WEST GERMANY: THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF THE MEDIA

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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 31, 2010
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• Publication Date: April 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

Directorate of Sea, et--
Intelligence
West- Germany: The Role and
Influence of the Media
Secrete
EUR 84-10064
April 1984
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) Intelligence
West Germany: The Role and
Influence of the Media
A Research Paper
This paper was prepared b Office
of European Analysis, with technical support from
Comments and queries are welcome
Division,
and may be directed to the Chief, European Issues
Secret
EUR 84-10064
April 1984
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.~cu ca
West Germany: The Role and
Influence of the Media
Summary West Germany's highly polarized news media both mirror and promote the
Information available breakdown of the country's security consensus. Much of the printed media
as of February 1984 strongly supports the Federal Republic's close ties with the Alliance and
was used in this report.
the United States. Left-leaning publications, however, along with the
electronic media, are fueling the peace movement, neutralism, and distrust
of US foreign policy.
Polarization of the media stems partially from journalists' own political
biases, but also from pressures by political parties, advertisers, and
publishers. The Soviet Union has taken advantage of the political divisions
in the media and cultivated good relations with popular leftist weeklies.
While the Soviets do not control the content of these publications, they
have benefited from incessant criticism of the United States.
Media impact is difficult to measure, but we believe left-leaning media are
disproportionately influential, especially among the educated elite. West
Germany's many conservative local newspapers give only limited coverage
to national and international affairs. Their readers, moreover, pay greater
attention to local events. The country has both conservative and leftist
national dailies, but the left-leaning weeklies have no serious competition.
Along with television, they can determine the agenda for discussion even
among those who reject their views.
We believe the influential leftist media will continue to add to strains in
West German-US relations. For instance, after fanning opposition to INF
deployments throughout the past two years, much of the press and
television may target next the issue of chemical weapons storage. The less
flamboyant conservative press will find it difficult to effectively counter the
leftist media's unceasing negative portrayal of the United States.
iii Secret
EUR 84-10064
April 1984
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Changing Structure of the Press
The Electronic Media: The Public System
2
Independence of the Press and Broadcasting
9
Political Influence
9
Dependence on Advertising
9
Impact on Public Opinion and Government
10
Perceptions of Media Reliability and Objectivity
11
Mirrors of Public Opinion
11
"Molding" Public Opinion?
12
Implications for the United States
14
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National Daily Newspapers
Germany's1our national dailies are.
? The Springer-owned Bild-Zeitung, the closest Ger-
man equivalent Qf the New York Daily News. It has
a far higher circulation than the other national
dailies, but, because of its sensationalist reporting,
the tabloid Qften has been accused of manufactur-
ing or distorting information.
? Die Welt, also a Springer publication, appeals to
the more educated reader. Its coverage of national
and international news is widely considered to be
among the best in the country.
? The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, designed for
intellectuals and businessmen, has a well-deserved
reputation for accuracy and thoughtful editorials.
? Munich's Sueddeutsche Zeitung has national re-
nown, but is more regionally oriented than the other
three dailies.
Important regional papers include the Frankfurter
Rundschau and the Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zei-
tung, which has a circulation second only to Bild.a
National Weekly Newspapers and Magazines
The weekly newspaper, a hybrid between newspaper
and magazine, is a significant feature of the West
German press. Unlike the national dailies, weekly
newspapers deemphasize news reporting and concen-
trate more on detailed analysis of salient events and
issues:
? Die Zeit enjoys a high regard among educated
readers because of its analytic depth and diversity
aA major reason for the lack of a rich national press, in our
judgment, is the absence of a true press capital. Bonn has not
developed the political and cultural stature that characterized
Berlin before World War II. Hamburg has filled the need for a
press center to some extent; it has become headquarters for the
influential Springer publications group, the German Press Agency,
and the financially strong West German radio-television station.
of opinion. The paper's superior quality, however, is
inversely related to its financial strength. Die Zeit
escaped bankruptcy in the late 1970s only after
adding Das Zeitmagazin-a colorful, less highbrow
supplement-to its regular edition.
? The Deutsche Zeitung and the Deutsche Allge-
meine Sonntagsblatt focus primarily on the con-
cerns of the Protestant Church. In addition to
religious subjects, however, the papers also print
articles on a variety of political, economic, and
social issues.
? The Rheinischer Merkur/Christ and Welt appeals
to Catholic and Protestant readers and sees itself
as the defender of Western Christian values.
? The news magazine Der Spiegel is highly controver-
sial. Some people have described it as "muckraking
and sensationalist, " while others have praised its
reporting on political life and its comprehensive
treatment of specific subjects. Spiegel's publisher,
Rudolf Augstein, claims that the magazine's main
purpose is to "burst political illusions. "
Illustrated magazines, such as Stern, Bunte Illus-
trierte, Quick, and Neue Revue have a much. larger
readership than the weekly newspapers and news
magazines because of their focus on sex, crime, and
society gossip. Despite their lurid covers, however,
Stern and Quick also are political magazines. Like
Spiegel, the two publications have shown great inter-
est in uncovering political scandals. There are also
many specialized periodicals serving industry, com-
merce, agriculture, and the scientific community.
Some of the scientific-academic journals have world-
wide reputations.
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West Germany: The Role and
Influence of the Media
Introduction
After World War II, the Allied occupation powers in
Germany restructured the press and radiobroadcast-
ing to help establish a strong democratic order.
