TRANSMITTAL OF FY-83 PRODUCTION ENHANCEMENT PROPOSALS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85M00816R001100160001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 10, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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OFIFII(C] OF THE iID IRE(CTOJ .
NA?TlONAIL )FOIRIEII(C`N ASSJCOMIEN?T (CJN?TIEIP1
C
8 June 1981
BATE FOR: D/NFAC
THRU : C/H?S
This is the 83 Enhancement package.
It will be followed later this week by the
progress reports on prior year
enhancements.
Note Tab I of Attachment A. It is
the writeup on our "Systems Dynamics"
idea. OPA prepared the text,
although he is not optimistic about
successful use of such techniques on NFAC
problems.
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LuKt I a,ta+a_v s
J
NFAC #3433-81
1 0 iu;i 1981,
MEMORANDUM FOR: Comptroller
SUBJECT Transmittal of FY-83 Production Enhancement Proposals
REFERENCE Your memo, dated 17 April 1981, same subject.
1. This memorandum forwards NFAC's FY-83 Production
Enhancement Proposals (Attachment A). As requested in the
reference, they are in priority order according to their
potential value to NFAC.
2. In addition, we have reviewed proposals prepared by
ORD. Their titles are listed as Attachment B, and they also are
prioritized according to their potential value to CIA's
production process.
3. Attachment C provides our rankings of the ORD proposals
when they are combined with ours. The fact that most of ORD's
have been ranked below our own should not be interpreted to mean
they are without merit. Rather, it indicates our view of their
relative potential value. If other components have submitted FY-
83 proposals, we request an opportunity for review and ranking
against our own.
4. Should you require further information, please contact
of PMES.
5. All portions of this memorandum are classified SECRET.
John McMahon
Attachment:
As stated
.,aka;,-~qq~
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SECRET
NFAC FY-83
Production Enhancement Proposals
Attachment A
.($000)
Tab FY-83
A PMES Computer for Experimentation
with Large Computation.Intensi~
Applications
B OPA Exploiting Political and
Social Data
C .OGSR Nonfuel Mineral Supply-
Demand Data Base
D OER Computer Technology Research
E OSWR Weapons Intelligence
Analysis Center
F OSR/ Center for the Study of Soviet
OSWR Naval Tactical Warfare
G OGSR Spatial Data Analysis Project
H OER Industrial Analysis Forum
I PMES Systems Modeling Center
FY-84
FY-85
C cr%n [T
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LL)INriuCiv i IHL
I. Project Title: Computer for Experimentation with Large
Computation Intensive Applications
Submitting Agency: CIA
II. Costs: 25X1
III. Description of Project:
A. Statement of Need:
Several NFAC offices have requirements for
experimentation with large computation intensive computer
applications. Large computer models such as OGSR's
CHALLENGE, some of OER's econometric models and some of OSWR's
and OSR's systems/models require large amounts of
mainframe computer processing time (some require
hours). Consequently, the number of computer runs is
limited to at most a few per work day and, in some cases,
is limited to a single overnight run. Such delays reduce
the overall amount of experimentation and exploitation
that can be done with these models. They also constrain
the ability to develop and subsequently run in a
production mode. A solution to this problem, and for
many computation intensive applications of this type, is
a high speed digital processor with parallel processing
of heterogeneous data. Such processors have been under
development for several years and are just now beginning
to enter the commercial marketplace. They have execution
speeds of 10 to 160 million instructions per second,
which compares to about five million instructions per
second for ODP's largest IBM mainframe. Such speeds
would reduce processing time by factors of up to 30 and
be able to execute different instructions on multiple
data streams simultaneously. This represents a
significant advance in computer architecture. (U)
B. Who Will Accomplish?
ODP will install and operate the parallel
processor. NFAC'requirements for the processor will be
coordinated through the NFAC ADP Control Officer. (U)
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CONFIDENTIAL
C. What is to be Installed?
A high speed digital processor with parallel
processing of heterogeneous data elements is to be
installed for experimentation with large computation
intensive applications. (U)
D. Payoff
The payoff of such a processor to NFAC production
offices will be substantial. For example:
o The OER linked econometric model of
major western economies now requires
over 30 CPU minutes per run and gets
currently about a single run turn-around
per work day.
o The OGSR CHALLENGE model now requires
30-60 CPU minutes per run and gets
currently about a single run (or several
late night runs) turn-around per work
day.
These are but two examples of NFAC applications that
will be considered for the parallel processor. The
processor can provide for quicker and much more frequent
turn-around of applications such as these. It will
facilitate experimentation and allow for more
exploitation of data due to timing considerations.
Analysts will be able to, on one hand, be more
speculative and be able to, on the other hand, do more
fine tuning of applications when they are able to turn
jobs such as these around in minutes rather than hours.
,In the case of CHALLENGE, over 100 runs are required to
fine tune a new version of the model. One run (or
several late night runs) turn-around of the model per day
is very restrictive. The more timely the runs, the
quicker the feedback, and the more experimentation
analysts can perform. (C)
E. Time Phasing
In the first year we will bring in the basic
parallel processor system and begin experimentation with
appropriate existing applications on the system. In the
second year we will expand the hardware to accommodate
more experimentation with new applications. (U)
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CONFIDENTIAL
IV. Intelligence Community Applicability
Information on our experience with such a device, from a
technical standpoint will be available to the Intelligence
Community. We will also make available software and system
information--barring proprietary limitations. (U)
V. Intelligence Consumer Benefits
Increased experimentation with and usage of computation
intensive applications will improve and broaden the scope of
our intelligence product and consequently will benefit
consumers. (U)
VI. Probability of Success
The probability of success,is high. High speed parallel
processors of the type described above should be available by
FY 1983 from industry to provide incredibly fast processing
times for many computation intensive computer applications.
