PAKISTAN: IMPLICATIONS OF MILITARY COMMITMENTS TO ARAB STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00364R002404760068-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: September 14, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

Approved For Release 2008/02/27: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404760068-8
SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 September 1983
Pakistan: Implications of Military Commitments to Arab States
Pakistan's approximately 18,000 military personnel stationed
in the middle East and North Africa are becoming an important
vehicle for achievement of Islamabad's foreign policy goals.
Pakistan has reaped significant benefits from the program,
according to our analysis:
-- Salary remittances have provided an economic boost.
-- Islamabad has acquired new sources of arms procurement.
-- Pakistan has become one of the largest non-Arab recipients
of financial support from the oil-rich Arab states.
-- Pakistan's military personnel have gained valuable
training on advanced Western and Soviet military
equipment--including Soviet aircraft--which has given them
a better understandin the capabilities of the Indian
Air Force.
We believe the military assistance, however, also carries
risks:
The longer the Pakistani troops stay abroad, the greater
the risk that Pakistan will become embroiled in local or
regional conflicts to which it is not a party.
Pakistan's international image is tarnished by charges
that it provides "soldiers for hire" to radical regimes
such as Libya.
morale within the armed forces
could be damaged by the disparity between overseas
d
an
domestic salaries and by discrimination against Pakistani
Shi
a personnel by the recipient countries.
This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division,
f' a of Near Eastern and South Asian Anal sis
In ormat~on as
of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper.
Comments and queries are welcome ans should be addressed to
Approved For Release 2008/02/27: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404760068-8
 Approved For Release 2008/02/27: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404760068-8
SECRET
We judge Pakistan will continue and may even expand its
military ties with the Middle East in order to ensure Arab
political support and economic assistance. In our view, as long
as Pakistani personnel demonstrate competence and Pakistan
maintains a stable and moderate government with Islamic
credentials, there will be a market for its military personnel in
the Middle East and North Africa. We believe that concern over
external and internal threats to stability brought on by the
strife in Lebanon, the continuing Iran/Iraq conflict, and Iran's
Shia religious fanaticism might well prompt the Gulf states to
request even larger foreign military contingents.
Our analysis suggests, however, that several factors could
slow an expansion of military ties or lead to a reduction in
requests for military assistance:
-- The limited capacity of the recipient countries to absorb
more military personnel.
-- Competition from other states to supply military advisers.
The risk that Pakistan could be drawn into regional
conflicts.
-- The limited number of skilled technical personnel in
Pakistan.
The United States generally benefits from Pakistan's
military assistance program. Cooperation between Islamabad and
the Arab States strengthens the military establishments of
moderate governments while dampening Pakistan's financial demands
on the United States and minimizing the US visibility in this
sensitive region. Only in the training of Libyan pilots and
small numbers of Palestinian guerrillas do Pakistan's military
ties run counter to US interests. We assess that a setback to
the military assistance program, accompanied by a reduction in
Arab economic assistance to Pakistan, would increase political
and economic strains in Pakistan and increase Islamabad's
requests for US economic and military aid.
Approved For Release 2008/02/27: CIA-RDP85M00364R002404760068-8