Believing that market competition stimulates diversi-
ty, the Allies promoted private ownership of newspa-
pers and magazines. By contrast, they set up broad-
casting stations as decentralized, nonprofit public
corporations to prevent exploitation by the federal
government and powerful economic interests. The
Allies hoped the media would strengthen West Ger-
man democracy by providing comprehensive and ac-
curate information, presenting competing viewpoints,
and vigilantly monitoring government behavior. In
fact, concentration of ownership, ideological biases,
and political and economic pressures jeopardize these
preconditions for an effective democratic press. This
paper looks at the changing structure and political
orientation of the West German media. It examines
the media's ability to set the public and governmental
agenda as well as the constraints on the media's own
independence. And it also discusses the impact of the
leftist media on US interests.
Changing Structure of the Press
The trend toward concentration of the press during
the past two decades-particularly at the local level-
has fanned a storm of criticism. Many intellectuals
fear that the decreasing number of independent news-
papers and the emergence of ever larger and more
powerful publishing houses have reduced the diversity
of information and opinion necessary for maintaining
the vitality of West Germany's democracy.
Before World War II, Germany had approximately
20 national dailies; today there are only four (see
box)-far fewer than in the United Kingdom and
France. The paucity of national dailies is compensat-
ed to some degree by a large number of weekly
nespapers and magazines catering to a national read-
ership. The same trend toward concentration is evi-
dent at the local level. Growing production costs have
caused a marked decline in the number of smaller
local newspapers, giving the financially stronger ones,
such as the Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, a
virtual monopoly in their region.
Although there are approximately 400 daily newspa-
pers, relatively few have full publication staffs. To cut
production costs, most papers print the bulk of their
pages from matrices supplied by central publishing
houses and change only the local news section. The
number of papers with independent political and
editorial sections has dropped steadily over the years.
In particular localities, the predominant newspaper
has little, if any, competition. In 1954, 15 percent of
all local districts had only one newspaper; the percent-
age of one-paper districts has more than doubled since
then. The Bild-Zeitung not only dominates the na-
tional market, but it is also expanding its circulation
locally through regional editions.
Declining competition in the press is linked to growing
concentration of ownership. According to the West
German Press and Media Handbook, the conserva-
tive Springer concern alone controls 85 percent of the
national newspaper market and 37.percent of all daily
newspapers. The degree of concentration is equally
pronounced for magazines. The four leading publish-
ers-Springer, Bauer, Burda, and Gruner + Jahr-
produce 65 percent of all magazines.
To prevent further accumulation of power by the
large publishing houses, two of West Germany's
antitrust agencies-the Monopolies Commission and
the Cartel Office-have blocked publisher Axel
Springer's efforts to sell as much as 51 percent of his
press empire to the Burda publishing group. The
Cartel Office argues that the proposed "elephantine
marriage" would create a dominant company in news-
paper and magazine advertising. The measures taken
by the antitrust agencies and bad publicity have
prompted Springer to postpone his merger plan.
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The Electronic Media: The Public System
The electronic media are organized as nonprofit pub-
lic corporations for each Land or group of Laender on
the model of the British Broadcasting Corporation-a
system designed by the occupation powers to protect
the freedom of broadcasting from federal government
encroachment and economic exploitation (see box).
The guiding principles for the radio and television
broadcasting stations are pluralistic control and bal-
ance. The networks are required by the West German
Constitution to represent "all socially relevant
groups." The broadcasting councils of most stations,
therefore, have representatives from Land govern-
ments, trade unions, churches, chambers of com-
merce, the press and local governments, and higher
education. In the case of the West German and North
German stations, the Laender parliaments elect the
broadcasting councils, each party receiving seats in
proportion to its strength in the legislature. All broad-
casting programs must reflect "a minimum measure
of balance in content and impartiality," according to
Article 5 of the Constitution.
Domestic radio and television stations are financed
primarily through fees paid by the owners of radio
and television sets. The fees are collected by the
federal post office and channeled to the broadcasting
stations. Although the networks obtain additional
revenues from commercial advertising, television time
for advertising is strictly limited, and sponsored pro-
grams are forbidden by law. Except for the regional
West German radio-television station in Cologne and
the nationwide ZDF television network, most broad-
casting organizations have budget deficits.
Private Television
In February the minister presidents of the Laender
approved private television, thus ending a drawn-out
and often acrimonious controversy between the Chris-
tian Democrats (CDU) and the Social Democrats
(SPD) over the appropriate organization of the elec-
tronic media. Before the minister presidents reached
their agreement, the SPD had vigorously fought the
Kohl government's plan to introduce nationwide cable
television with private-sector participation and satel-
lite TV, maintaining that:
? Only public-law broadcasting stations, constitution-
ally bound to represent all relevant social groups,
could ensure pluralistic control of television and
prevent exploitation by narrow economic interests.
? Commercialization of TV would lower program
quality because business people, following profit
instincts, would gear programs to mass tastes.
In a February session of the SPD's committee for
media policy, the party decided to accept private
participation in broadcasting, provided that "the prin-
ciple of internal pluralism to safeguard diversity of
opinion" will be upheld. The committee neither de-
fined "internal pluralism" nor elaborated on how to
achieve it in private television. The Social Democrats
also made their acceptance of private TV dependent
upon the Kohl government's promise to preserve and
improve the public broadcasting system.
According to the SPD's federal business manager, the
party changed its media policy when it realized the
Kohl government would introduce private TV any-
way. The Social Democrats also hoped that domestic
private television would discourage TV transmissions
from foreign satellites, which are not easily subjected
to national control
The minister presidents of the Laender had approved
cable TV experiments even before the SPD changed
its position on private television. Four pilot projects-
in Munich, Dortmund, Ludwigshafen, and West Ber=
lin-will be run for two to three years with the
number of subscribers ranging from 10,000 to 50,000.
