CUBA'S EVOLVING RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000200110005-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
_ _
n nce
With Latin America
Cuba's Evolving Relations
Secl Gl.
ALA 84-10092
September 1984
Copy 3 5 7
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Cuba's Evolving Relations
With Latin America
This paper was prepared by
Office-of African and Latin American Analysis. It
was coordinated with the Directorate of
Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Middle America-Caribbean
Division, ALA,
Secret
ALA 84-10092
September 1984
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Cuba's Evolving Relations
With Latin America
Key Judgments Havana has traditionally followed a two-track policy in Latin America-
Information available pursuing both revolutionary goals and diplomatic gains-with its tactical
as of 1 September 1984 emphasis determined by overall policy needs and the dictates of local
was used in this report.
situations. Over the last two years, Havana has largely been forced onto the
defensive by the United States and has sought energetically to improve
bilateral relations with much of Latin America. Castro is too ingrained a
revolutionary ever to halt support for insurgencies, but during this period
he has promoted destablization with greater selectivity. On occasion-as in
Colombia-evidence suggests he has moderated the extent of support for
revolutionary tactics when it conflicted with diplomatic objectives.
Cuba's covert activities and growing military involvement in Central
America ' have been complemented over the last two years by a relatively
more subtle and balanced strategy in the rest of Latin America. Cuba has
boosted its stock as a diplomatic actor and achieved several breakthroughs
in South America by:
? Capitalizing on the atmosphere of regional unity surrounding the 1982
Falklands war to improve diplomatic relations with Argentina and
Bolivia.
? Establishing full diplomatic relations with Ecuador.
? Increasing participation in regional conferences to try to improve Cuba's
image as a responsible member of the inter-American community and to
facilitate bilateral contacts.
? Successfully instituting bilateral commercial, cultural, and political
exchanges with most Latin American countries. Havana apparently
hopes that these actions will lead to early normalization of relations with
the Andean countries while laying the groundwork elsewhere for an
eventual upgrading of ties.
Despite galling setbacks in Grenada and Suriname, policy reassessments in
Havana apparently reconfirmed the need for a strong Cuban diplomatic
effort. According to reports from the US Interests Section, Cuban leaders
have perceived-particularly in the past year-the need to generate the
widest possible diplomatic support. This is because they fear alooming
confrontation with the United States over Central America, where Castro
remains committed to supporting his allies.
' This paper does not examine Cuba's role in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Grenada.F_
iii Secret
ALA 84-10092
September 1984
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We believe that Cuba will make some additional diplomatic inroads in
South America:
? Colombia is likely soon to allow a Cuban commercial office to open in
Bogota as a possible prelude to diplomatic relations.
? Ongoing talks with Venezuela could lead to a normalization of relations.
? In Peru, upgraded relations are likely if the main left-leaning opposition
party wins the April 1985 elections, as it is favored to do.
? Bolivia and Cuba would probably exchange ambassadors if President
Siles can consolidate his political power, which is questionable at this
point.
Overall, however, we doubt that Cuba's impact in the region over the next
few years will be greatly enhanced. Cuba's near-term prospects for
establishing diplomatic relations with other South American states are
generally dim. We doubt Brasilia will accede to Havana's overtures in the
face of opposition from military and conservative political groups. Havana
is prepared to wait until "pariah" military regimes in Chile, Uruguay, and
Paraguay are replaced before it seeks improved relations, according to
public statements by Cuban officials.
Havana has strived to maintain its traditionally close ties with Mexico
through frequent high-level exchanges between the governments and
several new commercial agreements. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, Havana
has not had much success in improving relations with English-speaking
countries, where its influence was never very strong. The exposure of
Cuban activities in Grenada last year and the forced withdrawal of Cuban
personnel from Suriname effectively aborted whatever diplomatic progress
Havana had made in the Caribbean up to that time. In recent months, Ha-
vana has been most active in Guyana, where it has increased the number of
Cuban diplomatic personnel and civilian advisers in Georgetown to 81; in
our view, the mutual distrust between Castro and Burnham is likely to
limit cooperation despite Havana's desire to turn Guyana into a base of op-
erations. In other areas, such as the Netherlands Antilles, Cuban ap-
proaches have centered on commercial opportunities, and the strategy
seems to be a methodical, building-block approach.
In our judgment, Havana's campaign to improve bilateral relations in the
hemisphere-as opposed to relying still more heavily or even exclusively on
subversion-is a temporary tactic to strengthen its regional flanks in the
face of the growing US challenge to Cuban interests in Central America
and against Cuba itself. Castro's commitment to the revolution in Central
America, nevertheless, remains strong, although it is tempered by concern
over the response of the United States,
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Cuba continues to train and provide guidance to guerrillas in Colombia,
Chile, and probably Bolivia. We believe Castro would not pass up
additional opportunities to foment trouble-if political agitation against
the Pinochet regime in Chile unexpectedly reached major proportions, for
example, and he judged that he could play a more direct role in subverting
the government.
Return to a regional policy dominated by the promotion of subversion; in
our view, would almost certainly increase Cuba's diplomatic isolation at
the very time Castro desperately needs allies. We believe that the USSR,
which, according to Embassy reporting, endorses 25X1
Havana's campaign to improve ties with its neighbors, would try to restrain
Castro out of concern for its own sizable diplomatic and commercial
interests in such countries as Argentina and Brazil.
Cuba's current mix of diplomacy and subversion in Latin America will
continue to threaten US interests in the region. Havana's activities are
resulting in a larger Cuban presence and in heightened Cuban influence
with receptive governments, particularly in South America. This presence
furthers Cuba's efforts to undermine US influence in the near term and
places Cuba in a stronger position to exploit future periods of instability. In
the event that Cuba returned in the next two years to a still more
aggressive policy of promoting subversion at the cost of imperiling its
diplomatic standing, the United States and moderate regimes could face
more direct and immediate security challenges in such key states as
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, or Ecuador. At a minimum, we believe
we are certain to see a continuation of selective support for radical groups.
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Contents
Key Judgments
The Current Strategy and Goals
Restraining Elements 2
Adjusting to the Grenada Setback 2
The Record
South America: Achieving Some Momentum 3
Multilateral Diplomacy: Complementing Latin American Policies 7
Slow Going Elsewhere 13
Implications for the United States 14
Panorama of Cuban Relations With Latin America, 1970 to June 1984 9
vii Secret
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Embassy level
a Venezuela-Cuban Embassy in Caracas closed,
but relations not broken; Venezuelan Embassy in
Havana still operating.
b Grenada-both embassies essentially inactive, but
relations not broken, since the October 1983 U.S.
operation.