Such processors will provide a practical means for
experimentation with large computation intensive
applications. (U)
CONFIDENTIAL
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Submitting Agency: CIA
II. COSTS:
A. Statement of need:
Intelligence analysis is often constrained by limitations in
readily available data. To the degree that information is
difficult to identify and manipulate, it will not be incorporated
in intelligence production. In practice, this has meant that a
vast array of political and social information--on public opinion,
social trends, and domestic confict--has remained largely untapped
by NFAC analysts. When analysts assess political and social
conditions, such as the potential for political instability, the
effectiveness of foreign government policies, or support for its
foreign policy, they, therefore, often rely on incomplete
information.
This situation calls for the creation of a unique intelligence
resource: a data archive of important political and social
information and the means for anal sts to easily use this
i o ma a e-se
data readily accessible by analysts, an extensive interactive
computer software system would need to be developed. The result
would be an archive more extensive and timely than any that
currently exists in either the public or private sector; one with
sophisticated retrieval and analysis capabilities that would
significantly enhance the depth and quality of NFAC analysis.
B. Current status:
The Intelligence Community is embarking upon an extensive effort
to upgrade its capabilities to monitor socioeconomic trends in
foreign countries through increased use of external data bases,
such as those of the Bureau of the Census, and by more intensive
analysis of these data. This is a vital effort. Rarely, however,
can one infer political consequences from socioeconomic trends
alone. To make this linkage, we need an in-house capability to
store and retrieve not only socioeconomic information, but also
information of a more political nature as well. For example, the
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historical relationship between inflation rate and a leader's
popularity or the incidence of domestic protest could be quickly
measured statistically and graphically. More complex models would
lead to forecasts of stability within a country.
The rapidly-increasing availability of information in
computerized formats, the projected arrival of large numbers of
computer terminals in NFAC offices, the development of analytic
aids through ORD's Intelligence Production Laboratory project, and
Agency acquisition of sophisticated computer graphics systems will
soon make possible a thorough and systematic exploitation of
political and social data. These new data and analysis tools will
be of particular importance for the new political instability and
terrorism analysts in NFAC.
C. What is required:
External research funds will be used to hire outside contractors
to complete four basic tasks:
1) Development of a computer software system that will allow
analysts to make queries regarding the availability of data on
their country or issue and conduct simple statistical analyses.
This would involve the capability to interface with computer
packages -- including graphics support -- already available on the
Agency's computer system or currently under development. The
computer software development is vital if maximum utility is to be
derived from these data. The system we envisage would permit the
analyst to specify a country, region, or issue and receive at the
terminal an inventory of available archive data by time period.
The system would then query the analyst about his or her interests.
At each point, the analyst would make choices, receive results,
process data statistically or graphically, save files, and
otherwise manipulate the data in an interactive way. Only by
making the information readily available and easily usable will its
full benefit be realized.
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3) Transcription of socioeconomic data and election returns from
published documents to computerized formats.
4) Coding of politically relevant events, such as acts of
terrorism, insurgency and government reprisal within countries.
OPA currently has such a file in the archive on 136 countries for
the period 1948 to 1977. The contractor would bring the file up to
date.
D. Implementation and timing:
We do not anticipate that these tasks will be implemented by the
same contractor. OPA will have overall responsibility. The
computer software development will be done in consultation with
ODP. It is assumed that major portions of that work will have to-
be contracted out, since the task is likely to exceed ODP's'
available resources. External contractors are the most appropriate
means for data collection and preparation because of the need to
develop an extensive set of historical files at the beginning.
Once the historical baseline has been developed, the archive will
be updated and maintained in-house, supplemented by a minor
investment of office external analysis funds when required.
If this project is funded, the OPA will conduct an ADP
requirements study during FY82 and locate, through competitive
bidding, contractors able to perform the related tasks, so that
there would be no delay in getting started in FY83.
The archive would constitute a unique resource within the
Intelligence Community that could be used by NFAC analysts via
their SAFE terminal in either VM or Batch mode, but would also
support requests for analysis from DIA and State. The computer-
based retrieval and analysis capability will be developed with such
flexibility that additional data bases could be added to the system
in the future. OER's TRADAR data base, for example, will be linked
to this system.
The development of an archive of this sort responds directly to
one of the basic issues involved in improving the quality of
analysis--namely, insuring the systematic analysis of the most
comprehensive data available. Consumers would benefit by getting
products whose judgments are derived from the best available
information.
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SECRET-I 4 25X1
While the data archive would be a unique resource, there are no
known technical or administrative obstacles to its development. We
anticipate that a significant amount of time would be needed to
familiarize analysts with its capabilities and use.
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-I
I , PRrOJECI' TITLE : Nonfuel Mineral Supply-Demand Data Base
Sumitting Agency: CIA
II. COSTS:
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
a. Statement of need:
There is a persistent and justifiable Federal policy concern
with the vulnerability of the United States and its allies to
interruptions in the imports of nonfuel minerals that are critical
to the maintenance of defense or essential civilian production or to
the general strength of the Western economies. The United States,
Western Europe, and Japan all import. more than 90 percent of their
requirements of such important minerals as manganese, cobalt,
chromium, and bauxite; interruptions would severely affect steel
production (manganese), stainless steel output (chromium), and the
manufacture. of jet engines (cobalt and chromium), among other
industries. The United States is also dependent on imports of
columbium, tantalum, and platinum, which are critical to such
industries as jet engine manufacture, metal working, electronics,
and petroleum refining.
The risks of supply disruption are magnified by the restricted
availability of these minerals: chromium?comes overwhelmingly from
South Africa, platinum-group metals mainly from South Africa and the
USSR, manganese from Gabon and South Africa, cobalt from Zaire and
Zambia, and tantalum from southeast Asia. In short, these and other
critical minerals are disproportionately imported from areas that
are especially subject to instability or politically motivated
supply interruption.
