TRIBALISM AND REGIONALISM IN WEST AFRICA: THE LIBERIAN CASE

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00315R000100080005-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: July 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
intelligence
`e i1l".ijff ?7i
Tribalism and Regionalism
in West Africa:
The Liberian Case
CI 84-10128
July 1984
Copy 378
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utrecrorare u^ C
Intelligence i.
Tribalism and Regionalism
in West Africa:
The Liberian Case
This paper was prepared b~
coordinated with the Directorate of Operation
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Geography Division, OGI, on
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Secret
GI 84-10128
July 1984
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Tribalism and Regionalism
in West Africa:
The Liberian Case
Key Judgments The peoples of West Africa comprise a vast number of tribes; during
Information available precolonial times some of these were organized politically, but most were
as of 27 June 1984 simply social units with little or no administrative authority. Regrouped
was used in this report.
into colonies (and the independent state of Liberia), West Africans of
diverse ethnic origins fell under the rule of a score of governments. Today,
with all of the states of the region independent, many precolonial traditions
and ties remain strong and represent a potential source of national
divisiveness:
? We detect a growing potential for a resurgence of tribalism and
regionalism in West Africa and believe that these factors could affect the
stability of several states, including Liberia, in which the United States
has a special interest.
? In our judgment, the removal of the ban on political activity in Liberia
scheduled for July 1984 is likely to be followed by rising tensions along
tribal and regional lines.
? Tribalism provides fracture lines along which the poorly disciplined
Liberian military might cleave if the electoral process is aborted or if
ethnic issues are highlighted in a political campaign.
? Ethnic and regional rivalries are most likely to develop between the
Krahn-now dominant under Head of State Doe-and other groups of
the interior of Liberia, which historically have been excluded from
political participation.
? The power of formerly dominant Americo-Liberians has been sharply
curtailed, but their former near monopoly of educational opportunities,
relative affluence, and political awareness should assure their continued
importance in the economic and political arenas.
? Cultural-linguistic and historic ties between ethnic groups could form the
basis for regional coalitions. A party drawing support from groups in the
northwestern interior and some of the coastal groups could form a
government acceptable to the majority of Liberians
Secret
GI 84-10128
July 1984
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Economic Activity in Liberia
a
5Z`
Rubber belt
Rubber concession or
processing facility
Iron mine
Timber exploitation
Road
Railroad
County boundary
County capital
GRAND KRU
~
Barclay.villex P\bo.
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Tribalism and Regionalism
in West Africa:
The Liberian Case
Introduction: Ethnicity and Regionalism
in West Africa
The jury is still out as to whether stable democracies
can be established in countries where tribalism is
strong. Westernized elements in most of these coun-
tries form small elites that dominate the government,
control the national economy, and manipulate tribal
groups in much the way the former colonial powers
did. Even the overthrow of these manipulative govern-
ments rarely leads to democracy. Successor govern-
ments usually have narrow population bases drawn
from particular tribal or regional groups-often those
who were previously denied access to power. The
result is usually an unstable tribally based dictator-
ship, factional squabbling, or, if pushed to the ex-
treme, civil war. In this paper we take a broad look at
tribalism and regionalism in West Africa and exam-
ine in detail the situation in Liberia.
West Africa is a mosaic of more than 400 tribal
groups overlaying 16 independent states. Despite
progress toward national integration, tribalism and
regionalism still have a fundamental influence on
political behavior and help shape coups. Although we
do not foresee an upheaval on the order of Nigeria's
1967-70 civil war-which cost a half million lives-
the dangers of ethnic divisiveness remain. In many
countries ethnic factors compound economic inequal-
ities and accentuate racial and religious differences.
Throughout the region, allegiances and patron-client
relationships tend to follow tribal and broader ethnic
lines. Development of social class consciousness in the
various West African states has been quite limited.
Social and economic mobility are dependent on link-
ages to political power, which is often concentrated
within a particular ethnic group.
