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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Directorate of t Intelligence El Salvador: Significant Political Actors and Their Interaction ALA 84-10039 CR 84-12039 April 1984 Copy 3 4 2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Intelligence and Their Interaction El Salvador: Significant Political Actors This paper was prepared by 25X1 of African and Latin Ameri 25X1 25X1 Reference, with a contribution from 25X1 Office of Global Issues. It was coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean Division, ALA ,Secret ALA 84-10039 CR 84-12039 April 1984 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Summary Information available as of 9 April 1984 was used in this report. El Salvador: Significant Political Actors and Their Interaction F El Salvador's military establishment has dominated the country's political system through most of this century. Although the military is helping to move the country toward a civilian democracy, it is the final arbiter of most key decisions, and its political instincts are rightist. Only the extreme left strongly resists its authority. Prior to 1979 the military ran the government under its own system of one-party rightist rule, which became increasingly oppressive to most elements of Salvadoran society during the 1970s. Fraudulent elections were accompanied by increasing repression of dissent- ers, often in response to the actions of militant leftist opposition forces. Entrenched wealthy interests resisted suggestions for even mild political liberalization. Fearing a civil war like that in neighboring Nicaragua, a group of military officers sought to preempt the Salvadoran revolutionaries by mounting a coup that established the Revolutionary Governing Junta in October 1979. The junta was subjected to strong centrifugal pressures from both the right and left, and a full internal conflict ensued. Nevertheless, the provisional rulers of El Salvador were able to organize elections for a Constituent Assembly in March 1982, and the Assembly drafted a new, reformist Constitution and prepared the way for presidential elections in March 1984. These developments represented the tentative emergence of a political center despite the efforts of the extreme left and right to dictate events and party politics. The emerging political center-dominated by the Christian Democratic Party, led by Napoleon Duarte-has gained some ground at the expense of both rightists and leftists, but has weaknesses that have prevented it from achieving a durable unity: ? The Christian Democrats are supported mainly by a centrist labor coalition, the Popular Democratic Union; we expect this support to strengthen with the formal sanctioning of campesino (peasant) unions in the new Constitution. Labor does not unanimously back the center, however. Other unions, mainly associated with the Labor Unity Move- ment of El Salvador, are heavily influenced by the leftist guerrilla coalition. ? Nor is the church solidly behind the Christian Democrats. A number of church activists, especially within the Jesuit Order, still sympathize with the leftist guerrillas despite support for more centrist political views within the church hierarchy. iii Secret ALA 84-10039 CR 84-12039 April 1984 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 ? The Christian Democrats may be able to form temporary coalitions with the leaders of other centrist parties, but the rank and file in these parties may resist such arrangements because of their traditional antipathy to the Christian Democrats. The extremists in El Salvador, both on the left and the right, are more co- hesive and determined than groups and leaders closer to the center. The leftists are controlled by the leaders of five guerrilla groups. Their conditions for ending the internal conflict are stern: they demand a share of power as an interim stage to the eventual establishment of a Marxist regime and refuse to accept the legitimacy of elections or the Constitution. The extreme rightists, led by Roberto D'Aubuisson and supported by most wealthy Salvadorans and a few military officers, bear an enmity toward the political center almost as great as their hatred of the left. They consider the centrists to be virtual collaborators with Marxist groups. We believe that the political order they seek to establish would resemble the authori- tarian, single-party-dominated regime that existed prior to 1979. In one way or another, all significant actors recognize that the role of the United States in influencing the present and future of El Salvador is crucial. The extreme left wants Washington to cede it a share (ultimately a controlling share) in the government. The center-left believes that "dia- logue" between the guerrillas and the government is more important than elections; groups elsewhere in the political spectrum fear such a dialogue. The extreme right also is hostile toward US "interference" designed to correct human rights abuses. Elements in the center look to the United States to provide material support, political protection, and a sense of confidence that otherwise has been difficult for them to sustain. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 Secret An Uneasy Consensus 1 The Broad Political Spectrum 6 Christian Democrats.(PDC) 6 Democratic Action Party (AD) 7 The FMLN/FDR 8 The Military High Command 12 The Extreme Right Outlook and Implications for the United States Politically Significant Organizations Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 Figure 1 Boundary representation is not necessarily euthoritetire~ ', SAN SALVABOA El Sal Ei La+Unitin North MANAB Pacific Ocean Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 secret El Salvador: Significant Political Actors and Their Interaction El Salvador is making a difficult transition toward democracy. It has a new Constitution, formally ap- proved in December 1983, and is choosing a new president. A national assembly has evolved from the body drafting the Constitution, and legislative elec- tions are scheduled for 1985. These political mile- stones have been erected despite four years of wide- spread violence, economic deterioration, and social upheaval. Whether El Salvador continues with the transition will depend largely on the political system's ability to nurture and sustain influential groups and leaders-inside and outside government-who favor democratic solutions. In the Salvadoran context, these political actors tend to be found in or near the center of the political spectrum. The results of the March 1984 presidential election, in which the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) exceeded the plurality achieved two years before in the Constitutional As- sembly elections, suggest that the center is gaining strength, at least for now.' Regardless of the outcome of the presidential runoff election scheduled for 6 May and the likely near-term course of the military conflict, many individuals and groups in El Salvador will continue to play political roles of US policy interest. This paper seeks to identify these actors in broad terms and to provide some historical background on them. Those groups nearest the center-for example the church-are the most difficult to categorize because they show the greatest potential for interaction; this study examines ways in which they relate across the political gamut from extreme. left to extreme right and draws general implications for the United States. In appendixes A through C we have offered capsule summaries on the groups, as well as listing all known organizations presently or recently active. ' Appendix A provides an alphabetical summary of the most important Salvadoran organizations. There is a foldout table, A Guide to Key Political Groups, at the end of the paper which contains a list of the political organizations, with their abbreviation An Uneasy Consensus The Salvadoran political system traditionally has been authoritarian and dominated by the military establishment. In 1961 Col. Julio Alberto Rivera ousted a junta of civilians and officers, replaced it with another civil-military junta under his (and the military's) control, and soon had himself named presi- dent. With support of the military high command he created the National Conciliation Party (PCN) as the political vehicle for the candidacies of a succession of senior military officers running for president.' Thus, Colonel Rivera was succeeded by Gen. Fidel Sanchez Hernandez in 1967, Col. Arturo Armando Molina in 1972, and Gen. Carlos Humberto Romero in 1977. The coup of October 1979 that brought the Revolu- tionary Governing Junta to power interrupted this process. For most Salvadorans, this system of rightist military rule had grown increasingly oppressive, but rapid economic expansion initially masked its harsher as- pects. Bolstered by substantial US aid under the Alliance for Progress and the formation of the Central American Common Market in the early 1960s, the crucial agricultural sector became the springboard for rapid industrialization during much of the 1960s and 1970s. Consequently, most subsistence farmers and squatters who previously had been evicted by land- owners to make way for new plantations found jobs in urban areas in neighboring Honduras-until the 1969 "Soccer War" limited that option-or as seasonal farm migrants. Rural areas benefited from new roads, schools, and public health facilities. As long as many z The 1962 Constitution required officers to leave active service six months prior to the election date, but they were allowed to wear uniforms and be promoted in rank; and, of course, each president had constitutional control over the military establishment. 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Salvadorans continued to prosper materially, the PCN and the military establishment could plausibly claim to be working in the public interest Moreover, the determination of the military establish- ment to maintain one-party control was not obvious during the 1960s. The 1962 Constitution expressly permitted the existence of "contesting political par- ties." This provided breathing room for the Christian Democrats and parties to the left of it. Thus, in 1964, a group of socialists from the National University of El Salvador formed the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR). Even the illegal Salvadoran Com- munist Party (PCES) functioned through a surrogate party, the Nationalist Democratic Union (UDN), formed in 1968. On the other hand, political freedoms were limited in rural areas, where efforts were made to mobilize campesino loyalties in support of the regime rather than to represent legitimate campesino interests. Campesinos were subject to considerable abuse by the various security officials operating on the. whims of landowners. The Rise of Extremism In retrospect, the 1969 "Soccer War" with Honduras probably was an important contributor to the polar- ization of Salvadoran politics, especially in rural areas. The Salvadoran workers expelled from Hondu- ras as a result of the conflict swelled the ranks of the indigent. Although El Salvador sustained fairly rapid economic growth for much of the 1970s, the majority of the country's increasingly overcrowded population gained scant benefits. A serious split developed within the Communist Party over whether to exploit the growing potential for political unrest. The late Salvador Cayetano Carpio, who had been secretary general of the PCES since 1964, urged the party to begin armed resistance in the countryside in expectation that the campesinos would join in. Failing to convince other key members of the PCES to join him, Carpio in 1970 formed the Fara- bundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), the first guerrilla group to take the field. A main source of recruits for the FPL in the 1970s proved to be a group of campesinos first organized by the Christian Democrats in the 1960s as the Federation of Salva- doran Christian Peasants. As early as 1970 other groups began to call for the expropriation of large estates as a necessary solution to the country's socio- economic problems. The more radical began to organ- ize antiregime demonstrations at the University of El Salvador. Polarization increased dramatically following the fraudulent presidential election of 1972. The PCN and the military had already tampered with the 1970 National Assembly elections in order to decrease the PDC's strength. Nevertheless, in 1972 the PDC joined with the MNR and the Communist front, the UDN, to form the National Opposition Union and contest the PCN's candidate, Colonel Molina. The ticket of Jose Napoleon Duarte of the PDC and Guillermo Manuel Ungo of the MNR was clearly ahead of the PCN ticket. Still, the electoral commis- sion, under pressure from the military high command, falsely announced that Molina was ahead and re- ferred the election to the PCN-dominated Assembly, which declared Molina the winner. Because of such blatant fraud, the election, in our view, proved to be the watershed for the political instability that has gripped the country since the mid-1970s. The 1972 election also sparked the formation of guerrilla groups targeted directly on urban recruit- ment. The People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), now headed by Joaquin Villalobos, was formed in 1972 mainly by students and teachers. The Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN), now led by Ferman Cienfuegos, along with its front group, the United Popular Action Front (FAPU), emerged in 1974-75 as a result of a violent dispute within the ERP. The ERP contrived its own front group, the Popular Leagues of 28 February (LP-28) in 1977. The FPL shared with the more urban=oriented FARN and ERP a charac- teristic that both distinguished them from orthodox Marxist-Leninist parties and made them similar to the Sandinista groups in Nicaragua: a strong compo- nent of church activists who justified their collabora- tion with Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries on the ba- sis of the so-called liberation theology. Another revolutionary group formed in the mid-1970s was the Central American Revolutionary Workers' Party (PRTC). Founded in Costa Rica by Fabio 25X1 25X1 25X1 , Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 Secret Castillo, exrector of the University of El Salvador, it has sought to appeal to those who believe that a leftist revolution in one Central American country ultimate- ly requires similar revolutions throughout the region in order to be successful Intensified repression from the right followed the political agitation and the onset of mass protests by these extreme leftists we generally agree with academic and journalistic ac- counts that much of this repression was carried out by the security services, particularly the National Guard. During the mid-1960s, the Guard director, Gen. Jose Medrano, had organized thousands of campesinos into the Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN). In tandem with the Territorial Service-the armed forces inactive reserve-ORDEN was committed at first to projects such as road repair and the construc- tion of health clinics. Gradually both were assigned roles in political indoctrination, intelligence gathering on suspected "subversives," and then direct support of security force operations in the countryside. They were compensated through monetary gifts from the landowners, preferred status as jobseekers, a measure of social prestige, and the same legal immunity as the military establishment as a whole. In the late 1970s, reporting of ORDEN brutalities began to reach the US defense attache office; during the same period the OAS Inter-American Human Rights Commission in- vestigated ORDEN and strongly recommended that it be abolished. Violence associated with the political polarization became extensive. The period since the late 1970s saw the proliferation of death squads sponsored by the security forces and by the private armies serving wealthy families. In addition to maintaining their own armed groups, wealthy Salvadorans mobilized to re- sist economic reforms. Their principal instrument was the National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP), which represented nearly all large legitimate businesses and, therefore, most of the elite families in El Salvador. In 1976, when even most PCN leaders and the armed forces high command began to push modest agrarian reform, ANEP and most large land- holders balked; the PCN and high command backed That combination of rightist intransigence, the hold- ing of yet another fraudulent presidential election in 1977, and the increasing violence between leftist guerrillas and rightist elements contributed to a grow- ing perception among many military officers-some reformists, other opportunists-that they would have to act decisively to prevent a full-scale civil war. The July 1979 victory of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua convinced many Salvadorans that the outcome of such a civil war might be a decisive victory for the left. This concern deepened as the Marxist-Leninist nature of the Sandinista leadership became evident. Conse- quently, in October 1979 a group of junior and middle grade officers overthrew the government of President Romero. Provisional Rule The officers' coup led to the establishment of the generally moderate Revolutionary Governing Junta, which was the primary source of political authority from October 1979 until the March 1982 Constituent Assembly elections. During the junta's rule, however, the country slipped into a full-scale internal conflict. The leftist guerrilla groups and their associated front organizations-with Soviet and Cuban prodding and aid joined in a combat alliance, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and its overt political arm, the Revolutionary Democratic Front (FDR). The armed forces expanded in size with US aid following the guerrillas' "final offensive" of January 1981 the rightist death squads exterminated hun- dreds-perhaps thousands-of suspected leftists or sympathizers. Internal violence and capital flight compounded the impact of deteriorating global condi- tions to deal the economy devastating blows. Al- though the guerrillas were held off, the reconstitution of the junta three times indicated the prevailing instability. The replacement of the junta in March 1982 by the Constituent Assembly and the executive elected by it signaled a slight shift to the right. but also some tentative emergence of centrist forces. A coalition 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 The Revolutionary Governing Junta: Four Phases The first junta, established in October 1979 as a result of the officers' coup, consisted of Guillermo Ungo of the MNR and Roman Mayorga, former rector of the University of Central America, both seeking to incorporate leftist elements in the new government; Mario Andino, a businesman whose acceptance of the need for economic reforms lost him the backing of ANEP; and Colonels Jaime Abdul Gutierrez and Adolfo Majano, the latter aggressively committed to broad reforms and the ending of human rights abuses. In January 1980, two prominent Christian Demo- crats-Hector Dada Hirezi and Jose Morales Ehr- lich-and Jose Ramon Avalos, an independent, re- placed Ungo, Mayorga, and Andino. The resignation of moderate socialists from the regime at least temporarily ended the Junta's chances for accommo- dation with the extreme left (Ungo became president of the FDR in late 1980). ANEP refused to recognize that Avalos represented business interests and com- plained about the "excessive" representation of the PD In March 1980 Dada Hirezi resigned after Attorney General Mario Zamora, a PDC member, was assassi- nated by a rightwing death squad. Jose Napoleon Duarte replaced him, but Dada Hirezi, Zamora's brother Ruben, and a few other PDC members defect- ed from the party to form the Popular Social Chris- tian Movement MPSC), which eventually joined the FDRJ In December 1980, Duarte and Gutierrez, by agree- ment of the armed forces high command, became President and Vice President, respectively; Majano was ousted in order to appease rightwing critics within the military and the private sector. The fourth junta lasted until the March 1982 Constituent As- sembly elections headed by the extreme rightist Nationalist Republi- can Alliance (ARENA) excluded the PDC from con- trol of the Assembly. At the same time, the voluntary retirement of General Gutierrez, a pragmatic right- centrist willing to collaborate with the PDC but worn out by the effort, weakened the PDC's influence in the military establishment. Both Defense Minister Jose Guillermo Garcia and his successor chosen in April 1983, Carlos Eugenio Vides Casanova, stand political- ly to the right of Gutierrez. Nevertheless, the tenure of the Constituent Assembly offered greater stability at the top than provided by the junta. Moreover, the various parties managed to collaborate on such important issues as the drafting of a new Constitution and the preparation of presidential elections. The reemergence of the PCN as a center- right group added weight in the middle of the political spectrum. On other fronts, President Magana used his authority to initiate discussions with the militant left and to attempt to correct human rights abuses in the El Salvador's new Constitution, the 15th since the country declared its independence in 1821, went into effect in December 1983. At the same time, the Constituent Assembly turned itself into a Legislative Assembly until 1985, and presidential elections were set for March 1984. The FMLN and the FDR, however, have rejected the validity of the Constitution and the March 1984 elections. Many on the right- whose principal leader is Roberto D'Aubuisson of the ARENA party-also seek to undo what progress has been achieved in political liberalization since the 1979 coup. The March 1984 elections produced a small relative gain for the Christian Democrats over the March 1982 election, whereas most other parties held their own or lost ground. Central Elections Council returns indicate that the PDC won 43.4 percent of the valid vote, compared with 40.3 percent two years before. ARENA's total in both elections was just under 30 percent. The PCN won 19.3 percent, versus 19.0 percent in March 1982. On the other hand, Demo- cratic Action (AD) obtained only 3.5 percent, com- pared with 7.5 percent in 1982. Four small rightist parties each obtained less than 2 percent. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Figure 2 The Political Spectrum ? Extreme left Center left Center Center right Extreme right Parties FDR PDC PCN ARENA MNR AD PAISA PPS MPSC MERECEN MIPTES POP Paramilitaries FMLN ESA PCES/FAL MHM FPL CAS RN/FARN PRS/ERP PRTC/FARLP MORb Front Group CRM UDN BPR FAPU LP-28 MLP Unions MUSYGES UPD CNT FECCAS ACOPAI FESTIAVTCES CGS FUSS CGT FSR? CTS FESTRAS Private CONAES FUSADES ANEP ASI CCIES Official Bodies CCE EMC GN CDHES DNI PH (governmental) COPREFA PN FINATA ISTA Social Groups CDHES (nongovernmental) Socorro Juridico Comite de Madres UCA UES CEDES Tutela Legal a For discussion of these and other significant political organizations see appendix A. b Not part of FMLN. ? Subordinate to MOR. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 PDC: The Strongest Political Group in El Salvador? Jose Napoleon Duarte and his running mate, Rodolfo Antonio Castillo, face the presidential runoff with numerous advantages. The party has survived consid- erable turbulence since its formation in 1960. It has endured the deprivation of electoral victory by fraud (in 1972 and 1977), the defection leftward to-the MPSC of distinguished `democratic and progressive" leaders in 1979 and 1980, and the assassination of 37 mayors and many party activists (Duarte claims several hundred) since 1979 by rightist and leftist death squads. It won more support-40 percent of the valid votes-in the March 1982 Assembly elections than any other party and exceeded that percentage in the March 1984 presidential election. It also has developed a strong organizational structure Moreover, the PDC's prestige among other democrat- ic parties in the region, notably in Venezuela and Costa Rica, and among West European counterparts, remains high. The US Embassy commented last October that Duarte (and by extension his party) "symbolizes change in El Salvador toward liberal democracy, as conceived in the United States and Western Europe, more clearly" than anyone else of political prominence in that country. The Embassy also noted that Duarte symbolizes that kind of change more "controversially" than anyone else. His enemies on the right will not forgive him for The Broad Political Spectrum The Center Christian Democrats (PDC). Many leaders of the Salvadoran political center are found in the PDC. The US Embassy has summarized the PDC's economic goals as "slightly socialistic," to be pursued, however, gradually. Politically, the PDC favors a civilian- dominated, pluralistic democracy with strong guaran- tees for individual rights. The PDC commitment to pluralism occasionally has been stronger than the party's desire for power-a rare quality among political parties. With Duarte as President of the ruling junta, it prepared the way for allying himself in the 1970s with the MNR (now affiliated with the FDR) and the UDN (the front for Shafik Handal's PCES). Many on the right and right center, therefore, agree with D'Aubuissons caricature of the PDC as the so-called watermelon party-green (for the PDC's official color) outside, but red inside. A book Duarte wrote in 1976 as a political exile in Venezuela, Communitarianism for a More Humane World, has fed rightist fears with its emphasis on the sociopolitical activism urged by various recent papal encyclicals. Its title also allows rightists in El Salva- dor to equate Duarte's philosophy with communism. Duarte may not have been the PDC's strongest candidate. He is controversial compared with Foreign Minister Fidel Chavez Mena, who is viewed in El Salvador as more acceptable to the private sector and, at the same time, perhaps more able than anyone else in the PDC to entice leftist leaders in the FDR to negotiate an end to the internal conflict. Chavez Mena declined to serve on the ticket with Duarte, probably because he did not want to be overshadowed by the PDC's leader, and he seems to have provided less-than-enthusiastic support during the campaign. the March 1982 Constituent Assembly elections, probably the most honest in El Salvador's history. The PDC lost control of the government to the ARENA- led coalition but accepted this setback gracefully. Its 24 Assembly delegates then set about contributing positively to the drafting of the new Constitution. Moreover, in order to gain some semblance of cooper- ation from the two other major parties, ARENA and PCN, the PDC voluntarily relinquished more than two-thirds of its mayoralties and thereby a certain amount of its grassroots strength. 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 Secret The PDC's prospects are tied closely to those of Duarte, but the Embassy has identified a "strong second tier" of youthful PDC leaders, many already participating in government. Among them are Educa- tion Minister Carlos Duarte (no relation to Jose Napoleon); Subsecretary of Youth, Sports, and Cul- ture Roberto Viera; Information Secretary Gerardo Le Chevallier; Dr. Humberto Posada, the party's legal adviser; and Assembly Deputy Maurico Mazier, who has proved sufficiently articulate and worrisome to the extreme right over'the past year to have attracted a public death threat from that quarter. Potentially, these new faces represent a plus and a minus for the PDC's midterm prospects. With pre- sumably fresh ideas for government and flexible attitudes toward their implementation, the party may find more allies or at least fewer enemies among the other parties. Yet, the tensions between these young, ambitious intellectuals and white-collar professionals on the one hand, and the current generation of urban and rural working-class leaders on the other, may lead to a loss of mass support for the PDC, unless some of the labor leaders also can advance within the party. Democratic Action Party (AD). A small, moderate party, the AD is led by Rene Fortin Magana and has a constituency largely among middle-class profession- als and intellectuals. Since the 1982 elections, in which the AD gained nearly 8 percent of the valid vote, the party has projected a more populist image and received an informal endorsement from a small labor union, FESTRAS. Fortin's running mate, Nel- son Segovia, was at one time a member of the MNR, which is now part of the leftist guerrilla front. Al- though these new credentials might have made the AD more attractive than the PDC to some leftist voters during the 1984 presidential race, they also alienated many of the AD's former supporters among the middle and upper classes. Labor. Salvadoran labor, theoretically a strong source of support for the political center, traditionally has been weak and politically divided. At least 30 percent of the labor force of perhaps 2 million is unemployed, and the vast majority.of those employed belong to no labor group. Prior to the passage of the new Constitu- tion, only 71,000 employees, none in agriculture or government, belonged to the 125 officially "regis- tered" unions. A larger number of workers and campesinos-the US Embassy in October 1983 esti- mated as many as 200,000-belonged to or were influenced by various semilegal.labor "associations." Personal and political rivalries, as well as persistent intimidation by ruling conservative governments, slowed the development of organized labor and.inhib- ited it from political activities. Nevertheless, after the 1979 coup, the junta proclaimed "the right to union- ize in all labor sectors." This encouraged pro-PDC labor activists to build a centrist coalition of unions, including campesinos, who comprise more than half the labor force. As a result, the Popular Democratic Union (UPD) was formed in September 1980, em- bracing industrial and campesino associations and, for a time, even a public employees' association. Samuel Maldonado, a key leader of the Salvadoran Commu- nal Union, a campesino federation, became its most prominent spokesman. Jorge Camacho of the coopera- tives' association, ACOPAI, also emerged as a strong leader and sometime rival of Maldonado. The US Embassy suggests that the formation of the UPD, by undercutting leftist labor support for the guerrillas, contributed significantly to the failure of their "final offensive" in January 1981. Following the March 1982 Constituent Assembly elections, the PDC-controlled Labor Ministry formed a labor reform commission that sought to achieve the right of campesinos and public employees to form registered unions. The new Constitution grants this right to campesinos and some public employees. This, in turn, bolsters the confidence of UPD leaders that they can function more openly and even campaign actively for political candidates. The PDC benefited greatly from their help in the March 1984 election and in return has promised the UPD several key posts in a PDC government. For the longer term, the UPD's greater visibility in the campaign may assist it in drawing additional workers and campesinos into its ranks, thereby increasing the organized strength of the center. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 The extreme left of the labor movement, nevertheless, recently made significant gains at the expense of the center.. In late 1982, a loose association of three Marxist-led labor federations subordinate to the FMLN created MUSYGES, described by the Em- bassy as "a leftist attempt to involve non-Marxist labor unions more openly in politically related activi- ties." The MUSYGES organizers persuaded six non- Marxist groups with a combined membership of perhaps 12,000 to join. They also nearly enticed the leadership of the several thousand strong Central Organization of Salvadoran Workers (CTS) into join- ing MUSYGES in a 1983 May Day demonstration. Although the CTS as a whole remains centrist, its present Secretary General, Miguel Angel Vasquez, appears to stand to the political left of the PDC and receptive to offers of cooperation, from MUSYGES. The Center Left The Church.' The mainstream church in El Salvador is in many respects inclined toward the political center by its traditional conservatism and by its aversion to the violence spawned by both left and right extremism in the country. Church reaction against officially sponsored brutalities occasionally made the hierarchy sympathetic to the insurgent cause, however, particu- larly when Archbishop Oscar Romero was the church spokesman. His successor, Arturo Rivera y Damas, has been generally evenhanded in criticizing sources of violence, and nearly every church statement touch- ing on politics calls for a dialogue among contending parties. At the same time, a vocal minority of activists in the church-those associated with "liberation theol- ogy"-openly sympathize with and in some cases actively support the guerrillas. A few priests have joined guerrilla factions as chaplains or propagandists or in some cases as combatants. Many church activ- ists in human rights organizations are well to the left of center in their political orientation Jesuit intellectuals have provided philosophic under- pinning for radical elements in the church. Working 'There is no question that the church as a whole in El Salvador has distanced itself from the extreme left since the death of Archbishop Romero in March 1980. Some analysts within CIA would now classify the church as basically centrist, rather than center leftist as at the University of Central America, which they founded in 1966, they have attempted to devise long- term goals for El Salvador. Their views, as expressed by the articulate and persuasive university rector, Ignacio Ellacuria, tend toward the radical formulas of the FMLN. Despite these extremist tendencies among the clergy, however, we believe the church as an institution has considerable potential to play a con- structive role in El Salvador's crisis and would gener- ally support an elected government committed to gradual reform. The Extreme Left The FMLN/FDR FMLN/FDR leaders are ostensi- bly optimistic about their prospects. The FMLN claims that it has strengthened its overall military position relative to the government particularly in the eastern part of the country. It further alleges not only that the Salvadoran armed forces are increasingly in disarray, but that some Salvadoran commanders are willing to enter peace negotiations with its representa- tives. Publicly, FMLN propagandists speculate that the time is fast approaching when Washington will have to decide whether to commit US combat forces to El Salvador or see the regime fall Some of this exuberance may be feigned. The March 1982 Constituent Assembly election, with its large voter turnout, represented a considerable propaganda setback for the FMLN. The cumulative effects of successful presidential elections, a legislative body meeting regularly, and the rest of the government beginning to function reasonably well under a new Constitution could considerably damage the FMLN's morale. Though the top leadership of the five member groups is generally unified on basic aims and ideology, serious disagreements still occur at that level, espe- cially over tactics and matters of authority In January 1984, the FMLN saw come and go the third anniversary of what was supposed to have been the "final offensive," but the FMLN leadership still appears confident of victory. If it were not, we believe it would offer a program more conciliatory to its opposition. Instead, the February 1984 FMLN-FDR 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Figure 3 El Salvador: Organization of the Insurgent Alliance Mixed . 0 Marxist-Leninist (Military) Marxist-Leninist (Political) Socialist, non-Marxist-Leninist d H Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) H Popular Liberation Forces (FPL)a Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU) Popular RI l oluti nar Bloc (B R)I People's Revolutionary Army(ERP) Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) Central American Workers Revolutionary Party (PRTC) Communist Party-Armed Forces of Liberation (PCS-FAL) a In December 1983 the Cayetano Carpio Revolutionary Workers Movement (MOR) broke away from the FPL and FMLN, carrying part of the BPR with it. Revoll i li i i Iry Froni ( I DtR)I Popular Leaguesll l 28 February (LPII I III 11111111111 United #opular+ Action Fro. iAli i l I I I l I h N Revolutionar Y Coordinator of the Masses (CRM) IIIIIIIIIII Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 In December 1983 the heads of the five guerrilla groups constituting the FMLN publicly announced that the fusion of these groups into a single party would occur soon. Propagandists for the FMLN immediately hailed this development as akin to the unification of the three "tendencies" within the Nica- raguan Sandinista National Liberation Front prior to the overthrow of Somoza in 1979. Some interpreted the Salvadoran guerrilla victories of 30 December 1983 and 1 January 1984 (overrunning the Salvador- an Army base at El Paraiso and destroying the Cuscatlan bridge) to mean that the FMLN's "victori- ous horizon" was within reach. Regardless of the military prospects, the forces tend- ing to coalesce these roues are strong. the Cubans have been pressing for it since the Sandinista victory. The DRU, which theoretically oversees the entire military political alliance of which the FMLN comprises the military component, was founded in Havana in 1980. The second key factor has been the removal of a major obstacle to unification, Salvador Cayetano Carpio, the late commander in chief of the FPL group, who insisted on the FPL's and his own prima- cy. By early 1983, many of his FPL colleagues, led by the FPL second in command, Melida Anaya Montes, had taken a position for unity and against Carpio. According to recent FPL accounts, he thereupon ordered the assassination of Monies in April 1983. When the assassins were arrested a few days later, Carpio allegedly committed suicide. The FPL then moved closer to the rest of the FMLN. In September 1983, Leonel Gonzalez and Dimas Rodriguez, both firmly pro-Cuban in our judgment, took the places of Carpio and Montes. In December, the FPL formally condemned Carpio. Yet, the spirit of Carpio has not been exorcised. In December, reacting to the FPL's condemnation of Carpio, a group calling itself the Cayetano Carpio Revolutionary Workers Movement (MOR) siphoned off a substantial portion of the FPL's strength, in- cluding the leadership of the leftist labor union, FSR. Even if this new fissure is closed, the potential for further internal wrangling is considerable. The squabbling ostensibly will address strategic issues concerning the conduct of the revolution, status and objectives of negotiation, and the like. But we believe the covert agenda-who is going to be in charge-will always be significant and occasionally the dominant issue over the near future. Declaration published .in Mexico City is virtually a copy of that announced in 1981 and treats all political and economic changes made by the government since that time as useless: ? As in 1981 the FMLN/FDR seeks to establish a "broadbased" provisional government. To achieve this in 1984, however, the FMLN/FDR proposes to: abolish the 1983 Constitution; replace existing exec- utive and legislative authorities with a "government junta, ministerial cabinet, (and) advisory state coun- cil"; and postpone the scheduled elections indefinite ? As in 1981 the FMLN/FDR would eliminate cer- tain elements from this "broadbased" regime. These are now identified as the ARENA; the "security corps"; members of the armed forces, as well as civilians "responsible for genocide" and various "political crimes"; parts of the judiciary; the entire "oligarchy"; and "sectors and persons opposed to achieving the objectives of the provisional govern- ment." 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 } Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Figure 4 FMLN/FDRe Representatives Abroad aFMLN-Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front FDR-Revolutionary Democratic Front 702028 (A04516) 4-84 North America Chief Representative Hector Oqueli Colindres United States Washington, D.C. Alberto Arene Francisco Altschul New York City (Fr.) Rafael Moreno Canada Dina Mendoza Western Europe Chief Representative (Fr.) Luis de Sebastian Austria Francisco Herrera Belgium Roberto Castro Roberto Guillen Italy-unknown Iberian Peninsula (Spain & Portugal) Antonio Martinez Uribe Enrique Rubio France Roberto Lopez Cesar Marti Ruth Argandona Netherlands-unknown Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland) Gabriel Lara Switzerland Francisco Galindo Velez United Kingdom Ana Maria Echeverria Federal Republic of Germany Luis Leandro Uzquiano Mexico, Central America, and Caribbean Chief Representative Guillermo Manuel Ungo Eduardo Calles Ruben Zamora Mexico Aronetta Diaz de Zamora Jose Salvador Arias Pellate Enrique Guatemala Garcia (Iu~ Bapuhlic Jamaica ...united, Kingdon Gen ma yRetl F.H.G.-Federal Republic of rermeny Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative. Mexico-continued Jose Antonio Hernandez Benito Tovar Cuba Norma Guevara Margarita Gonzalez Andres Martinez Silvia. Martinez Jorge Rodriguez Pedro Fuentes Costa Rica Rolando Elias Julian Belloso Jorge Alberto Villacorta Carlos Alberto Molina Panama Jose Francisco Marroquin Alfredo del Trdnsito Monge Jaime Suarez Dominican Republic and Jamaica Guido Vejar Eastern Caribbean Juan Ramon Cardona South America Chief Representative Fidelina Martinez Venezuela Calixto Zelaya Gerardo Godoy Brazil Rene Moreno Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay Francisco Diaz Rodriguez Colombia Carlos Calles Africa Chief Representative Marisol Galindo Toledo Libya Nelson Arrietta Algeria-unknown Mozambique-unknown Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 In 1981 the FMLN/FDR pledged that a new government would promote small- and medium- sized enterprises but would also seek "profound social reforms." In 1984 the FMLN/FDR promises a debt moratorium and unspecified financial assis- tance to help businesses and pledges a "massive literacy campaign." Its program, however, also gives more attention than previous FMLN/FDR state- ments to the need for economic restructuring. For example, the FMLN/FDR implicitly threatens to scrap the existing structures for agrarian reform and for nationalized sugar and coffee trade and banking and indicates that it would establish entire- ly new ones. In 1984, as in 1981, the FMLN/FDR proposes that the new government be "nonaligned" in foreign policy but pledges to "struggle against colonialism, neocolonialism, Zionism, racial discrimination, and apartheid." We agree with the Embassy that in the February 1984 declaration the FMLN/FDR has provided no- new basis for serious discussion with either its politi- cal opponents or neutrals. The FMLN's intransigence constitutes a rejection of the January 1984 public appeal by the Salvadoran Government Peace Com- mission to the FMLN/FDR to abandon the armed struggle and join the electoral process This intransigence raises the question of whether the relative moderates within the FMLN/FDR coalition have any current role in decisionmaking. The Embas- sy believes that continuing tensions between soft and hard liners can provoke serious disputes within the coalition, but that on important policy decisions the disputants are likely to settle for the hardline position. This tendency may have been reflected not only in the formulation of the FMLN/FDR program, but also in the attempt to disrupt the March 1984 presidential elections despite an earlier pledge to the contrary by FDR spokesmen. As propagandists and front men for the guerrillas, the political moderates nevertheless are useful in advancing the notion that the leftist revolu- tion is not just limited to hardcore Marxists. March 1984 presidential elections, although the new Constitution permits it. He also succeeded, for the most part, in curbing the tendencies of officers with extreme rightwing. sympathies to interfere in the March 1984 campaign. The results suggest that the few incidents of this kind were counterproductive for the rightists themselves. The military establishment as a whole, however, continues to enjoy a specially privileged status within Salvadoran society. It is still largely true that active (and retired) military personnel, regardless of rank, expect to enjoy virtual immunity from civil or crimi- nal prosecution. The case of Capt. Eduardo Avila, implicated in the -1981 assassination of two US labor