In response to this problem, the Agency has intermittently
carried out ad hoc analyses of particular mineral supply or
contingency situations, and its Resource Analysis Branch (ERAD/OGSR)
has initiated a series of System Dynamics modeling efforts designed
for systematic evaluation of the many influences, including
political and commercial, that impinge or may impinge on the
international flow of important nonfuel minerals. Such efforts,
however, are hampered by the lack of comprehensive, systematically
compiled and coordinated governmental and private information
bearing on future nonfuel mineral consumption and supply. It is
believed that the proposed effort would greatly enhance the
potential for quicker, more penetrating,?and more reliable
evaluative efforts. While a'substantial 6ammitment of resources
would be needed to establish the system,the maintenance cost should
be relatively modest.
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b. Who will accomplish:
The proposed data base would be maintained by Resource Analysis
(RA) Branch staff after having been established as the result of
both staff and contract efforts. It would rely largely on already
ongoing effort, in the sense that it would combine and coordinate
those relevant governmental and, possibly, commercial data bases
already in existence or under development. Crude data and
intelligence that is reported currently in a variety of open and
classified sources would also be assimilated and coordinated.
c. What is to be developed:
The proposed data base would consist of a variety of separate
data sets, both quantitative and narrative, on consumption,
capacity, production, inventories, prices, and recycling, as well as
on the relevant economic, political, psychological, geographic,
institutional, and other determinants of those variables.
Predictions made by other authorities would also be included-
especially predictions or contingency scenarios that relate to the
risk of future supply problems. These data sets would be maintained
on disk and magnetic tape files accessible through the CIA VM
system, which would be programmed to provide both machine readable
output and printouts suitable for distribution or for inclusion in
finished reports. Adjunctive use would also be made of the MAGAS
system to provide a variety of graphic displays and cartographic
arrays.
Under appropriate safeguards, the data sets would be made
accessible in part to other government agencies, and efforts would
be made to maximize, to the extent practicable, the automatic
assimilation of data sets and inputs available from these other
government agencies, as well as within the CIA itself. Following
the practice of other government agencies, efforts would also be
made to make the unclassified (security or business) portion of the
data base available, through an appropriate agent (governmental or
nongovernmental), to outside researchers and the general public.
The data sets would be established and maintained for each of
the important oommodity forms of those nonfuel minerals
(tentatively, some 15-20) selected for their importance in the
general economy and/or their critical defense applications.
Particular priority would be given to those minerals characterized
by the greatest apparent risk of potential supply problems. Part of
the initial project for establishing the data base would be the
review of selections and selection processes already used by other
Federal agencies. To the extent possible, advanced forms of a
particular mineral would be linked to the specific sources of
contributory inputs and cruder forms would be linked to the specific
processors which consurn4-them.
Information on relevant determinants would be kept in separate
data sets, code-linked to the particular minerals and commodity
forms to which they were relevant, and there would be similar,
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reverse linking of the particular mineral commodities to the
determinants. These determinants would include not only
macroeconomic, financial, and end-use consumption information, but
institutional and political factors affecting production or
consumption in particular places, including specific business
interrelationships. Care would be taken to include political and
business-relationship factors that would be likely to affect the
volume and direction of supply in a stringency or contingency
situation.
The data sets would consist not only of crude statistical and
narrative inputs, but of such analytical summations and
manipulations of the data as were determined to be useful on a
routine basis. Reports would be examined for apparent original
source and duplicate reports eliminated (with preference being given
to the retention of the least highly classified), except as
duplication (or partial duplication) seemed to be useful for
purposes of corroboration or clarification; procedures would also
allow for the routine replacement of original reports in their
entirety, where warranted, by analytical summaries, conversions, or
abstracts.
Apparently contradictory statistical data sets would be
maintained, as seemed useful, with cross-references to explanations
of the reasons for apparent or actual discrepancies; this would be
particularly in order for statistical data sets in common use,
including preliminary versions of statistics subjected to later
adjustment. Annotations would include reasons for preferring
particular statistical sets for particular applications. Poutinely
compiled composite, synthesized, or converted data sets deemed to
have useful analytical application would likewise be included. All
of the data sets used in the System Dynamics modeling would be
included, with the annotations in the computer file serving as the
necessary documentation.
Access to, and maintenance of, these files would require
additions to the present complement of computer terminals. The
corresponding offset would be a material reduction in the need for
individual file-keeping. The proposed data base would entail some
small overlap with the computerized document service of the office
of Central Reference, but would differ from the latter in its
organization and in its inclusion of processed rather than crude
intelligence; the OCR data base would be a key source for initial
file establishment. There would also be small overlaps with the
USGS Computerized Resource Information Bank (CRIB), the Bureau of
Mines Minerals Availability System (MAS), and other Bureau of Mines
computerized files (such as one on aluminum processing facilities
and a developing Automated Mineral Information System (MIS); to the
extent- feasible-withou ?saprifice.of analytical capabilities, -- - -
summary or synthesized output from these or other relevant files
would be utilized in lieu of raw records.
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d. Time phasing:
Since the proposed data base consists of a number of discrete
segments and sources, it can be phased in over a period of time and
yet be useful as soon as the first segment is in place and
accessible. Nevertheless, it is assumed that the bulk of the work
of establishing the data base can be accomplished, under one or more
outside contracts, during the first year of the program, with
practical application and "debugging" commencing late that same
year.
Several concurrent operations would be initiated within the
first few months of the first year, including, tentatively: design
and award of contracts for reconnoitering, appraising, and, if
appropriate, designing procedures for the incorporation of one or
more governmental data bases; in-house investigation of the optimal
means for incorporating material from the OCR and other intelligence
community files; and staff exploration with the office of Data
Processing (ODP) of the optimal means for assimilating inputs into
the proposed file, maintaining the file, providing both for
restricted and unrestricted access, and linking the file with the
System Dynamics models and other computerized operations.
