TANZANIA: NYERERE UNDER FIRE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000300070003-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 4, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of Seer et-
Intelligence
Tanzania:
Nyerere Under Fire
-Se"L
ALA 84-10109
November 1984
385
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Tanzania:
Nyerere Under Fire
An Intelligence Assessment
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations
This paper was prepared by (Office
of African and Latin American Analysis. It was
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA, on
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
Secret
ALA 84-10109
November 1984
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Tanzania:
Nyerere Under Fire 25X1
Key Judgments Tanzanian President Nyerere, an influential force in African politics for
Information available over 20 years, is facing the strongest challenge to his authority since an
as I November 1984 army mutiny in 1964 forced him to call for British troops. Nyerere is under
was used in this report.
increased pressure from moderates in the ruling Revolutionary Party,
government, and military to undertake economic and political reforms that
diverge from the socialist blueprint he has held to all his life. Although we
believe Nyerere's leadership abilities, personal appeal, and the lack of an
organized opposition probably will allow him to maintain control through
1985, his prospects thereafter are less certain.
In the next several months, Nyerere faces not only the continuing issues of
political and economic reform but also a critical personal decision on
whether to stand for reelection at the end of his term in October 1985 or to
relinquish the presidency and rule from his position as chairman of the only
political party. Although the latter has been his stated preference up to
now, we believe he will conclude he can be most influential by staying on as
President. He faces mounting challenges from factions within the party
that would make it precarious for him to try to run Tanzania solely from
the position of party chairman. Moreover, the lack of successors of
unquestioned loyalty to Nyerere and who are acceptable to all factions in
the party and military increases pressure on Nyerere to remain.
The need for effective control has been underscored by growing ideological
divisions among government and party leaders over how to solve the
country's economic woes. These differences, in our judgment, have spurred
the challenges to Nyerere's authority and political philosophy. President
Nyerere, in an attempt to improve Tanzania's dismal economy and quiet
criticism from aid donors, his own advisers, and moderates in the party
leadership, agreed recently to several pragmatic economic reforms, includ-
ing a devaluation and the elimination of subsidies on some consumer goods.
We believe, however, that Nyerere remains committed to his socialist
ideals and sees the reforms more as temporary adjustment to his socialist
blueprint than a reversal. If this view is correct, Nyerere may agree to
some further cosmetic reforms but is unlikely to agree to the significant
changes necessary for an IMF standby program because of his ideological
rigidity and fear that the resulting austerity program would cause urban
unrest. Moreover, entrenched party officials whose vested interests are
served through the maintenance of the present system are likely to impede
even nominal reform, resulting in only limited and piecemeal implementa-
tion at the local level.
Secret
ALA 84-10109
November 1984
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In addition to the dismal economy and the rift between party ideologues
and moderates, the regime has to contend with potentially explosive
tensions between the mainland and semiautonomous Zanzibar. Although
the mainland government strengthened control over Zanzibar in early 1984
by purging the local government and handpicking its new leaders, the
relationship will continue to be tense because of Zanzibar's longstanding
desire for greater political and economic autonomy. Should anti-Union
sentiment revive in Zanzibar, we believe that Dar es Salaam will not
hesitate to further purge the island government or, if necessary, again use
mainland troops as it did in late 1983 when calls for secession reached an
unprecedented high.
In our view, despite Tanzania's political and economic problems, Nyerere
will continue to make an impact on the international scene. Although
Nyerere's prestige and influence has waned somewhat in recent years, he
still is president of the Frontline States and a leading candidate to become
chairman of the OAU at the summit scheduled for November 1984. In
these visible positions he will continue to be an outspoken critic of
negotiations with South Africa and the linkage of Namibian independence
to Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. In addition, we believe he will
continue to provide military bases for the African National Congress, the
principal South African dissident group, and will encourage other African
states to do the same.
Tanzania, in our judgment, will seek to maintain correct, although not
particularly close, ties to the United States. Relations could deteriorate,
however, if Nyerere's recent attempts to make the United States a
scapegoat for Tanzania's and the region's ills intensify. Despite Tanzania's
domestic problems and cool relations with the United States, we believe the
Soviets will find it hard to increase their influence in Dar es Salaam. The
Soviets have recently refused Tanzanian requests for advanced weapon
systems and do not appear willing to expend the military or economic
resources necessary to significantly increase their presence. Moreover it is
unlikely, given Nyerere's distrust of Soviet motives in Africa, that
increased Soviet aid would translate easily into greater Soviet influence
over Tanzanian policies.
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Tanzania's strategic significance could, of course, be altered in the event of
Nyerere's death or a military takeover. Judging from the composition of
Tanzania's current elite, a new government, whether civilian or military,
would be unlikely to abandon nonalignment or Nyerere's current position
on regional issues. A new regime probably would gradually dismantle some
of Tanzania's socialist institutions and turn to the West for increased
economic assistance. If a coup was staged successfully by junior-level
officers-a group that is more susceptible to plotting than the senior
corps-the potential for unexpected policy shifts would be greatly en-
hanced. Under these conditions Nyerere's ouster is likely to have an even
greater unsettling effect in the region and usher in a period of political in-
stability in Tanzania that Moscow certainly would not ignore.
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Key Judgments
Attempts To Stem Decline
Smoldering Military Discontent
A More Powerful Senior Officer Corps
9
Alienated Junior Officers
9
Growing Political Discord.
Questioning Party Supremacy
10
Zanzibar: Endemic Separatism
A Military Takeover
15
Nyerere's Death
Implications for the United States
vii Secret
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Tanzania:
Nyerere Under Fire
As the 1985 presidential elections approach, Nyerere
confronts some of the most difficult problems of his
23-year reign as President.
? He has to make a critical decision on whether to
step down from the presidency and try to run the
country from his position as party chairman.