Most West African governments have tried to mini-
mize the threats to their stability inherent in ethnic
diversity by adopting single-party or military rule,
both of which allow centralized control and promote
national integration. Since the coup in Nigeria last
December, the only remaining multiparty democra-
cies in the region are Senegal and The Gambia. In
some cases, however, seizure of the government by
inexperienced and unsophisticated military personnel,
as in Ghana and Liberia, has led to interethnic
hostilities
Neither the Ivory Coast nor Sierra Leone has resolved
the issue of presidential succession, and both could
experience bitter competition for power among ethnic
groups if their leaders become incapacitated before a
successor is named. The sudden demise of the heads
of state of Benin or Togo also could stir deep-seated
ethnic and regional animosities.
Economic deterioration in countries already faced
with large foreign debts presents another set of prob-
lems that could undermine existing governments and
bring tribal and regional factors into play. The recent
coup in Nigeria is an example. The military assumed
power to prevent-among other things-continued
economic decline, but in the aftermath they abolished
a constitution that had provided for a legal balance of
ethnic and regional interests. Although it is not clear
that economic problems per se are a cause of political
instability in the region, economic deterioration, cou-
pled with high-level corruption, has been used as a
justification for the majority of coups in West Africa
over the past five years. Droughts and food shortages
have aggravated conditions. Moreover, social and
economic pressures in the poorer states are exacerbat-
ed by the new limitations on migration to relatively
prosperous Nigeria and Ivory Coast
Liberia is an example of a former one-party state
where long-established political arrangements have
been overthrown and where ethnic and regional fac-
tors are assuming new importance. The United States
has a strong interest in continued stability in this
small African nation. The historic "special relation-
ship" between the United States and Liberia extends
beyond defense agreements to important transport
access rights and to communications facilities un-
available elsewhere on the continent.
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Historic-Geographic Alignments
Two distinct Liberias-the coastal settlements and
the rural interior-have coexisted since early times.
Modern political, social, and economic developments
have been largely restricted to the coastal region.
Administrative and commercial activity becamefo-
cused on Monrovia where the first settlers, freeborn
and emancipated blacks from the United States,
established their society and government. Disdainful
of agriculture, fearful of the indigenous inhabitants,
and unfamiliar with the humid tropical environment,
the settlers chose to remain along the coast. Their
culture and economic system largely excluded partic-
ipation by the tribal majority.
The authority of the central government was minimal
in the interior prior to World War II. Administrative
controls were limited, and they were not accompanied
by a spread of "settler" culture, education, or eco-
nomic development. The tribal peoples retained their
traditional communities, with each group preserving
its own social, religious, and judicial institutionsF_
War II. The economy expanded into the interior,
where iron mining supported the development of
several modern enclaves, and tribal Liberians-espe-
cially from northwestern and central counties-
moved increasingly into urban and semiurban wage
labor. The social, residential, and occupational mix-
ing that took place increased communal solidarity
but also created greater awareness of cultural differ-
ences. Many tribals were incorporated into the tech-
nocratic levels of the Liberian Government, but few
were absorbed into the power structure.
During the 1960s, administrative initiatives led to
increased tribal representation in the national legisla-
ture and brought greater numbers of tribal leaders
into the ruling class. Regional self-consciousness was
enhanced and many tribal leaders were co-opted into
settler politics. But the 3e changes were largely cos-
metic. Before the 1980 coup, control of the ruling
True Whig Party and cif the legislature remained
securely in the hands c?'the traditional settler elite,
and real power remained concentrated in the execu-
Major changes in the practices, which had excluded
rural tribals from national life, occurred after World
The Liberian Case: Altered Relationships
In April 1980 an enlisted men's coup led by current
Head of State Samuel Doe installed a Krahn-domi-
nated military regime in Liberia and eliminated the
top leadership of the Americo-Liberian settler elite.