The second half of the first year would see the initiation of
staff work or contract design and award for follow-up with regard to
gaps in the system or, if necessary, improvements in system
design. in particular, the initial assessment of privately
maintained data bases may reveal a void needing to be filled by
original collection and coordination of published reports bearing,
particularly, on announced plans and projects for establishment,
expansion, or contraction of mineral extraction and processing
capacity. Work on this or other supplementary contracts, if
required, would be carried on mostly in the first half of the
project's second year. The third year of the project would find the
data bank in full current operation, though still on a "shakedown"
basis. The amount budgeted for the fourth year is the estimated
level of continuing operating expense for the mature system, subject
only to later inflationary escalation.
In the detailed scheduling, priority would be given to those
minerals and those elements of the system that were most relevant to
providing assessments of situations with apparently greatest risk
and most serious consequences of a supply contingency.
IV. IWELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPLICABILITY:
The project might pioneer some methods of data banking and access
-particularly with regard to varying degrees of access by varying
categories of users -.but this would be only an. incidental, and possibly
not too visible by-product. -'It may also-.`lead to the development=.of new
techniques for the screening and integration of partially or wholly
inconsistent reports on the same subject. In the development of the
project, previous experience of this sort would be reviewed, to the
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extent practicable, and information on any apparently useful new
experience gained would be disseminated to the intelligence community.
V. INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER BENEFITS:
The principal benefit to intelligence consumers would be a
considerably enhanced capability both for foreseeing the emergence of
potential mineral supply problems and for evaluating the implications of
contingency, policy, and other scenarios affecting mineral supply.
These benefits would accrue both from direct evaluation of the entries
in the data base and -- especially for longer term problems -- use of
the data base in the System Dynamics models. Of a comparable order of
benefit would be the vastly. increased productivity of each hour of RA
analyst time - sufficient, it is believed, to provide a substantial net
benefit over and above the costs of establishing and maintaining the
data bank. It is believed, furthermore, that as familiarity with the
data base spread to other parts of the intelligence community,
significant cost and time savings would be effected for other analysts
as well.
VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
There has by now been a sufficiently large body of successful
experience with large data banks - both numerical and narrative and
particularly within the CIA -- that the probability of success for the
one here proposed is very high. Furthermore, the proposed data base
would be a success in terms of its productivity, quality, and cost
aspects even if particular parts of it failed to be achieved. Although
some risk exists with regard to the costs and degree of effectiveness
with which the objectives - including both original establishment and
later upkeep -- are accomplished, it is very unlikely that the outcome
would be such as to negate in its entirety the potentially large excess
of net benefit.
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SECRET
I. PROJECT TITLE: Computer Technology Research
Originator: CIA/OER/DAC
II. COSTS:
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
a. Statement of need:
The Agency is now spending more than
dollars per year on computers, in order to increase e
productivity of NFAC analysts. Our success will depend
on how we spend the money.
Computer technology is advancing very rapidly.
Each year, trade journals such as Datamation offer
thousands of pages of advertisements of new hardware
and software systems. Even in very specialized areas
of computer science, such as the design of software for
information storage and retrieval, there are dozens of
alternative software packages.
It is extremely important for the Agency to keep
up with the advances in computer technology, as they
relate to intelligence analysis. We tend to regard
computer technology as being fixed, and the number of
NFAC analysts as being variable. Unfortunately, we can
not expect to gain much from this focus on labor
alone. With our present limitation on office space for
analysts, there is no way that we can double the
quality of intelligence by doubling the number of
analysts. A better option is to regard the number of
analysts as fixed, and to think of computer technology
as a key variable in determining analytical
productivity in NFAC.
Solid, thorough research is necessary to keep up
with advances in computer technology. The advertised
capabilities of new software products sometimes do not
match reality. Therefore, it is necessary to test the
new developments that seem most promising. Research
and testing in this area require time and money, just
as in any other field.
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Consequently, it seems reasonable to begin and
continue a small program of technology research aimed
at assessing new developments in computer software, as
they relate to intelligence analysis. The research
could be done by an external contractor working with
OER, OPA, and other NFAC offices.
This program of technology research would fill a
major gap. Presently, the Agency's Office of Research
and Development has a responsibility to develop new
computer software packages, buy not to find and test
software that has already been developed. The Office
of Data Processing (ODP) evaluates new computer
hardware, but ODP relies on NFAC for suggestions of
software in support of intelligence analysis. Project
SAFE has involved research on software for document
storage and r e t r i e v a l , bit this i small part of a
large pie. Of more than dollars spent by 25X1
ODP in support of NFAC in FY80, less than 10 percent
was for SAFE. We need to pay more attention to the
remaining 90 percent of the ODP budget for NFAC, much
of which is driven by NFAC's recommendations and use of
computer software for analyzing numerical data.
b. Initial phases:
The funds requested for FY83 are to cover the
testing of successors to our present system of data
storage and retrieval, namely the RAMIS package that is
used extensively in OER, OPA, and elsewhere throughout
the Agency. OER and OPA would develop criteria for
testing new systems of data storage and retrieval.
These criteria would be applied by an external
contractor to systems suggested by OER and OPA, along
with other systems suggested by the contractor. At the
end of FY83, a decision would probably be made to
purchase a r,_- package, for approximately 25X1
Thereafter, the research on new software continues at
an annual rate of while per year is 225X1
allocated for purchasing new systems based on the
research.
IV. CONSUMER BENEFITS:
This project would develop more sophisticated computer
software, so that analysts could create their own files of
mach ine=.r.eadable..data, and .access..these f.iles._. OER.would.
benefit from this effort in -the areas of international-arms.
trade, shipping, and finance, and in narrower areas of
research on specific industries and corrmodities.
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V. COV1'.UNITV BENEFITS:
New systems for accessing certain databases would
naturally be available to other intelligence agencies. In
particular, the Defense Intelligence Agency has already
requested a cooperative effort on our database of
international arms sales, along with the National Security
Agency.
VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
This project is too risky to be funded under normal
budgets. It is possible that we are now using the very
best computer technology for our work, and that we will
keep pace with developments in the field, so that
additional research in this area would yield no payoff. On
the other hand, for an amount not to exceed two percent of
our current annual expenditures on computers for NFAC, a
new program of software research might easily double the
productivity of our computer system for intelligence
analysis.
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PRODUCTION ENHANCEMENT INITIATIVES, FY-83
I. PROJECT TITLE: Weapons Intelligence Analysis Center
Submitting Agency: CIA
II. COSTS:
a. Statement of need:
There is a requirement for the application of interdisciplinary
analysis and seldom-used creative problem-solving techniques to the
solution of complex weapon systems problems. An innovative method of
proposing solutions and/or new directions to perplexing and enigmatic
intelligence problems would encompass some of these techniques and
apply multidisciplinary knowledge and experience to weapon systems
analysis.
Formal analytical techniques, technical education, and experience
are important factors in weapon systems analysis and results of such
analysis can be satisfactory. However, it is difficult for analysts
in these disciplines to step away from mind-sets, particularly on well
established or well understood weapon systems. Moreover, the pressure
of production schedules and the tendency of analysts to extrapolate
from experience often leads to the submersion of unique ideas. Thus,
we may be suppressing a variety of outlooks and limiting judgments and
solutions to complex weapon systems problems.
The establishment of a Weapons Intelligence Analysis Center would
provide the base for applying creative problem-solving techniques and
interdisciplinary analysis to weapon systems problems.
b. The Weapons Intelligence Analysis Center
The proposed analysis center would be permanently staffed by a
small number of personnel headed by a staff manager. They would be
selected for their knowledge and abilities in creative problem-solving
techniques and criteria. The staff would provide the organization,
logistics, and guidance for problem-solving projects and sessions.
Specific enigmatic, complex, undefined, or ambiguous weapon systems
problems would be submitted to the staff on an annual basis with
priority and timeliness requirements established by the submitting
component. Based upon the number of analysis projects to be conducted
per year, the staff will select a number of candidate problems. For
the first two years it is suggested that no more than five to seven
problems be undertaken. Depending upon results and community support,
this number could grow with time.
The Center's staff will select analysts from candidates submitted
from components throughout the community with the limitation that only
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a few weapon systems analysts be represented in a single analysis 25X1
Group members must be released by their components for a 25X1
specified period of time (perhaps two to four weeks) to work full time
on the selected problem analysis. The analysis groups will be housed
and operate in an environment completely removed from any interference
and/or interrupting influences. Possible permanent locations for the
center could include Analysts selected will of 25X1
necessity need some prior training in creative problem-solving
techniques. Selection criteria will be developed by the staff.
The center will propose solutions to, or methodology for solving
specific weapons system problems. In the case of ill-defined
problems, the center may propose problem definitions. The formal
output of the center might consist of one or all of the following:
Documented problem solutions or possible solutions.
Detailed methodology for obtaining a solution or solutions.
Documented ideas for obtaining either a methodology for or
solution to a problem.
Formal reports containing any or all of the above.
d. Operation of the Center over Time
The first quarter of the center's operation will be used for
developing and testing the methodology for soliciting candidate
problems and analysts. Plans for assembling, housing and providing
the proper setting for maximum output will be established.
Coordination, logistics, equipment requirements, and general details
of the operation of the Center will be finalized. In the last half of
the first year selected problems will be analyzed. During the first
quarter of the second year, the first year's operation will be
evaluated. Refinement, changes, new procedures, additional equipment,
permanent staffing requirements, etc will be implemented and tested.
The center should be fully operational by the middle of the second
year.
Reports to management of accomplishments and additional
requirements will be formally documented at the end of each of the
first two years. Each report will detail actions required by the
center and actions required by management. The reports will detail
areas of support or areas of non-support by the various components of
the community.
The center will concentrate on applying varied creative problem
solving techniques to complex and/or enigmatic weapon systems
intelligence problems and solutions or results will be reported to all
interested components within the community.
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The limitations on the outputs will be those imposed by time,
availability of proper equipment or facilities, support by management
in providing the proper analytical mix of personnel, and security.
The long-term benefit to intelligence consumers will be better
estimates and improved intelligence products with more comprehensive
and easier to use judgements and/or alternatives. Products should be
broader in scope and encompass the collective brain power which will
result from multidisciplinary analysis. Products should be more
reliable and potential errors should be minimized.
The center if implemented properly and if supported by the
community, should show successfull outputs by the second year which
may be greater than anticipated. The success could be such that the
envisioned center might be too small in the out-years to accomplish
all that it could. However, the latter case would hold only if the
operating components fully use the center's output and provide
accurate and timely products to the consumer. The probability that
this will occur will depend upon management support and analyst
cooperation in the various community components. If there are some
initial successes that exceed expectations support will certainly be
obtained.
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I. PROJECT TITLE: Center for the Study of Soviet Naval
Tactical Warfare
II. COSTS:
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROTECT
A. Statement of Need
There is currently much debate over the capability of the US Navy
to carry out its missions of sea control and projections of power ashore.
As US dependence on Mid-East oil has increased, so have the concerns
about the capability of the US to protect vital shipping lanes and, if
necessary, to transport troops and equipments to remote regions and then
provide extended logistical support. Accurate assessments of Soviet
naval capabilities and intentions are vital as decisions about the size,
capabilities, and composition of our navy are being made. These assess-
ments require a thorough understanding of Soviet naval doctrine and
Soviet perceptions of US naval capabilities. Additionally it requires an
understanding of Soviet weapon systems, ships, submarines, and the means
of integrating these elements into effective naval forces. It also
requires an understanding of Soviet naval support entities that range
from satellites for targeting naval weapons to supply ships for allowing
extended naval operations. Finally it requires a broad understanding of
Soviet and US naval programs in order to evaluate their comparative
strengths and weaknesses.