? Worsening economic problems are calling into ques-
tion his longstanding socialist economic develop-
ment strategy.
? The military's political influence has increased, and
there is growing unrest in the junior ranks.
? Moderates in the party and government are increas-
ingly challenging Nyerere's authority on economic
and political issues.
? The semiautonomous island of Zanzibar has never
accepted the mainland's dominion, and separatist
pressures are endemic.
This paper examines Nyerere's likely responses to
these pressures, which will shape economic and politi-
cal developments in Tanzania for the remainder of the
decade. It also discusses the implications of Nyerere's
continuation in power-which we consider likely-as
well as the potential impact of his removal.
Although Nyerere has stated, both publicly and pri-
vately, that he plans to relinquish the presidency when
his current term expires in October 1985 and run the
country from his post as party chief, pressures are
mounting that may lead Nyerere to stay on as
President. In our judgment, Nyerere has always had
ambivalent feelings about giving up the presidency,
and the recent death of Prime Minister Sokoine-
once Nyerere's most likely successor-and mounting
domestic problems probably have forced him to recon-
sider his decision to step down. Although Nyerere has
said he would like to be freed from the day-to-day
administration of the government, we believe that the
President's ideological commitments and strong desire
to leave a political legacy make it difficult for him to
leave. This is particularly true at a time when his
socialist policies and concept of party supremacy are
under attack.'
Despite Nyerere's successful efforts over the past two
years to increase the power of the party vis-a-vis the
government-exemplified by the results of the party
congress in 1982 and the new draft Tanzanian Consti-
tution-we believe that Nyerere would have serious
difficulties in protecting his socialist agenda from only
his position as party chairman.
growing ideological divisions in
the ruling party and indications that Nyerere has lost
some of his formerly unchallenged authority. These
developments have increased significantly the pros-
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pects that a presidential successor, with the support of 25X1
the pragmatists in the government, would advocate
policies that would bring them into conflict with 25X1
Should Nyerere step down from the presidency, we
are uncertain who he would appoint as his successor.
Although Vice President Mwinyi and Prime Minister
Salim are both well positioned to be his successor,
Nyerere, in our view, is not grooming either one at
this time, suggesting he doubts their loyalty. More-
over, Salim and Mwinyi are both Zanzibaris who lack
a political base on the mainland, and we would expect
substantial opposition from within the party to either
one's nomination.
' Nyerere's concept of party supremacy holds that the Revolution-
ary Party-Tanzania's only political party-is solely responsible
for Tanzania's development, and therefore the party has authorit
over the government and over all aspects of Tanzanian society.
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Nyerere: The Man and His Philosophy
Julius K. Nyerere, 62 years old and Tanzania's
President since independence in 1961, dominates the
country's politics. Nyerere has held to his model for
the country's development with remarkable persever-
ance since he first presented it in 1967. Collectivized
agriculture along with state ownership of industry
and services were then his stated goals, along with the
ujamaa village-a socialist adaptation of the ideal
African village where people share property and work
together for the common good.
US Embassy officials report that Nyerere's commit-
ment to these ideals is firm, a judgment in which we
concur despite Nyerere's occasional pragmatism on
some economic matters. We believe Nyerere's ideo-
logical rigidity stems partially from a strong belief in
the superiority of his own intellect, a reflection of the
prominent role that his academic and oratorical
skills played in his rise from a rural background to
the University of Edinburgh, to the leadership of the
preindependence nationalist movement, and finally
the Tanzanian presidency. Since Nyerere's intellectu-
al prowess has few challengers in Tanzania, he
remains locked into the ideas of his youth and
attributes the failures of his programs to external
forces-such as foreign interference or world market
conditions. Although he acknowledges that the proc-
ess of building socialism has taken longer than he
initially envisioned, Nyerere adamantly maintains
that his policies are not responsible for Tanzania's
economic deterioration.
Nyerere's strongly held ideological convictions have
led him to adopt an authoritarian leadership style.
Known throughout the country as Mwalimu, or
teacher, the US Embassy reports that he usually
relies on persuasion, although he has not hesitated to
use force when oratory has failed.
senior government
officials often refrain from speaking out on sensitive
issues because of Nyerere's readiness to reprimand,
dismiss, and even jail critics. When confronted with
intractable problems-such as mounting economic
woes or the period of high tension with Zanzi r in
1983 Nyer-
ere often ae/ers action indefinitely, preferring to
appear indecisive rather than change his course of
On the basis of his past behavior, we believe that
Nyerere considers himself a man with a mission to
create a new society in Tanzania. We believe that
Nyerere now recognizes that ujamaa will not be
created in his lifetime and is instead concentrating on
building a party organization powerful enough to
dominate government and society in general, and
dedicated to perpetuating his ideals
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The lack of successors acceptable to all factions
within the party and military has also increased
pressure on Nyerere to remain. In addition, the press
and Embassy have reported that several special inter-
est groups and leaders-including the party's youth
organization, the Musoma Group, Mozambique Presi-
dent Machel, and Tanzanian Vice President
Mwinyi-have called for Nyerere's reelection 2 More-
over, mainlanders, seeking an alternative to the two
Zanzibari front-runners, may urge Nyerere to stay
simply to buy enough time to find a more acceptable
candidate. In our view, it is possible that Nyerere has
orchestrated these demands to gauge the level of his
support. A key indication of Nyerere's plans will be
whom he backs to replace former Prime Minister
Sokoine as head of the party's Defense and Security
Commission. In our view, Nyerere's decision to ex-
clude elections for this post from the recent National
Executive Committee meeting suggests that Nyerere
is undecided on a successor or is uncertain of the
party's support for his choice.
Deep Economic Woes
Beyond the question of succession, the other pressures
on Nyerere, such as the faltering economy, are less
tractable. By almost any measure, the Tanzanian
economy is worse off today than at any time since
independence in 1961.
