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CONTENTS
IAC-D-55/8
(Draft)
IAC-D-55/,s
(Revised Draft)
IAC-D-55/8
IAC-D-55/8
(Final)
IAC-D-55/9
IAC`,.D-55/9. 1
IAC - D? 5 5/9.2
(Draft)
IAC-D-55/9, 3
(D raft)
IAC-D-55/9. 4
(Draft)
Attached Draft Of -LAC-D-55/8 (24 Jan
55)
Semi-Annual Status
on the Foreign for the NSC
gn Intelligence Program (4 Feb 55
Semi-Annual Status )
on the Foreign Intelligence Program (24 Feb 55)
Memorandum Jar
the
National Security Executive Secretary,
Subject: Semi-
uC on Annual Status Re
the Foreign Intelli port for the
(1 Mar 55) gence program
Semi-Annual Re
Status of port to the NSC on the
for the Foreign Intelligence P rogram
(30 Jun 555) Period 1 January - 30 June 1955
Memorandum for the
Committee, the Intelligence Advisory
Deputy Director S/PChairmen
lan /CI'IAC Subcommittees,
the Status of Foreign Intelligence Program
n
Status of ForeigAnnual n Intelligence Programs _
Second Report to the NSC Draft - 26 July 1955,
Annual Report to
Foreign Intelli the NSC on the Status of
Draft - 3 gence Programs, Fourth
August 1955
Annual Report to
The Foreign Intelligence NSC on the Status of
Draft - 12 August gence Program - Fifth
SECRET
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CONTENTS
IAC-D-55/9. 5 Memorandum to IAC re Drafts of Annual
Report to NSC (17 August 1955)
IAC-D-55/9 Annual Report to the NSC on the Status of
the Foreign Intelligence Program as of
30 June 1955 (16 August 1955)
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81GNATGRE RECORD AND COVER SHEET
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
OUR C E
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FORM NO. REPLACES PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF
i SEP 54 ~~ FORMS 38.13 AND 26 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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IAC-D-55/9
FINAL
16 August 1955
CENTRAL I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y
16 August 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Executive Secretary,
The National Security Council
SUBJECT Status of the Foreign Intelligence Program
1. This report has been prepared pursuant to Presidential
directive as forwarded to the Director of Central Intelligence by the
Executive Secretary, National Security Council, by memorandum
dated 1 July 1955. Primary reference has been made to national
security policy objectives applicable to the intelligence community as
set forth in NSC 5501.
2. The intelligence community was recently investigated
by the Clark Task Force of the Hoover Commission. The findings of
the Commission, which are presently under advisement, are not
covered or commented on in this report, The comments of the organ-
izations reported on are being transmitted separately to the White
House in accordance with customary procedure.
3. This report was concurred in by the Intelligence
Advisory Committee on 16 August 1955.
ALI:rEN W. LLES
Direc r
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FINAL
16 August 1955
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
PROGRAM AS OF 30 JUNE 1955
Evaluation of US Capabilities to Provide Warning of Attack
We believe, as we did at the time of our previous report,
that the US could expect possibly as much as six months and not
less than 30 days warning of Soviet preparation for full-scale
land, sea, and air attack, providing that the Soviets went to full,
or nearly full mobilization prior to the attack,
The current estimate of the growing air capabilities of the
USSR has made us somewhat more pessimistic than we were last
year regarding our ability to give advance intelligence warning of
surprise air attack. Should the USSR attempt a major surprise
air attack against the US from forward bases in 1955, the prepara-
tions might be detected, and if they were, would provide a general-
ized degree of warning of several days, and specific warning of
unusual and possibly threatening air activity on the order of 18-24
hours. A lesser scale of attack, involving about 250 aircraft, if
accompanied by an extraordinary security effort could be launched
as early as 1955 with no assurance of specific advance warning to
US intelligence (apart from that provided by early warning radar).
Attacks against US bases or forces overseas, or against US allies,
could be made with equal or greater likelihood of being accomplisF -
ed without advance warning.
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In the period between now and 1958, Soviet capabilities for
surprise attacks will almost certainly increase. Furthermore,
the USSR will have a progressively increasing capability for launch-
ing attacks on the US from interior Soviet bases. Such a method of
attack would probably provide no specific advance warning to US
intelligence.