Currently a number of efforts are underway within the Intelligence
Community to evaluate elements of the Soviet Navy. However, these
efforts are largely fragmented and the resultant products are not always
effectively integrated into a comprehensive study of Soviet naval capa-
bilities and intentions. The results are that gaps in our understanding
are not readily identified and recommendations regarding data collections
are often lacking. A single center for the study of Soviet tactical
warfare could integrate the analytical efforts already underway, identify
gaps in analysis and collection, initiate studies to fill the analytical
gaps, recommend changes to fill the collection gaps, and, in general,
provide a comprehensive product in Soviet naval tactical warfare. In
conjunction with the US Navy many issues regarding future US programs
could then be addressed in a more knowledgeable manner.
B. Who will Participate
The proposed center would be operated by existing OSWR/NSD staff
with important input from OSR, and external contractors. Participation
by other elements of the Community concerned with these problems would be
enthusiastically pursued.
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The Center will ultimately give definitive answers, based on an
interdisciplinary approach, regarding the Soviet capabilities and assets
available to initiate and sustain tactical warfare and Soviet doctrine
regarding such warfare. In documenting this appraisal, the following
more specific areas will be addressed rigorously:
o Role of the Soviet navy as a tool to effect
political goals and project economic/military
power;
o Soviet naval tactical doctrine
o Naval command, control, and communications
structures;
o Methodology, procedures, and equipments used for
battle management and pre-battle planning;
o Soviet perception of US naval tactical warfare
capabilities, assets, doctrine, etc.;
o Capability of Soviets to acquire relevant
intelligence;
o Targeting against naval forces to include
targeting assets, accuracies, timeliness, etc.;
o Definition and evaluation of the ECM environment
and assets available;
o Naval systems capabilities, vulnerabilities,
availability, numbers, deployment, technical
parameters;
o Human factors;
o Equipment factors;
o Factors in deciding whether to initiate nuclear
tactical warfare or conventional tactical warfare;
o Specific evaluation of important scenarios;
o Changes in US collection of intelligence.
D. Time Phasing
In the first year we will extensively review Soviet naval doctrine
for indications of Soviet naval goals. We will identify critical
elements in our understanding of Soviet naval capabilities and initiate
analytical efforts on those elements. We will attempt to integrate the
massive intelligence effort already being expended on the Soviet Navy and
determine if collection efforts can be initiated or redirected to answer
questions that have previously been unanswerable. We will review Soviet
reactions to current US naval programs and estimate Soviet reaction to
future US programs.
Extensive analyses of critical Soviet weapons, radars, ships,
submarines, satellites, and battle management assets will occupy the next
two years. Additionally, we will have to acquire a thorough under-
standing of US naval programs and capabilities in order to view Soviet
programs and capabilities in their proper context. The final year of the
study will be spent evaluating the effectiveness of an integrated Soviet
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r SECRET
naval force in achieving Soviet naval goals. Test cases in evaluating
the validity of our conclusion will involve specific scenarios relating
to vital US needs. For example, we will assess the capability of the
Soviet Navy to impair the US Navy's capability to protect shipping lanes
from the Mid-East oilfields in the face of determined Soviet opposition.
Additionally intelligence requirements that cannot be fulfilled with
current or planned collectors will be identified.
IV. Intelligence Community Applicability
The comprehensive methodology used by the Center could serve as a
model for the entire US Intelligence Community. Additionally, the
results of the analysis will affect analytical requirements and collec-
tion efforts at NSA, DIA, NISC, and CIA. Establishment of this Center
will allow us to optimize collection of Soviet naval intelligence with
current capabilities and define specific requirements for future
collection.
Intelligence Consumer Benefits
If successful, this effort should greatly assist the US Navy in
assessing the Soviet capability and assets available to conduct tactical
warfare and in planning for future resources. Additionally it will aid a
wide variety of US policy makers by better defining the strengths, weak-
nesses, and limitations of the Soviet Navy in thwarting US global plans.
This effort will also serve as a valuable input into DoD officials and
Congress in allocating future US military funds.
Probability of Success
This effort, if well managed and with selfless cooperation from
Community agencies, has a high probability of limited success and could
well prove to be very successful if cooperation exists at a high level.
The greatest uncertainties concern the complexities of the problems, the
sufficiency of the data, and the degree of interdisciplinary cooperation.
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I: PROJECT TITLE: Spatial Data Analysis Project
Submitting Agency: CIA
II: COSTS:
The quality of intelligence products, particularly in the
economic intelligence area, depends as much on the quality of the
raw data used in analysis and the inferences that can be derived
through comprehensive modeling of that data as it does on the
expertise of the intelligence production analyst working the prob-
lem. In recent years the volume of data available to analysts has
increased extraordinarily; the advent of electronic mail is an
indication of the magnitude of this growth and the concomitant
need to efficiently sift through the data, organize it, and present
it in a manner most effective for meaningful analysis. At the same
time, analytical efforts are necessarily growing in complexity with
the recognition that many of the problems being addressed are
affected by a growing number of variables that both interact with
each other and have an impact on the end result. For exceptionally
complex problems, the analyst must use sophisticated simulation
models to determine likely outcomes and alternatives. This is
particularly true where large geographic areas are a dimension
of the problem, as is the case in a variety of natural resource
analysis efforts underway in CIA.
In order to address these types of problems adequately, it
is necessary to develop new and innovative ADP procedures and
techniques, new software modeling approaches, and better
interactive graphics support for the modeling efforts. Faster,
larger-capacity computational capabilities are needed.
Experience in OGSR has shown that natural-resource modeling
efforts, which typically involve solution of complex, multi-
dimensional estimative equations, tend to demand exceptional
amounts of dedicated computer memory, use excessive amounts of
processing time, and require special types of peripheral data
processing equipment. Furthermore, these types of models are
most effective when the analyst has quick and repeated access to
them. The typical process involves frequent readjustment of
variables until model output matches available data, followed by
simulations of possible future alternatives and tests of
modeling assumptions. Special-purpose data processing
equipment is necessary to make this process most cost-effective.