Tanzania's foreign exchange reserves are
depleted, and all lines of credit from foreign banks
have been used up. On the basis of IMF reports and
academic studies, we estimate that approximately
two-thirds of Tanzania's economic activity now occurs
through the black market and illegal border trade,
thus depriving the government of revenue and foreign
exchange. Dar es Salaam is in default on payments to
all of its major oil suppliers and cannot pay for
essential imports for agriculture and manufacturing.
dential Secretary Butiku, Cabinet Secretary Apiyo, and Command-
er of the Defense Forces Musuguri-has banded together to
promote Nyerere's reelection.
' The Revolutionary Party has :a 17-member Central Committee,
but the 140-member National Executive Committee is, in theory,
the principal decisionmaking body
Moreover, we calculate that debt service on the
country's $2.5 billion debt now represents over two-
thirds the value of exports, and,
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Tanzania had fallen about $440 mil- 25X1
lion behind on its debt payments by the end of 1983,
and arrears have been rising throughout 1984. As a
result of Tanzania's inability to pay its debts, the IMF
and World Bank have both halted negotiations for
loans, commercial lenders have cut off funds, and the
United States has suspended disbursements of US
military and economic assistance.
continuing.
Agricultural output has declined sharply over the past
three years. The largest impact is on the standard of
living of small farmers, who account for over 80
percent of the country's population and almost all of
its agricultural output. Falling production has led to a
decline in export earnings as crop exports, which
account for over 75 percent of Tanzania's foreign
exchange and over 50 percent of GDP, declined from
a high of $350 million in 1981 to $245 million in
1983. The limited data for 1984 suggest this trend is
Domestic food production also has declined, and,
drought may soon cause a wide
spread famine in some rural areas. Food imports rose
in fiscal year 1983/84 (June to May), and we expect
them to continue to rise in fiscal year 1984/85 as the
government is forced to spend scarce foreign exchange
in the commercial markets to feed its urban popula-
tion.4 To the extent this occurs, even fewer funds will
be available for critical oil purchases. Over 60 percent
of the country's export earnings in 1983, for example,
were used for petroleum purchases;
Tanzania has often been
forced to use funds earmarked for food, medicine, and
other essentials to buy emergency supplies of oil on
the spot market.
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' The IMF estimates, probably correctly, that about 75 percent of
Tanzania's marketable food production is sold through private
channels. Moreover, the inability of the state marketing agencies to 25X1
buy and distribute food because of the low prices paid to farmers,
mismanagement, corruption, and transportation bottlenecks, has 2 A11
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Salim Ahmed Salim
Prime Minister
Became Prime Minister in April 1984 following
the death of Edward Sokoine ... is a Zanzibari of
Arab origin chosen by Nyerere for his loyalty,
competence, and consensus-building ability ...
because he has spent career in the international
arena, he has no political base or detailed knowl-
edge of domestic affairs ... probably will spend
next year gaining experience on domestic issues
and building a political base, particularly in the
military ... as he develops some economic exper-
tise and gains a political base, likely to propose
reforms that will conflict with hardline socialists
we believe Nyerere's decision not to appoint
Salim to Sokoine's former position as head of the
party's Defense and Security Commission indi-
cates doubts about grooming Salim as his succes-
sor ... Salim, however, does not appear to be
actively seeking the Presidency and may prefer
that Nyerere continue as President until he can
All Hassan Mwinyi
Vice President of Tanzania
President of Zanzibar
Nyerere probably chose Mwinyi for his loyalty
and administrative abilities rather than potential
leadership abilities ... but we believe growing
evidence that Nyerere may have problems run-
ning the country from his position as party chair-
man has led Nyerere to consider Mwinyi as a
potential successor ... Mwinyi probably would be
easier for Nyerere to control and less likely to
initiate reforms when compared with the more
independent Salim or another candidate that has
a political base ... although Mwinyi appears to
be building political support on Zanzibar, he has
made little effort to build support among main-
land or military leaders, and we believe he has no
ambitions for higher office ... US Embassy
reports that Mwinyi's recent election to the vice
chairman position was not without some behind-
the-scenes opposition ... opposition could build
should Nyerere begin to groom him as his succes-
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Table 1
Tanzania: Key Economic Indicators
Real GDP growth rate
(percent)
5.5
3.6
Rate of inflation (percent)
13.8
30.2
25.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
Exports (million US $)
498.0
511.0
580.0
447.0
340.0
340.0
Imports (million US $)
1,104.0
1,252.0
1,213.0
1,137.0
860.0
750.0
Debt service ratio (percent)
8.6
15.4
16.9
38.0
50.0
70.0
The country's economic problems have been long in
the making. They largely reflect Tanzania's limited
resources, poor government management, and social-
ist inflexibility, but also external factors beyond the
government's control. The dramatic increase in oil
prices in 1974 and 1979, the breakup of the East
African Community, the costly war in Uganda,
drought, and low world prices for Tanzania's agricul-
tural products are among the contributing causes of
Tanzania's economic crisis.'
Nyerere's adherence to his socialist policies, however,
has, in our view, exacerbated the effects of external
factors, particularly in the agriculture sector. For
example, moving small farmers into communal vil-
lages, sometimes forcibly; replacing regional coopera-
tives with inefficient state enterprises; decentralizing
administration; and emphasizing industry in the de-
velopment budgets of the late 1970s all contributed to
the decline in agricultural production. Government
campaigns, such as that in early 1983, to rout out
black-marketeers, hoarders, and smugglers further
damaged the economy by scaring away those tradi-
tional middlemen who supply scarce agricultural in-
puts, consumer goods, and other services that aug-
ment the inadequate government system.
' The East African Community was formed in 1967 by Tanzania,
Uganda, and Kenya. Its main features were a customs union,
regional transportation and communication corporations, and coop
erative research institutes. Growing friction among the three
partners resulted in the demise of the organization in 1977.