officials and a Salvadoran' labor leader, is illustrative. the decisions to arrest and detain Avila caused heated debates involving the Defense Minister and a large group of senior com- manders. (He has since been released.) In other cases involving officers implicated in rights violations, Vides has been willing to transfer the officer involved but not to subject him to criminal prosecution. Clearly Vides is concerned about the impact of legal penalties on the morale of the officer corps. The military's political orientation remains, as the Embassy has described, "quintessentially conserva- tive"; yet, the.armed forces leadership as a whole also has distanced itself from the extreme right. In addi- tion to supporting Magana for President in 1982, it has since intervened to save Phase III of the land reform by restoring illegally evicted campesinos; in- deed, Col. Galileo Torres, the head of the Phase III administrative agency, FINATA, has endured rightist death threats and the opprobrium of extreme rightist officers for vigorously defending campesino rights. Moreover, there are indications that new Chief of Staff Col. Adolfo Blandon, an erstwhile ARENA supporter, now opposes ARENA's leader, D'Aubuis- son. The rest of the General Staff appears to share his present center-rightist orientation. In addition, after a few false starts and much encouragement by Wash- ington, Vides has appointed a credible unit to investi- gate human rights abuses in the military. One note- worthy source of moral support for the unit's efforts is The Center Right The Military High Command. Defense Minister Vides Casanova has tried hard to ensure the nonparti- sanship of the military establishment. He even for- bade active duty military personnel from voting in the 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret the Armed Forces' official spokesman, Lt. Col. Ricar- do Cienfuegos, whose vigorous public attack on right- ist death squad activities in late 1983 earned him death threatsi PCN and PAISA. Were an opinion survey conducted among the officer corps, we strongly suspect it would show an overwhelming majority favoring either the traditional "officialist" PCN, whose presidential can- didate is Francisco "Chachi" Guerrero, or its splinter group that appeared after the 1982 Assembly elec- tions, the Salvadoran Authentic Institutional Party (PAISA), led by retired Col. Roberto Escobar Garcia. Since the split, both PAISA and the PCN have shown considerable political flexibility. As the new Constitu- tion entered into force, PAISA broke with the ARENA-led rightist coalition to cut a deal with the PDC, allowing the two to gain control of the National (that is, the post-Constituent) Assembly.' During the presidential campaign, however, the PCN distanced itself from ARENA-largely because of the unsavory reputation of the ARENA presidential candidate, Roberto D'Aubuisson negotiated a tentative agreement to collabo- rate with the PDC in a runoff presidential election.F The PCN now appears to have better long-term prospects than PAISA. PAISA's only real'strength relative to the PCN is that the party does not bear a name that conjures up an image of corruption and vote fraud. The election results proved, however, that the PCN has a stronger organizational structure at the grassroots, which puts it in a better position to bargain with other parties. The Extreme Right We have grouped at the right end of the political spectrum the private-sector group ANEP, four politi- cal parties, the death squads, and several extreme rightist officers in the security forces. The extreme right in this sense is not nearly as unified through formal political structures as its opposite counterpart ' In the March 1982 Constituent Assembly elections, the PCN obtained 14 seats and 19 percent of the valid vote; as a result of the on the left. On the other hand, the role of personal (especially family) connections is of far greater conse- quence politically than in any other grouping along that spectrum. And, unlike the other groups, the extreme right has in D'Aubuisson a single dominant personality clearly recognized by all members of the extreme right The Private Sector. Much has been written about the level of power and control over national affairs exer- cised by a tight network of families. Los catorce4the 14) is the journalistic euphemism referring to the key families, but more than 50 families form the top of the economic and social pyramid. These families maintain collective influence through intermarriage-the Regalado-Duenas connection, for example, has result- ed in a family with controlling interest in 40 different firms-as well as through a general policy of not selling shares to "outsiders." They exert their political power primarily through membership in ANEP, the umbrella organization that coordinates activities of more than two dozen private-sector associations repre- senting various economic segments, including most of the media. ANEP is led by Conrado Lopez Andreu and as a group strongly supports ARENA's political goals. There are exceptions to this ARENA/ANEP pattern of wealth mobilized behind rightist political extrem- ism. Not all affluent businessmen are from the key families. Many of these belong to CONAES, which is much smaller and far less influential than ANEP. CONAES politically supports the Christian Demo- crats. Moreover, not all members of key families support the politics of the extreme right. President Magana, for example, has been an articulate critic of the death squads, while his cousin heads the centrist AD party. The president of the guerrillas' political wing (FDR), Francisco Alvarez, murdered by a right- ist death squad in November 1980, was heir to one of the largest coffee fortunes in Central America and a member of one of the country's oldest aristocratic families. 25X1 2bAl 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 supporters rally to his three basic exhortations: e Defeat the Communists and their sympathizers by fair means or foul. e Treat the Christian Democrats as if they were the de facto allies of the Communists. e Restore El Salvador to the days before the 1979 officers' coup. There may be some ARENA stalwarts who shrink from some of the operative conclusions implicit in these messages-for example, death squad actions targeted against even Christian Democrats-but they remain in the party. D'Aubuisson's involvement in rightwing terrorist activities has been alleged since the 1970s. Moreover, over the past year, new information has added credibility to past In addition, the polarized politics of El Salvador have created animosities within the leading families. The Embassy has speculated that one reason for ANEP leader Andreu's vigorous support of ARENA is his desire to compensate for the fact that his brother-in- law is Guillermo Ungo of the FDR. A few guerrilla leaders bear distinguished pedigrees. An FMLN com- bat brigade is named for a guerrilla from the wealthy, politically rightist Zablah family. ARENA. Aside from ARENA, extreme rightists have relatively few political options. In addition to the Salvadoran Popular Party (PPS), whose presidential candidate is from the Quinonez family and the Popu- lar Orientation Party (POP), founded by former Na- tional Guard Commander Jose Medrano, there is an equally small party, misleadingly named the Stable Centrist Republican Movement (MERECEN). MERECEN's presidential candidate, Juan Ramon Rosales y Rosales, was the defense lawyer for a wealthy businessman who, according to Embassy records, probably was involved in the 1981 Sheraton murders of two US labor leaders and a Salvadoran unionist. In our judgment, MERECEN is simply a device for enticing centrists to support the extreme right. ARENA reflects the personality of its presidential candidate more closely than any other party. Its sination of Archbishop Romero. We note I that he retains important contacts in the military estab- lishment. We believe, nevertheless, that the recent transfers of the intelligence chiefs of the National Police and Treasury Police, and Hector Regalado's removal from the post of security chief for the Assembly, may have temporarily weakened D'Au- buisson's ability to employ active duty military and other government assets on behalf of ARENA. Outlook and Implications for the United States For the near term at least, most of the groups and individuals we have discussed are likely to remain about where they are now on the political spectrum. Moreover, whether positively or negatively, they will regard the US role in determining their country's political future as crucial. We believe that the extreme left and right are likely to continue displaying qualities of cohesion and deter- mination not as evident elsewhere along the political spectrum. Faultlines within the leftist coalition presid- ed over by the FMLN seem unlikely to induce the leadership to moderate its conditions to end the conflict. Meanwhile, FMLN propaganda is beginning 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 LJ/\ I 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 to claim that a de facto government under its con- trol-the term being used is Local People's Power- already exists in portions of El Salvador. Some ex- treme-right elements mirror the determination of the left. They believe they have everything to lose if the left wins. They increasingly resent US "interference" with their efforts to wage an all-out struggle with the left and those who would accommodate it. The potential for political movement in the wake of the presidential campaign-new fissures and alli- ances-appears greatest on both the center right and the center left. We believe the cohesion of the military .establishment will be strained no matter what the outcome of the presidential contest; many officers privately have expressed deep concern about the consequences of a PDC victory for the country's ability to wage war against the guerrillas and for their own careers, while others are strongly opposed to any outcome-for example, a D'Aubuisson victory-that would jeopardize US aid. Choosing between Duarte and D'Aubuisson in the runoff election will strain severely the cohesion of the PCN. The church, mean- time, is subject to forces that could pull it either closer to the center or further leftward. We believe the groups in the center will continue to place greatest reliance on US moral and material support. Perhaps the most positive development in this part of the spectrum for at least the near term is the new assertiveness of centrist labor leaders such as Samuel Maldonado of UPD. Their clout within El Salvador can be strengthened through greater inter- national visibility-for example, through additional exposure to US and European politicians and the media. In any society subject to prolonged political crisis, especially one magnified by a drained economy, centrist groups can become easily discouraged. Al- most by definition they function only as well as "the system" functions, whereas during a crisis the extrem- ists, who know they want to change the system radically and have decided how, are apt to be confi- dent. Nevertheless, through more than four years of assaults from both the left and the right the centrists have expanded their ground. Secret 16 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Appendix A Politically Significant Organizations AGEUS Association of Cooperatives of Integrated Ag- ricultural Livestock Products Jorge Ruiz Camacho (secretary general) a Marcus Salazar Mario Espinoza Fermin Garcia Rene Fortin Magana (secretary general) a Dr. Luis Nelson Segovia Ricardo Gonzalez Camacho General Association of Salvadoran University Students Julio Portillo (secretary general) , Conrado Lopez Andreu (president) a Miguel Angel Salaverria Eduardo Furies Hartmann Jose Ifantozzi Juan Vicente Maldonado Roberto Aquilar Papini Adrian Esquino Lizco (secretary general) Refugio Sanchez Roberto D'Aubuisson (president) a Armando Calderon Sol (secretary general) Hugo Barrera a Hector Regalado Cuellar Jose Antonio Rodriguez Porth a Mario Redaelli a More than 17,000 members and about 25 cooperatives. Repre- sents members of cooperatives and those involved in technical assistance to cooperatives. A member of UPD. Centrist; gener- ally supports PDC, but leader suspected of rightwing sympathies. Won two assembly seats in the March 1982 elections and about 7 percent of valid votes cast. Strongest in San Salvador. Promises to provide adherents "with the professional legal advice which they deserve." Basically centrist. Student organization of UES. Came under control of BPR in 1979 when that organization's student group, UR-19, won AGEUS's top positions in an uncontested election. Joined FDR when it formed in April 1980. Relatively inactive since the closure of UES in June 1980, but is prepared to resume activities if UES is reopened. Leftist teachers' union founded in 1965; member organization of BPR; Melida Anaya Montes, former FPL deputy head murdered in April 1983 in a factional dispute, was a founder and past Secretary General of the organization. Democratic elements split off in 1976. Formed in 1967 as a fraternal association of businessmen, rather than a business organization. Publicly committed to strengthening free enterprise, determining priorities for national investment and integration of foreign capital, and preserving integrity of private sector. In fact, it serves the interests of the 50 or so key families in El Salvador. Composed of 32 member groups run by these families controlling all key sectors of the business community. A seven-member Joint Directory consti- tutes the ruling body. Rightist. Association of native Indian communal farms. About 1,800 members. Loosely affiliated with UCS. Several members of Las Hojas farm killed by security forces in February 1983. Centrist. Officially inaugurated in September 1981 with help of ultra- rightist National Liberation Movement party of Guatemala. Pledged to "save" El Salvador from Communism; equates PDC with pro-Marxist forces. Supported by wealthy Salvadorans who oppose land reform, by portions of military establishment who oppose negotiations with guerrillas, and by exmembers of rural vigilante force ORDEN. Gained 29-percent of valid vote in March 1982 elections. Sponsors rightwing death squads, including the ESA and probably the Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Politically Significant Organizations (continued) Association of Industrial Sectors Eduardo Menendez (president) People's Revolutionary Bloc Julio Flores (secretary general) a Marco Antonio Portillo Francisco Rebollo Estrada No leader currently identified, but possibly D'Aubuisson. Armando Rodriguez Equizabal (president) Roberto Meza Delgado Eliseo Rovira Mixco Jorge Hernandez Jaime Trabanino Llovel Enrique Hayem Moreno Chamber of Commerce and Industry of El Salvador Conrado Lopez Andreu (president)s Jose Antonio Rodriguez Porth a Roberto Siman Eugenio Leon (secretary