The USAF now operates world-wide on a 24-,hour basis an
Indications System for detecting imminent Communist attacks,
especially air attack. with.nuclear weapons. Major air commands
have subsidiary centers tied in with Washington by preferential use
channels of communication for flash transmission of early warning
intelligence. This system is in turn tied in with the unified command
indications centers and with the National Indications Center in
Washington, which is maintained on a 24-hour basis by the Watch
Committee of the lAC.
Evaluation of Soviet Capabilities and Intentions
Intelligence to support over-all assessments of the strengths
of the USSR, Communist China, and the Satellites is generally
improving. The general limitations of intelligence on the USSR are
evident in the process of attempting to measure the forces shaping
Soviet policy. We can illuminate the broad outlines of the chief
problems confronting Soviet leadership, but we are still unable to
determine the degree to which these problems, such as allocation
of Soviet economic resources and German rearmament, generate
pressures on Soviet policy. The main questions of political intelli-
gence often involve matters of judgment on which little or no factual
evidence can be brought to bear -- the degree of independence en-
joyed by Communist China in matters of major policy, the degree of
likelihood that the USSR will withdraw from East Germany, the likeli-
hood of open intervention by the USSR in hostilities between the US
and Communist China which threatened the existence of the latter.
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16 August 1955
We have made progress in economic intelligence on the
USSR, most notably in improving techniques for measuring
economic growth. However, there remains the basic problem,
that of determining the extent to which the Soviet economy is
capable of meeting the competing claims for resources arising
from the various internal and external commitments of Soviet
policy. In an effort to find some solution to this problem, we
have recently focused attention on a particularly difficult aspect
of intelligence on Soviet resources allocation, the estimated
economic cost.of the over-all Soviet military effort.
New techniques for acquiring and analyzing data have
advanced our knowledge of Soviet scientific and technological
capabilities. Progress has been made in intelligence on Soviet
development of guided missiles and electronic equipment, and on
the Soviet nuclear program. Despite advances in these and other
fields, important questions such as the characteristics of various
guided missiles, the existence and nature of a Soviet biological
warfare program, and the apportionment of nuclear material
among various types of weapons and systems, remain to be
answered.
Although we have succeeded in collecting much information
on the separate branches of the Soviet armed forces, we have yet
to construct the picture of probable Soviet strategy so essential to
estimating general trends in the Soviet military establishment,
probable Soviet choices in weapons systems, or the strength of
particular military components. The requirement for such esti-
mates is particularly urgent at the present time because of recent
indications that Soviet military thinking is adjusting to the impact
of modern military technology.
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Collection
In most respects there has been little over-all change in
our collection capabilities within the Bloc, largely because of
the continued strict enforcement of Sino-Soviet security and
counterintelligence measures. However, there has been a
considerable improvement in the collection of intelligence data
through technological means such as ELINT, together with in-
creasing use of aerial reconnaissance. Evacuation of US forces
from Austria will deprive the military services of a significant
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16 August 1955
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL? SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
PROGRAM AS OF 30 JUNE 1955
REPORT
A. WARNING OF ATTACK
1. Evaluation of US Capabilities
a. We believe, as we did at the time of our previous
report, that the US could expect possibly as much as six months and
not less than 30 days warning of Soviet preparation for full-scale
land, sea, and air attack, providing that the'Soviets went to full, or
nearly full mobilization prior to the attack.
b. The current estimate of the growing air capabilities
of the USSR has made us somewhat more pessimistic than"we were
last year regarding our ability to give advance intelligence warding
of surprise air attack. Should the USSR attempt a major surprise
air attack against the US from forward bases in 1955, the prepara-
tions might be detected, and if they were, would provide a general-
ized degree of warning of several days, and specific warning of
unusual and possibly threatening air activity on the order of 18-24
hours. A lesser scale of attack, involving about 250 aircraft, if
accompanied by an extraordinary security effort could be launched
as early as 1955 with no assurance of specific advance warning to
US intelligence (apart from that provided by early warning radar).
Attacks against US bases or forces overseas, or against US allies,
could be made with equal or greater likelihood of being accomplish-
ed without advance warning.
