EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY, SECURITY, AND INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY AND TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR LDCS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00315R000100130002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: August 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Z'p
Intelligence
East European Military, Security,
and Intelligence Advisory and
Training Programs for LDCs
A Research Paper
-T%rseeret-
ugust 199 25X1
C
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Directorate of Top Secret
Intelligence
and Intelligence Advisory and
Training Programs for LDCs
East European Military, Security,
Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared byl Office
of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the
Division, OGI, on
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, International Security Issues
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East European Military, Security,
and Intelligence Advisory and
Training Programs for LDCs F-
Summary Since the late 1970s, the scope of East European military and related
Information available advisory and training programs for less developed countries has expanded
as of 1 August 1984 rapidly. In 1983 more than 2,600 East Europeans performed military
was used in this report.
support functions in some 25 LDCs-approximately matching the record
set in 1982 and a sharp contrast to about 150 personnel present a decade
earlier. Similarly, some 1,850 trainees from the Third World-more than
15 times the number in 1974-departed for Eastern Europe last year.
Equally important, East European governments provided an expanded
array of assistance in both LDCs and Eastern Europe. Their programs,
however, still are smaller and-except for East Germany-far less compre-
hensive functionally than that of the USSR. The East European presence
abroad in 1983, for example, was only 15 percent of the Soviet presence,
and less than half the number of LDC trainees went to Eastern Europe
than to the USSR. 25X1
The East European programs parallel and complement Soviet training and
advisory activities in several important respects. Arms buyers in Africa and
the Middle East, for example, are the biggest customers for all Warsaw
Pact'services, reflecting the close cooperation between Moscow and its
allies in meeting the needs of important clients. Moreover, Soviet and East
European programs are administered similarly. In both cases, they are part
of the overall military assistance packages to LDCs that also include the
provision of weapons, other materiel, and construction projects.
East Germany is by far the most active non-Soviet Warsaw Pact supplier 25X1
of advisers and training, accounting for about half the East Europeans
abroad in 1983 and accommodating some 40 percent of trainees sent to
Eastern Europe. Berlin historically has met LDC demands in the securi-
ty/intelligence field-an area in which East German capabilities at least
match those of the USSR-although in recent years it has also provided in-
creasing support in military areas. Other East European programs, more
narrowly focused functionally and geographically, have remained smaller
than East Germany's (and the USSR's), although not necessarily unimpor-
tant to both supplier and recipient. Bulgaria, uniquely among East 25X1
European countries, focuses on training insurgent and irredentist groups-
probably a function of its expertise and close relationship with Moscow
East European advisory and training activities clearly reflect Soviet efforts
to enlist the support of its allies to help Moscow gain influence in the Third
World and penetrate military and government establishments. East Euro-
pean countries, as members of the Warsaw Pact, are obligated to support
Soviet policy for political and economic reasons. As a result, Moscow
attempts to orchestrate East European selection of targets and the timing
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Moscow. Occasionally-for political reasons----East Europeans have pro-
vided training instead of the Soviets. Bulgaria, for example, was the first
of commitments, sometimes exerting considerable pressure. Although
direct evidence is lacking, some East European commitments-such as
East Germany's in Angola and Ethiopia-suggest close coordination with
Warsaw Pact country to train Nicaraguans, according to
figure
East European governments also have pursued advisory and training
activities for nationalistic purposes. The genesis of East Germany's pro-
gram, for example, was Berlin's efforts in the 1950s to establish itself as a
legitimate government and compete successfully with West Germany.
Romania, the most independent member of the Warsaw Pact, portrays
itself as a developing, nonaligned country that offers Third World states an
alternative to assistance from the large powers. Aside from political
considerations, East European governments have been motivated by hard
currency earnings. We estimate that LDC obligations for military services
totaled some $260 million in 1979-83-seven times the estimated 1974-78
USSR.