`Suriname-Cuban Embassy in Paramaribo closed,
relations inactive, but not broken. Suriname has no
embassy in Havana.
Non-resident level
d Dominica-relations inactive since early 1983,
probably discontinued.
Other
Dependencies are excluded, because they follow
the diplomatic policies of their sovereign states.
_ B ntt
si. Cnnstoener Fen-d.arbu
taetl.Naa a
SE. V cent nd Lucia
the Grenedines~ 'Barbados'
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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Cuba's Evolving Relations
With Latin America F_
Since early 1982, Cuba has successfully sustained a
broad program to improve bilateral relations with
numerous Latin American governments. To promote
its plan, Havana has claimed an affinity of interests
with sister nations and has emphasized its "modera-
tion" and greater respectability on the international
scene. Many observers believe this effort stems pri-
marily from Cuba's desire to buttress its regional
flanks as it faces stiff challenges to its activism in
Central America and Africa and from constraints
arising from a troubled economy and lukewarm popu-
lar support. Given Havana's strong commitment to
revolutionaries in Central America and selective sup-
port of radical groups elsewhere-most of which is
recognized by hemispheric governments-Cuba's
progress to date testifies to its dogged effort. This
paper will examine the gains Cuba has achieved and
the prospects for further state-to-state or commercial
breakthroughs that could strengthen Cuba's position
in the hemisphere.
The Current Strategy and Goals
Havana's energetic drive to reestablish or upgrade
diplomatic, economic, and cultural ties with as many
Latin American countries as possible grew out of a
reassessment of its foreign policy options that, accord-
ing to the US Interests Section and Havana's public
statements, Cuban leaders undertook in late 1981.
Having suffered several international reverses-in-
cluding defeat in its bid for a UN Security Council
seat in 1979 and the embarrassing Mariel exodus in
1980-Havana decided to try to refurbish Cuba's
international standing. According to the US Interests
Section, the centerpiece of this effort was to be a
campaign to improve relations with Latin America,
pursued in tandem with a drive to strengthen Cuba's
position in the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) and in
other international settings, and with an intensified
cultivation of West European governments.
Cuban policymakers saw new opportunities in the 25X1
climate of Latin American solidarity helped along
partly by the Falklands crisis, beginning in April
1982. According to the US Interests Section
Havana expected that assertive
approaches to key capitals, along with a.propaganda 25X1
barrage portraying Cuban solidarity with Latin
America on the Falklands dispute, would produce
early breakthroughs on the diplomatic front. Simulta-
neously, Havana decided to 25X1
pursue a longer term building-block approach; this
was designed to cultivate influential sectors in specific
countries and, where feasible, to facilitate dialogues
on contentious bilateral issues impeding normalization
of relations. The building-block push included:
? Issuing invitations to parliamentary delegations, po-
litical party groups, and government officials at all
levels to visit Cuba.
? Pursuing commercial contracts to convey the notion
that business dealings were possible even in the 25X1
absence of political ties.
? Conducting a broad range of cultural, athletic, and
other nonpolitical exchanges with hemispheric
neighbors to demonstrate that Cuba belongs in the
Latin American cultural mainstream.
Ultimately, according to the US Interests Section,
this longer term approach was intended to improve
Cuba's image as a responsible actor on the Latin
American political scene and to build support for
upgrading relations with such recalcitrants as Peru,
Venezuela, Costa Rica, and several Caribbean
countries. The effort also was designed to contrast
with US charges that Cuba was a threat to hemi-
spheric security. 25X1
Havana's motivation for persisting in its courtship of
Latin America has intensified, according to the US
Interests Section, as Cuban leaders saw an urgent
need to shore up Havana's flanks in the face of a
looming confrontation with the United States over
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Central America.I Iportrays Havana as
expecting that a general upgrading of ties, at a
minimum, would better enable Cuba to muster hemis-
pherewide solidarity against any US military inter-
vention in Central America or greater pressure
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against Cuba itself.
Restraining Elements
Weighing its policy options toward Latin America,
Havana has been encumbered by several constraints
that have tended to restrain Cuban adventurism in
South America and even in the Caribbean. Primary
among these,
is the fear that Washington will follow up on
charges that Havana is destabilizing Latin American
governments with a direct attack against Cuba. A
number of other factors that reinforce restraint, ac-
cording to the US Interests Section
include:
? The need to appear moderate, responsible, and
prepared to compromise regarding' Central
America.
? The high priority Havana attaches to drawing closer
to West European governments, particularly such
Socialist ones as France, Spain, and Sweden.
? The necessity of negotiating responsibly in resched-
uling a part of Cuba's $3.2 billion hard currency
debt, most of it owed to Japan, Spain, and France.
? The effects of continuing economic troubles at
home-low productivity, lagging exports, and con-
sumer goods shortages-and the lukewarm public
support for some aspects of Cuban foreign policy,
notably the maintenance of troops in southern
Africa.
? Concern that, despite increased Cuban involvement
in Angola, the time may be approaching when
Cuban troops will have to be withdrawn, thereby
heightening Havana's anxiety over the appearance
of another major foreign policy setback.
Moreover, Cuban plan-
ners have reduced the number of countries classified
as "operational targets" where revolutionary activities
might be emphasized if "objective conditions" become
Adjusting to the Grenada Setback
Despite Havana's multifaceted program to cultivate
its hemispheric neighbors, by late 1983 Cuba's foreign
policy fortunes had plunged anew. According to the
US Interests Section, setbacks in Central America
and Grenada prompted Cuban leaders to yet another
reevaluation of their options in Latin America. Cuba
faced two major problems in Central America and the
Caribbean. First, Castro was forced onto the defen-
sive by the rising challenge to his allies in Central
America, which carried the risks that the durability of
the Salvadoran insurgency might eventually trigger
direct US military intervention and that the Sandinis-
tas might be forced from power.
Castro viewed the deteriorating Cen-
tral American situation as directly threatening Cuba's
vital interests. Second,
Havana was caught offguard by the fall of
the pro-Cuban Bishop regime in Grenada. This over-
turned one of Castro's basic ideological principles,
namely the irreversibility of a revolutionary move-
ment once it achieves power. The US intervention in
Grenada in October 1983, followed by the ouster of
Cuban personnel from Suriname and the ensuing
condemnation of Cuba by most Caribbean govern-
ments, compounded Havana's frustration.