Attempts To Stem Decline
Dar es Salaam in the past year has implemented a
number of reforms designed to restore economic
performance. The most significant reforms were pub-
licly announced in June 1984 and included a 38-
percent devaluation of the shilling; elimini:Lion of the
consumer subsidies on corn flour, fertilizer, and pesti- 25X1
cides; and higher producer prices for export and food
crops. Wage increases for government and state enter-
prise employees also were enacted to cushion the
effect of the reforms on urban consumers. The US
Embassy reports that, despite some grumbling from
urban consumers and Tanzania's token labor union,
there appeared to be general agreement among the
populace that the economic situation required drastic
action. Although it falls short of IMF conditions for a
standby agreement, Dar es Salaam hopes that the
reforms will increase agricultural exports and reduce
government expenditures.
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Tanzania
Major Economic Activity
MINERALS
Cashews
'
Cement plant
C Coalfield
Cattle
`
Fertilizer plant
D Diamond mine
Au Gold mine
Coffee
- Oil pipeline
Fe Iron deposit
Cotton
it
Oil refinery
Ph Phosphate deposit
Pyrethrum
Power plant
Na Salt
Sisal
?
Rail shops and yards
Sn Tin
Tea
46
Steel rolling plant
Tobacco
9
Sugar refinery
,it
l/
Major cattle scheme
outside of main
'$
Textiles
cattle areas
0
Tires
Note: The US Embassy reports that industrial output has
declined some 40 percent since 1980, capacity is only 20 to
30 percent with many plants operating intermittently.
Curtailed capacity is due to inability to import raw material
and spare parts.
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Other policies have been aimed directly at improving
the efficiency of the agricultural sector. Public spend-
ing in this sector now accounts for nearly 30 percent
of the development budget, including hikes in prices
paid to the farmers and greater investment in indus-
tries vital to agriculture, such as transportation, fertil-
izer production, and extension services. Moreover,
according to Embassy reporting, food distribution is
gradually being taken away from the state enterprises
and turned over to newly established cooperatives at
the village, regional, and national level. The US
Embassy also reports that Nyerere has encouraged
increased foreign investment in the private agricultur-
al sector, despite protests by some hardline socialists.
he
new initiative has generated little interest from for-
eign firms because of investor skepticism about the
government's long-term commitment to private-sector
investment.
In our view, the recent reforms, although unlikely to
reverse the economic decline, suggest that pragmatists
in the government have, for now, gained influence at
the expense of the socialist ideologues who have
formulated economic policy since independence. En-
trenched district and regional party officials, however,
whose vested interests are served through the mainte-
nance of the present system, are likely to impede
implementation of these and future reforms-particu-
larly those that affect the state enterprise system-
resulting in only limited and piecemeal changes at the
local level. In addition, we believe that Nyerere
remains a committed socialist who has grudgingly
agreed to the reforms only because he believed them
to be a temporary adjustment needed to obtain critical
foreign exchange from the international financial
system. If this view is correct, Nyerere may agree to
some further cosmetic reforms but is unlikely to
dismantle the party and state enterprise system that is
the, foundation of his socialist blueprint
Nevertheless, the reforms have temporarily quieted
criticism among many Tanzanians that the govern-
ment has done nothing to address the country's
economic problems. Moreover, the reforms may reas-
sure many aid donors, such as the Nordic countries
that have been key donors in the past, that Tanzania
is willing to make practical reforms and therefore
warrants continued assistance even with no IMF
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Leading Pragmatists and Ideologues
Pragmatists
Cleopa Msuya
Fulgence Kazaura
Simon Mblinyi
Amon Nsekela
Paul Bomani
George Mbowe
Ideologues
Kighoma Malima
Joan Wicken
Charles Nyirabu
Kingunge Mgonbale
Mwiru
Minister for Finance
Principal Secretary for
Finance
Principal Secretary for
Agriculture
Chairman, National Bank
of Commerce
Minister for Lands, Re-
sources, and Tourism
Chairman, Development
Finance Corporation
Minister for Economic
Affairs
Presidential Assistant
Governor, Bank of
Tanzania
Secretary General, Minister
Without Portfolio
Minister of State, Prime
Minister's Office
agreement. Finally, the reforms have reduced the
wide gap between Tanzania's economic policies and
IMF conditions for a standby program and has
thereby set the stage for a resumption of formal
negotiations. Nyerere and the IMF, however, disagree
substantially on the reforms still needed for an IMF
standby program, and we are not optimistic that an
agreement will be reached.
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Pressures for Further Reform
The IMF
IMF conditions for a standby agreement include
another large currency devaluation, the dismantling
or reorganization of many state enterprises, strict
ceilings on government borrowing and spending, and
higher producer prices for crops. Many of Nyerere's
advisers appear to agree in principle with these IMF
guidelines but disagree strongly on the scope and
timing of the reforms. Nyerere, however, disagrees
fundamentally with some of the IMF conditions,
particularly those that tend to increase the role of the
private sector, and believes that some particularly a
40- to 50 percent devaluation-would pose unaccept-
able political risks
An IMF standby program was canceled after only
three months in 1980 because of Tanzania'sfailure to
meet performance targets, and, in our view, the IMF
is unlikely to reduce the stringency of its guidelines
nor the demand that many of the reforms be imple-
mented before any funds are disbursed. According to
the US Embassy, a new standby agreement is a
precondition for a World Bank structural adjustment
loan, Paris Club debt rescheduling, and a consulta-
tive group meeting on increased bilateral aid flows. In
addition, private international banks-some of whom
have cut Tanzania's credit line by 50 percent-have
indicated that they will not consider restoring them
without an IMF agreement.
