USSR: 1984 GRAIN CROP SHORTFALL NECESSITATES MASSIVE IMPORTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00315R000200070003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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i3 rn a uirecrorare or
USSR: 1984 Grain Crop Shortfall
Necessitates Massive Imports
A DRE?5?S '-
FILE COPY/SOURCED GOPY~Ir
CONTROL BRANCH/CPAS/PDG/IMC
1 ROOM-fSO7Th S j
NO ADttiC REQiJIKEMENTS
GI 84-10149X
SOV 84-10144X
September 1984
M a Copy
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 Necessitates Massive Imports
USSR: 1984 Grain Crop Shortfall
This paper was prepared by the Strategic
Resources and Economic Divisions, Office of Global
Issues, and the Soviet Economy Division, Office of
Soviet Analysis
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Agricultural Assessments
Branch, OGI
Secret
GI 84-10149X
SOV 84-10144X
September 1984
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Key Judgments Adverse weather since April in several major grain-producing regions of the
Information available USSR has eliminated Moscow's chances this year for even an average grain
as of 30 August 1984 harvest. Indeed, with normal weather for the remainder of the season, we
was used in this report.
believe that the crop will come in at about 185 million tons, 10 million tons
less than last year's estimated output and 55 million tons below plan.
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A crop of this size, coupled with prospects for a forage crop no larger than
last year's record, means that the USSR will need to import a near-record 45
million tons of grain during the market year that began on 1 July in order to
meet its estimated grain requirements. Having already purchased 21-23
million tons by late August, the USSR is now well positioned-both ~
financially and logistically-to accommodate imports of this magnitude.
Such heavy buying activity also suggests that Moscow foresees the need for
even larger imports or is planning some action-such as stepped-up attacks
against Afghan insurgents inside Pakistan, or the introduction of combat
aircraft into Nicaragua-that it perceives could precipitate a US embargo.
Barring an embargo, the United States probably will supply the largest
quantity-at least 15 million tons-of grain imported by the Soviet Union
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Secret
GI 84-10149X
SOV 84-10144X
September 1984
 Figure 1
Estimated Soviet Grain Yields, Late August 1984
Above average
Average
n 50 1000
Kilometers
Cyprus
editerranean Sea `7 Syria
eban ofl
L
Pakistan India
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 I II
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production this year. Following the 5.4-percent overall
growth averaged during 1982-83, this will help keep
the Food Program on track, thereby maintaining the
credibility of the leadership's commitment to improv-
ing the consumer's diet. Continued progress into .
1985, however, is being jeopardized by the smaller
grain crop, and the possibility that forage supplies
an important source of livestock feed-will fall short
,. . ..
Introduction
Following four poor-to-mediocre years, overall Soviet
agricultural production in 1983 surpassed the previous
record set in 1978,.although output of most farm
products fell short of plan.' Our analysis of the latest
available information suggests that the 1983 grain
crop (about 15 percent of the value of total agricultur-
al output) came in at about 195 million tons, 15
million tons larger than our estimate of the previous
year's harvest and the best showing since the 1978
record of 237 million tons. Forage production set a
new record for the second consecutive season, and the
harvest of most other crops was up over the relatively
low 1982 levels as well. Meat and milk output reached
record levels, and the number of livestock rose to a
Last year's agricultural performance enabled Moscow
to improve food supplies while reducing hard currency
expenditures for imports of Western farm products in
1983 by about 8 percent-two longstanding goals of
the Soviet leadership reaffirmed in the Food Program.
Surveys of collective farm markets and state retail
stores showed increased supplies of most foodstuffs.
Estimated per capita availability of meat in 1983 rose
by 3 percent-the largest increase in several years-
as a result of record production and imports of meat.