The Ludwigshafen project, which started operation
earlier this year, is the only one with private-sector
participation. The newscasts for the Ludwigshafen
experiment are produced by the conservative daily
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung~
Objectivity
Despite claims in the masthead of nonpartisanship,
most news publications are far more ideological and
partisan than US newspapers and magazines. West
German newspapers, for example, almost never pub-
lish opposing views, as US newspapers frequently do.
The trend toward polarization began in the 1960s
with a new generation of politically conscious journal-
ists. Decrying the artificial calm during the Third
Reich and the immediate postwar period, they were
determined to make the media a public forum of
political and social debate.
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There are nine regional domestic radio stations:
North German, Bremen, West German, Hesse, South
German, Southwest German, Bavaria, Saarland, and
Free Berlin (see figure 1). The two largest are the
West German station in Cologne and the North
German station in Hamburg. A director-general (In-
tendant) heads each network and is accountable to its
principal governing bodies: the broadcasting council
and the administative council.- In 1950 the radio
stations, while maintaining theirfederalist structure,
formed a 'Public-law consortium known as the Associ-
ation of Broadcasting Stations under Public Law in
the Federal Republic of Germany (ARD) for program
exchange, budget balancing, and operation of thefirst
television network.
The nine domestic radio stations carry three pro-
grams. Because the First and Second Programs
broadcast nearly 24 hours each day, they try to
provide a contrast in program content. The Third
Program, on the air only five to seven hours each day,
is directed primarily at guest workers. In 1960 the
Bundestag created two federal public corporations for
broadcasting abroad. Deutschlandfunk aims mainly
at East Germany while Deutsche Welle-primarily
on shortwave-broadcasts worldwide
Television
The regional radio services also participate in the
production of television programs. Unlike Americans,
who enjoy a wide selection of programs, most West
controlling body-the program advisory committee
The popular weekly news publications, particularly,
often make it difficult for the reader to distinguish
between news and analysis. The daily newspapers are
more factual-if not always accurate-but headlines
are often tendentious. Broadcasting networks, al-
though legally obliged to maintain neutrality, also
have become very politicized.
Germans can choose among only three channels. One
channel (Deutsches Fernsehen) is jointly operated by
the nine regional stations in ARD. Each station's
contribution to the common program is determined
by a quota system based on the number of television
owners in its area (see figure 2).
A second channel (Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen-
ZDF) is not run by ARD, but rather by a separate
public corporation with central studios in Mainz.
ZDF is the outgrowth of a failed attempt by the
Adenauer government in 1954 to gain control of a
portion of the radio-television media by introducing a
draft law for a second television station operated by
the federal government. The Federal Constitutional
Court ruled in 1961 that the Laender have sole
jurisdiction over the operation of radio-television
networks. After this landmark decision, the Laender,
realizing the need for a second television channel,
approved the establishment of ZDF. The members of
its supervisory body-the television council-are
chosen from the political parties according to their
strength in the Laender, and its programs are coordi-
nated with ARD.
A third channel-which is run by ARD-is not a
joint production of the nine regional stations, but
rather each station carries its own programs. Like the
Public Broadcasting System in the United States, it
transmits educational, scientific, and cultural
programs.
programs-are disproportionately influential, espe-
cially among the educated elite. The many conserva-
tive local newspapers give only limited coverage to
national and international affairs. Public opinion polls
show that their readers, moreover, pay greater atten-
tion to local news and sports. While there are both.
conservative and leftist national dailies, the left-
leaning weeklies have no serious competition. Along
Although conservative news publications outnumber
leftist ones, we believe the leftist media-particularly
the weekly news magazines and leftist-oriented news
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Figure 1
West. German Broadcasting Stations
International radio station
? Regional radio/television station
^ Television station
Projected television station
Regional broadcast boundary
Land (state) boundary
WDR, DW, DLF
gDortmund
*Brussels
Belgium
FIN West German (WDF)
A Deutschland Funk (DLF)
Bonn*
We
`Lux "'
Luxembourg
_-.'t * 1
so
Second Television
-Network (ZDF)
r
Free Berlin')
(SFB) SF' West Berlin
Germany
t
tf
ti
HESSEN tit
H R '-
Frankfurt
*gg
(HR)
Germ
SDR
France
BR
?.Munich
10 Bavaria (BR)
SCHLESWIG.
HOLSTEIN
RB' rvorrn r
German
emen (NDR)
Breme East
`- ry
(RB) NDR
St
SWF
BADEN--
WURTTEMBERG
d * Switzerland
Bern
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Figure 2
Shares of Regional Stations in the
First. Television Program (ARD)
WDR-West German SFB-Free Berlin
NDR-North German SDR-South German
BR-Bavaria RB-Bremen
HR-Hesse SR-Saarland
SWF-Southwest German
with television, they are able to determine the agenda
for discussion even among those who reject their
views.
West German journalists, like most members of the
intellectual elite, tend to have leftist sympathies. This
is true even of many of those employed by conserva-
tive-owned publications. An Allensbach public-opin-
ion survey showed in 1976 that slightly more than 50
percent of all press and broadcasting editors support-
ed the Social Democratic Party, while only 25 percent
favored the Christian Democrats. The leftist bias
among journalists in large part explains the increas-
ingly critical attitude of a significant portion of the
mass media toward US policies. (See table
Political Orientation of the Printed Media. Our
readings and the observations of other US officials
and of academicians indicate that the following publi-
cations are conservative:
The national dailies Bild-Zeitung and Die Welt as
well as the weekly Muenchner Merkur and the local
Koelnische Rundschau support the conservative
parties and rarely fail to criticize the Social
Democrats.