East European advisory and training pro-
grams are well received by LDCs. Virtually all clients value the opportuni-
ty to acquire support, often qualitatively equal or superior to that offered
by the USSR and without the blatant drive for political influence
associated with the Soviet program. Czechoslovak technicians in Nigeria,
for example kent most of the trainer aircraft supplied by Prague ' have operational, a stark contrast to
Moscow's problem-plagued MIG-21 program there. The most frequent
complaints by LDCs concern costs, which generally exceed Soviet charges,
although some customers have faulted assistance substantively (mostly
training in Eastern Europe) or dislike the close ties of East Germany to the
expand.
Continuing demands by LDCs for East European services and the
willingness, to varying degrees, of these governments to provide them
indicate further growth of the programs, albeit possibly at a slower pace
than in recent years. East Germany undoubtedly will remain the most
active East European country, based on its ability to meet a range of
requirements and its close ties to Moscow. The programs of suppliers such
as Czechoslovakia and Poland, barring their emergence as major arms
suppliers, probably will be confined to a small number of clients, while
Bulgaria will continue to focus on training insurgents. Although East
European programs still will be concentrated among large arms buyers in
the Middle East and Africa, recent initiatives by Bulgaria and East
Germany in Nicaragua suggest that the regional scope will continue to
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Experts in LDCs: Varying Levels of Support 1
Military Training in Eastern Europe: Diverse Courses and Clients 4
Surging Hard Currency Receipts
An Assessment: Gains Outweigh Drawbacks 7
A. Eastern Europe: Growth of Military Advisory and
Training Programs, 1979-83
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East European Military, Security, and Intelligence
Advisory and Training Clients in the Third World, 1983
East European Presence
500 or more
L. 100-499
Fewer than 100
NA l Data not available
II Country sending
trainees to
East Europe
R
India
NA
The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
into the Soviet Union. Other boundary representation
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East European Military, Security,
and Intelligence Advisory and
Training Programs for LDCs
East European countries,' especially East Germany,
have broadened their ties and expanded activities in
the Third World significantly since the late 1970s. One
of the most important vehicles has been the supply of
military, security, and intelligence advisory assistance
and training.' These programs complement parallel
efforts of the USSR for the Third World. Moreover,
they supplement related Soviet and East European
activities, including limited economic aid, active meas-
ures (such as disinformation and exploitation of front
organizations), and expanded party-to-party relations.
East European governments have increased advisory
and training aid, to varying degrees, both to support
the Soviet geopolitical objective of gaining influence at
Western expense-especially in strategic areas-and
to realize national goals. The most important of these
for all East European suppliers is hard currency earn-
ings-less of a consideration for the Soviets. Other
goals of specific countries vary widely:
? The involvement of East Germany, one of Moscow's
closest allies, is traceable largely to its longstanding
efforts to gain international visibility, especially vis-
a-vis West Germany; its capabilities, especially in
the security/intelligence field, are an outgrowth of
expertise developed before and during World War II.
? The programs of smaller suppliers, such as Czecho-
slovakia and Poland, help promote arms sales to
selected clients.
? Romania offers assistance largely to enhance its
position as the most independent member of the
Warsaw Pact.
Experts in LDCs: Various Levels of Support
Since the late 1970s, increasing numbers of East Euro-
pean military, security, and intelligence personnel have
Romania
'This paper includes a discussion of security and intelligence ad-
visory support and training because functionally such assistance
parallels strictly military efforts (rather than economic aid) and often
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been sent to LDCs worldwide to provide assistance in a
growing number of fields. A near-record 2,655 such
experts were stationed in about 25 LDCs in 1983.' The
doubling of their presence since 1978 (figure 1) out-
paced even the surge in Soviet experts abroad. East
Germany, the most aggressive non-Soviet Warsaw
Pact country, accounted for half the East European
presence in 1983 (figure 2). Czechoslovakia and Po-
land, largely as a result of arms sales to Libya, also
contributed to the dramatic gains in the East European
presence.
The types of East European military and related
personnel sent to LDCs parallel the composition of
Soviets stationed abroad. According to
? Advisers. Almost always military or state security
officers, advisers are assigned to LDC staff units,
line commands, and academies.
? Technicians. Principally enlisted men, technicians
maintain and repair military hardware provided by
their own governments and the USSR.
