ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

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IAC-D-55/12
IAC-D-55/12. 1
IAC-D-55/12.2
IAC-D-55/12. 3
(First Draft)
IAC-D-55/ 12. 3
(Supplement to
First Draft)
IAC-D-55/ 12. 3
(Supplement to
First Draft)
DIA review completed.
IAC-D-55/12.3
(Second Draft)
IAC-D-55/12, 3
ARMY review completed aft)
IAC-D-55/12
(Final)
USAF review completed.
NAVY review completed.
Memorandum for IAC and Chairmen, IAC
Subcommittees re Annual Report to NSC on
Status of Foreign Intelligence Program
(10 July 1957)
Memorandum for DD/P and AD's re Annual
Report to NSC on Status of Foreign Intelligence
Program (10 July 1957)
Memorandum for IAC and Chairmen, IAC
Subcommittees (19 July 1957)
Annual Report to the NSC on the Status of the
Foreign Intelligence Program (13 Aug .1957;)
Annual Report to the NSC on the Status of the
Foreign Intelligence Program (19 Aug 1957)
Annual Report to the NSC on the Status of the
Foreign Intelligence Program (21 Aug 1957)
Annual Report to the NSC on the Status of the
Foreign Intelligence Program (26 Aug 1957)
Annual Report to the NSC on the Status of the
Foreign Intelligence Program (28 Aug 1957)
Annual Report to the NSC on the Status of the
Foreign Intelligence Program (3 Sept 1957)
State Dept. review completed
JCS review completed.
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IAC-D-55/ 12
10 July 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
MEMORANDUM FOR : The Intelligence Advisory Committee
The Chairmen, IAC Subcommittees
SUBJECT : Annual Report to the NSC on the Status
of the Foreign Intelligence Program
REFERENCES : IAC-D-55/ 11 (Final), 18 August 1956
IAC-D-55/11, 22 June 1956 (with Attachment)
1. We have been advised informally that, as in the past few
years, the intelligence community will be required to submit to the
NSC a coordinated report on the status of the foreign intelligence
program for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1957. It is our under-
standing also that the deadline for submission of this report will be
15 August.
2. As far as we have been able to determine, it is expected
that the substantive content of the report will be roughly analogous to
the basic paper submitted last year. However, there probably will
be no similar requirement for a 3-year fiscal projection or a
progress report on action taken with respect to the recommendations
of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Science Advisory
Committee.
3. If, as it appears, the 15 August deadline is firm, this
report will have to be prepared and coordinated on a very tight
schedule. It is for this reason that we are alerting agencies and
-subcommittees to this anticipated requirement in advance of the
receipt of any formal notification from the NSC. Pending receipt
of the formal request from the NSC it is therefore hoped that the
agencies and subcommittees will begin preparation of contributions
along the lines of those submitted last year, taking into account
major developments in their respective fields during the past fiscal
year. The over-all coordination process will, of course, be
CONFIDENTIAL
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IAC-D-55/ 12
10 July 1957
greatly facilitated if the contributions by the IAC subcommittees
are coordinated through those committees prior to their submission
to the IAC Secretariat.
4. As soon as the formal request from the NSC becomes
available we shall circulate it and schedule a preliminary meeting
to discuss the guidelines set forth in the communication and outline
more precisely the procedures to be followed in preparing and
coordinating this report.
JOHN HEIRES
Secretary
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+ Ub.U9?L I re N ir - N
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Annual Report to the NSC on the Status of the Foreign
Intelligence program
1. Pursuant to Mr. Lay's direction, this report follows the general
lines of last year's report and includes an annex which cross-references
the activities discussed to relevant NSCID's. We were not required to
furnish a three-year fiscal projection or a progress report on action taken
with respect to recommendations of the Technological Capabilities Panel
of the Science Advisory Board, such as appeared in Annexes to last year's
paper.