The nationally distributed Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung is also conservative in its editorials, but it is
more balanced in its news reporting.
o The national weekly Rheinischer Merkur/Christ
and Welt supports the policies of the Kohl
government.
The regional weekly Bayernkurier, owned by the
Christian Social Union (CSU), is the mouthpiece of
Bavaria's Minister-President Franz Josef Strauss.
Other important publications tend toward the left:
The regional dailies Frankfurter Rundschau and
Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, as well as the
local Hamburger Morgenpost, sympathize with the
Social Democrats.
The SPD weekly newspaper Vorwaerts reflects pre-
dominantly the views of the party's left wing.
The weekly news magazine Der Spiegel is "leftist-
nationalist," but its antigovernment orientation
prompts it to lambaste political leaders regardless of
their party affiliation.
The weekly news magazine Stern, previously the
most polemical of the leftist publications, has be-
come more moderate as a result of a leadership
change in May 1983. Stern's recent. announcement
that conservative chief editor Peter Scholl-Latour
will be replaced by Rolf Winter, however, may
indicate a return to a more pronounced leftist
editorial policy.
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The Media: Political Orientation and
Attitude Toward the United States
Title
Circulation
Political
Orientation a
Attitude Toward the United States
Bild-Zeitung
4,896,200
More sensation-
alist than politi-
cal. Conservative.
Pro-US.
Bild am Sonntag
3,000,000
Pro-CDU.
Strongly pro-American, even during height of Viet-
nam War. Stresses need for US military presence-in
West Germany.
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung
338,000
Right-of-center
independent.
Generally supports US foreign policy and strong
Atlantic Alliance.
Frankfurter Neue Presse
147,100
Right-of-center
progovernment
regardless of po-
litical orienta-
tion.
Reports fairly and objectively.
Frankfurter Rundschau
193,400
Pro-SPD.
Critical of society and foreign policy, particularly
INF and military intervention in Latin America.
Koelner Stadtanzeiger
255,000
Pro-CDU.
Generally favorable.
Muenchener Merkur
252,200
Pro-CDU/CSU.
Generally pro-American. Favors a hardline US poli-
cy toward Communist countries.
Sueddeutsche Zeitung
210,000
Independent cen-
trist.
Basically pro-American. Favors disarmament talks
and detente with Soviet Union.
Die Welt
271,454
Pro-CDU.
Positive attitude toward US presence in West Ger-
many and West Berlin. Critical of detente. Strong
support for Israel sometimes prompts it to criticize
US efforts to be evenhanded toward protagonists in
Middle East.
Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
1,060,300
Pro-SPD.
Somewhat critical of United States, particularly dur-
ing Vietnam War.
Berliner Morgenpost
196,000
Conservative pro-
CDU.
Strongly pro-American. Advocates firm US attitude
toward USSR on START, INF, MBFR and human
rights.
Der Tagesspiegel
118,500
Independent.
Consistently pro-American. Best coverage in West
Berlin of US issues.
Rheinischer Merkur
60,000
Pro-CDU.
Generally well disposed toward United States. Some-
times critical, but always fair.
Vorwaerts
60,000
SPD publication.
Frequently criticizes US foreign policy and urges
greater efforts at disarmament.
Die Zeit
55,000
Left of center in-
dependent.
Sometimes critical, particularly editorials by Theo
Sommer.
Der Spiegel
1,044,500
Leftist national-
ist.
Generally negative,
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The Media: Political Orientation and
Attitude Toward the United States
Political Attitude Toward the United States
Orientation a
Stern 1,913,800 Left of center. Since last year's appointment of conservative chief
editor Peter Scholl-Latour, coverage of the United
States has become more balanced. Rolf Winter, who
will replace Scholl-Latour, may resume a more pro-
nounced leftist editorial policy, but he generally
seems well disposed toward the United States.
Quick 1,308,300 Pro-CDU. Generally pro-American along lines of Christian
Democratic Union.
ARD
ZDF
TV Political Programs
Tagesschau (ARD) Left. Often critical.
Heute (ZDF) Right. Generally unbiased coverage.
Weltspiegel (West German and Right. Balanced presentation.
Bavarian stations)
Internationaler Fruehschoppen
(West German station)
Perspektiven (ZDF)
Report (Southwest German station)
Monitor (West German station)
Panorama (North German station)
ZDF Magazin
Right.
Previously leaned
toward left. Mod-
erator Franz Alt
was recently re-
moved for being
too anti-INF.
Left.
Left.
Right.
Moderator Werner Hofer is pro-US, but his mostly
foreign guest journalists frequently are not.
Balanced presentation.
May become more objective.
Sometimes critical.
Sometimes critical, particularly with regard to INF.
Generally pro-US and anti-Communist.
? The weekly newspaper Die Zeit, which is politically
independent, pursues a center-left editorial line in
foreign policy and a conservative one in economic
policy.
? Many staff correspondents of the leading wire serv-
ice, Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA), also appear to
favor the left.
The regional daily Sueddeutsche Zeitung is the only
major centrist paper. At the extremes of the political
spectrum are the reactionary and ultranationalistic
Deutsche National-Zeitung and Unsere Zeit-Sozialis-
tische Volkszeitung (UZ), the main publication of the
German Communist Party.
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Political Orientation of the Electronic Media. The
broadcasting stations are required by law to maintain
neutrality, particularly in informational programs.