? Instructors. East European personnel train officers
and troops in the operation and maintenance of
weapons and nonlethal hardware and in security
and intelligence activities, and sometimes provide
political indoctrination.
? Support personnel. Interpreters, administrators, and
logistic experts assist East Europeans working di-
rectly with LDC personnel.
As is the case with the Soviet program, the increase in
East European experts in LDCs is related to deliveries
of military equipment (figure 3). This has been espe-
cially true in the Middle East and North Africa.
Figure 1
Eastern Europe: Military and Security/
Intelligence Personnel in LDCs, 1974-83
Number of persons'
South Asia
Middle East
D Latin America
O Sub-Saharan Africa
? North Africa
0 1974 75 76 77 78 79 80b 815c 82` 83
a Estimated number of personnel present for one month or more.
b Data not available for Latin America.
Data not available for South Asia.
Nearly half of all East Europeans in LDCs, for
example, were in Libya, Iraq, and Syria, which
accounted for 85 percent of the value of East Europe-
an deliveries in 1983. East European assistance to
LDCs also has been driven by:
? Soviet pressure. In 1980, for example, Moscow
asked East Germany to send technical personnel to
North Yemen, according to US attache reporting.
? Large Soviet arms deliveries. East Europeans some-
times are assigned to maintain or rovide instruc-
tion on such hardware,
Soviet terms.
? Growing LDC demands for security/intelligence
services.
? More favorable financial arrangements than offered
by Western suppliers, although less generous than
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Figure 2
Eastern Europe: Estimated Composition of
Military Advisors and Techniciansin LDCs, by
Supplier, 1983
State security and intelligence personnel usually func-
tion independently of East German military and
security experts in LDCs. Those assigned to Mozam-
bique in the late 1970s, for example, received their
orders directly from the State Security Service in East
uermany,.accorcling to US attach .ng~ 25X1
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Security and intelligence specialists and instructors
constitute one of the largest functional contingents of
East Europeans in LDCs. These experts, who made up
an estimated 30 percent of the total presence in 1983,
are virtually all East Germans from both military and
state organizations sent to help LDCs defend "revolu-
tionary" gains. They have been assigned throughout
the Third World:
? About 60 intelligence and security experts, includ-
ing electronics technicians, were sent to Nicaragua
in late 1982, according to US Embassy reporting
Army and Air Force personnel account for almost all
the estimated 1,800 East Europeans assigned to LDC
military services. This distribution largely reflects the
pattern of weapons deliveries. Armies, typically the
largest military organization in LDCs, usually receive
the bulk of weapons imports. Most clients are not able
to operate and satisfactorily maintain aircraft-even
the less advanced models supplied by Eastern Eu-
rope-on their own. All non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
countries except Bulgaria and Hungary have been
noted providing assistance to these services:
? Czechoslovakia and Poland have focused their ef-
forts on Libya, where they have provided instruction
on L-39 trainer aircraft, MI-2 helicopters, tanks
and other armored vehicles, and other ground force
weapons supplied by Pra ue and Warsaw, according
to US attache report- 25X
ing. Poles in Libya also are completing installation
of an expanded coastal radar network, according to
US attache reporting.
? East German Army and Air Force personnel are
present in LDCs throughout Africa and the Middle
East, where they have functioned as pilot instructors
(Zambia) and technicians on weapons and nonlethal
hardware (Syria), and have provided air defense
training (South Yemen), according to State Depart-
ment and US attache reporting.
mechanics were posted to Angola's military aviation
school in 1982, according to US attache reporting.F_
? Some 150 Romanian Air Force pilot instructors and
East European technicians also have been sent to
LDCs to supervise military construction projects.