2. With respect to substantive content, the summary section on warning
(pp. i-ii) except for the first and last paragraph, is expressed in the
language of the latest warning estimate (NIE 11-3-57). The second summary
paragraph under "Evaluation and Estimates" (pp. iii-iv) is designed to
highlight the broader aspects of our estimative problem with respect to the
Soviet Bloc rather than to summarize a specific portion of the text. In the
basic text, paragraph 5 (p. 5) adds a new item on "crisis situation" review
by the IAC. Elsewhere in the text those portions of the discussion which fall
within the province of specific IAC subcommittees were, generally speak-
ing, based on written contributions furnished by those subcommittees (e. g.
Watch, JAEIC, SEC, EIC, GMIC, etc.) The Clandestine Collection section
(p. 50a et seq.) is virtually identical with the draft you personally approved.
However, the representatives believed it desirable to add the last sentence
in paragraph 16a (p. 50a) to balance the presentation.
3. We are not aware of any potential dissents to this paper, except
for a possible question which might be raised by State. At the clean-up
session, the State representative tabled for the first time a paragraph which
characterized the activities of the intelligence community with respect to
the Hungarian and Suez crises. (A copy of State's proposed paragraph is
attached,) As we understood it, Mr. Cumming had not seen or approved
the draft. None of the other representatives believed that this language
should be included, and it was further felt that any decision to add such
material should be made, if at all, by the IAC itself. At this time we are
fzr
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book only, copies of certain background papers which you might find
useful to refresh your recollection in the event Mr. Cumming mentions
the issue.
uncertain whether Mr. Cumming will choose to raise this question. The
State representative tends to doubt it, but noted that he understood
Mr. Cumming was planning to contact Mr. Armstrong on the matter.
Under these circumstances, we obtained, and are adding to your briefing
JOHN HEIRES
Secretary, IAC
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IAC-D-55/12
'143 Final
3 September 1957
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
MEMORANDUM FOR : The Executive Secretary
National Security Council
SUBJECT : Report on the Status of the Foreign
Intelligence Program as of 30 June 1957
1. The attached report has been prepared pursuant to
Presidential directive as forwarded to the Director of Central
Intelligence by the Executive Secretary, National Security Council,
by memorandum dated 16 July 1957, Primary reference has been
made to national security policy objectives applicable to the intel-
ligence community, particularly as set forth in NSC 5707/8.
20 The report, as requested, follows the general lines of
Part 7 of NSC 5611, The attached Annex A cross-references the
activities discussed to relevant National Security Council Intelli-
gence Directives.
3. The Intelligence Advisory Committee concurred in this
report, including Annex A, on 3 September 1957,
e /~' 640'0(z~
C. P. CABELL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Acting Director
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Final
3 September 1957
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(as of 30 June 1957)
Submitted by
Intelligence Advisory Committee
September 1957
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Final
3 September 1957
CONTENTS
Page
Summary . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . O b . O . . . . O 0 O 0 1
Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities to Provide
Warning of Attack . . . . 0 0 . 0 . 0 . . . 0 i
Evaluation and Estimates . . b . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
A. Soviet Bloc . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
B. Non-Bloc Areas . O O . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Collection . O . 0 0 . 0 . O b O O 0 . . . . b . . . v
Report .
Warning of Attack. . O . . . . O . . . . . . . . . 1
1. Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities . . . . . . b . 1
2. The Watch Committee of the IAC . . . . . . . . 2
3. USAF Indications System. . . . . . . . . . . . 3
5. "Crisis Situation?1 Review by IAC .
O O b O O
6. Taiwan Strait Coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
B. Eva uation and Estimates . . . . . . . . . . , 4
1. National Intelligence Estimates . . . . . . . . 4
2. National Intelligence Surveys . . . . . . . . 0 6
3. Military Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4. Political Intelligence. . . . . . 9
O O O O O O .
5. Economic Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
6. Scientific and Technical Intelligence . . . . . 12
7. Geographic Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
C. Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. Priority National Intelligence Objectives . . . 17
2. The Foreign Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3. The Service Attache System . . 0 . . . . . . . 19
4. Overseas Commands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
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Final
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CONTENTS, continued
Page
5.
22
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6.