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c. In the period between now and 1958, Soviet capabili-
ties for surprise attacks will almost certainly increase. Further-
more, the USSR will have a progressively increasing capability for
launching attacks on the US from interior Soviet bases. Such a
method of attack would probably provide no specific advance warn-
ing to US intelligence.
2. The Watch Committee of the IAC
The Watch Committee and its permanent staff, the National
Indications Center, moved in January to new and more suitable
quarters in the Pentagon. In addition to its continued concentration
on detecting indications, of possible attacks on the US, its possessions
and overseas bases, a major focus of the Watch Committe's attention
during recent months has been the situation in the Formosa Straits
area. In dealing with the development of that situation, the Watch
Committee has improved its techniques, including the compilation and
dissemination to the intelligence community and to overseas commands
of an indicator list specifically responsive to the Offshore Islands
situation.
3. Formosa Straits Coverage
a. In response to the President's desire for coordinated
intelligence coverage of the Formosa Straits problem, the IAC
established an ad hoc Current Intelligence Group on the Formosa
Straits. This Group issued daily reports from 21 March to 6 May,
and now issues weekly reports supplemented by such special reports
as events require.
b. In the field, the marked expansion of the Formosa
Liaison Center has resulted in improved intelligence coverage.
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4. USAF Indications Center
The Air Force has activated, and now operates world-wide
on a 24-hour basis, an Indications System keyed to the detection of
imminent Soviet/ Communist attacks, especially air attack with
nuclear weapons. The Air Defense Command, Alaskan Air
Command, Far East Air Command, Northeast Air Command and
USAF Europe, all have subsidiary indications centers tied in with
the Unified commands system and with Washington by preferential
use channels of communication for flash transmission of early
warning intelligence. This system is tied in with the National
Indications Center referred to in para. 2 above. .
6.
SHAPE Request for Indications Intelligence
We have noted an increase in the requests from SHAPE for
intelligence which could be made available to all National Member
representatives. The IAC now has before it a request for intelli-
gence on indications of Soviet military aggression. While the policy
of the IAC on release of intelligence to SHAPE, because of the multi-
nationalities problem, has been cautious (though more liberal with
respect to the Standing Group), we of course make available to
General Gruenther and his US staff officers any intelligence of use
to them.
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B. EVALUATION AND ESTIMATES
1. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE)
a. The NSC reaffirmed, with procedural changes, its
directive for producing "net evaluations" of the capabilities of the
USSR to inflict direct injury on the continental US and key US
installations overseas. For the pending study, scheduled to go
to the NSC on 1 October 1955, the IAC has produced several
estimates keyed to the focal period of mid-1958. These have in-
cluded "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attacks on the US and Key
Overseas Installations Through Mid-1958, " and "Probable
Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US Through Mid-1958. "
b. Intelligence support was also rendered to the NSC on
other topics, and of the 30 NIE's published during the last six months,
19 were related to specific NSC papers or policy decisions (compared
to 16 of the 24 published during the preceding six months).
c. Special estimates are in process in support of the
work of the Special Assistant to the President for Disarmament.
d. The IAC is now surveying the use to which recipients
are putting NIE's, in order to determine how these estimates can be
made more useful to policy makers.
2. National Intelligence Surveys (NIS)
Since the start of the NIS Program in 1948, over 2, 700
sections have been produced on 87 foreign countries and areas.
This represents over one half of the total world coverage, most of
which has been on JCS high priority areas. The goal of 8 equivalent
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NIS per year established for the program was attained and it is
expected that this rate of production will continue. New elements
are being produced in accordance with revised interagency require-
ments for biographic intelligence and for psychological warfare and
the United States Information Agency programs. There has been
improvement during the past year in the collection effort in support
of NIS.