Cuban leaders evidently decided that a vengeful
reversion to an aggressive foreign policy ran the risk
of sharp retaliation from the United States. Accord-
ing to the US Interests Section, by January 1984
Cuba's leaders completed their post-Grenada policy
review and decided to pursue more vigorously the
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drive to improve bilateral ties, concentrating on South
America for the time being at least. In the Caribbean,
a low-profile drawn-out effort to regain influence was
judged by Cuban leaders to be the only logical
alternative for now. Consequently,
Castro is determined to rebuild
Cuban prestige and evidently realizes that continued
cultivation of as many hemispheric neighbors as possi-
ble is the most practical approach as long as the fate
of Cuba's Central American allies hangs in the
balance.
By mid-1982, Havana's drive to improve relations
.with much of Latin America was in full swing, with
the earliest gains achieved in South America. Build-
ing-block activities were pursued throughout the Ca-
ribbean and even in Costa Rica and Belize. Bilateral
efforts were complemented by concerted multilateral
activities, as Havana successfully courted Latin
American support through the NAM, regional orga-
nizations, and international gatherings held in Latin
America. Continuing efforts to improve Cuban rela-
tions with Western Europe also were intended in part
to enhance Cuba's image in Latin America, according
to US Interests Section reports.
South America: Achieving Some Momentum
The Falklands crisis was especially fortuitous from
Havana's standpoint. The Latin American political
climate became more conducive for Cuba's plans in
the region. The Castro government, after some early
ambivalence because of its longtime aversion to the
Argentine military, quickly endorsed the Argentine
cause and moved rapidly to improve strained rela-
tions. It also acted opportunistically to associate Cuba
in various forums with the pro-Argentine emotional
groundswell that swept Latin America for several
months.
Castro likewise looked upon the crisis as a "golden
opportunity" to strike a blow at Washington by
reducing its influence in Latin America and perhaps
even destroying the Organization of American States
(OAS), which the Cuban leader termed the US "Min-
istry of Colonies."
L~l
Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
meeting with Argentine President Raul Alfonsin.
'Although Havana's hatred of the Argentine military
and Buenos Aires's memory of Cuban links to the
Montoneros made both parties wary of an overly close
association, they have sustained the momentum of
their relationship since the Falklands crisis by concen-
trating on economic matters. Thus, they have negoti-
ated several major economic cooperation and trade
agreements. Havana also quickly applauded the vic-
tory of Raul Alfonsin in the October 1983 Argentine
national elections and sent Vice President Rodriguez
to head a large delegation to the presidential inaugu-
ration in December. According to US Interests Sec- 25X1
tion reports, the Cubans were not about to lose the
chance to display solidarity with Latin America's
general euphoria over the advent of democratic gov-
ernment in one of the region's major states.
Beyond the general improvement in Cuba's standing 25X1
facilitated by the Falklands crisis, governmental
changes in Bolivia and Colombia aided Havana. New
populist presidents came to office in both countries
during 1982, promising to follow more autonomous
foreign policies. Havana's first opening came when
the left-leaning Hernan Siles Zuazo became President
of Bolivia in October and invited Castro to send a 25X1
delegation to his inauguration. Thereafter, the two
governments moved steadily toward a resumption of
diplomatic ties-broken by La Paz in 1964-and this
was formalized in January 1983 at the charge level.
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Cuban Vice President Carlos Rafael Rodriguez
meeting with Ecuadorean President Osvaldo
Hurtado.F_____1
case, there was the added dispute over Caracas's
stalled judicial decision on Orlando Bosch, an accused
perpetrator of the 1976 bombing of a Cubana airliner
that killed all aboard. Even President Betancur, ac-
cording to Embassy reports, feared that should he
move quickly to restore ties with Havana, he would
face domestic political repercussions, due to Cuba's
record of support for the M- 19 guerrillas. The Cubans
experienced similar setbacks in Brazil and some Ca-
ribbean countries-in Brasilia's case, because of the
military's longtime animosity, and in that of several
Caribbean countries, because of anxiety regarding
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Similarly, the inauguration of President Betancur in
Colombia, in August 1982, led to several months of
bilateral soundings and Bogota's public statement
that it was disposed to revive diplomatic ties with
Havana'which had been suspended since 1981. The
Colombian Foreign Minister cautioned publicly, how-
ever, that both capitals wanted to move deliberately.
Reflecting this approach, Bogota and Havana expand-
ed political and cultural contacts, and the two presi-
dents soon developed a cordial relationship and con-
sulted regularly on regional issues, according to
Embassy reports.
Cuban contacts with other South American coun-
tries-Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela-were also ex-
tensive, including a marked increase in high-level
visitors, trade consultations, and numerous cultural
events. This contributed to Havana's overly optimistic
hope in early 1983 that relations with these countries
and Colombia would be upgraded in succession,=
Havana also ap-
parently believed that once this occurred, other hold-
outs-even in the Caribbean and Central America-
would become more receptive to Cuban approaches.
Nevertheless, officials in several South American
countries remained dubigus about Cuba's motives.
According to Embassy reporting,
Venezuelan, Ecuadorean, and Peruvian officials were
irritated that Havana still refused to compromise on
bilateral disputes-such as diplomatic asylum issues
related to the 1980 Mariel exodus-that had soured
bilateral relations in the first place. In Venezuela's
Havana's regional subversive proclivities.
To help overcome the obstacles, Cuban leaders shifted
to the longer term building-block approach, and,
throughout 1983 placed less emphasis on governmen-
tal contacts, while also continuing low key dialogues
on contentious bilateral disputes. Moreover, where
feasible, Havana intensified dealings with nonradical
leftist political groups-such as in Peru, Ecuador,
Venezuela, and Colombia.
Cuba was seeking thereby to generate addi-
tional support-and, in some cases, pressure-for
eventual establishment, or improvement, of bilateral
relations. Electoral developments, showing the consid-
erable influence of the leftist groups in the first three
countries at least, were encouraging to Havana in this
context, according to Embassy
Cuba's revitalized drive since the Grenada debacle
has paid dividends, according to the US Interests
Section. In addition to Cuban attendance at the
Alfonsin inauguration last December, Havana sent
high-level delegations to the Latin American Econom-
ic Conference in Quito in January and the Lusinchi
inauguration in Caracas in February and has stepped
up exchanges with Latin American officials in gener-
al. Further, the Ecuadorean President announced in
January he would restore relations with Havana to the
ambassadorial level. According to Embassy reporting
Cuban leaders recently
also have made headway in assuring some high-
ranking South American officials-in Argentina, Co-
lombia, Ecuador, and even Venezuela-of Cuba's
greater "moderation" regarding the Central Ameri-
can situation.