22
7. The Foreign Language Publications Program. 23
8. Geographic Intelligence Collection . . . . . . 24
9. International Communism . . . . . . . . . . . 25
10,
25
11. Foreign Radio and Television Broadcasts. 26
14. Coordination of Information Processing
16. Clandestine Collection Programs . . . . . . .
D. Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
29
33
1. Review of National Security Council
Intelligence Directives. . . . . . . . . . . . 33
NSCID?s Relevant to Activities Covered by
Annual Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
List of National Security Council Intelligence
Directives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Final
3 September 1957
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
ON THE
STATUS OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities to Provide
Warning of Attack
The difficulties for intelligence in giving warning prior to the
launching of a Soviet attack against the U. S. or U. S. forces are
increasing. This is true particularly because the USSR's growing
strength in advanced weapons--modern jet aircraft, guided missiles,
submarines, and nuclear bombs and warheads--is increasing from year
to year Soviet capabilities for large-scale surprise attack.
At present, as a rough estimate, a force up to 300 long-range
aircraft could probably be launched concurrently without producing
indications permitting intelligence to give warning of possible attack.
Generally speaking, the probability of obtaining warning indications
would increase as the numbers of aircraft increased. There is no
basis for judging at what point the chances of receiving warning indi-
cations would be about even; it is believed, however, that if the
number of aircraft launched concurrently was as great as about 800,
the chances of their producing warning indications would be consider-
ably greater than even. If received, these indications would probably
permit intelligence to warn of a possible attack some 4-8 hours
before attacking aircraft could reach radar warning lines.
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Warning of possible attack in Western Europe by Soviet forces
stationed in Germany might range from a few hours to a week,
If a Soviet attack was preceded by full mobilization of the
USSR's military establishment, warning of possible attack could
probably be given a few weeks in advance. Intelligence might during
the course of mobilization be able to forecast the approximate date at
which military preparations would be complete, but it would always be
possible for the USSR to attack with its ready forces at an earlier date.
Warning of attack by clandestine means would depend primarily
on the possibility that some part of the Soviet clandestine plan had
miscarried or on chance discovery. Thus, there could be no assurance
that intelligence would be able to warn of such forms of attack.
Once surface-to-surface guided missiles were positioned for
launching, advance warning of their use would be unlikely.
With respect to the warning problem, the Intelligence Advisory
Committee has undertaken a survey of sources of warning information
to determine how fully and promptly present and potential collection
methods, sources, and transmission channels can provide information
essential to advance warning of Sino-Soviet Bloc hostile action.
A. Soviet Bloc
With respect to developments in the Soviet Bloc, the struggle
for dominance within the Soviet leadership since Stalin?s death
resulted in an increasing exposure to intelligence of the inner
workings of the regime and of the issues which divide the leadership.
The public justifications made by the victorious factions in the suc-
cessive crises since 1953 have enabled intelligence to check its
- ii -
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information and thus to formulate its views on a sounder footing of
evidence. This does not mean that we are in a very much better
position to predict particular developments in the USSR9 such as
the rise or fall of individual personalities, but it does mean that we
can delimit more confidently the range of possible developments on
the Soviet internal scene. Similarly, the relatively greater openness
of discussion in the USSR and the greater accessibility of Soviet
personalities at all levels have given us a better insight into the
motivations and tactics of Soviet foreign policy. However, these gains
are more significant for short-term estimates than for long-term ones.
The Soviet leadership, for example, seems likely to be presented with
difficult choices of policy. Already it must reconsider its economic
policies at a time when military costs and the claims of consumption
are pressing ever harder on the traditional priority given to invest-
ment to sustain a high rate of economic growth. It must reconsider
the shape of its military programs during a period of revolutionary
change in weapons. Relations with the restive Satellites and Com-
munist China have evidently called for redefinition. There is
evidence that the regime has increasing difficulty in retaining the
loyalty of students and intellectuals and needs to provide more
nourishing ideological fare. Such fundamental problems affecting
future developments in the USSR are extremely complex, slow-
moving in their resolution, and do not lend themselves readily to
reliable estimating on the basis of the kinds of evidence ordinarily
available to intelligence.
In the field of military intelligence, valuable additional informa-
tion was obtained on the Soviet military establishment, including data
on those elements posing the most direct threat to U. S. security in-
terests. Military intelligence information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc is
adequate to support broad assessments of the current capabilities of
the armed forces of those countries and to discern general trends in
their development.