3. Military Intelligence
a. We can report no appreciable change in the status of
military intelligence as described in our last report (NSC 5509,
Part 7). Military intelligence to support broad assessments of the
military, logistical, and related industrial and government control
strengths of the USSR, Communist China, and the Satellites is
generally improving.
b. Nevertheless, information in many critical fields is
not adequate, qualitatively or quantitatively, to meet the require-
ments of the military planners for a firm intelligence basis for the
formulation of military plans, the calculation of risks, the conduct
of military operations, the development of material, the orientation
of research, and the allocation of resources.
c. Within the last six months improvements have been
made in certain limited categories of military information on the
Sino-Soviet Bloc. These have included gains in (a) our knowledge
of Soviet postwar modifications of tactical doctrine for regiments
and battalions, as a result of acquisition of Soviet Field Service
Regulations, dated 1953; (b) the degree of reliability and accuracy
of Chinese Communist order of battle; and (c) our knowledge'of
the pattern and scope of the Soviet program for modernizing ground
weapons, to the extent that such weapons have been issued to troops
in Germany and Austria. This last development has also made
possible some confirmation of existing estimates on the production
of weapons.
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d. The Sino-Soviet Bloc continues to exercise the most
stringent of security measures. This has steadily reduced overt
access to military information and has limited clandestine penetra-
tion operations to marginal successes. Accordingly, we are
intensifying our clandestine program for the collection of military
intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. Of even more importance,
considerably greater attention is being given to the development of
scientific and technical equipment and methods as a potentially
promising means for overcoming security measures in target
areas.
e. In view of the basic nature of the obstacles con -
fronted an expanded program must be operated over a long period
of time before a significant reduction in our critical deficiencies is
in sight.
f. There has been considerable progress toward the
attainment of the minimal requirements for air target materials in
support of joint war plans. Predicated on present target assignments
and production capabilities, these minimal requirements are sched-
uled for completion by the end of calendar year 1955. However,
full requirements for target materials are still incomplete for a con-
siderable number of those joint.war plan targets assigned for destruc-
tion by the Unified and Specified Commanders. Target materials for
all-weather coverage on presently assigned joint war plan targets are
scheduled for completion by the end of calendar year 1956. The fore-
going is without reference to targets not presently assigned for
destruction.
4. Political Intelligence
a. Resources and capabilities for production of political
intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc remain unchanged and continue
to make possible a reasonably accurate interpretation of political
developments.
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b. The program for analyzing problems of the under-
developed areas in the free world continues as a major focus of
attention, together with the study of vulnerabilities in those areas
to Communist infiltration and other action. Negotiations are in
progress between State and CIA to strengthen the production of
intelligence on international Communism. We have also concen-
trated on attitudes and reactions in the free wor_r' to the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons, with increasing emphasis upon the
c. State, Defense, OCB, and USIA have joined with CIA
in an interagency committee (Social Science Research Group) to co-
ordinate external research projects relating to the fields of psycho-
logical and unconventional warfare.
5. Economic Intelligence
a. There has been continued improvement in our intelli-
gence on the economy of the Sino-Soviet Bloc. This improvement has
been primarily in research and analysis, but also in collection.
Useful advances have been made in techniques for the study of long-
run Soviet economic growth and for estimate of Bloc capabilities,
Increasing emphasis is being given to the costing and economic evalua-
tion of individual Soviet military programs, including guided missiles
and air defense programs; and to Soviet defense expenditures. How-
ever, important gaps continue to exist in data on industries and products
which are closely identified with priority military uses. Attempts are
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being made to correct inadequacies in data and methods for
analyzing Soviet agricultural capabilities and their implications,
Bloc consumer goods production, Soviet economic penetration' of
underdeveloped areas, and other economic fields of national
intelligence interest. The coordination effort in the field of
economic intelligence under NSCID 15/1 has been particularly
noteworthy in recent months.
b. Special attention had been given to the analysis of
the nature and importance of Sino-Soviet relationships to the
economic growth potential of Communist China. Outputs of cer-
tain basic industries are reasonably well established but more
information and expanded research are required on over-all
consumption and on agricultural and transportation capabilities.
C, Economic intelligence continues to support the US
program for underdeveloped areas. It has given extensive support
to the President's program for peaceful uses of atomic energy.
d. Substantial assistance was given to the United States
delegation to COCOM by the intelligence community during the inter-
national review of trade control lists in Paris, and intelligence
support was also provided in preparation for negotiations on major
commodity problems that have arisen during the past year. Accel -
eration in the effort to improve enforcement of economic defense
measures requires improved collection of information on trade
control violations and increased analysis of trade and financial
transactions. The completion of an intensive study, conducted
has provided agreed estimates re-
lating to trade with Communist China.