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Castro considers relations with Bogota better than
The Caribbean Basin: A Harder Road
In the Caribbean Basin, Cuba has faced greater
obstacles and met with less success than in South
America. For instance, Cuban influence in the En-
glish-speaking Caribbean-never strong-reached a
low point by late 1981 following the rupture in
diplomatic relations with Jamaica. Apart from the
Sandinista and Bishop regimes, Cuba at that time
maintained normal ties only with Panama. Anti-
Cuban attitudes prevailed throughout much of.the
Basin.
To help reverse this trend,"a Cuban diplomatic mis-
sion in late 1981 toured the English-speaking Carib-
bean islands, seeking to improve Cuba's image. Ha-
vana followed up this initiative with a diversified
program to develop commercial opportunities, expand
airlinks, and promote increased cultural and educa-
tion exchanges. Havana demonstrated considerable
persistence and flexibility in this effort.
it was intent on offset-
ting-to the extent possible-criticism of its growing
involvement in Grenada and on undermining the US-
sponsored Caribbean Basin Initiative. Similar but
lower key activities were directed at the Dominican
Republic and Costa Rica, although, according to US
Interests Section reports, Cuban leaders evidently
realized there was little prospect for improving rela-
tions with them any time soon.
Despite these efforts, the Cubans had only limited
success. They achieved a moderate expansion of diplo-
matic contacts throughout the region, leading in the
case of Barbados to an upgrading of ties in early 1983,
and increased collaboration with several Caribbean
governments in the NAM. Some governments also
were willing to consider scholarships for their nation-
als to study in Cuba and responded to Cuban com-
mercial promotion efforts by agreeing to a few minor
trade deals and limited expansion of airlinks. Accord-
ing to Embassy reporting, the attitude of most coun-
tries, however, was conditioned by growing concern
over Cuba's ever-closer association with the Bishop
regime and anxiety over the rapid expansion of Cuban
influence in Suriname beginning in late 1982. In 25X1
addition, moderate, anti-Cuban political leaders were
elected in several countries during 1981-82. The
October 1983 events in Grenada triggered Suriname's
request for the withdrawal of most Cuban personnel
from that country and produced a strong regional
condemnation of Cuba. This effectively aborted what-
ever progress Havana had achieved until then
In recent months, Havana has limited its contacts in
the region almost exclusively to Guyana and Trinidad
and Tobago, which opposed the Grenada intervention.
The number of Cuban personnel in Georgetown has
increased from about 70 to a total of 81-including
11 in the Embassy and the remainder as civilian 25X1
advisers-and cultural and economic exchanges have
expanded, We have no
evidence that the long-lasting mutual suspicion be-
tween Castro and Guyana's President Burnham has
lessened appreciably, however.' Havana has made
several overtures to Trinidad and Tobago to expand
commercial ties and to obtain agreement to open a
long-desired embassy in Port-of-Spain. The US Em-
bassy there reports that local officials seem receptive
to increasing trade with Cuba but are unwilling to
upgrade diplomatic relations.
Cuba expects few opportunities to improve
its tenuous ties with other Caribbean Basin countries
in the near future. Nevertheless, Havana persists in its
long-term building-block efforts in the region. For
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instance, the Cubans re- 25X1
cently have tried to expand business ties and establish
airline connections with the Netherlands Antilles, as 25X1
well as to promote increased educational and cultural
exchange. Curacao, however, evidently has not re- 25X1
--"d'd t' these
t"-" so
over
far
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Playing Down Operational Activities
Despite Cuba's energetic pursuit of closer bilateral
relations with much of Latin America, Havana-
regardless of tactical shifts-almost certainly will
not deviate from its goal of spreading "revolutionary
struggle" throughout Latin America. For now at
least, Cuba has largely restricted its operational
activities to Central America. Elsewhere, in our view,
Cuba is in a holding pattern, seeking to retain its
revolutionary credentials by providing minimal
assistance and guidance to insurgent groups but not
enough to jeopardize its diplomatic campaign. F_
The Cubans are continuing to provide at least mini-
mal levels of support and guidance to Latin American.
insurgent roups in various other countries. For
instance, Cuba
has continued to train Chilean insurgents in recent
years.
IIn the Domin-
ican Republic, the vigilance of successive anti-Cuban
governments has forestalled Cuban meddling until
recent!
military training in Cuba for several dozen leftists.
avana has expanded its contacts with
Dominican left might finally be realized.
t e riots in the Domini-
can Republic in Apri 1 4 evidently led Havana to
conclude that political instability there will persist
and that Cuba's long aspiration to unify the disparate
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Cuba's relations with Mexico are unique in Latin
America. Mexico has been the only Latin American
country never to sever relations with Cuba, and
Havana has looked to successive Mexican presidents
.for understanding and active support, where feasible,
in Cuba's strained relations with Washington. Mexi-
co, in turn, has nurtured its relations with Havana
partly to underscore its foreign policy independence,
especially with regard to Washington,
We believe Mexico's role in the Contadora process-
which Havana sees as strongly supportive of Nicara-
gua-and with regard to Central American develop-
ments in general have eased Castro's concern that the
de la Madrid government might draw closer to 25X1
Washington. Havana
consults regularly with Mexico City on such matters. 25X1
Nevertheless, Castro's personal ties with de la Ma-
drid are not as warm as those with the Mexican
President's two immediate predecessors; the highest
ranking Cuban to have direct contact with senior
Mexicans during the past two years has been Vice
Over the past two years, Havana has devoted special
attention to its traditionally close relations with
Mexico. High-level exchanges between the two capi-
tals have become more frequent during the past six
months, and several new commercial and other coop-
erative accords have been signed. We believe that
Havana decided to push for these expanded contacts
in part because of Castro's reported concern that
Mexico's economic woes might prompt the de la
Madrid administration to seek closer relations with
Washington.
Multilateral Diplomacy:
Complementing Latin American Policies
Havana's efforts to bolster its position in the NAM, to
cultivate better relations with Western Europe, and to
promote other aspects of its multilateral diplomacy
were intended partly to supplement its improving
relations with Latin American governments, accord-
ing to the US Interests Section. During late 1982 and
early 1983, for example, Havana succeeded in its
persistent effort to encourage greater Latin American
membership in the NAM. It hoped, thereby,
to promote a regional bloc
President Rodriguez,
close associations with Mexico City.