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Figure 3
Eastern Europe: Comparison of Military Presence and
Deliveries to LDCs, 1974-83
Military Deliveries to LDCs, 1974-83 Military Advisory Personnel Present in LDCs
500 O O 0
0 1974 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
0 1974 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83
Czechoslovakia has been one of the most active
su liers in this re and
Few East Europeans are assigned to LDC navies-
almost always the smallest military service-or to
general staff positions, which Soviets typically monop-
olize. Most of the East Europeans in these categories
have been East Germans in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Military Training in Eastern Europe:
Diverse Courses and Clients
The flow of LDC trainees sent to East European
countries has surged in recent years, reaching an
estimated 1,840 departures in 1983 (figure 4)-a
record. Like the growth in East Europeans posted
abroad, expanded training reflects increased arms
sales as well as the need to conduct some instruction
(such as advanced weapons maintenance) at special
facilities. About 90 percent of all trainees went to
East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland-the
same countries that supply the bulk of East European
experts working in LDCs. Libya sent some two-thirds
of all trainees to Eastern Europe, while Algeria, Iran,
and Syria accounted for most of the remainder (ta-
ble 2).
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Figure 4
Eastern Europe: Military and Related
Trainees From LDCs, 1974-83
South Asia
Middle East
Latin America
Sub-Saharan Africa
North Africa
0 1974 75 76 77 78 79 80b 81 82` 83
Estimated number of departures. Actual departures to Eastern
Europe probably are significantly higher and more evenly
distributed than depicted above; a poor data base, however prevents
better quantification.
b Data not available for South Asia.
Data not available for Latin America.
The general characteristics of East European training
programs for LDCs are similar to those of the
USSR-a reflection of the pervasive, longstanding
domination of its allies. All Warsaw Pact training
accommodates the varying capabilities of students
with different backgrounds, mainly by conducting
separate classes and offering rudimentary courses.
Moreover, they emphasize rigid adherence to pre-
scribed procedures. This tendency, however, is less
pronounced among some East European countries,
such as Poland. The similarity between East Europe-
an and Soviet curriculums occasionally is manifested
in complementary instruction for certain trainees.
About 250 members of the radical Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine were sent to Bulgaria and
East Germany in 1980, for example, before a second
Training in other East European countries is more
narrowly focused than in East Germany. Czechoslo-
vakia and Poland, whose primary client is Libya,
provide technical instruction, mainly on weapons sup-
plied by Prague and Warsaw)
East Germany's training program is by far the most
comprehensive of non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries.
Berlin provides a wide variety of basic and advanced
military, security and intelligence, and police instruc-
tion-all including heavy doses of political indoctrina-
tion, unlike most other East European-sponsored
courses. Sub-Saharan countries and Libya have been
traditional East German clients, although Berlin has
broadened its list of'recipients during the past several
years:
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Table 2
Eastern Europe:
Estimated Composition of LDC
Military and Related Trainees, 1983
Libya
Iran
1,200
200
Bulgaria's training program is unique in several re-
spects. As one of Moscow's closest allies, Sofia has
provided instruction in politically sensitive situations,
instead of the USSR.
Surging Hard Currency Receipts
Hard currency earnings provide much of the impetus
for East European advisory and training services to
LDCs. These suppliers historically have placed more
emphasis on generating financial returns than the
USSR, and this goal has become increasingly impor-
tant as key clients-mainly in the Middle East and
North Africa-realized large oil revenues in the mid-
1970s. Even poor LDC:s, such as Somalia, sometimes
have been required to pay for services, according to
US attache reporting
Nearly 50 facilities used to train LDC personnel have
been identified throughout Eastern Europe, mainly in
East Germany and Poland. These include officer and
noncommissioned officer schools, academies, securi-
ty/intelligence installations, and state production
plants. Because most of these sites are used mainly to
train indigenous personnel, separate classes usually
are established to accommodate language and apti-
tude needs of specific LDC students, according to US
attache reporting.
East European governments for advisory and training
services totaled roughly $260 million in 1979-83-
more than seven times the value during the previous
five years (table 3).' Obligations surged in the early
1980s-reaching more than $100 million in 1983-on
the strength of increased training in Eastern Europe.
' Hard currency obligations estimates are based on average report-
ed charges per recipient applied to all LDCs required to reimburse
East European governments for services rendered. The estimates
assume that payments, to the extent they are made, are received in
the same year services are performed-a reflection of the require-
ment that reimbursement be made on a current account basis.