Donor Pressure
Unlike in the past when Dar es Salaam could count
on generous, unconditionalforeign aid-$838 million
in 1980-Nyerere's recent pleas for increased assist-
ance have been met with pressure from foreign
donors to adopt a tougher fiscal policy and come to
terms with the IMF. Foreign aid in 1982 and 1983
fell to $450 million, and it may decline to $400
million in 1984, as many donors made good on their
decision to decrease aid if Tanzania did not reach
agreement with the IMF. The World Bank formerly
Tanzania's largest source of aid, providing some $120
million annually-now limits itself to one or two
projects a year that are immune to Tanzania's cur-
rent economic policies and will not consider other
projects until an IMF standby program is in place.
Pressures From Within
According to Embassy reporting, Nyerere is subject
to substantial pressure from his pragmatic economic
experts and Cabinet members to come to terms with
the IMF. At the same time, ideologues led by Minis-
ter of State for Economic Affairs Malima and sup-
ported by most party leaders have successfully op-
posed or diluted the policies advocated by these
pragmatists.
the pragmatists-led by Fi-
nance Minister Msuya and supported by most of the
country's leading economists and many military
leaders-recently convinced Nyerere to support the
Msuya-initiated reforms. In our view, the degree of
discussion and controversy among government offi-
cials, the public, and parliament over the recent
reforms was unprecedented, and we expect heightened
tension between pragmatists and ideologues over fu-
ture economic decisions as well as increased pressure
on Nyerere for further reforms.
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Smoldering Military Discontent
A More Powerful Senior Officer Corps
In our view, Tanzania's economic problems have
become of such concern to senior officers that they
have decided to become more politically involved.
Nyerere's earlier decision to integrate senior officers
into the party and government has already positioned
the military to take a greater role in the decisionmak-
m rocess
senior officers have used their positionsand
Nyerere's fear of military unrest to influence recent
policy decisions. For example, after Prime Minister
Sokoine's death in a car accident in April 1984
senior officers
lobbied Nyerere to choose a new prime minister with
proven abilities to deal with the country's economic
problems-a factor we believe was critical to Nyer-
ere's surprise decision to appoint Foreign Minister
Salim to the post. We also believe that senior military
officers probably helped convince Nyerere to agree to
the recent economic reforms.
Nyerere, in an obvious at-
tempt to shore up his standing with senior officers,
said he would consult them on a successor to Chief of
the Defense Forces Musuguri when the latter retires
next year.
Despite their recent assertiveness, almost all senior
officers, in our view, are hesitant to take on the task of
governing Tanzania and continue to support Nyerere
as the only person who can hold the country together.
Alienated Junior Officers
Although the senior officer ranks are relatively se-
cure, lower-ranking officers with more to gain and
less to lose may not be as hesitant to express their
discontent. In our judgment, discontent in the bar-
racks over economic conditions is once again at the
level that helped spur the January 1983 coup at-
junior-level discontent is caused by the shortage of
food and basic goods; increased taxes on beer, gaso-
line, soft drinks, and cigarettes; and the preferential
treatment given to senior officers by the base commis-
saries. any
in the junior ranks are unhappy because the s ortages
of necessities are aggravated by embezzlement and
theft by senior officers. Although a few corrupt
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2 A11
officers have been caught-including a Navy captain25X1
who sold diesel fuel from his ship-we believe that
Nyerere has turned a blind eve to senior-level profit-
eering in the military.
Nyerere protected senior military per-
sonnel from former Prime Minister Sokoine's anticor-
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Although Nyerere may have recently attempted to
appease lower-ranking military personnel when he
before it was implemented.
ordered that scarce foreign exchange be used to buy
new uniforms, we do not believe that Tanzania has
the means to improve substantially the standard of
living in the barracks. Nonetheless, although some
coup plotting is likely, Nyerere's effective intelligence
network probably would uncover a serious coup plot
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Growing Political Discord
delegates as yet unwilling to confront Nyerere direct-
ly? almost all parliamen-
tarians oppose the concept of party supremacy, and a
few may sponsor a resolution that calls for the new
Tanzanian Constitution, which significantly strength-
ens the role of the party vis-a-vis the government, to
be debated in popular forums and presented to the
Questioning Party Supremacy
The issue of internal discord is not limited to the
military. There are signs that Nyerere's formerly
unquestioned authority over the Chama Cha Mapin-
duzi (Revolutionary Party) and the government is
being challenged as moderates press for economic and
political reforms that diverge from Nyerere's socialist
agenda. uring
the party congress in August, an anonymous docu-
ment calling for the abolition of one-party rule and
party supremacy was circulated among party leaders
and the 1,700 delegates. The document, addressed to
Nyerere, warned that popular sentiment favored a
multiparty democratic approach and that, if one-party
rule were not abolished, the resulting crisis would lead
to a military takeover. In our view, the document
probably was written by academics or a few party
people in the form of a national referendum.'
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there are other issues that mays ark a clash betty
Nverere and Harty moderates. 7 '') F Y 1
for example, Nyerere did not let the
' Since 1982 Nyerere has been attempting to strengthen the role of
the party vis-a-vis the government and thereby the authority of the
party chairman in preparation for his stepping down from the
presidency. The proposed Tanzanian constitution embodies many of
the changes he has sough
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Major General Kombe
Director General TISS
His experience as Chief of Staff and performance
as Director General make him the leading candi-
date to replace General Musuguri as commander
Executive Committee or party congress discuss ratifi-
cation of the new Constitution because he feared
protracted debate on some of the amendments. 0
some party dele-
gates favor elections with two candidates, rather than
the current one-candidate approach, and are advocat-
ing an amendment that would allow non-party-en-
dorsed candidates to run as independents in the next
parliamentary elections.
another potential problem for Nyerere is a movement
among some party members to oust Secretary Gener-
al Kawawa-a longtime Nyerere loyalist and staunch
socialist ideologue.