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well as thorough exploitation of open source materials
have resulted in gains in certain categories of military
information despite Bloc security measures.
Gains in economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc have re-
sulted from a growing return on our effort in research and analysis
over several years and from a continuing increase in published data
within the Bloc, particularly the USSR. Serious deficiencies remain,
however, particularly as related to the extent, cost, and economic
burden of Bloc military programs. To reduce this deficiency indirect
research techniques have been developed.
There has been continued improvement in scientific intelligence
on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, both through research and through information
gained from increased contacts with Soviet nationals. During the past
year, significant information has been obtained on Soviet nuclear
weapons testing, but there is inadequate information on Soviet pro-
duction of fissionable materials and nuclear weapons. Although there
has been a continued improvement in the quality of our guided missile
intelligence information, it is still inadequate to meet our minimum
intelligence requirements. Highest priority continues to be given to
this problem, with special emphasis being placed on technical col-
lection methods.
B. Non-Bloc Areas
The periodic preparation of National Intelligence Estimates and
Special National Intelligence Estimates on Non-Bloc areas, con-
stituting a substantial proportion of all estimates published during the
period, has been directed towards providing a meaningful measure of
probable political, economic, and military developments bearing upon
U. S. security interests. As a result of its continuing program of
current intelligence research and analysis of political, economic, and
military affairs throughout the world the IAC has also been able to
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provide advance intelligence support to policy-makers at all levels
of the government regarding significant trends and events. Support
in depth of both policy-making and policy-executing arms of the
government has continued through the production of basic intelligence
studies including the NIS series.
Collection
The list of Priority National Intelligence Objectives was again
revised and continued to emphasize Sino-Soviet strategy, intentions
or plans related to the initiation of hostilities. The highest priority
was also assigned to Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack, defense
against air (including missiles) attack, and the clandestine delivery
of nuclear, biological or. chemical weapons against the U. S. or key
U. S. overseas installations. There was intensive exploitation of new
collection opportunities
open discussions in the USSR and Satellite
certain types of Soviet Bloc publications,
greater availability of
and the general stimulation to collection activities arising from the
Middle Eastern and Eastern European crises Intelligence gains also
resulted from better technical collection techniques and from a general
improvement of collection capabilities, both overt and clandestine.
Despite these gains, deficiencies continue to exist in many
fields, particularly with respect to our collection activities directed
against the Sino Soviet Bloc.
freer access to Bloc personalities or
publications and a general improvement in existing collection and
processing facilities show promise of reducing political and economic
intelligence deficiencies. Further development of our technical col-
lection techniques and expanded clandestine efforts will be necessary
to reduce significantly critical deficiencies in the military and scientific
and technical fields. In any event, factors such as security re-
strictions and rapidly advancing technology will continue to limit our
ability to achieve a significant reduction in our most critical intelli-
gence deficiencies by an early date.
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A. Warning of Attack*
1, Evaluation of U. S. Capabilities
a, The +diffic It es.'for intelligence in giving warning prior to the
launching of a Soviet attack against the U. S. or U. S. forces are in-
creasing. This is particularly true because the USSR's growing
strength in advanced weapons--modern jet aircraft, guided missiles,
submarines, and nuclear bombs and warheads--is increasing from year
to year Soviet capabilities for large-scale surprise attack,
b. At present, as a rough estimate, a force up to 300-long-range
aircraft could probably be launched concurrently without producing in-
dications permitting intelligence to give warning of possible attack.