Although payment data are far from complete, sufficient evidence
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Table 3
Eastern Europe: Estimated Hard
Currency Obligations From Military
Advisory Services and Training for
LDCs, 1974-83 a
1974-
78
1979-
83
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
Total
35
260
15
20
35
75
115
Czechoslovakia
10
85
5
10
10
20
40
East Germany
20
105
5
10
20
30
40
Hungary
NEGL
5
NEGL NEGL NEGL
NEGL
5
Poland
5
55
5
NEGL
5
20
25
Romania
NEGL
10
NEGL NEGL NEGL
5
5
a Rounded to the nearest $5 million. Actual receipts, in contrast
to obligations, undoubtedly were lower.
Libya accounted for about 60 percent of 1979-83
obligations, while virtually all the remainder probably
came from Iraq, Syria, Algeria, and Angola. Actual
receipts, however, may have been lower than the $260
million in obligations, as declining oil revenues un-
Most hard currency earnings have accrued to East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland-a reflection
of their leading position among East European coun-
tries in providing advisory and training services.
Training in these countries generated an estimated
two-thirds of total East European revenues from these
programs in 1979-83-a sharp contrast to the Soviet
program, which realizes most earnings from personnel
posted abroad. This circumstance is largely attribut-
able to the estimated 2,200 Libyans sent to East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland during the
past five years-far more than from any other LDC.
East European countries have independent policies for
pricing advisory services and training, although in
general such fees are higher than comparable Soviet
charges. US attache reporting, for example, indicates
that Syrian payments in 1978 for officers and enlisted
men of the same grade from Hungary, Czechoslova-
kia, East Germany, and Bulgaria varied as much as
several thousand dollars annually. The average reim-
bursement for these technicians-$15,000 a year-
was about 50 percent greater than for their Soviet
counterparts. In general, Libya pays the highest rates
Some especially poor LDCs continue to be provided
training on concessionary terms. Virtually all ex-
penses incurred by trainees sent to East Germany
from Benin and Ethiopia in 1980 and 1982, for
example, were borne by Berlin
LDCs in precarious financial situations also are pro-
vided in-country advisory services largely on a grant
basis.
East European hard currency earnings are especially
favorable when considered in the context of salaries
paid to individual experts and the other expenses of
the programs. Overall, such costs are much lower than
receipts. Various Czechoslovak technicians in Libya
in the late 1970s, for instance, received only a fraction
of the $15,000 and up paid by Tripoli to Prague,
according to US attache reporting. More important,
most expenses are payable in soft currency. Although
the advisers also may receive a small amount of hard
currency, the bulk of their salaries almost always is
denominated in East European currencies and depos-
ited in accounts in their native countries, according to
US attache reporting. Moreover, the local expenses in
LDCs occasionally subsidized by East European gov-
ernments-for which all recipients are contractually
responsible-are soft currency expenditures.
An Assessment: Gains Outweigh Drawbacks
The rapid expansion of East European training and
advisory programs during the past decade reflects the
ability and willingness of supplier countries to meet
growing LDC requirements for improved military and
security capabilities. Although neither suppliers nor
recipients have realized all their objectives, the mutu-
al benefits of the programs have outweighed the
disadvantages.
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East European governments probably consider hard
currency earnings to be the most important return
associated with their training and advisory programs.
These receipts have helped reduce the large current
account deficits of all East European countries (except
for Poland, which still had a more than $2 billion
deficit in 1983) and Bulgaria (which has enjoyed a
surplus for years). Some East European countries-
notably East Germany-have acquired reputations in
the Third World as reliable sources of unique services,
a situation that has buttressed efforts to achieve
recognition independent of the USSR. Advisory and
training programs also have spurred arms sales (espe-
cially by Czechoslovakia, by far the largest East
European seller of arms), which in turn increase
demands for services. Despite these benefits, most
supplier countries, except for Romania, probably
would have pursued training and advisory programs
for LDCs solely to satisfy their obligations to Mos-
cow, although less actively.