Newscasters, for example, reporting about activities
or policies of the SPD, must give equal time to the
CDU, regardless of the news value. Many radio and
television news programs, however, do not comply. In
fact, an ideological polarization has developed among
the regional stations in the ARD radio and television
network, and between the left-leaning ARD and the
more conservative ZDF television network.
The ARD's North German, Bremen, and Hesse sta-
tions are more leftist and favor the SPD, while the
Saar, Southwest, and South German stations tend to
support the CDU/CSU. ZDF programs such as the
popular heute and ZDF Magazin are also more
supportive of the CDU/CSU. The North German
station has moderated its leftist political rhetoric in
response to the growing strength of the Christian
Democrats in its area and to the threat by conserva-
tively governed Lower Saxony to pull out of the inter-
Land agreement. In our judgment, however, it is still
far from objective. For example, a report about the
peace movement on its television program Panorama
during the recent "hot autumn" not only disregarded
the complexity of the INF issue but also blatantly
favored antimissile groups.
The conservative daily Die Well charged last Septem-
ber that. television programers have become spokes-
men for the peace movement and reminded TV
decisionmakers of their responsibilities to a public
institution legally committed to balanced reporting.
ARD's Southwest station seems to have taken this
sort of admonition to heart. It announced early last
October that Franz Alt-a Christian Democrat-
would no longer moderate its political program Re-
port because of his strong partisan attitude in favor of
the peace movement. Leftists have charged that this
decision violates the freedom of the press.
Attitudes Toward the United States. While the con-
servative media generally have supported US security
and foreign policy, left-leaning news publications and
television programs have been sharply critical. The
conservative prestige dailies Die Welt and Frankfurt-
er Allgemeine Zeitung are probably America's
staunchest friends. Because of their strongly anti-
Communist outlook, they have supported NATO
modernization policies, defended the US intervention
in Grenada, and stressed the Soviet military buildup.
When much of the West German media criticized
President Reagan's 1982 technology embargo against
the West European-Siberian pipeline, Die Welt
wrote:
"... the US Ambassador in Paris was right in
comparing the pipeline project to the development
of the Russian railroad system at the end of the
19th century. This is not a trade agreement compa-
rable to the US-Soviet grain deal. This is the
greatest infrastructure project the Soviet Union
has ever seen ..."
The leftist printed media vigorously have attacked
Washington's attitude toward arms control and mili-
tary initiatives in Latin America:
? Der Spiegel has accused Washington of insincerity
in the arms reduction talks in Geneva and willing-
ness to wage a limited nuclear war in Europe.
? Stern also has opposed INF deployment strongly,
and a recent cover pictured President Reagan as a
"warmonger."
? Die Zeit, although more objective than the other
two publications, often has disapproved of the as-
sumptions and substance of US policy. According to .
Embassy reporting, Die Zeit's publisher, Countess
Doenhoff, and senior editor Theo Sommer, in a
meeting with the US Ambassador, questioned
Washington's commitment to arms control.
? Frankfurter Rundschau, commenting on the recent
US troop maneuvers in Central America, charged
that the United States "disregards the minimum of
political good conduct and derides the very cause of
freedom it allegedly promotes as the leading power
of the West."
? The SPD publication Vorwaerts portrayed the US
intervention in Grenada as a reckless action indicat-
ing Washington's disregard for the European allies.
The paper also suggested that the United States
might not consult its NATO partners before launch=
ing INF missiles to be deployed in Europe
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Broadcast journalists also frequently have criticized
the United States. Michel Meyer, a French television
correspondent in Bonn, told US Embassy officials
recently that he saw few broadcasts that could be
called friendly toward the United States during a two-
month period of formally monitoring West German
TV in 1982. As an example of negative television
reporting about the United States, Meyer cited .a
newscast showing a poverty-stricken section of New
York and a woman about to commit suicide. Accord-
ing to the correspondent, the film then "brutally cut"
to an excerpt of a speech by President Reagan saying
that America had been too warmhearted in the past
and needed a cool head
There are differences in the degree of criticism ex-
pressed by the networks, however. ARD has been
more hostile toward the United States than ZDF. The
difference between the two networks was particularly
evident in their respective coverage of anti-INF dem-
onstrations at the US Air Force base at Ramstein last
summer. ZDF's news program heute tried to present
the clashes between demonstrators and West German
and US security forces evenhandedly. ARD's Tages-
schau, by contrast, covered the event exclusively from
the viewpoint of the demonstrators. It showed US
military police beating demonstrators, and cameras
focused on a banner reading "Shooting Order Against
Pacifists" to underline US brutality.
Independence of the Press and Broadcasting
The media's ideological tendentiousness stems partial-
ly from journalists' personal biases, but also from the
influence of powerful interest groups. This is the case
despite constitutional protection against pressure both
from government and private interests and despite
formation of the German Press Council by media
leaders to uphold journalistic standards. In some
instances, we believe, the media have been propagan-
da instruments of the Soviet Union.
Political In/luence. In the broadcast media, political
parties have been much more successful in influencing
decisions than the other social groups represented on
the supervisory bodies of the networks. A number of
pressure groups called Freundeskreise (circles of
friends), affiliated with the two major political parties,
have become permanent institutions on the periphery
of some stations. Consisting of leading politicians,
these groups meet regularly with members of the
supervisory bodies-and sometimes important mem-
bers of production teams-to discuss broadcasting
matters. Before every meeting of ZDF's television
council, for instance, Christian Democratic and Social
Democratic Freundeskreise go to their respective
party annexes in Mainz to receive their orders, ac-
cording to academic studies. One study concludes that
the major parties' jockeying for partisan advantage
has nearly paralyzed decisionmaking in the West
German station, where SPD and CDU representation
is almost equal.