Generally speaking, the probability of obtaining warning indications
would increase as the numbers of aircraft increased. There is no
basis for judging at what point the chances of receiving warning indi-
cations would be about even; it is believed, however, that if the
number of aircraft launched concurrently was as great as about 800,
the chances of their producing warning indications would be considerably
greater than even. If received, these indications would probably permit
intelligence to warn of a possible attack some 4-8 hours before attacking
aircraft could reach radar warning lines,
c. Warning';of possible attack in Western Europe by Soviet
forces stationed in Germany might range from a few hours to a week,
The most recent comprehensive review of this problem by the
intelligence community appears in NIE 11-3-57, "Probable
Intelligence Warning of Soviet Attack on the US9" approved by
the IAC on 18 June 1957,
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d, If a Soviet attack was preceded by full mobilization of the
USSR's military establishment, warning of possible attack could
probably be given a few weeks in advance. Intelligence might' during
the course of mobilization be able to forecast the approximate date
at which military preparations would be complete, but;it. would always
be possible for the USSR to attack with its ready forces at an earlier
dated
e. Warning of attack by clandestine means would depend. primarily
on the possibility that some part of the Soviet clandestine plan had
miscarried or on chance discovery. Thus, there could be no assurance
that intelligence would be able to warn of such forms of attack,
f. Once surface-to-surface guided missiles were positioned for
launching. advance warriing of their use would be unlikely,
2, The Watch Committee of the IAC
a, The Watch Committee has continued its examination of
intelligence information for indications of Soviet /Communist intentions
to initiate hostilities
The critical
developments of October -November 1956 confronted the Watch Com-
mittee with a major test of its alertness and ability to achieve prompt
common evaluations as to Soviet intentions, particularly with refer-
ence to the employment of military force in critical situations, The
National Indications Center (the 24-hour staff of the Watch Committee)
has used the experience gained during the crisis period to refine
further its lists of potential indicators of hostile SinomSoviet Bloc
intentions,
b, The Intelligence Advisory Committee has undertaken 'a survey
of sources of warning information to determine how fully and promptly
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present and potential collection methods, sources, and transmission
channels can provide information essential to advance warning of
Sino=Soviet Bloc hostile action.
3. USAF Indications System
The Air Force has continued operation of an expanded worldwide
Indications System keyed to the detection of the imminence of
hostilities, especially air attack with nuclear weapons. Capabilities
of the system to provide warning are being improved through sharpened
collection requirements, better communication links, revised indicator
lists and analytical techniques, and through continuing research and
development. Indications centers serving the Air Defense Command,
SAC, Alaskan Air Command, Pacific Air Forces, 5th Air Force,
13th Air Force and USAFE are tied in with the Headquarters USAF
Indications Center by rapid communications for high priority trans-
mission of indications intelligence. The USAF Indications Center
maintains close liaison with the National Indications Center in
Washington.
5. "Crisis Situation" Review by IAC
Under a procedure initiated in the past year, the IAC at its
weekly meetings regularly reviews as a body intelligence and infor-
mation bearing on actual or potential "crisis situations" anywhere
in the world. This has proved to be a valuable stimulant for the
3
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regular exchange of views, at the highest level in the intelligence
community, on matters of both immediate and long-range intelligence
interest. The new procedure has also assisted in scheduling esti-
mates, and has provided a mechanism for inspiring suggestions and
crystallizing the community viewpoint with respect to matters on which
the Director of Intelligence may brief the National Security Council,
6, Taiwan Strait Coverage
The Ad Hoc Current Intelligence Group for the Taiwan Strait
Problem, established by the IAC in March 1955 in response to the
President?s desire for coordinated intelligence coverage of this area,
continues to meet regularly, at least once a month. Since early
December 1956 its reports have been prepared on a monthly basis,
except during June 1957 when two reports were issued because of
unusual military activity in the area,
B. Evaluation and Estimates
1, National Intelligence Estimates (NIE ? s )
a, Production of NIE?s continued to be guided largely by the
needs of the NSC and related bodies. Of the 57 NIE?s published
during the last year, 35 were related to specific NSC papers or
policy actions.