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6, Scientific and Technical Intelligence
a. Through intensified research our understanding of
Soviet basic scientific capabilities and scientific. manpower has
improved. Successful application of new collection techniques and
improved analytical processes, now in part under development and
being implemented, will be required for substantial improvement in
scientific and technological intelligence.
C. Guided Missiles. Preparation of the first national
intelligence estimate on guided missiles revealed critical gaps in our
knowledge. Recent action reemphasizing the position of this field
within the highest priority category of national intelligence objectives
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has resulted in increasing the effort on the collection and analysis
of information. Considerable effort is being devoted to scientific
techniques for collecting guided missile intelligence information;
although many of these techniques are in the study phase, some are
being implemented with promising results. To foster further im-
provements, the IAC has established an ad hoc committee to
survey and evaluate the status of the nation's guided missile intel-
ligence effort on the Sino-Soviet Bloc. The National Security
Agency will assist in this survey. In the light of limited, but per-
haps significant information recently acquired, we have under-
taken a review of the national estimate, completed last fall, of.the
Soviet guided missile program.
d . Biological Warfare. Based on the experience gained
in producing the first community-wide estimate in this field, a joint
study of critical deficiencies in biological warfare intelligence and
means for their elimination was completed in April. Positive evidence
of the nature of the Soviet BW program has yet to be obtained.
e . Electronics. Our estimates, made as additional infor.
mation is received, show an increase in Soviet electronics capabili-
f. Meteorological Intelligence . A survey of critical de-
ficiencies in meteorological intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc is
under review by an IAC ad hoc subcommittee.
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C. COLLECTION
1. The Foreign Service
a, Reporting from and collection by the Foreign Service,
an extensive source of overt intelligence data, continued generally
to meet expectations and was somewhat more responsive to intelli-
gence needs, notably in the biographic field. Further improvement
is expected during the coming year.
b. Although Foreign Service reporting from the Sino-
Soviet Bloc on political matters continues to be inadequate for intel-
ligence needs, some improvement is noted and further improvement
expected. US missions in Bloc countries are now more aware of
intelligence needs, and the strengthening of staffs at some posts has
produced .expanded coverage. In particular, increased emphasis
is being given to coordinated support of economic and agricultural
collection activities by more intensive briefing of personnel going
to Bloc posts and by better substantive guidance. Information of
all kinds on Albania and Bulgaria, where the US has m foreign
service posts, remains insufficient to cover minimum needs; the
irregular and delayed receipt of Bulgarian and Albanian publications
has contributed to the deficiency.
c. Reporting and analysis by Foreign Servile posts in
the Free World have also shown some improvement, although weak-
nesses continue to exist. More information in the sociological field
is needed. Recent instructions to the field recommending methods
for more systematic inter-agency coordination at the posts should
help to improve intelligence collection. The intake of political and
economic information on North. Vietnam and on Korea, especially
North Korea, is notably inadequate. The phasing-out of FOA (ICA)
activities in certain areas may reduce the flow of economic infor-
mation to a degree requiring some personnel realignments.
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d. Outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc, map procurement has
been satisfactory except in northwestern Europe and in Latin
America, where no Geographic Attaches are currently assigned.
Peripheral procurement of maps on the Bloc has provided a limited
number of maps on this area.
1
Bolivia, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, Costa Rica and
Haiti.
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3. Overseas Commands
a. Evacuation of US forces from Austria will deprive
the military services of a base from which a significant part of
current intelligence on Soviet forces has been obtained. It will
also decrease our capability for receiving intelligence on imminence
of hostilities, since one point of direct contact with Soviet forces
will be lost. Intelligence operations against Sov , t forces in
Southern Europe will be mounted mainly from Europe.
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Aerial Reconnaissance
a. Navy and Air Force aerial reconnaissance operations
continue to be performed within the framework of policy guidance
furnished to operating agencies. The value and capability of this
means of gathering intelligence information is recognized, and
collection operations are vigorously pursued. For example, the
Air Force averages more than one thousand aerial reconnaissance
flights annually in regions peripheral to the Communist Bloc. Use-
ful data related to Communist Bloc capabilities, techniques of
operation, order of battle, military and industrial developments,
and installation changes are being obtained in peripheral regions.
employment of aerial reconnaissance has resulted in an invigorated
research and development program.