Despite the value Havana places on this unique
relationship, however, Cuban leaders do not appear
to regard it as directly related to their efforts to
cultivate better ties elsewhere in Latin America. We
have no indication that Cuban officials have attempt-
ed to portray ties with Mexico as a model for
relations with other countries or to utilize the Mexi-
cans as intermediaries with other Latin American
capitals, at least during the past two years. We
believe Havana realizes that such efforts would pro-
voke adverse reactions, especially among South
American governments, most of which have never had
responsive to prolonging its leadership in the move-
ment. Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Barbados,
The Bahamas, and Antigua and Barbuda-each for
its own purposes-applied for NAM status. From
Havana's perspective, by the time Castro stepped
down as chairman of the NAM in March 1983, only a
few key Latin American governments-notably Bra-
zil and Mexico-appeared uninterested in joining.F_
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In addition, high-level Cuban participation in interna-
tional conferences held throughout Latin America-
but most often in South America-has become an
increasingly important channel for Havana. The Cu-
bans have shown keenest interest in economic meet-
ings, where they carefully portray their involvement
as evidence of Havana's readiness to help overcome
Latin America's socioeconomic disparities. Cuban
spokesmen also occasionally intimate their willingness
to reintegrate Cuba into those parts of the inter-
American system that in Havana's view are not
"controlled" by Washington, as Havana depicts the
OAS. In contrast to its NAM tactics, Havana has
assumed a low profile in conference sessions and has
been circumspect in its efforts to manipulate such
organizations as the Latin American Economic Sys-
tem (SELA) and the Economic Commission for Latin
America (ECLA), which
We believe Havana sees several advantages, and few
risks, flowing from the increased visibility and direct
access to many top Latin American figures afforded
by the meetings. They provide an opportunity to
deepen Havana's "solidarity" with Latin America in
opposition to the United States. Moreover, attendance
at some meetings enables Cuban officials to visit
countries with which relations are strained or
nonexistent, such as Brazil, the Dominican Republic,
and Uruguay. Finally, most of the conferences have
been ideal for exploring informally the removal of
obstacles to improving ties.
European allies on such issues as the Central Ameri-
can crisis and the US-Cuban estrangement, and
complement Havana's program to improve bilateral
relations in Latin America.
Although we believe Havana's two-year drive to
improve relations with its hemispheric neighbors al-
most certainly is not in direct response to pressures or
guidance from Moscow, the two countries have long
shared-and cooperated to achieve-several basic
objectives in Latin America. The foremost is a mutual
desire to undermine the US position in the hemi-
sphere. The Soviet Union apparently is motivated in
this regard primarily by strategic and global concerns.
Embassy Oreporting suggests that Moscow
calculates that continuing instability in the region will
divert US attention and resources-including military
forces-from more distant problem areas and weaken
Washington's credibility in the eyes of its hemispheric
neighbors and the Third World in general.
Moscow and Havana also are in basic ideological
agreement on the need to support leftist causes
throughout the hemisphere. Thus, even though at
times they have espoused different tactics, they both
hope that as a result of their support revolutionary
regimes eventually will gain power. Their expectations
over prospects in this context have waxed and waned
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Since 1982, Havana also has stepped up its participa-
tion in regional cultural activities. To commemorate
the bicentennial of Simon Bolivar's birth, Cuban
representatives in 1983 attended several events in
Colombia, Venezuela, and elsewhere. Local officials
responded positively, and media coverage of these
activities pointed to Cuban participation as evidence
of Havana's serious desire to rejoin the inter-
American system.
In addition, according to the US Interests Section
since late 1983 Havana has
intensified significantly its cultivation of virtually all
West European governments. In our view, Cuban
leaders probably believe such efforts in Western
Europe help overcome recent blows to Cuba's interna-
tional image, may help divide Washington from its
for decades. For instance,
Moscow and Havana welcomed the coming
to power of the Sandinista and Bishop regimes in
1979 and subsequent consolidation of Bouterse's rule.
in Suriname as likely preludes to a succession of
similarly oriented regimes in Latin America.
they, therefore, acted in
unison to expand military and security links to Nica-
ragua, strengthen their ties,to Grenada, and co-opt
Suriname. The Soviet Union, however, moved more
cautiously than did Cuba in developing political rela-
tions with these regimes-apparently because it
feared an adverse US reaction.
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Panorama of Cuban Relations With Latin America,
1970 to June 1984
Argentina Relations restored in 1973. Embassies headed by ambassadors operate in both
capitals.
Bolivia Relations restored in January 1983. Cuban Embassy, headed by charge, operates in La
Paz; there is no Bolivian Embassy in Havana.
Relations broken following Allende's ouster in
1973; not resumed.
Relations restored in 1975; suspended by Bogota
in 1981.
Relations restored in 1979; downgraded to charge Embassies headed by ambassadors operate in both
level in 1981; upgraded to ambassadorial level, capitals.
January 1984.
Relations restored in 1972; downgraded to charge Embassies headed by charges operate in both capi-
level in 1980. tals, although the Peruvian Mission in Havana has
only a skeleton staff.
Relations restored in 1975; Caracas downgraded Venezuelan Embassy, headed by a charge, operates
its Embassy in Havana in mid-1980; Havana in Havana; although Cuban Embassy in Caracas
closed its Embassy in Caracas in September 1980 remains closed, two Cuban diplomats unofficially
but did not sever relations. . handle Cuban interests there.
Only Latin American country never to sever Embassies headed by ambassadors operate in both
relations with Castro regime. capitals; the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, with 79
officials, is the largest Cuban diplomatic mission in
Latin America and one of the largest worldwide; in
addition, there is a Cuban Consulate in Merida.
Consular and economic relations restored in Feb-
ruary 1979; severed by San Jose in May 1981; no
relations at present.
Relations restored upon Sandinista victory in July Embassies headed by ambassadors operate in both
1979. capitals.
Panama Relations restored in 1974. Embassies headed by ambassadors operate in both
capitals.
Antigua and Barbuda No relations.
The Bahamas Relations established soon after Bahamian rode- Cuban Ambassador to UN accredited to The Baha-
?pendence in 1973, but only at nonresident level. mas, but first presented credentials in 1979; Bahami-
an Ambassador to UN is accredited to Havana but
apparently has never presented credentials there.
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Secret
Panorama of Cuban Relations With Latin America,
1970 to June 1984 (continued)
Barbados Relations established in 1973 but at nonresident
level; minimal diplomatic contact for a decade.
Dominica Relations established by 1980,,but only at nonres-
ident level.
Grenada Relations established following Bishop coup,
April 1979.
Jamaica Relations established in 1972; severed by Jamaica
in 1981.
St. Lucia Relations established in 1979, but only at nonresi-
dent level.
St. Christopher and Nevis No relations.