Kawawa's illness has exacerbated party ten-
sions and an internal struggle between ideologues and
moderates for the secretary-generalship is likely
should Nyerere decide to replace him.
Zanzibar: Endemic Separatism
Nyerere's domestic difficulties are compounded by
continuing friction between Zanzibar and the main-
land. Zanzibari resentment over Nyerere's attempts
to maintain a one-party monopoly of power is at the
root of many of the political, economic, and cultural
tensions that have existed ever since the Tanzanian
Union was formed in 1964.8
Zanzibari grievances focus on
five key areas:
? The supremacy of Tanzania's only political party
over all government affairs.
? Lack of consultations on important issues that affect
Zanzibar.
? Unfair distribution of foreign aid, most of which
goes to the mainland.
? Underrepresentation in Tanzania's diplomatic serv-
ice and failure of Dar es Salaam to protect Zanzi-
bar's interests abroad.
? Loss of autonomy in Zanzibar's financial institu-
tions and trade policy.
Zanzibari-mainland differences reached an unprece-
dented high during 1983 as the ruling party's Nation-
al Executive Committee thwarted an attempt by
Zanzibari leaders to make fundamental changes to
the Tanzanian Constitution that would have given
Zanzibar more autonomy in essentially a federal
system. the
confrontation reached a climax mate December
1983, when Zanzibar Chief Minister Faki, speaking
on behalf of the Zanzibari Government and probably
with Zanzibari President Jumbe's approval, rejected
the supremacy of the party over the government and
state and presented other demands for continued
Zanzibari participation in the Tanzanian Union.
Nyerere dealt with the Zanzibari challenge by send-
ing mainland troops to the island, forcing Jumbe and
Faki to resign, and imprisoning several separatist
leaders.
Mainland dominance of island affairs has increased
significantly since Jumbe's ouster. Nyerere appointed
Ali Hassan Mwinyi, a loyalist with no political base
on the island, as Zanzibar's new President, and high
government positions were awarded to the Zanzibaris
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Julius Nyerere
Samuel Sitta
MustaJa Nyanganyi
Amir Jamal
Ali Hassan Mwinyi
Salim Ahmed Salim
Kingunge Mgombale
Mwiru
Anna Makinda
Getrude Mwongola
Rashidi Kawawa
Brigadier Muhiddin
Kimario
Kighoma Malima
Jackson Makweta
Cleopa Msuya
Benjamin Mkapa
Aaron Kiduo
Salimin Amour
Joseph Warioba
Daudi Mwakawago
President
Minister of State
Minister of State
Minister of State
Vice President of
Tanzania
President of Zanzibar
Prime Minister
Minister of State
Minister of State
Minister of State
Minister Without
Portfolio
Minister for Agriculture
and Livestock
Minister for Communi-
cations, Transport,
and Works
Minister for Defense and
National Service
Minister for Economic
Affairs
Minister for Education
Minister for Finance
Minister for Foreign
Affairs
Minister for Health
Minister for Home
Affairs
Minister for Industries
and Trade
Minister for Justice
Minister for Labor and
Manpower
Development
Minister for Lands, Na-
tional Resources, and
Tourism
Minister for Water, En-
ergy, and Minerals
on the Executive Committee who spearheaded the
attacks against Jumbe. Zanzibar lost additional au-
tonomy when the Executive Committee adopted an
amendment that integrates Zanzibar's legal system
Although Mwinyi has criticized the mainland on
several occasions since taking office, we believe he
remains loyal to Nyerere and is unlikely to precipitate
a serious confrontation. Mwinyi, however, is likely to
continue to advocate Zanzibari interests-if only to
maintain his standing on the island-and this at times
may bring him into conflict with Nyerere. Indeed,
Nyerere's tolerance for Mwinyi's independent postur-
An undercurrent of opposition to party supremacy
still exists among many high-level Zanzibari officials,
and, in our view, a reemergence of strong anti-Union
sentiment could be sparked by any of a number of
events. the
concept of party supremacy and the National Execu-
tive Committee's appointment leverage over Zanzi-
bar's Revolutionary Council-the island's principal
policymaking body-is resented by most Revolution-
ary Council members, some of whom otherwise sup-
port the Union the
Revolutionary Council approved a draft of the revised
Zanzibari constitution, although it does not question
party supremacy, contains some wording that Nyerere
is likely to view as defiant and could precipitate
further problems between Zanzibar and the main-
land."
' The concept of the union between Zanzibar and the mainland
resides in the Tanzanian Constitution, but Zanzibar in accordance
with its semiautonomous status has its own Constitution. Amend-
ments to the Zanzibari Constitution, however, must be approved by
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Table 2
Chama Cha Mapinduzi Central Committee
Julius K. Nyerere
C
Butiama, Mara
Chairman
President
Ali Hassan Mwinyi
M
Zanzibar
Vice Chairman
Vice President/ President of
Zanzibar
Ali Mzee Ali
M
Zanzibar
Regional Party Secretary,
Pemba North
Salimin Amour
M
Zanzibar
Head, Finance Administration Minister for Home Affairs
Department
Seif Shariff Hamad
M
Perna, Zanzibar
Head, Economic Affairs and
Planning Department
Zanzibar Chief Minister
Getrude Mwongola
C
Ukerewe, Mwanza
Head, Social Welfare
Department
Minister of State in Prime Min-
ister's office (Cabinet member)
Hassan Nassor Moyo
M
Songea (raised in
Zanzibar)
Zanzibar Minister of
Agriculture
Cleopa Msuya
C
Pare, Kilimanjaro
Minister for Finance
Daudi Mwakawago
M
Iringa
Head, Political Propaganda
and Mass Mobilization
Department
Minister for Labor and Man-
power Development
Abdallah Natepe
M
Mainland (raised in
Zanzibar)
Kingunge Mgombale Mwiru
C/A
Songea (raised in
Zanzibar)
Head, Ideology, Political,
Education, and Training
Department
Minister of State, Prime Minis-
ter's office (Cabinet member)
Moses Nnauye
C/A
Nyangamara, Lindi
Head, Party Organization
Department
Salim Ahmed Salim
M
Pemba, Zanzibar
Head, Foreign Affairs
Department
Prime Minister
Andres Shija
C
Shinyanga
Regional Party Secretary for
Dar es Salaam
Paul Andreas Sozigwa
C
Kisarawe, Pwani
Secretary Control and Disci-
pline Commission
Press Secretary
President
a C-Christian
M-Muslim
C/A-raised as Christian but is now a professed atheist.