The political parties exert little direct influence on the
printed media-except, of course, for the party-owned
press. While the majority of papers are ideological
and partisan, they carefully maintain their formal
independence from the parties. Individual journalists,
however, sometimes succumb to political pressure,
particularly if they have developed good sources in the
government or the opposition with whom they hope' to
curry favor.
Dependence on Advertising. The growing dependence
of the press on advertising gives private businesses
great potential leverage over content. National papers
and magazines receive approximately 75 percent of
their income from advertising. Although it is difficult
to prove that commercial groups use their economic
power to force a particular editorial line, there have
been some newspaper reports about large firms dis-
cussing concerted actions for or against certain publi-
cations. In January 1972, for instance, industrial
leaders reportedly met with the owner of the Bauer
publishing group to talk about an advertising cam-
paign against the Social-Liberal coalition in Bonn.
Publisher Heinz Bauer allegedly suggested to the
industrialists that they should give their advertising to
his company instead of Der Spiegel. There is no proof
that the participants in the meeting actually reached
an agreement, but, according to a West German
media expert, Der Spiegel and Stern suffered heavy
advertising losses during 1972. The reduction in in-
come, however, did not trigger a change in the
magazines' editorial policy.
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"Internal" Freedom of the Press. The political left-
including members of the SPD and student leaders-
has led the battle against the oligopoly of the large,
mainly conservative, publishing houses. It has charged
that freedom of the press is the freedom of a few rich
publishers. Leftists have directed their protests pri-
marily at conservative Axel Springer, who often has
used his publications to attack individuals he dislikes,
such as Social Democrats Willy Brandt, Egon Bahr,
and Herbert Wehner.
To protect the "internal" freedom of the press, the
previous Social Democratic-led government intro-
duced a draft law in 1974 giving editorial staffs a veto
power over top-level personnel changes and shifts in
basic policy. The law was never passed, but some
leftist newspapers and broadcasting stations-such as
Koelner Stadt Anzeiger, the SPD publications, Stern,
and the North German radio-television network-
voluntarily have adopted statutes giving their journal-
ists more say in determining editorial and personnel
policy
During the past 10 months, journalists at Stern have
been testing the value of such voluntary statutes.
After the exposure of the alleged Hitler diaries as a
hoax in the spring of 1983, chief editor Henri Nannen
announced the resignation of Stern editors Peter Koch
and Felix Schmidt and their replacement by Peter
Scholl-Latour and Johannes Gross. Stern's staff re-
acted angrily to the appointments, arguing that they
had not been consulted and that the conservative
political orientation of the new editors would endan-
ger the "liberal-progressive" policy of the magazine.
To show their disapproval, the staff "occupied" their
workplaces during a weekend last May, and demand-
ed rescission of the new apointments along with the
resignation of Henri Nannen. The Bertelsmann pub-
lishing house-the principal owner of Stern-with-
drew the appointment of Gross, but insisted on Scholl-
Latour. Henri Nannen, who founded Stern, retired in
the wake of the scandal. Less than a year after Scholl-
Latour became chief editor, Stern announced his
replacement by more left-leaning Rolf Winter.F_
Soviet Influence. US Embassy officials believe that
neither the Soviet Union nor any other Bloc country
has control over any of the non-Communist press or of
the broadcasting media. The Soviets, nonetheless,
have been adroit in handling their relations with the
West German media. Realizing Der Spiegel 's impor-
tance in Bonn, they have cultivated its editors. Ac-
cording to US Embassy officials, the relationship is
maintained in regular working-level meetings between
Spiegel editors and a Soviet journalist assigned to the
Soviet Embassy. US officials report that publisher
Augstein also conducted clandestine "summits" with
Valentin Falin when he was Soviet Ambassador in
Bonn.
Der Spiegel and Stern have repeated Soviet attacks on 25X1
the United States, but sometimes they also have
criticized the Soviet Union. Although Der Spiegel has
supported detente fervently, it has not limited its
coverage of Eastern Europe to topics of which the
Soviets approve. The magazine, for instance, has
accused the Soviet Union and the United States of
conspiracy in building the Berlin Wall. In 1976 it also
serialized two books on the USSR by American
journalists. After the arrest of GDR regime critic
Rudolf Bahro, moreover, Der Spiegel published the
"dissident manifesto" describing government corrup-
tion and Soviet influence in East Germany
While the Soviets do not control Der Spiegel and
Stern, they have gained from incessant negative cov-
erage of the United States. Occasional criticism of the
USSR has not hurt greatly Soviet interests in West-
ern Europe. By contrast, continuing attacks against
the United States have promoted neutralist senti-
ments in West Germany and increased disunity in the
Alliance.
Impact on Public Opinion and Government
Public opinion surveys by the Allensbach Institute
indicate that perceptions of media objectivity and
reliability are affected by such factors as the political
outlook, age, and educational background of the
respondents. We believe that the West German media
mold public opinion primarily in the foreign policy
area, where the public has little experience, and that
they influence the government by increasing the
salience of certain issues.
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Media Habits of the Public. A recent Allensbach
survey showed that television was the most important
source of political information, that most people pre-
fer the local over the national press, and that leftist-
oriented television programs are the most popular:
? Forty-four percent of the respondents obtained most
of their political information from television, 23
percent relied primarily on newspapers and maga-
zines, while only 5 percent favored radio.
? Reliance on TV is greater for older and less educat-
ed people, as well as for supporters of the two major
parties. Well-educated persons and supporters of the
small Free Democratic Party, by contrast, prefer
newspapers.