This upset the sociopolitical structures through which
control of the country had been maintained for the
past century and a half. The coup also removed the
Americo-Liberian elite as a unifying focus of tribal
Liberian dissatisfaction and opened the way for com-
petition among groups with little experience in power
sharing. Ethnic and regional interests, historically
subordinated to those of the elite, have now surfaced,
and Liberians from the long-neglected rural hinter-
land are for the first time in a position to participate
Over the past 18 months, the military government has
begun a gradual process of return to civilian rule. A
draft constitution has been prepared, and a ban on
Live
political activities is supposed to be removed in late
July 1984; elections are scheduled for 1985, although
that schedule may be altered again as it was earlier
this year. The draft constitution proscribes develop-
ment of parties along ethnic lines, but nonetheless,
pre- and post-election politics are likely to reflect the
country's basic ethnic and geographic divisions. Tribal
and regional tensions have already begun to surface
and could strain national unity. If the election process
is aborted or if ethnic issues are highlighted in the
campaign, tensions along, tribal lines could erode the
unity of the poorly disciplined military.
The Americo-Liberians and Their Wards. The core of
the Americo-Liberian (settler) population is formed by
descendants of freeborn. and emancipated blacks from
the United States who settled along the coast begin-
ning early in the 19th century. Also included in this
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group were Africans from captured slave ships, a few
immigrants from Barbados, and a limited number of
tribal people who were integrated during the next 150
years by means of a "ward" or "apprenticeship"
system. The culture that developed promoted solidari-
ty and ensured their dominance. The settlers are
estimated to represent about 3 percent of the popula-
tion.
The settlers are socially and economically stratified.
The "inner elite," an interlocking network of families,
controlled most political, economic, educational, so-
cial, and religious structures. The True Whig Party,
the Protestant churches, and the public service were
the settlers' principal instruments of domination. It
was, however, through the Masonic Lodge-largely
impervious to tribal involvement-that the elite fam-
ilies exercised control of these institutions
Sharing power and wealth with the inner elite was a
broader group that included important government
officials, doctors, lawyers, and clergymen. On the
periphery of this ruling class were the poorer settlers
who-along with those indigenous Liberians who had
adopted the urban, Christian, English-speaking life-
style-worked in semiprofessional occupations
During the 1980 coup and its aftermath, visible
symbols of settler control were attacked. The Masonic
Lodge edifice in Monrovia was destroyed and the
organization was banned; many of the elite were
killed, or imprisoned, or fled. The solidarity of the
settler group, already weakened by the student and
leftist opposition movements of the late 1970s, was
further eroded. Many of those who had been part of
the ruling class and the "civilized" portion of the
modern sector managed, however, to maintain posi-
tions in the public service and the community. The
settlers also retain their self-consciousness as a group.
They remain the best educated, most affluent, and
most politically aware of Liberia's ethnic groups and
will continue to be a factor in the economic and
political arenas.
The Tribals. The end of settler rule in 1980 set the
stage for greater participation by the country's tribal
majority-more than 95 percent of the population-
in the political arena. Liberia has 16 major ethnic
groups, and none make up the majority necessary to
dominate politics in a multiparty state. The groups
fall into three linguistic categories, the Mande-, the
Kru-, and the West Atlantic-speaking peoples. A
limited cultural commonality exists among West At-
lantic- and Mande-speaking groups that could lead to
political alliances. Historic and recent interactions
between tribal groups and the location of their home-
lands in relation to foreign economic enclaves are also
of political importance
The urban coastal/rural interior dichotomy, which
characterizes the nation's political and economic life,
is also reflected among the tribal groups. Tribals
whose native lands are close to urban centers have
been the main indigenous participants in "civilized"
society. They are generally better educated, more
affluent, and healthier than tribals from the interior.
The settlers chose administrators for the interior
provinces from the coastal tribes; educated members
of these groups are more likely to have participated in
settler politics. Many from the interior identify coast-
al groups-who they see as having reached an accom-
modation with the former rulers-with the settler
re ime However large numbers of tribals from the
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and Kru (some of whom are found inland) remained
outside the modern sector.