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Despite the difficult problems confronting Nyerere,
we believe he will be able to maintain control over the
government, party, and military at least through the
next presidential elections scheduled for 1985. His
leadership abilities, personal popularity, prestige as
the country's father figure, and the lack of organized
opposition are formidable advantages. Nonetheless,
divisions in the party will continue to grow, resulting
in heated debate on a variety of issues and further
erosion of Nyerere's authority. Consequently, we be-
lieve Nyerere may be forced to rely increasingly on
coercion to protect his socialist agenda.
From the standpoint of the key issues facing Tanza-
nia, we believe Nyerere is unlikely to agree to the
economic reforms necessary for an IMF agreement
because of his ideological rigidity and fear of urban
unrest that could upset the country's delicate political
balance. As a result, Tanzania's economic situation
probably will not improve in the near term because
increased agricultural production-the vital first step
in reviving the economy-is unlikely without major
institutional reforms and large infusions of external
capital. Nyerere probably will continue to implement
limited reform measures, such as cosmetic changes in
the state enterprise system and possibly another small
devaluation, in an effort to deflect criticism that the
government is doing nothing to improve conditions.
Nevertheless, we concur with Nyerere's judgment
that strict austerity measures such as those recom-
mended by the IMF are more likely to cause serious
social unrest in the cities than a continuation of the
current economic malaise.
As far as the military is concerned, senior officers are
likely to be dissatisfied with this piecemeal approach
to economic reform, but we expect that Nyerere will
continue to appease them with perquisites and a
continuing voice in decisionmaking, particularly on
matters that affect the military. In our view, although
senior officers will continue to press Nyerere for
further economic reform, a senior officer coup spurred
by Nyerere's intransigence is unlikely. Coup plotting
is more likely to originate in the disgruntled lower
ranks of the military, but senior officer loyalty and an
effective intelligence service militate against a suc-
cessful coup. Moreover, we believe, that, if Nyerere's
pervasive network of informants in the military report
serious discontent and coup rumors, Nyerere probably
would temporarily reallocate scarce supplies from the
cities to the barracks to restore calm as he did after
the 1983 coup attempt.
On the issue of national unity, we believe that Nyer-
ere will continue to have problems with Zanzibar
because of the island's longstanding desires for great-
er economic and political autonomy. In response, we
believe that Nyerere may accommodate some Zanzi-
bari demands for more autonomy in trade and finance
in an effort to improve the island's economy and
reduce criticism of the mainland. If anti-Union senti-
ment on the islands reaches 1983 levels, however, we
believe that Nyerere will not hesitate to further purge
the island government or, if necessary, to again use
mainland troops to control dissent.
As far as Nyerere's personal political aspirations are
concerned, we believe that Nyerere has not yet decid-
ed to step down from the presidency, primarily be-
cause of doubts about whom to name as his successor
and uncertainty that he can control the country from
his post as party chairman. In our view, Nyerere is
unlikely to accept nomination for another five-year
term, but a decision to postpone the presidential
elections-and thereby his decision-until the 1987
party elections is becoming increasingly likely. In
either case, we would first expect to see an orchestrat-
ed campaign praising Nyerere as the only person
capable of solving the country's problems and sup-
porting his continuation as President
If Nyerere relinquishes the presidency and opts to
control from his position as party chairman, we
believe that whomever he appoints to succeed him will
encounter widespread resistance within the party. The
two front-runners-Mwinyi and Salim-are both
Zanzibaris and are likely to meet strong opposition
from some mainlanders should Nyerere begin to
groom either one. In our view, if Nyerere believes he
will have problems maintaining control, he probably
would pick Mwinyi over Salim because, of the two,
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Mwinyi is more pliable and less likely to alter Nyer-
ere's socialist policies. In our view, however, if Salim
succeeds in building support among moderates in the
party and military, he could become a viable candi-
date even without Nyerere's support. In this uncertain
atmosphere a darkhorse candidate such as Minister of
Communication and Works Malecela or a total un-
known-as Mwinyi was before Nyerere elevated him
to the vice-presidency-also become strong possibil-
ities
In our view, no matter whether Nyerere steps down or
remains as President, pressures for economic and
political reform will increase significantly in 1985,
and Nyerere's overall political prospects will become
less certain. We believe, however, that a decision to
leave the presidency carries the greater risk to Nyer-
ere's continued mastery of Tanzania's political scene
and eventually to Tanzania's stability. A decision to
step down may spur opponents of Nyerere's socialist
agenda to organize and directly confront Nyerere;
malcontents in the military may see this as a time to
make a move; and at a minimum Nyerere is likely to
'lose some of the day-to-day authority necessary to
control government decisions. A decision by Nyerere
to postpone the election or accept another five-year
term carries with it many of the same risks, but we
believe that Nyerere would be better able to meet
these threats if he retained both his posts as president
and party chairman.
A Military Takeover
Although we believe that a military coup against
Nyerere is unlikely, we do not rule it out entirely.