? Seventy-one percent of those queried read local
daily newspapers, while only 8 percent read nation-
ally distributed prestige papers, such as Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt, and Sueddeutsche
Zei t ung.
? Among people who read daily newspapers, 76 per-
cent generally always read local reports. Only 59
percent always read domestic political news, and
less than half paid attention to editorials or foreign
news.
? TV magazines, such as Hoer Zu and Hoeren and
Sehen, attracted more than twice as many readers
as political/economic magazines, such as Der Spie-
gel and Capital.
? Stern, read by 39 percent of the respondents, ap-
pealed primarily to less educated people. By con-
trast, the prestigious Der Spiegel has a somewhat
smaller, highly educated readership.
? The television news program Tagesschau was the
favorite of 83 percent of the respondents, followed
by heute (74 percent), Panorama (45 percent), Re-
port (45 percent), and ZDF Magazin (44 percent).
Perceptions of Media Reliability and Objectivity.
According to other Allensbach surveys, most West
Germans believe that the media's news reporting is
reliable. Fewer people, however, think that political
commentaries are objective:
? Roughly four-fifths of the respondents in one poll
considered the broadcast media to be reliable. By
contrast, only 69 percent perceived the newspapers
to be reliable. Popular perceptions varied across
social groups. Younger, more educated, and leftist
individuals had less confidence in the reliability of
media reporting than the respondents as a whole.
? Approximately half of those queried thought that
the media are politically neutral. Newspapers, how-
ever, were perceived as much more ideological than
the broadcast media.
? Younger, leftist, and better educated people were
more inclined to believe that the media are too far to
the right, while older, conservative, and less educat-
ed ones tended to consider them to be too far to the
left. Supporters of the Green Party believed that the
media are even further to the right than did SPD
voters.
Mirrors'ofPublic Opinion. Polls, not surprisingly,
show a strong correlation between the political orien-
tation of German news publications and that of their
readers. Thus, the readers of the conservative Die
Well vote predominantly for the CDU/CSU coalition,
while the leftist Frankfurter Rundschau attracts pri-
marily readers identifying with the Social Democratic
and Green Parties.
There also is a strong correlation between the policy
preferences of a news publication and those of its
readers. Die Welt, for example, has ardently support-
ed NATO and a strong Western defense. The Frank-
furter Rundschau has been more ambivalent about.
NATO and has pleaded for a reduction in West
German defense spending and a concomitant increase
in social expenditures. A recent Allensbach poll shows
that 84 percent of Die Welt readers consider NATO
essential and 14 percent believe that the Alliance is no
longer necessary. By contrast, only 55 percent of
Frankfurter Rundschau readers think that NATO is
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still essential, while 25 percent state that it has ceased
to be useful. Readers of Die Welt and Frankfurter
Rundschau diverge even further on the issue of
defense spending. Among readers of Die Well, 51
percent want to keep defense spending at the present
level and 41 percent favor a reduction. By contrast,
only 13 percent of Frankfurter Rundschau readers
are in favor of keeping defense spending at the current
level, while 86 percent want to decrease it
"Molding" Public Opinion? Numerous West Ger-
man academic studies have investigated the impact of
the mass media on public opinion. Some researchers
claim that the media mold people's political beliefs
while others maintain that they merely reinforce
opinions. Empirical evidence for the "molder hypothe-
sis" is sparse because of the difficulty of establishing a
causal link between media views and public opinion.
The observed congruence between the political orien-
tation of West German news publications and their
readers, however, does suggest that the media at the
least reinforce people's beliefs.
We believe the media are most likely to mold people's
views in the area of foreign affairs, where judgments
are based almost exclusively on media reports. There
appears to be a connection, for instance, between
President Reagan's popularity among West Germans
and the degree to which the populace must rely on
media commentary about him. An Allensbach survey
in the spring of 1982-when negative reports about
the President dominated the media-showed that 18
percent of the respondents held a favorable opinion of
President Reagan while 51 percent held an unfavor-
able one. A poll taken in June 1982, after the
President had visited Bonn and Berlin and people had
had a chance to form more direct impressions, pro-
duced dramatically different results: 40 percent of
those queried held a favorable opinion of President
Reagan, while only 31 percent held a negative one.
Shortly after the President had left West Germany,
however, and the public again became dependent on
the media for their information, attitudes toward him
became more disapproving.
The leftist media, in our judgment, also have fueled
popular opposition to INF deployment and US policy
in Central America. They have accorded wide-rang-
ing coverage to the German peace movement and its
mass antimissile rallies and protests at US military
installations. The leftist media's constant barrage of
criticism against US arms control policy in Europe
and US actions in Central America probably also
have prompted young West Germans to make a
mental linkage between the two issues, reinforcing
their inclination to view the United States as "imperi-
alistic and militaristic.')
We believe the ability of the media to shape public
opinion is likely to vary among different demographic
groups. Young, less educated people probably are
most susceptible to media influence. Highly educated
persons are more open to new ideas, but they are also
most likely to criticize media content. The media may
be least able to alter the opinions of older people, who
tend to resist change
Influence on Government. There has been little sys-
tematic research about the media's impact on govern-
ment. In our judgment, the media have a major
influence on the governmental agenda, but their
impact is circumscribed in West Germany by such
factors as centralization of the government informa-
tion process and the lack of an investigative reporting
tradition.