East European advisory and training programs, espe-
cially East Germany's, also have served Soviet inter-
ests by affording Moscow expanded, albeit indirect,
opportunities for political penetration of LDCs. This
return has been most significant in LDCs where the
Soviet presence is restricted for internal or external
political reasons. East European activities have en-
abled Moscow to gain access to military intelligence
and assess attitudes of key government decision-
makers who often have close ties to the military.
Many LDCs value East European assistance because
they believe it protects their nonaligned image. East
European governments present their programs as
efforts independent of the USSR to help support the
illusion of nonalignment. Substantively, some East
European assistance is preferred to that offered by
Moscow. The East Germans are most favored, mainly
for their security and intelligence expertise-reflected
in the widespread reliance of LDCs on Berlin for such
assistance. Similarly, some Libyan pilot trainees pre-
fer basic training in Poland to the USSR because of
the former's greater flexibility in accommodating
specific student weaknesses, according to US attache
reporting. Some recipients rely on technicians and
instructors because of their unique capabilities with
certain weapon systems. Czechoslovak aircraft me-
chanics, for example, were credited by Nigeria for
expediting pilot training in 1982 because they were
able to decrease aircraft downtime
This success contrasts
sharply with the often maligned Soviet effort on
MIG-21 fighters.
East European training and advisory programs, like
virtually all Communist and non-Communist efforts,
do not escape criticism. Some LDC concerns reflect
the close ties between Moscow and its closest allies.
North Yemen's wariness of the Soviet-East German
relationship, for example, was exacerbated in early
1980 when, according to US attache reporting, Mos-
cow pressured Sanaa to admit East German technical
advisers. Other East European countries have been
criticized mainly for substantive training shortfalls.
There is little question, however, that poorly qualified
We believe that East European advisory and training
programs will continue to expand in the near term,
albeit at varying rates. The high demand for security
and intelligence services by LDCs, for example, is
expected to result in an even more active East Ger-
man program. By contrast, Czechoslovak and Polish
efforts probably will continue at recent levels only if
Libya or another large client relies on these countries,
because they are unable to offer a wide range of
services. Similarly, there is no evidence to indicate
that Bulgaria, Hungary, or Romania will become a
major source of personnel assistance for LDC govern-
ments because these suppliers offer little expertise
that is not already available from other countries,
often as part of an integrated weapons transfer pro-
gram. Bulgaria, however, probably will maintain its
active support of irredentist and insurgent groups,
both on its own and Moscow's behalf.
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Appendix A
Eastern Europe:
Growth of Military Advisory
and Training Programs, 1974-83
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Table A-1
Eastern Europe:
Estimated Military and Paramilitary
Personnel in LDCs, 1974-83
1
40
270
560
645
1,300
1,405
1,485
1,865
2,675
2,655
Angola
50
55
300
400
550
400
500
500
100
250
200
200
600
600
Mozambique
50
50
50
Zambia
80
30
80
40
50
NA
Other
10
40
110
35
90
50
75
100
70
NA
NA
60
60
Middle East
1
10
225
385
390
335
550
390
500
550
585
Iraq
5
100.
115
100
65
50
50
100
100
South Yemen
25
25
35
35
50
300
100
100
100
100
80
200
250
220
180
180
240
300
300
300
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Top Secret
Table A-2
Eastern Europe:
Estimated LDC Trainees Departing for
Military and Paramilitary Training, 1974-83
Total
110
235
475
655
845
375
530
860
1,555
1,840
North Africa
25
NA
40
220
115
200
1,200
1,400
Algeria
260
200
Libya
25
NA
40
220
115
200
940
1,200
Sub-Saharan Africa
95
150
390
155
135
345
150
110
15
Angola
NA
NA
5
NA
NA
NA
NA
Congo
40
NA
NA
40
NA
Ethiopia
300
150
50
30
20
NA
Nicaragua
65
45
NA
NA
Iraq
60
25
135
155
150
10
10
80
50
Syria
50
50
120
75
500
10
NA
5
100
100
Afghanistan
35
NA
370
5
NA
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