The tribes of the interior, whose members had little
access to power or to economic and educational
opportunities under settler rule, are prominent in the
current government. The principal interior tribes are
the Gio, Kpelle, Krahn, Loma, Mandingo, and Mano.
Mostly subsistence farmers, their traditional pattern
of life changed after World War II when iron mines
and roads drew many into the modern economic
sector. The military was held in low esteem by the
settlers but provided an important means of upward
mobility for members of tribal groups. Prior to the
coup the enlisted ranks were made up largely of Loma
and Kpelle from the northwest
Among the native institutions that remain potentially
politically significant is the Poro, an all-male secret
society with political, judicial, religious, and educa-
tional functions. It is widespread among the Mande-
and West Atlantic-speaking groups in northern Libe-
ria and still takes precedence in many rural areas over
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Population Density and Ethnic Composition of Liberia
ETHNO-
LINGUISTIC Kru
KPEJLLE
Gbarnga
--
ETHNIC COMPOSITION
(percent of total population)
Settlers Other
Kissi (28) (1.2)
Dey Gola(3.4)v Kpelle
(0.4) (4.5) (19.9)
Belle -- -
(0.5)
Krahn
(4.7)
Kru
(8.0)
Gio
(8.7)
Mano
(7.4)
'ViA~','IDE
Loma
Bassa (5.9)
(14.2) I Mandingo
Mende Gbandi ~ai ) (39)
West
Atlantic
J
MANO
POPULATION
DENSITY PER
SQUARE MILE
under 40 _ 40-90 f over 90
Mixed, over 90
^-1 inhabitants per
sq. mile
DEY Tribe name
Sarpo Subtribe name
BASSA I
Zwedru?
KR.AHN
Sarpo
K R U
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other associations within the community. Most groups
in Liberia have secret societies, but no other secret
society is transtribal or affects tribal life as thorough-
ly as the Poro. It could act as a unifying mechanism-
transcending tribal bonds-among groups where it is
important. This unifying potential was appreciated
during the Tubman presidency; the Poro was recog-
nized by law, and the President became its nominal
head. Head of State Doe, his Krahn tribe, and the
related Kru tribe, now prominent in the military
government and officers corps, do not belong to the
Poro. Thus, they lack a politically important link to
the many Liberians who are members of the society.
A large majority of the tribal peoples (more than 95
percent of the country's total population) follow tradi-
tional African religions, and traditional practices re-
main strong even among those who claim adherence
to Islam or Christianity. Islam, which is in an expan-
sionary phase, accounts for more followers among the
indigenous population than does Christianity. Mus-
lims, making up about 20 percent of the total popula-
tion, are found in the north, especially in Grand Cape
Mount and Lofa Counties but also in Bong, Nimba,
Bomi, and Montserrado. Christianity, on the other
hand, has spread along the coast in the areas where
the settlers are concentrated. Christian missionaries
have had only limited success in the central and
southeastern interior, and Christians are estimated to
constitute no more than 10 percent of the total
population. Liberia under settler rule was a nominally
Christian state. With the growing number of Muslims
in the population and the enhanced position of tribals,
however, Islam probably will assume a somewhat
more important role in national life. The Muslim
community is still relatively conservative.
Throughout rural Liberia tribal institutions continue
to dominate daily affairs, and local leaders maintain
order by consensus. Since the 1960s tribal chiefs and
elders have actively participated in national politics,
and Head of State Doe has on several occasions
sought their counsel. These leaders are likely to play
an increasingly important role, especially in rural
areas, when the ban on political activity is removed.
Cultural-linguistic and historic ties between ethnic
groups could provide an organizational basis for polit-
ical activity. Coalitions along regional lines are possi-
ble in the northwest interior, the central interior, the
southeast interior, and in the coastal areas. Politically
significant coalitions are least likely to occur in the
southeast where an autonomous achievement-oriented
tribal structure prevails.