St. Vincent and the No relations.
Grenadines
Relations established in 1979 at nonresident level;
Cuban Embassy in Paramaribo opened in June
1981.
Trinidad and Tobago Relations established in 1972 but only at nonresi-
dent level.
Current Status
Cuban Ambassador in Guyana accredited to Bridge-
town; Barbadian Ambassador to UN accredited to
Havana, presented credentials, January 1983.
The then Cuban Ambassador to Grenada was ac-
credited to Dominica as of November 1980; relations
inactive by early 1983, probably discontinued.
Embassies headed by ambassadors operated in both
capitals until the joint Grenada operation in October
1983; currently relations essentially inactive but not
broken; British Embassy in Havana represents Gren-
adian interests.
Embassies headed by ambassadors operate in both
capitals.
The then Cuban Ambassador to Grenada was ac-
credited to St. Lucia until November 1983; present
designee unknown.
Cuban Embassy headed by ambassador operated in
Paramaribo until November 1983; when Bouterse
ordered drastic reduction in Cuban staff, Havana
withdrew all personnel and closed its Embassy; rela-
tions now inactive but not broken; Suriname has yet
to open an Embassy.in Havana.
Cuban Ambassador in Guyana accredited to Port-of-
Spain in October 1980; new Trinidadian Ambassador
presented credentials in Havana, July 1983.
Despite these areas of mutual agreement, there have
been numerous instances since Moscow and Havana
first established their partnership in 1961 when they
have diverged over policy toward Latin America.
Moscow publicly made it clear that it was more
interested in fostering relations with governments
themselves and in developing trade, and that it was
highly skeptical of the "armed struggle" tactics es-
poused by the Cubans throughout the 1960s. Pressure
from Moscow-including the use of economic lever-
age-was one of the principal factors in Castro's
decision to forgo his rogue elephant approach to
"armed struggle" by the end of the decade. This was
one of the watershed developments in the evolving
Soviet-Cuban relationship that still conditions Cuban
decisionmaking,
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The two capitals continued to differ on important
occasions regarding tactics and objectives in Latin
America, most notably toward the Allende govern-
ment in Chile in the early 1970s, and,
they may have even backed
rival factions within the Bishop regime in Grenada.
On balance, however, since the mid-1970s Moscow
generally has deferred to Havana in identifying and
providing advice and support to Latin American
revolutionary groups, as well as in setting guidelines
over when and where "armed struggle" tactics should
be pursued.'
careful not to work at cross-purposes with Moscow at
least with respect to several South American coun-
tries. Havana realizes, for example, that Moscow
greatly values its sizable trade and basically cordial
relations with Argentina and Brazil, as well as its
unique arms relationship with Peru. Moreover, Mos-
cow apparently believes that conditions in South
America still are not propitious for pro-Soviet Com-
munist parties and their allies to promote "armed
struggle." Moscow's attitude, the lessons of the 1960s,
and Cuba's deepening economic dependence on the
Soviets undoubtedly reinforce Havana's decision to
use a pragmatic diplomatic track, particularly in
We believe that Havana will persist in trying to
improve bilateral relations with as many Latin Ameri-
can governments as possible, particularly in South
America, over the short run at least, and that Castro
is encouraged by gains to date. With a lack of good
opportunities for armed struggle in South America,
Havana probably realizes that until the issue of
Central America is settled, it is also wiser-for
tactical reasons-to emphasize the diplomatic ap-
proach and, by doing so, increase the chances of
winning support for the Cuban positions on Nicara-
gua and El.Salvador.
' Havana has long had a low regard for several old-line Communist
party leaders in Latin America who have continued to enjoy
Moscow's favor. Cuban support for a number of radical leftists also
has caused friction with the Soviets for years. At times, these
differences have become public knowledge, causing some embar-
rassment in both capitals and, more important, undermining efforts
to unify leftist forces in several Latin American countries.F
We strongly doubt, however, that Castro assigns such
priority to the campaign to improve bilateral relations
that he will slacken his support for the Sandinistas
and the Salvadoran insurgents or his efforts to foment
guerrilla activity in Honduras and Guatemala. Nor,
in our view, will he cease his support to sustain radical
groups in the Caribbean and South America such as
the Dominican Republic's United Leftist Front and
Colombia's M-19. Rather, he will play down such aid
and probably be somewhat more selective in carrying
out his basic commitment to "revolutionary struggle."
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Cuba is likely to continue trying to sway the South
Americans and others, such as the West Europeans, 25X1
with its pose of moderation in pursuing a negotiated
solution in Central America while playing down the 25X1
extent of its involvement there. In our view, Cuban
leaders expect their clamor regarding the "inevitabil-
ity" of US military intervention in Central America
or even against Cuba to have an impact with South
American leaders. At a minimum, it aids their cam-
paign to position Cuba in the mainstream of Latin
American "solidarity." 25X1
We judge that Castro-in the absence of new set-
backs-may rationalize that continuing the bilateral
relations approach indefinitely does not damage Cu-
ba's revolutionary credentials beyond the costs al- 25X1
ready incurred by the loss of Grenada. Thus, Cuba
gains "legitimacy" through striving to improve rela-
tions with its hemispheric neighbors while it continues
to "defend and sponsor" the revolutionary process in
Central America. Its current tactic also does not
require major new commitments of resources that
could detract from Havana's priority to defend Cuba's
position and that of its allies in Central America.
We believe that the general perception in much of
Latin America that Cuba is being stalemated in
Central America-a perception strengthened by.
events in Grenada and Suriname-has the effect of
leading some governments, particularly in the Andean
countries, to be more responsive to Havana's overtures
for upgraded ties. Thus, judging by public and private
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statements, some responsible South American com-
mentators seem convinced that Havana is now less
dangerous as a diplomatic interlocutor than in the
past because its clipped wings and burdensome com-
mitments in Central America and Africa will influ-
ence Havana to "behave." Moreover, as part of a
trend toward espousing more autonomous foreign
policies, several governments profess to want "nor-
mal" diplomatic relations with as many countries as
possible; for instance, Ecuador's President stressed
this point to the US Ambassador in upholding his
decision early this year to exchange ambassadors with
Cuba. In all cases, however, even South American
governments contemplating closer contact with Ha-
vana, in our view, almost certainly remain suspicious
of Castro's intentions toward them and most continue
to deplore Cuba's actions in Central America. Ac-
cording to Embassy reports, however, some-even a
few in the Caribbean Basin-apparently calculate
that, unless they maintain a dialogue with Havana on
how to improve relations, Castro might be tempted to
try to destabilize their governments. They also see
flirtation with Havana as useful for domestic political
purposes, in outmaneuvering or attracting support
asylees who have been in Lima's Embassy in Havana
since the 1980 Mariel episode, although
a compromise recently was quiet-
ly negotiated allowing half of them to depart. Never-
theless, neither President Belaunde nor his Prime
Minister are ideologically inclined toward substantial-
ly better relations with Havana. Consequently, no new
initiatives are likely until after the April 1985 elec-
tions, which the major left-leaning Peruvian opposi-
tion party now is favored to win. Several of its leaders
openly support upgrading ties with Havana.