Increased disaffection at lower levels of the military,
in particular, raises the possibility that a military coup
could occur with little warning. There is, however, no
tradition of military intervention in politics and no
political group that might provide a rallying point for
military dissidents. In addition, the military and
civilian intelligence services are on guard against
incipient plots and are capable of quashing them, as
they did in January 1983. The widespread belief that
there are informants throughout the ranks also deters
dissidence. Nonetheless, throughout Tanzania's 23
years of independence, the incidence of coup rumors
and plotting has risen dramatically in the 12 to 18
months preceding each national election, and we
expect this to happen again. Given the economic and
political situation, a military coup could have a
number of precipitating circumstances
Intelligence Failure. Nyerere's intelligence network
fails to uncover a coup plot among the junior ranks of
the military in time, and the attempt succeeds. Alter-
natively, senior officers might uncover a coup plot or
perceive one to be imminent among junior officers
impelling them to preempt it with a coup of their own.
Antigovernment Demonstrations. Mistimed austerity
measures or mounting separatism on Zanzibar would
be the most likely immediate causes. Mass demon-
strations could also be caused by a continued econom-
ic decline that led to serious food shortages in the
cities and military commissaries. Junior officers and
enlisted men hardest hit by such economic conditions
would be likely to lead this type of coup. We can also
envision a situation, however, in which the military
leadership, called upon to put down antigovernment
demonstrations or a mutiny by one of its own units,
might decide instead to remove Nyerere.
Nyerere Loses Political Control. Nyerere's intransi-
gence on economic and political reform leads some
party and government leaders to band together to
contest Nyerere's leadership and the legality of party
supremacy. Nyerere's inability to crush such an oppo-
sition movement quickly probably would result in a
protracted leadership struggle, which might lead se-
nior military officers to assume power.
Nyerere's Death
Nyerere's early demise would greatly increase the
risks of sparking serious unrest. In the unlikely event
that medical problems force Nyerere-now in good
health, according to US Embassy reporting-to relin-
quish power, or, if he is assassinated, we would expect
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an intense period of political maneuvering and in-
creased military involvement in the government, pri-
marily because of Nyerere's failure to groom a succes-
sor." We believe the possible successors to Nyerere in
the event of his death differ somewhat from those
Nyerere might choose in a personally orchestrated
succession and include Prime Minister Salim; Minis-
ter of Communication and Works Malecela; Minister
of Lands, National Resources, and Tourism Bomani;
and Minister of Finance Msuya. Moreover, should the
military become actively involved in the process, a
military leader such as Major General Kombe or
Minister of Defense Kimario could emerge as Tanza-
nia's new president.
A prolonged power struggle after Nyerere's death or
the nomination of a candidate that did not have the
military's support would significantly increase the
prospects of a military takeover. Military leaders
probably would reason that only they could hold the
country together in the face of economic deterioration
and the rising ethnic tensions that are likely after
Nyerere's death
Notwithstanding Nyerere's political and economic
pressures, we expect him to continue to challenge the
United States publicly on a number of issues. Nyerere
is a leading spokesman for the Nonaligned Movement
and at times has been an acerbic critic of US policy in
Africa. He still wields considerable influence in the
region and, is
under considerable pressure from many African states
to run for the chairmanship of the OAU at the
summit meeting scheduled for November 1984. He is
also president of the Frontline States and in this
position will continue to rail against any negotiations
by black African states with South Africa and the
linkage of Namibian independence to Cuban troop
withdrawal from Angola. In addition, we believe he
will continue to provide military bases for the African
National Congress, the principal South African dissi-
dent group, and will encourage other African states to
do the same.
10 The Tanzanian Constitution provides for a vice president to serve
as interim president, although a broad grouping of party members
is required within 60 days to elect a new party leader who
automatically becomes the sole presidential candidate in a popular
referendum
Recently, Nyerere has attacked the suspension of US
aid as politically motivated and has blamed the West
for the dismal economic conditions of the region.
Although these occasional outbursts are not unusual,
increased use of the United States as a scapegoat for
Tanzania's problems could cause relations to deterio-
rate, although we do not believe to the point of
threatening US personnel or assets. At the same time,
however, Nyerere has supported the United States on
issues such as the condemnation of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan and is publicly critical of Soviet
influence in the region.
Beyond that, however, the events we see unfolding in
Tanzania over the next several years will have little
impact on US interests. As long as Nyerere maintains
control, we do not believe that Tanzania's internal
problems will provide an opportunity for the Soviets to
extend their influence substantially in the near future.
Soviet activity in Tanzania is primarily in the form of
military aid totaling only about $400 million since
1954, although the two countries also have concluded
a number of cultural and scientific agreements. In our
view, the Soviets desire greater influence in Tanzania
but, as evidenced by their refusal to include MIG-21
fighters and IL-76 transports in a recent military aid
agreement, are not willing at this time to pay the high
price necessary to increase substantially their pres-
ence. Moreover, it is unlikely, given Nyerere's deep
suspicions of Soviet motives and intentions in Africa,
that increased Soviet aid would translate easily into
greater Soviet influence over Tanzanian policies so
long as Nyerere remains on the scene.
The overall thrust of the implications for the United
States could of course change in the event of Nyer-
ere's death or a military takeover. Although we would
expect any new leadership, whether civilian or mili-
tary, to feel a certain momentum toward continuing
nonalignment and Tanzania's current positions on
regional issues more dramatic, change cannot be ruled
out. A new regime, for example, untethered by Nyer-
ere's socialist mandate could begin the process of
gradually dismantling some of Tanzania's socialist
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300070003-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300070003-8
Secret
institutions and turn to the West for increased eco-
nomic assistance. Dramatically different outcomes
are also possible. In the event of a military coup by
junior-grade officers, we cannot rule out a shift more
to the left. At a minimium it is clear that the initial
unrest that would surround a coup by junior officers
would almost certainly attract Moscow's attention.
This in turn would only increase the odds of injecting
a greater East-West dimension into the Tanzanian
scene. 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300070003-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300070003-8
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/19: CIA-RDP85SO0317R000300070003-8