Growing Importance of Ethnic and Regional Factors
The political significance of ethnicity prior to the
1980 coup was very limited because it was held in
check by the settlers' monopoly of power. Student
activism represented one of the few expressions of
political vitality, and this followed the coastal/ interior
dichotomy. The leading opposition party, the Progres-
sive People's Party (PPP), was urban based and
apparently transethnic. However, the rapidity with
which ethnically based tensions arose following the
coup and the events surrounding recent coup plotting
indicate that tribal affiliation, especially among less
sophisticated Liberians, has remained an important
influence
Doe, upon seizing power, attempted to reduce inter-
tribal problems by including representatives of
Liberia's main ethnic groups in the People's Redemp-
tion Council (PRC) and Cabinet, by banning political
activity, and by antitribal pronouncements. However,
US Embassy analysis indicates that, despite the sup-
pression of open expression of ethnic enmities, ten-
sions exist below the surface, primarily in reaction to
the growing dominance of Doe's Krahn tribe. US
defense attache reporting also reflects the increasing
awareness of ethnicity in Liberian society over the
past year. In particular, it points up the growing
resentment among other tribal groups of the Krahn
influence in the military and in the affairs of state. A
so-called Nimba County conspiracy last November,
involving prominent Mano and Gio, served to high-
light these sensitivities.
Since the 1980 coup, the PRC and the Liberian Army
have been the most visible elements of tribal society in
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Possible Regional Coalitions
Coastal Liberia
Most of the country's urban educated people live in
settlements at river mouths along the coastal plain. A
coalition of groups from these settlements and their
environs-the settlers, the Vai, the Bassa, and the
urban Kru and Grebo-could be formed. Historic ties
between some coastal groups and tribes in the north-
western interior could provide a basis for a larger
coalition. A party drawing support from both regions
could minimize ethnic friction and lead to the elec-
tion of a central government acceptable to the major-
ity of Liberians
The Northwestern Interior
Tribal groups in the flat-to-hilly northwestern por-
tion of the country have cultural-linguistic affinities
reinforced in some cases by Islamic ties and by the
Poro secret society. A coalition of peoples from this
region would be politically significant. The Kpelle,
Loma, Kissi, Gbandi, and Gola also are well repre-
sented in heavily urbanized Montserrado County.
Members of these groups-especially the Kpelle and
the Loma-are well represented among the enlisted
A regional self-consciousness seems to be emerging
the Mano and Gio tribes of the area, who are
reported to have a strong group identity and a well-
developed political consciousness. Cultural-linguistic
affinities exist between the Mano and Gio and fellow
Mande speakers to the northwest. Mano and Gio
have reportedly joined the military in increasing
numbers since the 19180 coup.
The Southeastern Interior
The sparsely populated, heavily forested southern
interior is the home c/ the Krahn, the Sarpo, and the
"bush " Kru and Grebo. The potential political power
of these relatively autonomous groups is limited both
by sparse population and tribal structure, but anti-
Krahn/Kru feelings among other Liberians-who per-
ceive the eastern Kru speakers as a group-could
promote a coalition among the Kru, Krahn, and
Grebo. Identcation of Krahn and Kru with the Doe
government could work to their disadvantage during
the election campaign or in a civilian government
dominated by members of groups from the north. The
prominence of the Kru and Krahn among the rank
and file and in the officers' corps, which has grown
since the coup, has become an irritant to relations
The Central Interior
In Nimba County, where rolling plains give way to
hills and mountains near the eastern border, iron
mining, timber operations, and commercial agricul-
ture provide a basis for relative economic prosperity.
Liberia. Their practices-including those of Doe him-
self--have focused attention on ethnic divisions:
? Head of State Doe, as Chairman of the PRC, has
surrounded himself with fellow Krahn tribesmen-a
policy that has engendered considerable anti-Krahn
sentiment.
? Lesser PRC members have also promoted the ap-
pointments of unqualified fellow tribesmen to gov-
ernment positions and interfered in disputes on
behalf of ethnic compatriots with some regularity.
between groups.