Cuba also recently settled its asylees dispute with
Caracas, and the two capitals are moving carefully
toward warmer relations,
Castro, however, wants punishment meted
out to Orlando Bosch for the 1976 Cuban airliner
bombing. We do not know whether Castro will be
satisfied with the much-publicized recent request of
Venezuelan prosecutors asking for maximum terms
for Bosch and his confederates. In Bolivia, the Siles
Zuazo administration is ideologically inclined to ex-
change ambassadors, but hesitates mainly for fear of
offending the military, conservative political sectors,
and Washington. Siles's tenure is uncertain and, if he
were overthrown by the military, relations with Cuba
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Quickest Gains in South America
Assuming that Castro continues to adhere to the
course suggested by his actions to date, we believe a
growing receptivity by several South American gov-
ernments to Cuban overtures could enable Havana to
achieve several gains in the next two years. The most
likely prospect is Colombia, which US Embassy-
reporting suggests probably will permit
Cuba to open a commercial office in Bogota within
the next few months. The reaction of the military and
conservative political interests to such a Cuban opera-
tion would determine when-or whether-President
Betancur, who aspires to follow a more autonomous
foreign policy, would be able to exercise his inclina-
tion toward the resumption of full diplomatic rela-
tions. A definitive truce with the M-19, which Ha-
vana favors, could strengthen Betancur's hand in this
regard.
Peru, Venezuela,
and perhaps Bolivia all offer possibilities for an
upgrading of relations to the ambassadorial level
within the next two years but also present knotty
problems. With Peru the problem turns partly on the
probably would be curbed anew.
Brazil is the only other South American country
where Havana-mistakenly, in our view-may expect
to achieve a breakthrough. Last year, Havana made
several tentative overtures, and Castro may be en-
couraged by the pro-Cuban statements of some Bra-
zilian officials. He may believe that the election of a
civilian president in early 1985 will make Brasilia
more receptive, especially if Havana's relations with
one or more other South American countries improve.
We believe, however, that a new civilian government
in Brasilia is unlikely to offend so gratuitously the
Brazilian military at least during its first year in
office. This important void in Cuba's diplomatic
presence in South America probably will increasingly
irritate Castro because it will continue to frustrate his
drive to regain "legitimacy" in Latin America.
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of Brazilian parliamentarians.
Cuban officials are uncertain whether they can retain
even tenuous ties with governments of the English-
speaking Caribbean states following the Grenada
debacle. Whereas Havana will continue to monitor
events in Grenada-particularly looking for ways to
strengthen the successor to Bishop's New Jewel
Movement-we judge that Cuban officials are pessi-
mistic over prospects for any meaningful Cuban role
in Grenada, at least in the near term. In the case of
Jamaica and some of the smaller islands, Havana
evidently calculates it will have to await new govern-
ments before. it can initiate steps to renew or establish
ties, judging by US Interests Section reports. For its
part, Trinidad and Tobago, based on statements by
Trinidadian officials, probably will insist on keeping 25X1
relations at the nonresident level but may respond to
Elsewhere in South America, Havana almost certain-
ly will not make any overtures for. formal relations
with Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay unless their
rightwing military regimes are replaced. Judging by
Cuban media treatment and some limited official
contacts, Havana apparently expects that Uruguay-
scheduled to return to civilian government in 1985-
will be the first of the three to undergo political
liberalization sufficient to justify a change in ap-
proach. Meanwhile, Castro may prefer the propagan-
da benefits of proclaiming that Havana has no inter-
est in relations with these "pariah" regimes.
Slow Going Elsewhere
We-and Cuban leaders,
xpect no other Latin American
governments, apart from Colombia, Venezuela, Peru,
and Bolivia, to respond to Cuban overtures for nor-
malizing relations in the near term. A change of
regime in Suriname or a renewed tilt toward Cuba by
Army Commander Bouterse could result in a reopen-
ing of the Cuban Embassy in Paramaribo. We have
no indication, however, that Havana expects a turn-
around in relations with Suriname any time soon
with Panama-over Central America and Cuban
activities in Panama-undoubtedly worry Castro.
Several reliable reports suggest Panama's central
location is important to Cuba for many of its overt
recent Cuban proposals to expand trade.
Havana is paying greater attention to Guyana, and,
considering Cuba's setbacks in Grenada and Surina-
me, we believe Guyana could become a more impor-
tant operational base for Havana in the Caribbean
Basin." For this reason, as well as to improve its
damaged reputation as the hemispheric center for
assistance and advice to like-minded revolutionaries,
we believe Cuba might extend modest levels of mate-
rial assistance and further expand its personnel and
operations in Georgetown. Nonetheless, the poor rela- 25X1
tions between Burnham and Castro are likely to
continue to hinder Cuban operations in the country.
Cuba probably will continue to pursue the building- 25X1
block approach elsewhere in the Caribbean Basin. In
our view, however, Havana has little chance of estab-
lishing ties with conservative governments such as in the the Dominican Republic, Costa Rica, and Belize over
the near term. Recent strains in Havana's relations
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and covert operations aimed at Central America and
western South America. Consequently, Havana is
trying to strengthen its standing with Panama's mili-
tary and is cultivating leaders of the civilian govern-
ment to be inaugurated in October. Judging by a
recent surge in high-level bilateral consultations, we
believe Cuban leaders probably are making some
headway.
The Multilateral Picture
We judge that, because of its need to mobilize support
for its position in Central America, Havana will
continue to use international forums to foster closer
contact with Latin American governments. Thus,
Cuba probably will continue seeking to collaborate in
Latin America's efforts to resolve its basic socioeco-
nomic problems, while hoping to frustrate what it
views as Washington's drive to isolate it.
Similarly, we judge that Castro probably will persist
at least throughout 1984 in trying to improve ties with
Western Europe. Cuba probably expects to derive
substantial political advantage as long as France,
Spain, and Sweden, among others, continue to criti-
cize Washington's policies on Central America and
Cuba. We believe that Havana in its dealings with
Latin America will continue trying to exploit the
treatment by these West European countries of Cuba
as a responsible interlocutor, particularly regarding
the Central American crisis. Nonetheless, it seems
unlikely that Castro will be able to make his long-
sought European tour this year-given the hesitation
of several capitals to offend Washington during an
election year.
