204280061-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2007
• Sequence Number: 61
• Publication Date: April 18, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2007/12/19: CIA-RDP85M00364R002204280061-0
Memo for Record:
called and requested special courier
to send attached to Wall Street Journal,
Had to get there before 3 PM_ today,
This cy came from
STAT
office, STAT
no cover note or nothing elese.
STAT
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 Approved For Release 2007/12/19: CIA-RDP85M00364R002204280061-0
MEETING THE SOVIET CHALLENGE IN THE THIRD WORLD
The effects of American defeats in Vietnam and Iran undermined the
confidence of US friends and allies in the Third World (and Europe and Japan)
and ensured that the Soviet Union would see in the Third World its principal
foreign policy opportunities for years to come.
The Soviets themselves suffered setbacks in the 1960s and early 70s in
the Third World. They suffered one setback after another in Africa. They
saw their hopes in South America dashed by the overthrow of Salvador Allende
in Chile and were humiliatingly expelled from Egypt in 1972. When they turned
again to the Third World in 1975, it was with a strategy designed to minimize
the chance of a repetition of those setbacks. The strategy, enriched and
strengthened over several years, is realistic and calculated to exploit
effectively both events and opportunities.
-- First, shown the way by Castro in Angola, they helped him consolidate
the radical power of the MPLA there, creating a government dependent on Soviet
and Cuban support for survival. This was followed by the dispatch of thousands
of Cuban troops to Ethiopia. Unlike Sadat, neither the MPLA nor Mengistu
could afford to order the Cubans and Soviets out. In the new strategy, the
principal, obvious role in Third World countries would be played by another
Third World state--Libya, Vietnam, Nicaragua. No superpower would be seen to
.be guiding or arming or directing the radical forces at work; the host government
would be maintained by foreign advisors and troops who could not be expelled.
It was a strategy that made (and makes) any direct response appear neo-
imperialistic, and a change of heart by the host government difficult if not
impossible.
-- Second, when radical governments come to power, the Soviets directly
or through their surrogates help establish an internal security structure to
ensure that any challenge from within would be stamped out. There would be no
more Allendes. Sometimes it worked--as in Ethiopia and Angola, and sometimes
there was not enough time--as in Jamaica.
-- Third, the Soviets continued tc supplement these tactics with
its more traditional offerings, such as techical (and political) training in
the USSR; the rapid supply of weapons; and,1he use of propaganda and subversion
to support friends or help destabilize unfriendly governments.
-- Fourth, where a vacuum existed or the costs and risks were 16w',
the USSR proved still willing to launch its.own forces at targets on its periphery--
Afghanistan, and perhaps elsewhere when and if circumstances seem right.
-- Fifth, the Soviets advised new radical regimes to mute their
revolutionary rhetoric and to try to keep their links to Western commercial
resources, foreign assistance, and international financial institutions.
Moscow's ambitions did not cloud recognition that it could not afford more
economic dependents such as Cuba and Vietnam.
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This strategy has worked. A Soviet Union that had found itself in
1972 without major successes and with many failures in the Third World after
two decades of effort. could count the following achievements by.the end of
1982, ten years later:
-- Victory in Vietnam and Hanoi's consolidation of power in all
of Indochina.
-- New radical regimes in Ethiopia, Angola, and Nicaragua.
-- Possession of Afghanistan, a Russian goal for over a century.
-- Cuban control of Grenada (and new military facilities there
for support of further subversion).
-- An active insurgency in El Salvador where US assistance had
rekindled old Vietnam memories.
-- Nicaraguan support of revolutionary violence in Honduras and
Guatemala, as well as El Salvador.
-- US expulsion from Iran, which, though not through any Soviet
action, represented a major strategic gain for the USSR.
-- Rapid progress toward Cuban control of Suriname, the first
breakthrough on the South American continent.
-- Pro-Western regimes under siege in Chad and the Sudan.
Beyond these successes, the Soviets could see opportunities, actual or
potential, to achieve its objectives in many other places.
The US is in need of a realistic counter-strategy. Many components of
that strategy also are familiar, though they must be approached and linked in
new ways. The measures needed to address the Soviet challenge in the Third
World have the additional appeal that they represent also a sensible American
approach to the Third World whether or not the USSR is involved: '
1. We have too often neglected our friends and neutrals in Africa, the
Middle East, Latin America, and Asia until they become a problem or are threatened
by developments we consider hostile to our interests. The Third World now
buys 40 percent of our exports; that alone is reason enough to pay greater.
attention to the problems of the LDCs before we confront coups, insurgencies,
or instability. Except when we confront a situation we consider dangerous to
ourselves, the Third World has been a very low priority. The priority of the
Third World in our overall foreign policy must be raised and sustained. The
Executive Branch must do more to educate the public, the Congress, and Third
World governments about Soviet strategy in the LDCs generally.
2. The US must establish for itself priorities in terms of major commit-
ments. President Nixon wanted to rely on key regional states as bulwarks for
stability and keeping the peace. There are some dangers in this approach
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(Iran was to be the key state in the Persian Gulf), but it is generally a
sensible strategy. If our early help fails to prevent serious trouble, for
which countries are we prepared to put our chips on the table? We should choose
ahead of time and in consultation with key members or committees of Congress
so that their support at crucial moments is more likely. Great losing battles
for FMS, economic assistance, and the like, played out on the world stage
and at critical times represent devastating setbacks for the US with ramifications
going far beyond the affected country.
3. We must be prepared to demand firmly but tactfully and privately that
our friends observe certain standards of behavior with regard to basic human
rights. It is required by our own principles and essential to political support
in the US. Moreover, we have to be willing to talk straight to those we would
help about issues they must address to block foreign exploitation of their
problems--issues such as land reform, corruption, and the like. We need to
show how the Soviets have exploited such vulnerabilities elsewhere to good
effect to make clear we are not preaching out of cultural arrogance but are
making recommendations based on experience elsewhere.
4. We need to be ready to help our friends defend themselves. We can
train them in counterinsurgency tactics and upgrade their communications,
mobility and intelligence. We need changes in our foreign military sales laws
to permit the US to provide arms more quickly. We also need to change our
military procurement policies so as to have stocks of certain basic kinds of
weapons more readily available.
5. We must find a way to mobilize and use our greatest asset in the
Third World--private business. Few in the Third World wish to adopt the Soviet
economic system. Neither we nor the Soviets can offer unlimited or even large-
scale economic assistance to the LDCs. Investment is the key to economic success
or at least survival in the Third World and we, our NATO allies and Japan need
to develop a common strategy to promote investment in the Third World. The
Soviets are helpless to compete with private capital in these countries. The
US needs to explore incentives to encourage the private sector to play a greater
role in the LDCs, especially in countries of key importance.
6. Finally, the Executive Branch needs to collaborate more closely in
the setting of strategy with key members and committees of Congress. Too often
opportunities to counter the Soviets have been lost by clashes between the two
Branches. The independent stand of Congress is a fact of life, and any effort
to counter the Soviets in the Third World will fail unless the Congress is
made a party to the Executive's thinking and planning--all along t:he way.
Support for a Third World policy must be bi-partisan and stable.
Without a sustained, constant policy applied over a number of years, we
cannot counter the relentless pressure of the USSR in the Third World. It is
past time for the American Government--Executive and Congress--to take the
Soviet challenge in the Third World seriously and to develop a broad, integrated
strategy for countering it. It will be the principal US-Soviet battleground
for many years to come.
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