general) Human Rights Commission Pedro Ramos Saul Valentin Villalta a Fernando Justo Mendez Col. Carlos Reynaldo Lopez Nuila a Monsignor Frederico ("Fredy") Delgado a Mario Luis Velasco Cristobal Aleman Benjamin Cestoni This industrialists' association joined AP when AP was formed in 1980. Opposed labor reforms of Duarte government and criticized Duarte government for seeking a "socialistic, coercive, and collectivist system." Clearly rightist. Militant front organization of the FPL founded in 1975. Comprised of intellectuals, teachers, students, peasants, and workers. Attained a membership of 50,000 to 70,000 and conducted demonstrations, occupied government buildings and foreign embassies, and promoted labor unrest. Since 1980 security constraints have greatly reduced its strength. Many members have joined guerrillas and pulled back to safehaven areas to do mass organization work. Name used by a rightwing paramilitary group. In January 1984 publicly attacked the Defense Ministry for its efforts to curb human rights abuses by security forces. Probably linked to ARENA. Runs elections in El Salvador. As a precondition for participat- ing in the March 1982 elections, rightist political leaders insisted that PDC members be removed from CCE. At a November 1981 meeting of the Political Forum, a conference composed of the six legal parties contested the election. ARENA, supported by PCN, PPS, and the normally centrist AD, succeeded in ousting the PDC members. Only POP sided with the PDC. CCE among many others surprised by large voter turnout in March 1982. In December 1982 the Constitu- ent Assembly elected a new CCE with the PDC represented by Roberto Meza Delgado. CCE had trouble developing registra- tion procedures for the March 1984 presidential elections. An important component from the business-sector ANEP mem- ber groups. Its leader serves as President of ANEP. Very rightist and supportive of ARENA. In October 1982, when the US Ambassador publicly denounced rightist violence in El Salvador, CCIES in the local press denounced the Ambassa- dor's "interference in Salvadoran internal affairs." CCIES has publicly attacked PDC leader Duarte on many issues. BPR labor organization without legal recognition. Involved in violent activities. Has taken over government buildings and factories and has held hostages, including US citizens. Nongovernmental Established about 1978 and membership has included center leftists and extreme leftists. Its documentation on human rights abuses is suspect, and members engage in propaganda favoring the guerrilla alliance. Most members reside abroad. No connec- tion with governmental CDHES. Governmental Established in December 1982 by President Magana to recom- mend procedures for curbing human rights abuses. No connec- tion with nongovernmental CDHES. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Politically Significant Organizations (continued) CEES (or CEDES) Episcopal Conference of El Salvador Bishop Marco Antonio Revelo (president)s Archbishop Arturo Rivera y Damas (vice presi- dent) a Rev. Leopoldo Barreiro Gomez (secretary general) . CGS General Confederation of Trade Unions Anibal Somoza (secretary general) Composed of the Catholic bishops of El Salvador. As such it is a component of the Central American Episcopal Conference (SEDAC), which forms part of the Latin American Episcopal Conference (CELAM). Periodically issues frank comments on political and economic problems in El Salvador. Kept to the right of the orientation of religious orders such as the Jesuits, mainly through efforts of its former long-time secretary, Monsi- gnor Delgado. The dominant political views. since Delgado's departure are unclear. Trade union confederation founded in 1958. Membership- mainly seamen and textile, construction, food, and restaurant workers-has fallen from nearly 10,000 to less than 6,000 in last four years. Joined MUSYGES but may leave it soon. Centrist, but Secretary General has joined National Council of center-right party, PAISA. Confederation of five unions, with combined membership of less than 4,000, involved in municipal, commercial, and agricultural activities. Formed in'March 1983 as a split from the CTS by the loser in a CTS election. Supported by PDC, and seeking to join UPD. Domitila Juarez Teresa Ayala Vilma Sanchez Graciela Payes Maritza Ruiz Julio Rivas Gallont a Atilio Vieytez CONIP National Conference of the Popular Church Rev. Placido Erdozain (member coordinating board) Rev. Rogelio Poncel Rev. Rutilio Sanchez Human rights group formed in 1977 under the protection of the Archbishop of San Salvador and generally leftist in orientation. In January 1984, Archbishop Rivera y Damas expelled it and the nongovernmental CDHES from their offices in the Archbi- shopric's building. Demands a negotiated (power sharing) end to the war, full investigation into the fate of missing persons, freeing of all political prisoners, and "justice" for those assassinated. Formed in August 1982 as labor front for ARENA. Two member unions-for construction and housing administration workers-with a combined membership of perhaps 1,000. Its first chief was expelled in 1981 from CGS and murdered in December 1983. Rightist. A pro-PDC counterweight to ANEP. Formed in October 1982. Headed by brother of Salvadoran Ambassador to the United States. Views ANEP as representing the reactionary leftovers from the old-line hierarchy but is smaller numerically than ANEP, weaker financially, and less influential in Salvadoran politics and internationally. A religiously oriented coalition of 12 groups. Issued a statement in January 1981, just prior to the FMLN's "final offensive," urging that Christians acknowledge the "justice" of the guerril- las' cause and "the legitimate right which moves them to insurrection." The groups identified themselves as: Archdioce- san Caritas; a committee from the Health Ministry; the Confer- ence of Men and Women Religious of El Salvador; the Federa- tion of Centers of Catholic Education; the Archdiocesan Pastoral Council; the National Commission of Justice, Peace, Faith, and Joy; Christian Life Communities; the Foundation of Promoters of Cooperatives; the Federation of Cooperative Asso- ciation of Agriculture/ Livestock Production; the Baptist As- sembly; the Christian Student Movement. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Politically Significant Organizations (continued) Fabio Castillo Figueroa a Ana Guadalupe Martinez a Jose Napoleon Rodriguez Ruiz a Ruben Zamora a Salvador Samayoa a Mario Aguinada Carranza a Guillermo Manuel Ungo a Jose Leoncio Pichinte a Marco Antonio Portillo a Saul Valentin Villalta a Mario Aguinada Carranza a Miguel Angel Vazquez (secretary general) Juan Aristedes Escobar Unified Revolutionary Directorate Joaquin Villalobos a Jorge Antonio Melendez a Juan Ramon Medrano a Leonel Gonzalez a Dimas Rodriguez a Ferman Cienfuegos a Eduardo Solorzano a Roberto Roca a Jose Venancio Salvatierra a Shafik Jorge Handal a Mario Aguinada Carranza a Issues official statements on behalf of the armed forces. Inhibit- ed from objective news reporting. For example, after denounc- ing rightwing death squads last year, the COPREFA chief was threatened by a death squad. Minister of Defense Vides Casa- nova apparently wishes COPREFA to play down stories that hurt the image of the military establishment. Primary diplomatic organization of insurgent alliance. Seven- member executive directorate has two representatives from FDR and one from each of the guerrilla groups. Founded in January 1981. In theory all seven share equal billing as spokesmen; in fact Aguinada seems currently in charge. Coalition of Marxist-Leninist front organizations, composed of BPR, LP-28, FAPU, MLP, and UDN. Established in January 1980. Largely moribund since early 1981, as many front group members have been integrated into parent armed wings. Proba- bly still useful in transmitting DRU directives to noncombatant supporters. Perhaps 9,000 workers in Ministries of Agriculture and Public Works and tourism and teachers and other professionals. Mem- bers of UPD. Centrist; generally supports PDC, but with some leftist sympathies. In December 1983 the National Intelligence Agency (ANI) was upgraded to directorate status. Its chief was scheduled to become a member to allow him to flesh out the DNI and give it more control over other military intelligence components. He also was slated to have more authority to investigate human rights abuses by members of the security forces. Not clear that all these mandates are firm-to date he has not been added to the EMC-and in any case the present DNI director was Defense Ministry coordinator of ORDEN in the late 1970s, when ORDEN was the source of many such abuses. Executive body of the insurgency made up of three leaders from each of the five main guerrilla groups: FPL, FARN, FAL, ERP, and FARLP. Established in Havana in May 1980. Not clear whether this is a group or a generic name used for certain death squad actions that occurred, particularly in western El Salvador. ESA claimed in June 1980 that EM had been absorbed by ESA. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Politically Significant Organizations (continued) Col. Adolfo Blandon (Chief of Staff)a Lt. Col. Galileo Conde Vasquez (D-I, personnel) Lt. Col. Gilberto Rubio (D-II, intelligence) Col. Miguel Antonio Mendez (D-III, operations) Col. Carlos Angel Aviles (D-IV, logistics) Col. Ramon Morales Ruiz (D-V, civil affairs) People's Revolutionary Army Joaquin Villalobos (commander in chief) a Claudio Rabindranath Armijo a Juan Ramon Medrano a Ana Guadalupe Martinez a Jorge Antonio Melendez a Ana Mercedes del Carmen Letona a Ana Sonia Medina Arriola a "Aquiles Baires" "Adolfo Torres" "Jorge Palomo" Shafik Jorge Handal (commander in chief)a Julio Cesar Castro (secretary general, Modes- to Ramirez Front) Saul Valentin Villalta a Mario Ernesto Cabrera Jose Napoleon Rodriguez Ruiz a Popular Liberation Revolutionary Armed Forces Roberto Roca (commander in chief) a Jose Venancio Salvatierra a Miguel Mendoza Jose Trinidad Nidia Diaz Pablo Uribe a "Camilo Torres" Rogelio Martinez Juan Jose Obregon Often referred to simply as the General Staff (Estado Major). As of January 1984, there were plans to add another officer to handle special counterintelligence responsibilities. EMC should be distinguished from the loose term "high command" which refers to the top six or so officers, including the Chief of Staff but not his deputies. Political complexion of EMC is center rightist; Blandon appears opposed to D'Aubuisson and Duarte. By extension the dominant views of EMC probably reflect the prevailing consensus within the military establishment. Established in 1972 and operated initially as an anarchist- terrorist group. Member of the FMLN. Fastest growing and most aggressive of the rural guerrilla organizations. Has strength of 3,000 to 3,500. Long the name of a Guatemalan rightwing terrorist group, ESA was formed in June 1980 in El Salvador by D'Aubuisson and others. Combined several rightwing groups: UGB, ORDEN (officially abolished in 1979); Mano Blanca; EM; OLC; Salva- doran Anticommunist Brigade; and two transnational groups, the Legion del Caribe and FALCA. Claimed credit in 1983 for several attacks on suspected leftist activists. Linked to ARENA's security force. Military arm of PCES established after 1979 party decision to enter insurgency. Member of the FMLN. Has strength of 1,160 to 1,325. Created in 1974. Subsequently became front group for FARN. Comprised of student, church, labor, and peasant organizations. Staged demonstrations and occupied churches and public build- ings. Had membership of 12,000 to 20,000 before 1980. Since then, many members have joined guerrilla ranks; organization further diminished by security constraints, defections, and casualties of political violence. Military arm of the Salvadoran branch of the PRTC, which was founded in 1976. Began using current title in early 1983. Has strength of 700 to 850. Member organization of FMLN. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Politically Significant Organizations (continued) FESIN- CONSTRANS Eduardo Sancho Castaneda (also known as Ferman Cienfuegos) a Eduardo Solorzano a Raul Hercules a Misael Gallardo Chano Guevara Guillermo Ungo (president) a Eduardo Calles (vice president) a Ruben Zamora a Luis de Sebastian a Jorge Alberto Acosta Bernabe Antonio Garcia Imelda Lopez Ricardo Hernandez Salvadoran Workers' National Union Federation Fidel Alberto Palacios Mario Cabrera Bernabe Recinos (secretary general) Ernesto Flores (acting secretary general) Carlos Ernesto Vasquez Someta Federation of Salvadoran Agrarian Reform Cooperatives Luis Felipe Aguilar (president) Trade Union Federation of Construction, Transportation, and Related Industries Broke away from ERP in 1975. Perhaps the least doctrinaire of FMLN groups. Has strength of 1,400 to 1,500. Serves overseas as the principal diplomatic and overt political organization of the insurgent alliance. Charged with propagan- da and fundraising. Makes no major policy decision without approval of the DRU. Formed in April 1980. BPR peasant organization. Had reputation as strongest and most militant peasant organization in country. Among opposi- tion activities, involved in occupation of churches. Along with UTC, its membership numbered about 7,000. Since 1980 most members have become FMLN combatants. More than 12,000 members, mainly fishermen, coffee and textile workers, and campesinos. Originally part of the centrist CGS, but has shifted leftward. Most of its members now support FARN; the organization is part of the FARN front group, FAPU. Leadership strongly leftist, but rank and file have centrist tendencies. Secretary General is in jail. Formed in 1982 as a result of Phase I of agrarian reform enacted in 1980. Over 150,000 members. Strongly influenced by UCS. Centrist. Leadership has distrusted UPD leaders and therefore hesitated to join UPD. Over 22,000 workers, nearly all in construction. Once part of CGS, now in UPD. Centrist; supports PDC. Juan Antonio Argueta Salvador Carazo (secretary general) Tito Castro (adviser) FESTIAVTSCES Salvadoran National Trade Union Federation About 2,250 textile workers in these 11 unions. Founded in of Workers of the Food, Clothing, Textile, and 1968. Mainly subordinate to the PCES. Part of the Committee Related Industries of Union Unity (CUS) and of MUSYGES. Clearly leftist. Trade Union Federation of Salvadoran Workers About 1,000 members, mainly workers in cement production. No governmental recognition or international affiliation. Shows both centrist and leftist sympathies. Helped bring CGS into MUSYGES, but, like CGS, may leave MUSYGES. Supports AD. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Politically Significant Organizations (continued) Joaquin Villalobos a Jorge Shafik Handal a Ferman Cienfuegos a Roberto Roca a Leonel Gonzalez a Leonel Gonzalez (commander in chief) a Dimas Rodriguez (deputy commander) a Salvador Guerra a Ricardo Gutierrez Milton (or Guillermo) Mendez Salvador Samayoa (member, CPD) Revolutionary Trade Union Federation Jose Jeremias Pereira Amaya (secretary general) Gerardo Anaya Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development Roberto Murray Meza (president) Mario Cantizano Unions Single Federation of Salvadoran Trade Created in 1980, as a result of Phase III (Decree 207-the "land to the tiller program") of the agrarian reform, to process applications for titles from tenants. Potentially more than 100,000 beneficiaries. Through political and military efforts, evicted land claimants had been put back and new beneficiaries signed up. Centrist; a thorn in the side to ARENA-led efforts to undermine agrarian reform. FINATA chief has endured death threats from rightists and the opprobrium of many military colleagues. Marxist-Leninist front established in November 1980. Umbrel- la organization that directs military and political resistance against government. Member organizations are ERP, FPL, FARN, FAL, and FARLP and their associated party and front groups. Military strength is 9,000 to 11,000. Founded in 1970 as a radical splinter of the orthodox PCES and is the oldest of El Salvador's insurgent groups. Evolved from its origins as an urban terrorist group to a predominately rural guerrilla movement. Was largest and most prestigious insurgent organization until factional disputes beginning in 1982 caused a split in the group in September 1983. Member of FMLN, had 2,800 to 3,500 troops before that rupture. Also called Popular Liberation Armed Forces (FAPL). A radical leftist labor union created in January 1980 by FPL's front group, BPR, with some assistance from FARN. Claimed strength of almost 5,000, and members said to be textile, metal, and coffee workers. Now aligned with FPL breakaway organi- zation, MOR. Composed of a number of private-sector leaders, mostly wealthy. Provides technical advice and other services to its members particularly on matters related to Caribbean Basin Initiative. Centrist compared to ANEP, which would like to influence and control it. Denied membership to prominent ARENA leader Hugo Barrera because he was considered "too political." President of FUSADES criticized ANEP for not denouncing more strongly the death squads. About 4,000 members: fishermen, metalworkers, electricians, entertainers. Part of the FARN front group, FAPU, but also influenced by the PCES. Maria Lopez Castro Jorge Mendoza Santos Cristina Marin Col. Napoleon Aristedes Montes (director) a Capt. Ricardo Arango Macay (chief of intelligence) Formed in 1912 as a rural constabulary. About 4,200 strong, with companies assigned to each department. More vulnerable to leftist guerrilla attacks because of the disposition of its forces than other components of the security forces; more deeply involved in sponsoring rightwing paramilitary activity (ORDEN, UGB) against perceived enemies. Defense Minister Vides tried to clean out some of the worst human rights offenders when he led the GN. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Politically Significant Organizations (continued) ISTA Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian Transformation Dr. Jorge Arturo Argueta (president) Raul Gochez Sergio Rene Canales Rodriguez Dr. Juan Ramon Rosales y Rosales (president) Dr. Luis Rolando Lopez Fortis Anticommunist Alliance of El Salvador of the Glorious Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade No leader currently identified, but D'Aubuis- son at one time. was leader MIPTES Independent Movement of Salvadoran Professionals Eduardo Calles (president) a Carlos Alberto Molina Osegueda People's Liberation Movement Carlos Gomez Alfredo Torres Jose Mario Lopez a Guillermo Manuel Ungo (president) a No Primo Alvarenga Italo Lopez Vallecillos Hector Oqueli Colindres David Guardon Valencia Mauricio Domenech Velasquez MOR Cayetano Carpio Revolutionary Workers Movement Established in 1975 by Molina government to distribute 150,000 acres of government-controlled land. This caused back- lash from traditional oligarchy, including ANEP and FARO, but won cautious approval from several figures now in the FDR. Reconstituted in March 1980 to administer new decrees on agrarian reform. Rightwing violence was directed at ISTA officials and peasant beneficiaries of the program. (The Salva- doran gunned down with two labor officials in the 1981 Sheraton murders was president of ISTA.) In wake of 1982 Assembly elections ISTA has been captured by ARENA and is being used to undermine Phase I of reform and to recruit votes for ARENA. Small coalition of students, teachers, and peasants. Formed after government shooting of demonstrators protesting fraudu- lent 1977 presidential elections. Front group of ERP and now largely integrated with it. Carried out terrorist activities and at peak strength had about 1,000 members. A party formed in 1983 to compete in March 1984 elections. Claims to be centrist but appears to be close to ARENA on most issues. Rightwing death squad which claimed responsibility for killing six FDR leaders in November 1980 and similar incidents in 1983. Named for general who ruled El Salvador 1931-44. Probably linked to ARENA. Formed in early 1980 as a moderate socialist movement. Member organization of FDR, and its original membership was about 200 to 400. Membership includes professionals-doctors, lawyers, economists, engineers, and writers. Created in 1979 as the political front for the PRTC. Many of its small membership of students and teachers have been incorpo- rated into FARLP and others serve in diplomatic positions for insurgent alliance. Small social democratic party founded in 1964. Belongs to the SI. Member organization of the FDR, and its total strength is perhaps 100 to 200 card-carrying members. Part of UNO coalition, along with PDC and UDN, that took part in fraudu- lent presidential elections of 1972 and 1977. A splinter group that broke away from the FPL in December 1983. Has condemned and threatened the current FPL leader- ship. Follows the divisionist policies of the former FPL leader, the late Salvador Cayetano Carpio. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Politically Significant Organizations (continued) An organization belonging to the FDR whose two dozen or so original members broke with the PDC in March 1980. Jorge Villacorta Ruben Zamora (secretary general)a Juan Jose Martel Luis Antonio Menjivar Rivera (also known as Roberto Arguello or Roberto Mena) Julio Cesar Saravia Avalos Alberto Arene a No leaders currently identified but, in effect, FARN and FAPU probably are in charge A leftist umbrella labor organization founded in late 1982. Marxists and non-Marxists members, but Marxists predomi- nate. Was to serve as an action arm in overall guerrilla plan to create civil disturbance in urban areas in late 1983. Plans shelved because of government success against subversives and extreme right terrorism against members and sympathizers. Roberto Escobar Garcia (secretary general) a Dr. Maria Julia Castillo Dr. Carmen Canas de Lazo Angel Armando Alfaro Napoleon Bonilla, Jr. Dr. Carlos Arnulfo Crespin Daniel Ramirez Dr. Alfredo Marquez Juan Francisco Puquirre Shafik Jorge Handal (secretary general) a Jorge Arias Gomez Mario Aguinada Carranza a Mario Americo Duran Dagoberto Gutierrez Linares a Miguel Saez Varela Adan Chicas Raul Molina Martinez (secretary general) a Rafael Moran Castaneda Francisco Jose Guerrero a Arturo Mendez Hugo Carrillo Corleto Adolfo Ramirez Pena Julio Rey Prendes (secretary general) a Jose Napoleon Duarte a Fidel Chavez Mena a Rodolfo Antonio Castillo Claramount a Dr. Pablo Mauricio Alvergue a . Jose Antonio Morales Erlich a Formed in October 1982 by nine deputies who had been elected in March 1982 on the PCN ticket. Basically rightist, especially in its willingness to blame all Salvadoran problems on what "the Communists" have done since 1977. Nevertheless, publicly supports issues such as land reform, advocacy of strong public health service, and denunciation of rightist death squads. Orthodox Communist party that follows Moscow line. Formally established in 1930. After 1932 inspired peasant uprising, party devoted efforts to political activism and rejected armed insur- gency. Altered that course following 1979 decision to create an armed wing, FAL. Also called Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS). Formed in 1961 and was the "official" party until 1979 coup. Able to use governmental organs such as CCE and the security forces to ensure election of its presidential candidates in 1967, 1972, and 1977. Finished a strong third in 1982 elections, winning 14 Assembly seats. Since then, however, nine of its 14 Assembly members joined PAISA because they believed its current leaders were shifting the party's orientation to the left. Still commands political sympathies of many military officers and some businessmen. Largest party in terms of popular support. Centrist. (See profile in text.) Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Politically Significant Organizations (continued) Comments Treasury Police Security force of 1,800. Organized in 1926 for customs duties and control of contraband. Operated primarily at airports, Col. Nicolas Carranza (director) a seaports, and frontier areas to fulfill those duties, but in recent Capt. Tomas Salvador Perdomo (acting chief years has targeted "political subversives." Members accused of of intelligence) death squad activities, but PH also has tried on occasion- honestly-to investigate other security forces' involvement in such activities. Suspect in guerrilla killing of US military officer was evidently tortured by PH to make him confess. Previous PH intelligence chief was transferred abroad because of his associa- tion with human rights abuses. National Police Security force of about 5,500. Organized in its present form in 1945. The outgrowth of police forces intended for the protection Col. Carlos Reynaldo Lopez Nuila (director) a of cities rather than rural areas (the responsibility of GN). Captain Antonio Lopez Davila (chief of Incumbent chief not an ARENA supporter nor directly involved intelligence) in rightwing extremist activities, but both characteristics prevail just below his level. Previous chief of intelligence transferred because of association with human rights abuses. Jose Alberto Medrano Averred (president) Rene Segovia (secretary general) Dr. Carlos Terorio Dr. Armando Pena Quezada Dr. Juan Dono Altamirando in the 1982 Assembly elections. Appealed to rural conservative voters, who, nevertheless, voted for ARENA. POP won no Assembly seats. Salvadoran Popular Party Formed in 1965 by some disaffected PCN members and the conservative remnant of the centrist PAR. The rest of PAR had Jose Francisco "Chico" Quinonez (secretary been taken over by leftists led by Fabio Castillo, who is now a general) a political front man for the guerrillas. PPS obtained less than 3 Dr. Edgardo Guerra Hinds percent of vote in the March 1982 elections and only one Roberto Lahud Assembly seat. Ri htist? virtually indistinguishable from Genaro Pastore ARENA. PRS Salvadoran Revolutionary Party Party organization of the ERP formed in 1977. Name used in leftist propaganda, but organization is indistinguishable from Joaquin Villalobos (secretary general) a ERP. PRTC Revolutionary Party of Central American Marxist-Leninist regional organization formed in 1976. Most Workers active branch is in El Salvador, and until 1983 Salvadoran guerrillas connected with organization used PRTC as designa- Fabio Castillo a tion for military force, which is now known as FARLP. Jose Mario Lopez a Roberto Roca a Christian Legal Aid Generally referred to as Socorro Juridico. Until May 1982 was the human rights office of the Archdiocese of San Salvador. Roberto Cuellar (executive director) Archbishop Rivera y Damas established Tutela Legal to take over the task of monitoring human rights abuses for the Archdiocese; He complained that Socorro Juridico focused on political violence emanating only from the government. Socorro Juridico, adding the adjective "Christian" to its name, has continued to function as an independent human rights organiza- tion located at the Jesuit high school, Externado San Jose. Leftist in orientation. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Politically Significant Organizations (continued) STIUSA Trade Union of United Textile Industries, Inc. Francisco Calles (secretary general) SUTC United Trade Union of Construction Workers Juan Antonio Argueta TL (or) Tutela Legal Archbishop's Office of Legal Protection Ignacio Ellacuria, S. J. (rector) Luis de Sebastian, S. J. (former head, Economic Department) a Jon Sobrino, S. J. (head, Theology Department) Ramon Mayorga Quiros (former rector) Ignacio Martin-Baro, S. J. (vice rector) Italo Lopez Vallecillos (editor, ECA) Ramon Aristides Mendoza Samuel Maldonado a Guillermo Blanco (secretary general) Tito Castro (adviser) Henry Santiago Fidel Joya Mario Aguinada Carranza (secretary general) a Dr. Miguel Angel Parada (rector) Ricardo Calderon (secretary general) Ernesto Vela (dean, Science and Humanities) Miguel Angel Vazquez Salvador Carazo Orlando Echeverria Samuel Maldonado a Ramon Aristides Mendoza Gabriel Pilona Araujo Alejandro Escobar Cartagena Juan Antonio Argueta (all members of Political Commission) a For biographic profiles, see appendix B; for Roberto D'Aubuisson, see special profile in text. 1,000 unionized employees of the Industrias Unidas textile firm. A founding member of the FDR, but has withdrawn from it and moved toward a centrist position. Presently a non-Marxist component of MUSYGES. With over 20,000 construction workers, this union comprises 90 percent of total membership of FESINCONSTRANS. Cen- trist; supports PDC. Generally referred to as Tutela Legal. Established by Archbish- op Rivera y Damas in May 1982, in place of Socorro Juridico, to monitor political violence from all sources. More centrist in orientation than Socorro Juridico, and its statistics are some- what more reliable. Jesuit university founded in 1966 ostensibly in part as a counterweight to leftist influences at the older University of El Salvador. Since then its faculty and publications, especially Estudios Centroamericanos, have moved steadily leftward. UCA supported the officers' coup of 1979-Mayorga was a member of the first junta formed at that time- but by 1981 generally favored the program of the FMLN and FDR. Over 50,000 members, including sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and members of cooperatives. Founded in 1968. Strong ties to its creator, the American Institute for Free Labor Development. Influences other rural-based cooperative associations, in part by providing technical assistance not readily forthcoming from ISTA. Front group of PCES formed in 1968 and built around trade unions, student groups, and slumdweller organizations. Consid- ered only legitimate Marxist party by government. Joined with PDC and MNR in UNO coalition that contested presidential elections of 1972 and 1977. Most of its activists have joined FAL or left El Salvador. The national university, sometimes called UN, with a peak enrollment in the late 1970s of more than 20,000. Marxist-led student organizations engaged in riots, which led to the closing of UES by the government in June 1980. No definite date for reopening has been set. Most of its faculty and administrators are center leftist or leftist. Umbrella organization of four labor associations with a total membership of about 100,000: UCS, FESINCONSTRANS, CTS, and ACOPAI. Two members of the UPD's Political Commission represent each association. UPD is basically a political lobby group. Centrist; linked to PDC. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Iq Next 28 Page(s) In Document Denied Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Appendix C Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations AAC AAES a AAES a Asociaciones de Ahorro y Credito Asociacion de Avicultores de El Salvador Asociacion Azucarera de El Salvador ABECAFE a Asociacion Salvadorena de Beneficiadores y Exporta- dores de Cafe ABS ACESa ACOPAIb ADESa ADMAI a AEAS AEME AES AGEAP AGES a AGEUSb AGU AMAD AMES AMOISS AMPa AMUS ANA ANDA ANDES b ANEP b ANES ANIS b ANSESAL ANTEL Asociacion Bancaria Salvadorena Asociacion Cafetalera de El Salvador Asociacion de Cooperativas de Produccion Agropecuaria Integradas Asociacion de Distribuidores de El Salvador Asociacion de Distribuidores de Maquinaria Agricola e Industrial Asociacion de Empresarios de Autobuses Salvadorenos Asociacion de Empleados del Ministerio de Education Asociacion de Estudiantes de Secundaria Asociacion de Graduados de la Escuela Agricola Pana- mericana Asociacion General de Empleados Publicos y Munici- pales Asociacion de Ganaderos de El Salvador Asociacion General de Estudiantes Universitarios Salva- dorenos Asamblea General Universitaria Asociacion Magisterial de Accion Democratica Asociacion de Mujeres de El Salvador Asociacion Medical Odontologica del Instituto Salvador- eno de Seguro Social Asociacion de Medios Publicitarios Salvadorenos Asociacion de Mujeres Universitarias Salvadorenas Asociacion Nacional de Agricultores Administracion Nacional de Acueductos y Alcantarillados Asociacion Nacional de Educadoras Salvadorenos Asociacion Nacional de la Empresa Privada Asociacion Nacional de Enfermeras Salvadorenas Asociacion Nacional Indigena Salvadorena Agencia Nacional de Servicios Especiales de El Salvador Administracion Nacional de Telecomunicaciones Savings and Loan Associations Poultry Growers' Association of El Salvador Sugar Association of El Salvador Salvadoran Association of Coffee Processors and Exporters Salvadoran Banking Association Association of Salvadoran Coffee Producers Association of Cooperatives of Integrated Agricultural Livestock Products Distributors' Association of El Salvador Association of Distributors of Agricultural and Industri- al Machinery Association of Salvadoran Bus Owners Association of Education Ministry Employees Association of Secondary School Students Association of Graduates of the Pan-American Agricul- ture School Association of Salvadoran Cattlemen General Association of Salvadoran University Students University General Assembly Teachers Association of Democratic Action Association of Salvadoran Women Medical-Dental Association of the Salvadoran Social Security Institute Association of Salvadoran Advertising Media Association of Salvadoran University Women National Association of Farmers National Administration of Waterworks and Sewers National Association of Salvadoran Teachers National Association of Private Enterprise National Association of Salvadoran Nurses National Association of Salvadoran Indians National Agency of Special Services of El Salvador National Administration for Telecommunications Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued) AP APA a APCAESa APES APES a APHESa APLESa APROCEL ARENAb ARS ASA a ASDERa ASDVa ASEIG a ASIA ASOB ASPAS ASR ATACES ATES AUTMES a BPR b BPS BRES BTC Alianza Productiva Asociacion de Provedores Agricolas Asociacion de Productores de Cana de Azucar de El Salvador Asociacion de Periodistas de El Salvador Asociacion Pesquera de El Salvador Asociacion de Productores de Henequen de El Salvador Asociacion de Productores de Leche de El Salvador Asociacion de Profesionales de la Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica del Rio Lempa Accion Revolucionaria de Estudiantes de Secundaria Alianza Republicana Nacionalista Accion Revolucionaria Salvadorena Asociacion Salvadorena de Agricultores o Asociacion Salvadorena Agropecuaria Asociacion Salvadorena de Agencias de Publicidad Productive Alliance Association of Agricultural Suppliers Association of Salvadoran Sugarcane Producers Association of Salvadoran Journalists Salvadoran Fishing Association Association of Henequen Producers of El Salvador Milk Producers' Association of El Salvador Professional Association of the Rio Lempa Hydroelectric Executive Commission Revolutionary Action of Secondary School Students Nationalist Republican Alliance Salvadoran Revolutionary Action Salvadoran Association of Farmers or Salvadoran Agri- cultural Association Salvadoran Association of Advertising Agencies Asociacion Salvadorena de Criadores de Ganado Regis- Salvadoran Association of Registered Cattle Breeders trado Asociacion Salvadorena de Radiodifusores Asociacion Salvadorena de Distribuidores de Vehiculos Asociacion Salvadorena de Empresarios de Industrias Graficas Salvadoran Association of Broadcasters Salvadoran Association of Motor Vehicle Distributors Salvadoran Association of Printing Industry Owners Asociacion Salvadorena de Ejecutivos de Relaciones Publicas Asociacion de Sectores Industriales (o) Asociacion Salvadorena de Industriales Asociacion Salvadorena de Ingenieros y Arquitectos Asociacion Salvadorena de Oficiales Bancarios Asociacion Sindical de Pilotos Aviadores Salvadorenos Asociacion Salvadorena de Radiodifusores Asociacion de Trabajadores Agropecuarios y Campesinos de El Salvador Asociacion Salvadorena de Transportistas Asociacion de Usarios de Transporte Maritimo de El Salvador Asociacion de Vendedores de Billetes de la Loteria Nacional Bloque Popular Revolucionario Brigadas Proletarios Salvadorenas Brigadas Revolucionarias Estudiantes Salvadorenas Brigadas de Trabajadores del Campo Association of the Industrial Sectors (or) Salvadoran Industrialists' Association Salvadoran Association of Engineers and Architects Salvadoran Association of Banking Officials Trade Union Association of Salvadoran Airline Pilots Salvadoran Association of Radio Broadcasters Association of Salvadoran Agricultural-Livestock Workers and Peasants Salvadoran Association of Drivers Association of Maritime Transport Users of El Salvador People's Revolutionary Bloc Salvadoran Proletariat Brigades Salvadoran Students Revolutionary Brigades Workers Brigades of the Countryside Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued) CAESS Compania de Alumbrado Electrico de El Salvador CAS b Comando Anticomunista Salvadorena CASL Cooperativa Algondonera Salvadorena, Ltda. CBO Comite de Bases Obreras CCAES Camara de Comercio Americana de El Salvador CCE b Consejo Central de Elecciones CCEA Consejo Coordinador de Empresas Agropecuarios CCIES a b CCSb CCS CDHES b CEDA CEES (or CEDES) b Camara de Comercio e Industria de El Salvador Comite Coordinador de Sindicatos Centro de Campesinos Salvadorenos Comision de Derechos Humanos de El Salvador Centro de Desarrollo Agropecuario Conferencia Episcopal de El Salvador CEFA Centro de Estudios de las Fuerzas Armadas CEL Comision Ejecutiva Hidroelectrica del Rio Lempa CENAP Centro Nacional de Productividad CENTA Centro Nacional de Tecnologia CEPA Comision Ejecutiva Portuaria Autonoma CESAH Comite Ecumenico Salvadoreno de Ayuda Humanitaria CGS b Confederacion General de Sindicatos CGT b Confederacion General de Trabajadores CGTS Confederacion General de Trabajadores Salvadorenos CIS Comite Inter-Sindical Comite Comite de Madres y Familiares de Presos, Desapareci- de Madres b dos y Asesinados Politicos de El Salvador Monsenor Oscar Arnulfo Romero CNE, Comite Nacional de Emergencia CNT b Confederacion Nacional de Trabajadores COMAPAN Cooperativa de Maestros Panaderos CONAES b Consejo Nacional de Empresas Salvadorenas CONAPLAN Consejo Nacional de Planificacion y Coordinacion Economica CONIP b Conferencia Nacional de la Iglesia Popular CONSISAL Consejo Sindical Salvadoreno COPEFA Consejo Permanente de las Fuerzas Armadas COPREFA b Comite de Prensa de las Fuerzas Armadas COSDO Consejo Sindical de Obreros COSO Central Obrera Sindical de Occidente CPD b Comision Politico-Diplomatico Electric Light Company of El Salvador Salvadoran Anticommunist Command Salvadoran Cotton Cooperative, Ltd. Workers Base Committee American Chamber of Commerce of El Salvador Central Electoral Council Coordinating Council for Agricultural and Livestock Enterprises Chamber of Commerce and Industry of El Salvador Trade Union Coordinating Committee Salvadoran Peasants Center Salvadoran Human Rights Commission (two commis- sions with same name) Center for Agricultural Development Episcopal Conference of El Salvador Armed Forces Study Center Lempa River Hydroelectric Executive Commission National Center for Productivity National Center for Technology Autonomous Executive Port Commission Salvadoran Ecumenical Committee for Humanitarian General Confederation of Trade Unions General Confederation of Workers General Confederation of Salvadoran Workers Inter-Trade Union Committee Archbishop Romero Salvadoran Committee of Mothers and Relatives of Political Prisoners, Missing and Assassinated Persons National Emergency Committee National Confederation of Workers Cooperative of Master Bakers National Council of Salvadoran Business National Council for Economic Planning and Coordination National Conference of the Popular Church Salvadoran Trade Union Council Permanent Council of the Armed Forces Press Committee of the Armed Forces Trade Union Council of Workers Trade Union Workers Central Organization of the West Political-Diplomatic Commission Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued) Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 CRM b Coordinadora Revolucionaria de las Masas Revolutionary Coordinator of the Masses CSEN Comite Sindical de Emergencia Nacional Trade Union Committee of National Emergency CSI Consejo de Sindicatos Independientes Council of Independent Trade Unions CSIC Camara Salvadorena de la Industria de Construccion Salvadoran Chamber of the Construction Industry CSO Consejo Sindical de Oriente Trade Union Council of the East CST e Camara Salvadorena de Turismo Salvadoran Chamber of Tourism CSU Consejo Superior Universitario University Higher Council CTOS Central de Trabajadores Organizados de El Salvador Central Organization of Salvadoran Organized Workers CTS b Central De Trabajadores Salvadorenos Central Organization of Salvadoran Workers CUS Comite de Unidad Sindical del Salvador Committee for Salvadoran Trade Union Unity CUTS Confederacion Unitaria de Trabajadores Salvadorenos United Confederation of Salvadoran Workers DGEA Direccion General de Economia'Agropecuario General Directorate of Agricultural Economy DGOR Direccion General de Obras de Riego General Directorate of Irrigation Works DIDECO Direccion de Desarrollo Comunal Directorate of Communal Development DIPPSA Distribuidora de Productos de Petroleo Petroleum Products Distributor Corporation DNI b Direccion Nacional de Inteligencia National Directorate of Intelligence DRUB Direccion Revolucionaria Unificada Unified Revolutionary Directorate EMb Escuadron de la Muerte Death Squadron EMCb Estado Mayor Conjunto Joint General Staff ERP b Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo People's Revolutionary Army ESA b Ejercito Secreto Anticomunista Secret Anticommunist Army FAL b Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion Armed Forces of Liberation FALANGE Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion y Guerra de Eliminacion Armed Forces for Anticommunist Liberation and War of Elimination Frente Anticomunista de Liberacion-Guerra de Eliminacion Anticommunist Front of Liberation-War of Elimination Frente Anticomunista para la Liberacion de Centro America Anticommunist Front for the Liberation of Central America Frente Amplio Nacional Broad National Front Frente Anticomunista Nacional National Anticommunist Front FAPU b Frente de Accion Popular Unida United Popular Action Front FARLPb Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Liberacion Popular Popular Liberation Revolutionary Armed Forces FARN b Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional Armed Forces of National Resistance FARO Frente Agropecuario de la Region Oriental Agricultural Front for the Eastern Region FARP Frente Accion Revolucionaria del Pueblo People's Revolutionary Action Front Frente de Accion de la Resistencia Popular Popular Resistance Action Front FAU Frente de Accion Universitario University Action Front FD Frente Democratico Democratic Front Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued) FECAMCO Federacion de Camaras de Comercio del Istmo Centroamericano FEDECACES Federacion de Cooperativas de Ahorro y Credito de El Salvador FENAPES Federacion Nacional de la Pequena Empresa Salvadorena FENASTRAS b Federacion Nacional Sindical de Trabajadores Salvadorenas FESACORA b Federacion Salvadorena de Cooperativas de la Reforms Agraria FEPRO Federacion de Profesionales FESIN- Federacion de Sindicatos de la Industria de la CONSTRANS b Construccion, Transporte y Similares FESINTEXIS Federacion de Sindicatos Textiles, Similares y Conexos Federation of Chambers of Commerce of the Central American Isthmus Federation of Salvadoran Christian Salvadorenos Peasants Federation of Savings and Loan Cooperatives of El Salvador National Federation of Salvadoran Small Businesses Federation of Professional Associations Trade Union Federation of Construction, Transportation and Related Industries Trade Union Federation of Textile, Similar and Related Industries FESINTRABS Federacion de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de Alimentos Trade Union Federation of Food, Beverage and Related Bebidas y Similares Industries FESINTRI- Federacion de Sindicatos de Trabajadores en Varios SEVA Industrias y Servicios FESTIA- Federacion Nacional de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de VTSCES b la Industria del Alimento, Vestido, Textil, Similares y Conexos de El Salvador FESTRAS b Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores Salvadorenos FICTAS Federacion Internacional de Campesinos, Trabajadores Agricolas y Similares FINATA b Financiera Nacional de Tierras Agricolas FLN Frente de Liberacion Nacional FMLN b Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional FMS Federacion Magisterial Salvadorena FOCCO Fomento y Cooperacion Comunal con Esfuerzo