Risky Alternative Paths
We recognize that several conceivable circumstances
could lead Castro to change course abruptly and
revert to "armed struggle" beyond Central America:
? Should a dramatic setback occur to Cuban interests
in Central America-such as a near total defeat of
the Salvadoran insurgents on the battlefield or
indications that the Sandinista regime is tottering-
a desperate Castro probably would want to respond
by lashing out in any number of ways against the
United States. This might involve instigating vio-
lence against US installations and individuals
throughout Latin America and a sudden effort to
foment insurgent activities and other political desta-
bilization efforts on a wider scale in South America
and the Caribbean. Castro's ultimate intent proba-
bly would be to raise the cost to the United States of
defeating Cuba's allies in Central America.
? An irresistible target of opportunity, from Havana's
perspective, might appear on the political horizon.
We believe that Chile would be the most tempting.
In the unlikely event that political opposition and
violence there escalate to the point where Castro
judges that radical leftist groups-trained, supplied,
and counseled by Cubans-could play a central part
in ousting the Pinochet regime, Havana probably
would not forgo the opportunity to play a direct role.
Similarly, we believe that Castro might not resist
the temptation to meddle if there were a military
coup in Bolivia or if the internal situation in Jamai-
ca, the Dominican Republic, or Colombia deterio-
rated sharply.
? Castro almost certainly would view a series of
rejections by South American governments of Ha-
vana's overtures, particularly if they were accompa-
nied by reversals of recent gains, as spelling failure
of his diplomatic policy toward South America. He
might be sufficiently irritated by these cumulative
reverses to revert to "armed struggle" and other
political destabilization activities aimed at several of
them, especially, in our view, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, or the Dominican Republic. We believe
that, rather than repeating the "scattergun" ap-
proach of the 1960s, he would selectively choose his
targets so as not to spread his assets too thinly. We
believe he would calculate that this approach would
not seriously undermine Cuban efforts to sustain
insurgency in Central America, although he proba-
bly would weigh carefully the risk of provoking
direct US military counteraction, possibly aimed at
Cuba itself.
US pressure and other constraints on Castro have
forced Cuba into a defensive posture. We believe
Castro sees no realistic choice other than to continue
seeking to improve bilateral relations as broadly as
possible throughout the hemisphere and to curb his
revolutionary proclivities for the time being.
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Nevertheless, in our view, there will be adverse impli-
cations for current US policies in the region as a
consequence of the more subtle inroads Cuba is likely
to achieve. The upgrading of diplomatic ties with
several countries already has somewhat lessened Cu-
ba's isolation and undercut US efforts to persuade
others that the Castro regime should still be treated as
a pariah because of its intervention in Central Ameri-
ca. Further gains in Havana's campaign may increase
Latin American perceptions that US policies toward
Cuba are losing effectiveness.
Castro in his statesman's guise will continue to take
every opportunity to undercut Washington's influ-
ence. He and his formidable propaganda apparatus,
for example, are likely to interpret any new diplomat-
ic breakthrough as a repudiation of US policies
toward Cuba and, by extension, toward Central
America. Similarly, Cuban representatives in these
countries will use all forums and occasions they deem
useful to denigrate the United States.
We doubt that Cuba's impact in the region over the
next few years will be greatly enhanced by the result
of its ongoing campaign, which at most will amount to
normalizing diplomatic ties with several additional
countries, some trade expansion, and increased cultur-
al and other exchanges. Although each country that
opens or upgrades relations with Cuba adds a measure
of respectability to the Castro regime and opportuni-
ties for an increased Cuban presence, Havana's re-
gional influence will be circumscribed by remaining
widespread skepticism about Cuban intentions. Even
legitimate Cuban activities are likely to increase the
anxieties of those military and conservative political
sectors-and perhaps many moderates-that almost
universally oppose relations with Havana. Moreover,
considering the hostility toward Cuba on the part of
Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, most of the Caribbean,
and probably Brazil at least over the near term,
Cuba's diplomatic gains will fall considerably short of
the hemispherewide success that Castro is seeking.
In addition, we doubt that any expansion of Cuba's
formal relations with its Latin American neighbors
will significantly help Havana to play a leadership
role in regional organizations to the detriment of
Washington. Most governments, in our view,'are
unwilling to go beyond welcoming Cuba back into the
inter-American fold. Nor are Latin American govern-
ments-which traditionally seek consensus rather
than following the lead of any country-likely to
become more disposed to line up behind Havana in
such multilateral forums as the United Nations. We
believe that the Cubans themselves recognize this
situation and will continue to view their recently
intensified activities essentially as a means to further
Cuba's bilateral relations with Latin America, rather 25X1
than constituting a major drive to rejoin the inter-
American system in a leadership capacity.
Finally, any general improvement in Cuba's relations
with South America, and perhaps some Caribbean
countries, would probably be perceived in Moscow as
benefiting Soviet interests in at least two contexts. For
one, the resultant blow to US influence would comple-
ment Soviet global interests in seeing the United
States lose stature worldwide. Moscow also would
welcome Cuba's success in overcoming its hemispher-
ic isolation, especially following Grenada and at a
time of heightened international tension over Central
America. Moreover, Moscow probably would view
increased receptivity to Havana, particularly in South
America, as indicative of a lessening of the suspicion
that Havana is a Soviet surrogate and thus helpful in
furthering Moscow's own substantial trade and diplo-
matic ties with several South American countries.
By the same token, we believe that the Soviets would
oppose any Cuban decision to resume large-scale
"armed struggle" tactics, especially in South Ameri-
ca, because of the importance of Soviet commercial
and political interests in the region. Moscow probably
would calculate that the Soviet Union and the pro-
Moscow Communist parties in the region would be
blamed along with Cuba. If Havana were to attempt
to promote insurgency widely in South America,
either in reaction to setbacks to its Central American
allies or because its diplomatic gains in South Ameri-
ca were reversed, we believe Moscow probably would
seek to restrain Havana by threatening to withhold its
vital economic support, as it did in the late 1960s. If 25X1
Havana were to increase assistance to individual rebel
groups whose fortunes appeared clearly promising,
however, Castro would run significantly less risk of a
negative Soviet reaction and Moscow's posture would
be decided on a case-by-case basis.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200110005-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200110005-2
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/10: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000200110005-2