There is little doubt that the media exert pressure on
government by increasing the salience of certain
controversial issues-such as INF and Central Amer-
ica. At the same time, however,.the highly centralized
structure of West Germany's governmental informa-
tion apparatus frequently permits government leaders
to set the reporting agenda of the media. In contrast
to the United States, where the government informa-
tion function is spread out among the White House
and various Executive Branch departments, the West
German Press and Information Office of the Federal
Government is the principal disseminator of govern-
ment information (see figure 3). Since this cabinet-
level agency, which is directly under the jurisdiction
of the Chancellery, largely controls the release of
information, the Federal Government can direct it to
withhold or phase the release of information to suit its
own purposes.
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Figure 3
Organizational Chart of the West German Press
and Information Office
Press and
Information Office
Directorate- General Directorate- General
of Administration of News
Directorate-General
for Home Affairs
Directorate-General
for Foreign Affairs
I I
Budget and personnel Media monitoring
Press archives
Federal photographic
department
Domestic pulse reading
and public relations
The tradition of investigative reporting in West Ger-
many is much less developed than in the United
States. Some of the older journalists still hesitate to
criticize political leaders because of deep-seated re-
spect for authority and fear that too much criticism
will destabilize government. Their younger colleagues
are more willing to question government policy and
behavior, but partisan overtones reduce the credibility
of their criticism. Only Der Spiegel and Stern investi-
gate government affairs regularly. In 1982 Der Spie-
gel exposed payoffs against the giant Flick conglomer-
ate made to politicians in exchange for tax breaks.'
The magazine also publicized corruption and misman-
agement in the Neue Heimat (New Home) program-
an apartment project for low-income groups sponsored
Overseas pulse reading
and public relations
by the West German Trade Union Federation
(DGB)-as well as high cost overruns in the develop-
ment of the Tornado aircraft.
Future Trends
Further concentration of the local press is likely
because of the smaller papers' inability to absorb
growing costs and the relatively poor record of the
Economics Ministry in preventing press mergers.
While the trend toward concentration favors
conservative political forces-most publishing houses
buying up bankrupt papers pursue a conservative
editorial policy-the leftist local press may extend its
political reach as well. The left-leaning Westdeutsche
Allgemeine Zeitung, for example, already has become
the major newspaper in the Ruhr region
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The Kohl government is likely to develop a nationwide
cable TV system, but the project's high cost probably
will delay its completion. Despite continuing opposi-
tion from some members, the SPD probably will
adhere to its new broadcasting policy in the hope that
a more conciliatory position on private-sector partici-
pation in TV will assure it greater say in the organiza-
tion of the new media. The SPD, however, is likely to
insist on provisions protecting the financial situation
of the public broadcasting stations in the face of
private-sector competition.
The Social Democrats probably also will push for
reform in public broadcasting. Notwithstanding the
leftist bias of much of the broadcast media, the SPD
has argued that the CDU/CSU wields too much
power over program and personnel decisions. The
leftist magazine Der Spiegel recently accused the
CDU/CSU of pressuring journalists in broadcasting
stations where CDU/CSU representatives on deci-
sionmaking bodies outnumber those of the SPD.
We do not believe that private TV will change
drastically the political outlook of the broadcasting
media. Cable and satellite TV probably will concen-
trate on entertainment, where the profits are greater,
while traditional television will continue to produce
the majority of news programs. The few privately
produced political programs, however, probably will
be even more ideological than current Laender-
controlled ones. Private TV producers-even less than
producers of public programs-cannot be legally held
to political neutrality, since they carry the economic
risk and need to consider profitability. Thus, the
ideological outlook of private news programs is likely
to depend largely on the producers' and editors'
ideology or their perceptions of consumer preferences.
Implications for the United States
The pro-American media in West Germany will
remain hard pressed to counter the flamboyant leftist
press and broadcast journalists. In our view leftist
media criticism of NATO policy almost certainly has
helped break the West German consensus on security
policy, which had lasted for more than two decades,
by fueling public fears of nuclear war. Der Spiegel
and Stern were the first to dramatize the dangers of
the Pershing II for West German security. They
argued, for instance, that an accidental launching of
the Pershing would trigger an automatic Soviet retali-
ation because the short warning would not permit
Soviet leaders to consult with Washington. The maga-
zines charged, furthermore, that nuclear moderniza-
tion of NATO would permit the United States to
"decouple" its own nuclear risk from that of Western
Europe and thus increase Washington's readiness to
wage a limited nuclear war with the Soviet Union on
European soil. Der Spiegel and Stern also questioned
Washington's sincerity in the INF talks and criticized
its alleged unwillingness to include the British and
French nuclear systems in the negotiations.
The leftist media probably will continue to demand a
reduction of nuclear arms in Europe and to urge the
United States to be more conciliatory toward Mos-
cow. Washington's performance at the Stockholm
Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE) is
already being scrutinized. The leftist press is showing
increased interest in chemical weapons storage-an
issue that, in our judgment, could succeed INF.
Persistent media criticism of NATO eventually could
erode popular support for the Alliance, even though
recent public opinion polls indicate that most West
Germans still oppose military neutrality
Driven by their sympathies for leftist governments
and movements in Latin America-and correspond-
ing opposition to rightist regimes there-leftist jour-
nalists probably will continue to attack Washington's
policy in the region and to fuel popular protests
against US "imperialism" and "militarism." Al-
though the Kohl government finally has named an
ambassador to El Salvador and has cut off aid to
Nicaragua, we believe that public opinion will contin-
ue to be an important influence on Bonn's policy
toward Latin America.
The United States, in our opinion, faces formidable
obstacles in trying to improve its image with leftist
West German journalists. According to State Depart-
ment officials, for instance, the "public diplomacy"
campaign launched last year to explain the US posi-
tion on INF to West German journalists was futile.
Some journalists supported Washington's policy in
private conversations with US officials, but their
articles continued to present Washington unfavorably.
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