? In several cases of coup plotting by officers and
enlisted men, the unifying element among plotters
has been common tribal affiliation or historic affini-
ties between groups such as the Mano and Gio.
The Liberian Army is composed mainly of tribal
peoples from the interior of the country. The core of
the Army is not a self-conscious professional force,
but a disparate group of semiliterate tribals who see
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Regional Coalitions of Liberia
Sierra
Leone
Interior
P?%
NORTH
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
Coastal
Liberia
military service primarily as a means of providing for
their families. They place greater importance on clan,
tribal, and village interests than on national institu-
tions. Although no current ethnic breakdown of the
5,000- to 6,000-man Army is available, Loma and
Kpelle reportedly accounted for 60 and 15 percent of
the enlisted men, respectively, prior to the 1980 coup;
their dominance has been diluted by increasing num-
bers of Mano, Gio, and particularly Krahn recruits in
the postcoup era. Kru-speaking groups, especially the
Kru and the Krahn, are disproportionately represent-
ed in the officer corps, and since the 1980 coup they
have gained an even larger share of the higher ranks.
Should the unity of the poorly disciplined Army be
undermined in the coming months, factionalization
could follow ethnic lines. The most likely alliances
among troops would be: between Loma and Kpelle
tribes, who probably still make up the majority of
enlisted personnel; between Mano and Gio tribals
from Nimba County; or possibly between Kru, Sapo
(half Krahn), and Krahn. The Army's units are
SSanniquellie
Central
Interior
Southeastern
Interior
generally ethnically heterogeneous, but the loyalties
of members of the units to their commanding officers
vary. The Executive Mansion Guard, which according
to the US Army attache is the only ground unit in the
Monrovia area with both functioning weapons and
ammunition, is heavily Krahn. This unit could be
expected to engage any group attempting to over-
throw the Doe government, although its ability to
respond to a threat is uncertain. Recent overt grum-
bling within the unit over poor living and working
conditions, however, could increase Doe's vulnerabili-
ty to an attempt to remove him.
The military government has announced plans to
relinquish power to a civilian government in January
1986. Preparations for elections, including the regis-
tration of voters, are continuing, although progress is
uneven and the government's commitment to free and
fair elections remains in doubt. The US Embassy
believes Head of State Doe now wants to remain in
power beyond 1986 and to become civilian president.
In our judgment, Doe is not above rigging the elec-
tions or delaying the timetable for civilian rule indefi-
nitely if it looks as if he cannot control the transition
process.
Even if the Main contestants for presidential and
legislative office are educated Liberians, they will
need a constituency outside urban areas and will most
likely draw support from particular ethnic or regional
groups. If candidates appeal to regional and ethnic
interests, uneducated rural Liberians as well as unas-
similated tribal Liberians in the urban areas probably
will be attracted to them. Most observers agree that
only a "tribal" can be elected president at this time;
however, the majority of the candidates are likely to 25X1
be members of the educated class with partial or full
tribal heritage who have adopted "elite" culture.
Prospects
According to US Embassy reporting, the require-
ments for registration of political parties are so mini-
mal that, when and if the ban on political activity is
lifted, a very large number of parties could spring
forth to test their strength. The current ban and the
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Monrovia, the capital and largest city, has been at
the center of Liberia's commercial, social, and politi-
cal life since the founding of the first republic. The
metropolitan area has a population in excess of
250,000. Its inhabitants are ethnically heterogeneous
and broadly representative of the country's various
ethnic groups, but include sizable concentrations of
settlers and of certain coastal and Lofa County
groups. Residential patterns increasingly reflect so-
cioeconomic status rather than ethnic background,
although a number of ethnic neighborhoods still
Rural Liberians contribute significantly to the city's
rapid growth. They are attracted by urban amenities
but find high rates of unemployment and crime and
housing shortages. The World Bank estimates that as
many as 70 percent of the metropolitan area's popu-
lation falls below the poverty line.
Expatriate Lebanese and Indian firms are the back-
bone of the city's commercial and manufacturing life.