Even so, because disposable income grew by a similar
amount while meat prices remained constant, queuing
and rationing did not decrease substantially. Soviet
grain imports during the market year (MY) that
ended on 30 June 1984 were roughly equal to those of
On the basis of the performance of the agricultural
sector through July, we estimate that total 1984
output will remain at least at last year's level.' We
believe that continued growth in the livestock sector-
which accounts for more than half of the total-will
more than offset the expected downturn in grain
' Estimates of the value of total agricultural output are derived
from the gross output of crops and livestock products, less feed
Under Soviet leader Chernenko, agricultural policy'
appears to be the same as under his immediate
predecessors. Support for the Food Program is being
continued, as are efforts to improve the quality andI
quantity of forage production and to provide material
incentives directly to those involved in farm produc 25X1
tion. The continuity signifies that Chernenko, like
Brezhnev and Andropov, hopes to close the gap
between domestic supply and consumer demand fort
quality food through even better agricultural perform-
ance, augmented with imports, rather than by increas-
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Following a good start last fall, prospects for the 1984
Soviet grain crop deteriorated sharply this spring and
summer because of adverse weather in some key .I
grain-growing regions. Furthermore, the area sown to
grain is one of the smallest in a decade. As a result,)
even with normal weather for the rest of the year,
total Soviet grain production is likely to be only some
185 million tons, 10 million tons less than last year's 25X1
estimated output, and well below the 205-million-ton
average for the 1976-80 period' The US Department
of Agriculture currently forecasts the crop at 180 f 25X1
illi
i
m
on tons. Est
mates by other western grain ana-
lysts range from 170 million to 190 million tons. t
' The 185-million-ton figure is our best estimate of the 1984 Soviet
grain crop, but one that is subject to error. On the basis of our 125X1
analysis of best and worst case scenarios, there is a 90-percent
probability that the crop will come in between 165 million and 195
million tons, and a 75-percent chance that it will range between 175
million and 190 million tons. Thus, we believe that there is more
risk than potential for the crop at this point in the season. F -1
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Table 1
USSR: Grain Production a
Actual
1976-80
Estimated b
Average
1981
RSFSR
113.9
78.0
99.5
112.0
101.0
Ukraine
43.1
38.2
42.0
39.0
44.0
Kazakhstan
27.5
23.8
19.5
25.0 -
21.0
' Measured in bunker weight, that is, gross output from the
combine, which includes excess moisture, unripe and damaged
kernels, weed seeds, and other trash. For comparison with US or
other countries' grain output, an average discount of l l percent
should be applied.
Moscow's poor crop prospects stem primarily from
several episodes of adverse weather. Most damaging
was a severe drought during May that devastated
crops in and around the Volga Valley-an area that
typically produces about one-fourth of the annual
Soviet harvest' Imagery from both Landsat and
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
meteorological satellite (NOAA-7 AYHRR) taken
after the drought abated in early June showed that
many grainfields had been destroyed and that damage
to most of the surviving ones was irreversible. Despite
a subsequent improvement in the weather, we expect
production throughout the affected region to be well
b The USSR has not published overall grain production or yield
statistics since 1980. Total grain production in 1981 was unofficial-
ly reported at 158 million tons. Data for Kazakhstan for 1981 and
1982 are official. All other figures represent our estimates.
Coarse grains comprise rye, barley, oats, corn, and millet.
d Other grains include pulses, buckwheat, and rice.
Additional losses were incurred during July in Ka-
zakhstah, the Ukraine, and Belorussia. Meteorologi-
cal data show that about half of the grain crop in
Kazakhstan was hit with sukhovey conditions (hot,
dry winds) from 9 to 12 July. Soviet weather stations
reported temperatures as high as 42 degrees Celsius
(1070 Fahrenheit) and winds of 10 to 15 knots.
Because the sukhovey occurred during the critical
flowering period,' yields probably were cut by as
4 The areas affected by the drought were the Volga, Volga Vyatka, excessive rain a there ostered weed growth and
Central Black Earth, western Kazakhstan, western Urals, and disr
ted the harvest somewhat thereb
reducin
y
g
up
' Unless stated otherwise, the term average refers to the 1976-80
rerind ' Flowering is the stage of crop development when maximum
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 A secondary factor limiting this year's. potential crop
size is grain hectarage. On the basis of statistics
released by the USSR's Central Statistical Adminis-
trationin earlyJune,,we believe that the final harvest-
ed grain area will.total only about 121'million hec-
tares; the second smallest since 1972 and well below
the 1245-million=hectare average of the past five.
example, extremely wet conditions during the second
.half of the harvest-just now under way-or an early
onset of winter could force Soviet farmers to cut
grainfields prematurely or abandon them entirely. In
1980, when such conditions were widespread, losses
were estimated to have totaled about 10 million tons.
years.' Assuming average yields, such a decrease in
hectarage produces a loss of some 5 million tons of, On the other hand, several factors could have a
potential, grain production positive impact on the outcome of the harvest. The
Soviet midyear plan fulfillment results show that
The outlook for the 1984 crop would be even worse deliveries of fertilizes to. farms matched last year's
were it not for the good-to-excellent prospects else- record level. Because Siberia and parts of the Europe-
where in the Soviet grain belt: an, USSR have received, adequate rainfall this sum-
mer, grain yields in those areas could exceed the
? Inthe Baltic, Central, and Northwest Regions, the bumper yields already incorporated into our 185-
persistence of mostly favorable weather throughout million-ton, figure. In ' addition;' we estimate that the
the crop season augurs well for bumper harvests amount of grain growing on land that, was ' previously
there. fallow is somewhat larger than in recent years. Al-
though fallowing, sacrifices production in the year. in
? Siberia appears headed for a record or near-record which the land is idled, it