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16 August 1955
d. In a related activity, teams using cameras with
100-inch focal length lens recently developed by the Army have
produced ground photography of considerable intelligence value
along the Bulgarian-Greek border and on Quemoy Island. As
equipment becomes available additional teams will be deployed
along the Bloc border.
5. Exploitation of Defectors
In recent months the flow of defectors has been normal in
numbers but outstanding or specialized sources have been relative-
ly few as compared with the past year.
Programs in Electronics
cept).
New and significant information on Soviet equipment and systems,
has
resulted rom FLINT collection activities. The national ELINT
program was considered by the NSC, and NSCID-17 now provides the
basic framework for this processing effort; much remains to be done
before a satisfactory, integrated effort is achieved. We have made
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16 August 1955
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progress in building ELINT collection capabilities, includins the
8, Foreign Materials and Equipment
The procurement of important non-military items produced
in the Soviet Bloc has continued to improve, showing a 20% increase
i the number of ac uisitions this year,
Relatively few items of Soviet mili-
tary equipment ave been acquired. The last maior acquisition of
STATSPEC
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FINAL
16 August 1955
Clandestine Collection Program
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16 August 1955
C. DCID 5/1, "Coordination of the Foreign Clandestine
Collection Activities of the Armed Services with those of the
Central Intelligence Agency," was approved by the IAC on 11
January 1955. In accordance with the provisions of this Directive,
a systematic review and adjustment, where necessary, of going
operations has been undertaken. Little progress has been made to
date.
d. In the past year, CIA and the service intelligence
organizations have launched a series of clandestine operations and
made arrangements under DCID 5/1 for new clandestine efforts.
Surveys are being conducted for the purpose of developing further
operations.
12. Coordination of Information Processing
An IAC ad hoc committee on information processing is at
work on the increasingly complex problem of handling data within
the intelligence community. The committee is now studying exist-
ing systems. It will next make studies and recommendations con-
cerning such matters as a common classification scheme; uniform
publishing, processing and dissemination procedures; and efficiency
of storage and retrieval of intelligence information.
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17 August 1955
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Intelligence Advisory Committee
The Chairmen, IAC Suhcn'-+mittees
Deputy Director/Plan,-/CIA
SUBJECT : Recall or Destruction of the Preliminary
Drafts of the Annual Report to the NSC on
the Status of the Foreign Intelligence Program
as of 30 June 1955
1. At its meeting on 16 August 1955, the DCI directed
that all copies of the preliminary drafts of the Annual Report to
the NSC on the Status of the Foreign Intelligence Program as of
30 June 1955 either be recalled or destroyed.
2. Accordingly, would you either return to the Office
of National Estimates, or destroy, copies of the following drafts
in your possession which are not required for record purposes:
IAC-D-55/9. 2, 26 July 1955
IAC-D-55/9. 3, 2 August 1955
IAC-D-55/9. 4, 12 August 1955
Secretary
IAC-D-55/9. K
17 August 1955
SECRET
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SIGNATURE RECORD AND COVER SHEET
DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
SOURCE
/'[TL+ 10MG-0
CIA CONTROL NO.
DOC. NO.
12 August
12August 3.95
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED
DOC
DATE
N
o? 6
Coo,
.
COPY NO.
ry1
~}.
ry
o Pages , .Attache
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES
OP SECRET
TOP
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS
ATTENTION: This form will be attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or
classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded,
destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel
and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or
release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand col-
umns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the
right-hand columns.
REFERRED TO
RECEIVED
RELEASED
SEEN BY
DtFI GE
SIGNATURE
DATE
TIME
DATE
TIME
SIGNATURE AND OFFICE
DATE
it
jc
Ip.
0 T_ r) n lit
~5} NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate
spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.
DOWNGRADED
DESTROYED
DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)
... TO - .,. .. `.. _
BY (Signature)
TO
BY (Signature) - --
WITNESSED BY (Signature)
BY (Signature)
DATE - -~
DATE
OFFICE
DATE
71M Tgff
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