In order to develop the requisite modeling capability it is
necessary to significantly upgrade OGSR's MAGAS (Meteorological
Agronomical Geographical Analysis System)--which presently provides
primarily interactive graphics analysis and cannot handle large
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models--through procurement of appropriate complementary processing
equipment; in our experience existing OGSR and Agency computers
cannot address these types of modeling needs with the necessary
efficiency. The models OGSR would like to use to help its analysts
work with the large volumes of available data (many of these models
have already been acquired by CIA) will then be adapted to the
processing equipment through specialized programming assistance.
Both the equipment and programming needs can be met quite
readily. In industry, special-purpose computing systems employing
array processors tied to minicomputers (which are enormously
efficient in solving the types of "number-crunching" partial
differential equations resource models typically use) are being
developed for just such applications. The added computing
capability that will make MAGAS compatible with these array
processors is available in industry, and most of the models OGSR
is interested in using have been (or can readily be) adapted with
minimal programming. It is therefore in the interest of
significantly increasing analyst efficiency and analytical
capabilities that we propose the Spatial Data Analysis Project,
through which these OGSR needs will be defined and coordinated,
a system capable of meeting them will be built, and the desired
models will be installed on the system.
b. The Spatial Data Analysis Project
In the first phase of the Spatial Data Analysis Project antici-
pated OGSR modeling needs during the early 1980's will be
identified and the system capabilities necessary for satisfying
them will be defined. The OGSR experience with MAGAS and current
computer modeling efforts in the agronomic, narcotics and petroleum
resources areas will be evaluated to help determine potential
modeling and system needs in such topical areas as foreign
agriculture estimation, food and population assessment, water
resources assessment, demographic change and migration, and
transportation network assessment. Based on these needs, a
unique special-purpose minicomputer-based system that will
meet the dedicated use and special interactive graphics
requirements of OGSR will be designed. Such a system would in
all probability involve a direct supplement to the existing
MAGAS system, which is already fulfilling a vital role in
graphics support for many of these analytical efforts.
The second phase of the project would concent a on systems
and software procurement/enhancement; in FY 1983 would be 25X1
used to acquire an array processor and to upgra e MAGAS to 25X1
give the added computational capabilities to make it compatible
with the array processor. The third phase would involve training
and applications development; in FY 84 and in FY 85 225X1
would be devoted to contract programming to adap want models
to the system.
Approval of the Spatial Data Analysis Project would provide for
a logical enhancement and expansion of existing analytical acti-
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vities and capabilities in OGSR and would result in a consolidation
of many OGSR data processing efforts. The Project would have a
high probability of success and would involve a relatively small
investment of funds.
c. What is to be Developed:
The Project will implement new and innovative ADP hardware and
software techniques with the goal of improving the quality of
OGSR's intelligence products in its Geographic Research and
Environment and Resource Analysis Programs. Specific areas that
will be addressed in developing these capabilities include:
o Petroleum analysis software and estimative techniques
applications
o Spatial inference modeling in support of geographic, environ-
ment and resource issues
o Improvement of graphical analysis capabilities and procedures
o Alternative methods for processing, exploitation and presen-
tation of analytical data
d. Who Will Accomplish
The proposed OGSR Spatial Data Analysis Project would be
operated by existing OGSR staff with external hardware procurement,
contractor development and software implementation and external
consultant assistance.
IV. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPLICABILITY:
While the Project will initially concentrate on techniques of the
most utility to OGSR's intelligence production program, the resulting
research and analyses findings will be made available to the entire
Intelligence Cai unity, and it is logical to expect that the added
modeling capability it will provide will support analytical efforts in
other sectors of the Community as well as in OGSR and CIA should the
need arise.
V. INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER BENEFITS:
The principal benefit to consumers is that policymakers will be able
to have many of their queries on natural-resource-related issues
currently handled by OGSR answered far more quickly and definitively
than is now possible. The effects of alternative policies could
be examined rapidly with a high degree of confidence because all
of the available data can be taken into account in each case. The
costs of these analytical efforts would be minimized through the
use of a dedicated modeling system of this type because
contractor/consultant efficiencies would be greatly improved by
the rapid turnaround and extended commuting capacities that would
be acquired. Operational efficiency of all CIA computer-using
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analytical efforts would be improved because the Project would
divert a significant number of large, time-consuming analytical
programs from Agency mainframes to a system that both would handle
them much more rapidly and provide the unique interactive graphics
that make such large-scale programs so useful for analysis.
The probability of success for the Spatial Data Analysis Project is
high, as much of the software that OGSR is interested in using has
been acquired or is available in industry, and most of the rest is well
along in the development phase. The necessary ADP hardware that would
support OGSR objectives is also in existence in industry or in the final
stages of development. The chances of blending both the new hardware
and programs with the existing MAGAS system appears excellent, since
the requisite array processing technology has already been melded with
similar PDP equipment successfully. The implementation of the new
analytical procedures and techniques that would follow will greatly
enhance current analytical efforts and will break new ground in the
area of improved quality, timeliness and completeness of intelligence
research and analysis products in OGSR.
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I. PROJECT TITLE: Industrial Analysis Forum
Submitting Agency: CIA
H. COSTS:
III. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT:
a. Statement of need:
Present analytical capabilities of CIA's National
Foreign Assessment Center preclude producing finished
intelligence which integrates specific industry
knowledge, multicountry political economy and knowledge
of the world market, to generate'world-wide, in-depth
perspective on key industrial policy issues.