Propio y Ayuda Mutua FPA Frente Politico Anticomunista FPL b Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion FRAP Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas Populares FRTS Federacion Regional de Trabajadores Salvadorenos FSR b Federacion Sindical Revolucionaria FTC Federacion de Trabajadores del Campo FUDI Frente Unido Democratico Independiente Trade Union Federation of Workers in Various Industries and Services Salvadoran National Trade Union Federation of Workers of the Food, Clothing, Textile, and Related Industries Trade Union Federation of Salvadoran Workers International Federation of Peasants, Farm Workers and Related Workers National Financiers of Agricultural Lands National Liberation Front Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front Federation of Salvadoran Teachers Self-Help and Mutual Aid Communal Development and Cooperation Program Anticommunist Political Front Popular Liberation Forces People's Revolutionary Armed Forces Regional Federation of Salvadoran Workers Revolutionary Trade Union Federation Federation of Farm Workers United Independent Democratic Front Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued) FUERSA Frente Unido de Estudiantes Revolucionarios Salvador Allende Salvador Allende United Front of Revolutionary Students FUNPROCOP Fundacion Promotora de Cooperativas Cooperatives Promotion Foundation FUR-30 Frente Universitario Revolucionario 30 de Julio 30 July Revolutionary University Front FUSADES b Fundacion Salvadorena para Desarrollo Economico y Social Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development ICR Instituto de Colonizacion Rural Rural Settlement Institute INACOP Instituto Nacional de Cooperativas National Institute of Cooperatives INDES Instituto Nacional de los Deportes de El Salvador. National Sports Institute of El Salvador INDEP Instituto Nacional de Pensiones de los Empleados Publi- cos National Institute of Government Employee Pensions INSAFI Instituto Salvadoreno de Fomento Industrial Salvadoran Institute for Industrial Development INSAFOCOOP Instituto Salvadoreno de Fomento Cooperativo Salvadoran Institute of Cooperative Development INSAFOP Instituto Salvadoreno de Fomento de la Produccion Salvadoran Institute for Production Development IN-PRO Instituto Salvadoreno de Productividad Salvadoran Institute of Productivity IRA Instituto Regulador de Abastecimientos Institute of Supply Regulation ISCE Instituto Salvadoreno de Comercio Exterior Salvadoran Institute of Foreign Trade ISIC Instituto Salvadoreno de Investigaciones de Cafe Salvadoran Institute of Coffee Research ISSS Instituto Salvadoreno de Seguro Social Salvadoran Institute of Social Security ISTA b Instituto Salvadoreno de Transformacion Agraria Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian Transformation ISTU Instituto Salvadoreno de Turismo Salvadoran Institute of Tourism IVU Instituto de Vivienda Urbana Institute of Urban Housing JCS Juventud Comunista de El Salvador Communist Youth of El Salvador JDC Juventud Democrata Cristiana Christian Democratic Youth JRG Junta Revolucionaria de Gobierno Revolutionary Governing Junta LIGAS Ligas Campesinas Peasants Leagues LL Liga para la Liberacion Liberation League LP-28 b Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero Popular Leagues of 28 February LPC Ligas Populares Campesinos Popular Peasant Leagues LPO Ligas Populares Obreras Popular Workers Leagues LPS Ligas Populares de Secundaria Popular Secondary School Leagues LPU Ligas Populares Universitarias Popular University Leagues MAG Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock MAN Movimiento Anticomunista Nacional National Anticommunista Movement MBS Mano Blanca Salvadorena Salvadoran White Hand MERECEN b Movimiento Estable Republicano Centrista Stable Centrist Republican Movement Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued) Movimiento de Estudiantes Revolucionarios de Secun daria Alianza Anticomunista de El Salvador de la Gloriosa Brigada de Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Movimiento Independiente de Profesionales Salvador- enos MLP b Movimiento de Liberacion Popular MNR b Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario MNS Movimiento Nacional Suprapartidista MOR b Movimiento de Obreros Revolucionarios MPSC b Movimiento Popular Social Cristiano MRC Movimiento Revolucionario Campesino MRS Movimiento Reformista Salvadoreno MUN Movimiento de Unidad Nacional MUP Movimiento de Unidad Popular MUSYGES b Movimiento Unitario Sindicalista y Gremial de El Sal- vador OLC Organizacion para Liberacion de Comunismo OMCOM Oficina de Mejoramiento Comunal OMR Organizacion Magisterial Revolucionaria ORDEN Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista ORT Organizacion Revolucionaria de los Trabajadores OSPA Oficina Sectorial de Planificacion Agropecuaria PAR Partido Accion Renovadora PAISA b Partido Autentico Institucional Salvadoreno PCES b Partido Comunista de El Salvador PCN b Partido Conciliacion Nacional PDC b Partido Democrata Cristiano PH b Policia de Hacienda PLN Partido de Liberacion Nacional PN b Policia Nacional POP b Partido de Orientacion Popular PPS b Partido Popular Salvadoreno PRAM Partido Revolucionario Abril y Mayo PRIDECO Programa Integral de Desarrollo Comunal PROCANA Asociacion de Productores de Cana de Azucar PRS b Partido de la Revolucion Salvadorena PRTC b Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centramericanos PRUD PSD PUCA Partido Revolucionario de Unificacion Democratica Partido Social Democratico Partido Unionista Centroamericano Anticommunist Alliance of El Salvador of the Glorious Maximiliano Hernandez Martinez Brigade Independent Movement of Salvadoran Professionals People's Liberation Movement National Revolutionary Movement National Supraparty Movement Cayetano Carpio Revolutionary Workers Movement Popular Social Christian Movement Peasant's Revolutionary Movement Salvadoran Reformist Movement National Unity Movement People's Unity Movement Labor Unity Movement of El Salvador Organization for Liberation from Communism Community Improvement Office Revolutionary Teachers Organization Nationalist Democratic Organization Revolutionary Organization of Workers Area Office for Agricultural-Livestock Planning Renovation Action Party Salvadoran Authentic Institutional Party Communist Party of El Salvador National Conciliation Party Christian Democratic Party Treasury Police Party of National Liberation National Police Popular Orientation Party Salvadoran Popular Party April-May Revolutionary Parrty Integral Program of Community Development Association of Sugarcane Producers Salvadoran Revolutionary Party Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification Social Democratic Party Central American Unionist Party Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued) SAI SEIS Sindicato de Auxiliares de Ingenieria Sociedad de Estudiantes de Ingenieria y Arquitectura Salvadorenos SELSA Sindicato de Empresa La Laguna, S. A. SEMECA Sociedad de Estudiantes de Medicina Emilo Alvarez SEUSS Sociedad de Estudiantes Universitarios San Salvador SFES Sindicato de Fotografos de El Salvador SGOPC Sindicato General de Obreros de Productos de Cemento SGTICES Sindicato General de Trabajadores de la Industria de la Construccion de El Salvador SIADES Sociedad de Ingenieros Agronomos de El Salvador SICAFE Sindicato de la Industria del Cafe SICES Sindicato de la Industria del Cemento de El Salvador SIES Sindicato de la Industria Electrica de El Salvador SIGAC Sindicato de la Industria Gastronomica y Actividades Conexas Sindicato de la Industria General de Empresas Bancar- ias y Asociaciones de Ahorro y Prestamo Sindicato de la Industria de Muebles, Accesorios y Similares SINA Sindicato de la Industria Nacional del Azucar SIP Sindicato de la Industria Pesquera SIPALAC Sindicato de la Industria de Productos Alimenticos, Lacteos y Actividades Conexas SIPES Sindicato de la Industria Portuaria de El Salvador SIT Sindicato Industria Textil SITRACOCS Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Construccion y Conexas Salvadorenas SITUS Sindicato de Trabajadores Universitarios Salvadorenos SJC b Socorro Juridico Cristiano SNIC Sindicato Nacional de la Industria de la Carne SNTIT Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Industria de Transporte SNTS Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores Sastres SOTMES Sindicato Obrero Textil de Mejoramiento Social STAG Sindicato de Trabajadores de Artes Graficas STEES Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Educacion de El Salvador STIADES Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Electrica STIGCES Sindicato de Trabajadores de las Industrias Graficias y Conexas de El Salvador Trade Union of Engineering Assistance Association of Salvadoran Engineering and Architecture Students Trade Union of the La Laguna Enterprise, Inc. Emilio Alvarez Association of Medical Students Association of San Salvador University Students Trade Union of Salvadoran Photographers Trade Union of Cement Products Workers General Trade Union of Workers of the Salvadoran Construction Industry Association of Salvadoran Agricultural Engineers Trade Union of the Coffee Industry Trade Union of the Salvadoran Cement Industry Trade Union of the Salvadoran Electrical Industry Trade Union of Workers in the Restaurant Industry and Related Activities Trade Union of the General Industry of Banking and Savings and Loans Trade Union of the Furniture, Accessories and Related Industries Trade Union of the National Sugar Industry Trade Union of the Fishing Industry Trade Union of the Food, Dairy and Related Industries Trade Union of Salvadoran Port Workers Trade Union of the Textile Industry Trade Union of Salvadoran Workers in Construction and Related Activities Trade Union of Salvadoran University Workers Christian Legal Aid National Trade Union of the Meat Industry National Trade Union of Transportation Industry Workers National Trade Union of Tailors Trade Union for Social Improvement of Textile Workers Trade Union of Graphic Arts Workers Trade Union of Salvadoran Education Workers Trade Union of Electric Industry Workers Trade Union of Salvadoran Graphics and Related Industries Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 I Secret Comprehensive Glossary of Salvadoran Organizations (continued) STIMBS Sindicato de Trabajadores de Industrias Metalicas Basicas y Similares STIMCES Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Minera y Conexas de El Salvador STIMMB Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria Mecanica y Metalicas STIRTTES' Sindicato de Trabajadores de la Industria de Radig, Teatro y Television de El Salvador STISSS (or Sindicato de Trabajadores del Instituto Salvadoreno del STISS) Seguro Social STITASSC Sindicato de Trabajadores de Industrias Textil, Algodon, Sinteticas, Similares y Conexas STIUSA b Sindicato Textil Industrias Unidas, S. A. SUTC b Sindicato Union de Trabajadores de la Construccion TL (or) Tutela Oficina de Tutela Legal del Arzobispado, Comision Legal b Arquidiocesana de Justicia y Paz UCR UCSb UDES UDN b Union de Campesinos Revolucionarios Union Comunal Salvadorena Union de Directores de Empresa de El Salvador Union Democratica Nacionalista UES b Universidad de El Salvador UFDC Union Femenina Democrata Cristiana UGAASAL Union General de Artistas y Autores Salvadorenos UGB Union Guerrera Blanca UIT a Union de Industrias Textiles UNJ. Union Nacional Jornalera UNO Union Nacional de Oposicion UNOC Union Nacional de Obreros Cristianos UPI )b Union Popular Democratica UPT Union de Pobladores de Tugurio UR-19 Universitarios Revolucionarios 19 del Julio UTC Union de Trabajadores del Campo UTF Union de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros a Member of ANEP, which is discussed in the text and appendix A. A few ANEP members also are separately listed in appendix A. b For details see appendix A. A few organizations of historical interest (for example, JRG, ORDEN) are described in the text. Trade Union of Basic Metals and Related Industries Workers Trade Union of Salvadoran Mining and Related Industries Workers Trade Union of Mechanical and Basic Metals Industries Workers Trade Union of Salvadoran Radio, Theater and Television Industry Workers Trade Union of Salvadoran Social Security Institute Workers Trade Union of Textile, Cotton, Synthetic, Similar and Related Industries Workers Trade Union of United Textile Industries, Inc. United Trade Union of Construction Workers Archbishop's Office of Legal Protection, Archdiocesan Justice and Peace Commission Central American University (Jose Simeon Canas Catholic University) Revolutionary Peasants Union Salvadoran Communal Union Union of Directors of Enterprises of El Salvador Nationalist Democratic Union University of El Salvador Christian Democratic Women's Union General Union of Salvadoran Artists and Authors White Warriors Union Union of Textile Industries Nationl Union of Laborers National Union of Opposition National Union of Christian Workers Popular Democratic Union Union of the Slum Dwellers 19 July Revolutionary University Students Union of Farm Workers Railroad Workers Union Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 A Guide to Key Political Groups ACOPAI AD ANEP ARENA CONAES CTS ERP FAPU FARN FDR FESTRAS FINATA FMLN FPL LP-28 MERECEN MNR MUSYGES ORDEN PAISA PCES PCN PDC POP PPS PRTC UDN Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85S00317R000100060008-6 Association of Cooperatives of Integrated Livestock Products Democratic Action Party National Association of Private Enterprise Nationalist Republican Alliance National Council of Salvadoran Businesses Central Organization of Salvadoran Workers People's Revolutionary Army United Popular Action Front Armed Forces of National Resistance Revolutionary Democratic Front Trade Union Federation of Salvadoran Workers National Financiers of Agricultural Lands Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces Popular Leagues of 28 February Stable Centrist Republican Movement National Revolutionary Movement j Labor Unity Movement of El Salvador Nationalist Democratic Organization Salvadoran Authentic Institutional Party Salvadoran Communist Party National Conciliation Party Christian Democratic Party Popular Orientation Party Salvadoran Popular Party Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers National Democratic' Union Centrist Centrist Extreme rightist Extreme rightist Centrist Centrist Extreme leftist Extreme leftist Extreme leftist Extreme leftist Centrist or center leftist Centrist Extreme leftist Extreme leftist Extreme leftist Extreme rightist or rightist Leftist Leftist or extreme leftist Extreme rightist Center rightist or rightist Extreme leftist Center rightist Centrist Extreme rightist or rightist Extreme rightist or rightist Extreme leftist Extreme leftist 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6 Secret Secret Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/05/12 : CIA-RDP85SO0317R000100060008-6