Their dominance in these fields, especially their
control of import activities, makes them a focus for
resentment. Under the proposed constitution, these
groups will be forbidden Liberian citizenship because
absence of a tradition of multiparty democracy make
it impossible to determine at this time what parties
might emerge or to which tribal groups they are likely
to turn for support. Prior to the 1980 coup, the only
party with a national organization was the ruling
True Whig Party. Although the reappearance of this
party is unlikely, politicians with tribal backgrounds
and former ties to the True Whig Party may attempt
to revitalize networks in the tribal interior. Other
precoup organizations likely to participate in the
elections include the former People's Progressive
Party and the Movement for Justice in Africa
(MOJA). These groups were based mainly in and
around Monrovia but had made limited attempts to
broaden their base of support in the interior.
The growing probability that Head of State Doe will
openly run for the presidency increases the potential
for tribally based opposition. There have been indica-
tions over the past year that his candidacy will be
opposed in Lofa, Nimba, and perhaps Kru counties.
The chances for instability in the medium term are
likely to increase if potential presidential contestants
are intimidated by a Doe candidacy and refuse to
participate in the elections. Groups opposed to the
prospect of continued Krahn dominance and/or mili-
tary influence are unlikely to support a Doe govern-
US Embassy reporting indicates that discontent
among tribally based elements is increasing, but we
expect no imminent outbreak of hostilities. However,
should the process of return to civilian rule continue,
we expect that as the election nears economic deterio-
ration and distrust of hoe's intentions are likely to
increase the potential for tensions along ethnic and
regional lines. A campaign arousing ethnic divisive-
ness could erode the fragile ties uniting the poorly
disciplined military, and, if it fanned anti-Krahn
hostilities or was dominated by personalities from a
particular group or region, it could threaten the return
to civilian rule.
Changes effected by the 1980 "revolution" make it
unlikely that a freely elected government would be
able to institutionalize regional or ethnic discrimina-
tion as did the settler regime. Unless an able executive
and a strong central government representative of the
majority of society is elected, however, Liberia is
likely to experience a turbulent period in which the
various tribal and regional interests will struggle for
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Appendix
Politically Significant Ethnic Groups
Percent of Ethno- Poro Geographic Historic Position
Population Linguistic Group Distribution
Base
Coastal settlements, Dominated the coun-
especially Monrovia. try's social, political,
and economic life for
more than a century
until 1980.
Coastal areas, espe- Despite their proxim-
cially Grand Bassa, ity to the coastal set-
Montserrado Coun- tlements, few were
ties, and Rivercess assimilated into set-
Territory. tler culture, and
Bassa are rare in civ-
ilized society. The
majority were ad-
ministered under a
system of indirect
rule until after
World War II.
Southern Counties- Despite sporadic re-
Grand Jide (Gedeh) sistence to the set-
and Maryland. tlers, many were as-
similated into settler
culture, serving as
teachers and minis-
ters by the early 20th
century and later on
as middle- and high-
ranking government
officials.
Coastal areas, espe- Like members of the
cially Sino, Grand other coastal groups,
Kru, and Montser- some were assimilat-
rado Counties. ed and several held
high-level positions
in the settler govern-
ment. They were
well represented in
the precoup officer
corps-especially in
the Coast Guard.
The role and influence
of the group have been
modified but not
eclipsed. Several impor-
tant positions in the cur-
rent government are
held by members of the
group, and many with
strong ties to the group
participated in the draft-
ing and review of the
new Constitution.
They make up a signifi-
cant portion of the wage
labor force in Monrovia
and surrounding planta-
tions. They have exerted
little influence on the
national level. There are
no Bassa serving in the
Cabinet or in the PRC.
There are currently
some Grebo serving on
both the PRC and in the
Cabinet.
They have played an im-
portant role in the mili-
tary government. They
hold a large portion of
the Cabinet and PRC
positions allotted to
coastal groups.