DOD has sponsored some research in strategic
materials and U.S. industrial capacity. Department of
Commerce has accumulated vast stores of fragmented
industry data. But the Intelligence Community lacks
the ability to provide policy-makers with timely
unbiased and comprehensive analysis of major industries
in an international setting. Within NFAC, the Office
of Economic Research has recently formed an Industrial
Organization and Analysis Branch to provide such
analysis.
Given the limited resources of NFAC, the fact that
the Branch will be charged with breaking new ground in
both assembling raw data and production, and the need
to quickly develop a capability to produce finished
intelligence, OER is requesting additional funds to
expand the Branch's activities in innovative ways.
The Branch will have the responsibility within
NFAC for research, analysis and reporting on the role
of foreign governments and industry in technological
development, and industrial strategies which may evolve
from those achievements. The Branch will work closely
with OSWR in assessing the technology strategies of
selected high-technology industries. It will highlight
perceived threats to the U.S. and allied industrial
base and resulting national interest concerns. The
The problem is to insure that industries, and sectors
within industries, are properly.understood. F
CONF1OE T!AL
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V. CONSUMER BENEFITS:
This proposal will access important, substantial
resources to the Intelligence Community, improving our
capability of providing good, timely policy support on an
important subject: the parameters and dynamics of threats
to the U.S. and allied industrial base, and the role of
foreign governments in technological and industrial
development.
VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
We
would expect that this new and more coherent approach will
turn up information not presently available to the
Intelligence Community, especially in Free World countries,
and lead to sharply defined external analysis contracts with
funds earmarked for the out-years of the program.
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Submitting Agency: CIA
A. Statement of need:
The increasing need for multi-disciplinary teams in the analysis
of complex intelligence questions poses the problem of how
different types of expertise and information can best be combined.
Existing mechanisms for combining the expertise of several
disciplines into intelligence products are deficient; genuine
synthesis rarely takes place. Clearly, alternative mechanisms need
to be developed. In this regard, formal modeling of complex
intelligence problems has distinct advantages in a multi-
disciplinary environment. Working as a team, analysts bring
together their particular contributions, but are required to come
to a common understanding of the factors that shape the situation.
Modeling allows the analysts to explore the interactions between
political, social, economic, and military factors in ways that are
simply not possible through conventional analytic approaches.
Differences in viewpoint between team members can be explored
through the. development of alternative models. The outcomes of
alternative models can then be compared and evaluated--leading
analysts to a better understanding of the impact of their differing
views. Whether or not the results of the formal model are
explicitly incorporated into the final intelligence product, the
modeling effort will provide the analysts with a better
understanding of the key assumptions of their analysis. In turn,
this understanding will enable analysts to search more efficiently
for needed information in the future.
B. Status and Requirements:
NFAC analysts are generally unaware of formal modeling
techniques of potential applicability to intelligence problems,
such as system dynamics, linear programming, difference equations,
artificial intelligence, and applications of graph theory. What is
_establ-ishment of.an NFAC resource- unit-.that could,
required-is-the'
provide assistance to analysts, particularly those involved in
multi-disciplinary work. Regional units that cut across office
lines would be especially in need of assistance. External research
funds will be used to hire outside consultants and contractors to
provide the necessary expertise.
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C. Implementation and timin :
During FY82, NFAC will survey the modeling abilities of its
analysts, arrange with OTE to strengthen those abilities through
training, and evaluate the approaches identified by ORD in its
Intelligence Production Laboratory project. We anticipate that the
need for outside assistance will decline from FY83 to FY85 as in-
house capabilities are developed.
IV. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY APPLICABILITY:
The systems modeling center will be an NFAC-wide resource whose
primary clients would be interdisciplinary teams or regional units.
It would also serve individual analysts working on complex
intelligence problems that lend themselves to a more formal
approach. As expertise grows within NFAC, greater interaction with
DOD modeling units can be anticipated--particularly when the
problems being addressed contain a large military component.
V. INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER BENEFITS:
The development of modeling skills in NFAC will improve the
quality of interdisciplinary analysis and lead to more forward-
looking estimative work. By being based on models where the
assumptions are explicit, policymakers will be better able to
identify the critical factors shaping intelligence estimates.
Models also offer policymakers the opportunity to simulate the
impact of alternative policy choices.
VI. PROBABILITY OF SUCCESS:
There are no known technical or administrative obstacles to the
enhancement of formal modeling skills in NFAC. We do anticipate
some time lag before a majority of NFAC analysts will feel
comfortable with these new techniques.
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St(-,Kt I Attachment B
DDS&T/ORD FY-83
Production Enhancement Proposals
FY-83
Large Scale Econometric Modelling
System
Advanced Cartographic Support System
Water/Rail Transportation Assessment
Multidisciplinary Military Research
Advanced Computer Techniques for the
Production and Interpretation of
Finished Intelligence Products
Digital Back-Issue FBIS Dailies
Cost Estimation Methodology for
Non-Market Economies
Analytical Skills Enhancement Program
($000)
FY-84
FY-85
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NFAC COMBINED RANKING
NFAC/ORD FY-83 Production Enhancement Proposals
($000)
FY-83 FY-84 FY-85
PMES Computer for Experimentation with
Large Computation Intensive
Applications
OPA Exploiting Political and Social Data
OGSR Nonfuel Mineral Supply-Demand Data
ORD Large Scale Econometric Modeling
System
OER Computer Technology Research
OSWR Weapons Intelligence Analysis
Center
OSR/ Center for the Study of Soviet
OSWR Naval Tactical Warfare
OGSR Spatial Data Analysis Project
OER Industrial Analysis Forum
ORD Advanced Cartographic Support System
ORD Water/Rail Transportation Assessment
PMES Systems Modelling Center
ORD Multidisciplinary Military Research
ORD Cost Estimation Methodology for
Non-Market Economies
ORD Advanced Computer Techniques for the
Production and Interpretation of
Finished Intelligence Products
ORD Digital Back-Issue FBIS Dailies
ORD
ORD Analytical Skills Enhancement Program
TOTALS
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