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Politically Significant Ethnic Groups (continued)
Percent of
Ethno-
Poro
Population
Linguistic
Group
Base
Mande-
Yes
Northern
Geographic
Distribution
Grand Cape Mount
and Montserrado
County.
Mande- Yes Heavily concentrated
Eastern in Nimba County.
This largely Muslim
group came in early
contact with the set-
tlers, forming an
aristocratic relation-
ship with settler
leaders, marrying
into their Families,
and taking part in
their economic, so-
cial, and political
life. Prominent Vai,
who adopted Chris-
tianity, were among
the few indigenous
folk who held posi-
tions in the Masonic
Lodge.
They are closely re-
lated to the Mano
and are reported to
have a strong group
identity and a well-
developed political
consciousness.
Mande- Yes Throughout western Although they repre-
Western Liberia, but especial- sent a significant
ly in Bong, Lofa, and portion of Liberia's
Montserrado Coun- wage labor force-
ties. especially on the rub-
ber plantations-
they were largely ab-
sent from the central
government prior to
the coup.
Vai participation in the
military government has
been limited.
The group is represented
in the PRC and the Cab-
inet. US defense attache
reporting indicates in-
creasing tensions be-
tween members of the
Gio and related Mano
groups and the Krahn.
Both Mano and Gio
were heavily involved in
the November 1983
Nimba County coup
plot. Dismissed head of
the Army Thomas
Quiwonkpa is a Gio.
The Kpelle are now rep-
resented on the PRC
and in the Cabinet, but
were not part of the orig-
inal PRC. They were in-
cluded in an effort to
defuse intertribal
tensions.
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Politically Significant Ethnic Groups (continued)
Percent of
Ethno-
Poro
Geographic
Population
Linguistic
Group
Distribution
Base
Kru
No
Mainly Grand
Gedeh and Sino
Counties.
The Tchien, Putu,
and Sapo are names
sometimes given dif-
ferent elements of
the Krahn group who
have only recently
been recognized as
an ethnic group. In-
ternal divisions with-
in the group, in par-
ticular between the
Krahn and Sapo,
continue to cause
problems. The group
was among the most
obscure prior to the
coup.
Mande- Yes Majority in Lofa Most of the people
Western County, significant are farmers. They
numbers in Montser- made up the major-
rado. ity of the enlisted
ranks prior to the
coup and were heavi-
ly represented in the
late President's Ex-
ecutive Guard.
Mande- No A concentration in This largely Muslim
Northern Lofa County near group of itinerant
Voinjama, but found traders played an im-
throughout the coun- portant role in com-
try. merce, especially in
the interior. They re-
sisted assimilation
into the elite group
and were rarely ab-
sorbed into commu-
nities.
in Nimba County. an political and eco-
nomic development
prior to World War
II, the development
of Lamco Iron Mine
at Yekepa and asso-
ciated transport in-
frastructure brought
an increased number
of the group into the
modern sector.
They are heavily repre-
sented on the PRC and
in the higher echelons of
the military. They domi-
nate the Executive Man-
sion Guard and key posi-
tions in units stationed
in or near the capital.
There are a number of
Krahn in the Cabinet as
well. Head of State Doe
is the country's leading
Krahn. Clannish and
mistrustful of others;
visibility in the govern-
ment has exacerbated
their previous negative
image.
They hold positions on
the PRC, Cabinet, and
in the military. The re-
cent naming of Loma to
top-ranking positions in
the PRC and Army may
have been calculated to
eliminate growing dis-
content among the
group. Loma were in-
volved with the settlers
in the first plot against
the current regime.
Supplemented by signifi-
cant numbers of fellow
tribesmen from neigh-
boring Guinea, this ag-
gressive group is active
in the diamond and gold
trade and in most facets
of the country's trans-
port sector. The Man-
dingo are unpopular
with other groups, but, if
they decide to become
politically active, their
relative economic
strength may allow them
to exert some influence.
Mano have reportedly
increased their represen-
tation in the military
since 1980. There are
currently two Mano
serving on the PRC.
Mano were involved in
the recent coup plot.
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