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b, The IAC continued to provide estimates in support of the
reports to the NSC on the "net evaluation" of the capabilities of the
USSR to inflict direct injury on the continental U. S. The main esti-
mates for the 1956 report, keyed to the focal period of mid-1959,
were NIE 11-56, "Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US
and Key Overseas Installations and Forces Through Mid-1959" and
NIE 11-2 -56, "The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, t' The 1956
report was also supported by NIE 11-4-56, "Soviet Capabilities and
Probable Courses of Action Through 1961," Estimative support for
the net evaluation to be submitted in late 1957 will include SNIE 11-6-57,
"Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the Continental US in Mid-
1960, " NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in
the Guided Missile Field," NIE 11-2-57, "The Soviet Atomic Energy
Program" and NIE 11-3-57, "Probable Intelligence Warning of Soviet
Attack on the US, t'
C. The work of the Special Assistant to the President for
Disarmament was supported by NIE 100-6-57, "Nuclear Weapons
Production in Fourth Countries--Likelihood and Consequences."
d, A substantial proportion of the NIE's and SNIE's were devoted
principally to problems of the Non-Bloc world, A number of these
were on emergency situations such as those in the Middle East and
Eastern Europe,
e, The post-mortem. procedure on NIE's continues to be a
valuable method of highlighting intelligence gaps and providing
guidance for future intelligence collection. Pursuant to the recom-
mendation of the post-mortem on NIE 11-5-57, "Soviet Capabilities
and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field, " for example,
the IAC established an "Ad Hoc Weapons Systems Study Committee, "
This Committee is studying methods for evaluating the comparative
effectiveness of competing Soviet weapons systems in order to assist
in the formulation of national estimates on Soviet military programs.
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Final
3 September 1957
2. National Intelligence Surveys (NIS)
a. During the year NIS production essentially fulfilled the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (JCS) annual production requirement, and brought the
total of the NIS production thus far to over 3, 700 sections. This re-
presents more than 65 percent of the total world coverage, and on the
JCS high priority areas coverage is now over 90 percent complete.
Nearly one-third of the production effort during the year was directed
towards maintenance revision of published NIS sections.
b. A major accomplishment this year has been the comprehensive
revision of the NIS Standard Instructions, and the development of the
NIS Reference Guide to provide for a better understanding and more
effective use of the NIS among the growing body of NIS recipients.
Other noteworthy activities during the year included the production
of the NIS on the Arctic two years ahead of schedule, the attainment
of world-wide NIS Gazetteer coverage on all foreign areas, and the
development by the Defense agencies of formal NIS Control and
Coordination Directives.
C. In summary, this has been a year of solid accomplishment,
characterized by excellent interagency support and coordination, and
reflecting a gradual improvement in collection guidance and acquisition,
better administrative controls, and more efficient interagency pro-
cedures.
d. If present production capabilities are maintained the NIS
program will meet the JCS annual requirement for the next three
years. This would result in 85 percent to 90 percent coverage of
world areas by 30 June 1960, and the revision of one-third of all
published NIS under the maintenance program.
30 Military Intelligence
a. Military intelligence information on the SinomSoviet Bloc
is adequate to support. broad assessments of the current capabilities
of the Armed Forces of those countries and to discern general trends
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in their.:development. This informations however, remains inadequate
in critical fields to provide a firm intelligence basis for .'U. S. military
plans, operations, and research and development. Moreover, the
rapidity of change in military technology is increasing our difficulties
in collecting hard evidence to support future projections of Soviet
military capabilities.
b. The quality and quantity of certain types of military intelli-
gence information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc improved during the past
year.
However, deficiencies continued in categories such
as order of battle on non-divisional units, strength level of units, and
in information relating to the design, characteristics and production of
both conventional and new-type weapons and equipment.
still lack specific information regarding new weapons systems and
related techniques which the Soviets intend to introduce into their navy,
especially their submarine arm.
u ure projections of Soviet air capabilities continue to be hampered
by the lack of detailed information on aviation research and development
programs as well as on the performance characteristics of new
weapons and equipment that may be introduced.
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Army continues to be relatively good although not quite at last year?s
level. However, intelligence on both this Army and the North Korean
Army is inadequate to assure advance warning of impending military
operations,
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f. Our efforts to overcome deficiencies in military intelligence
continue to be severely restricted by the security measures imposed
by other countries. The factors and conditions which have limited
access to the most critical information continue to be studied in
order to develop more successful collection resources, through both
overt and clandestine means. However, it is not now possible to
predict a significant alleviation of major deficiencies by an early date.
4. Political Intelligence
a. Political intelligence continued to provide policy-makers
throughout the government with both current and basic finished
intelligence to assist in the assessment of foreign situations. For
example, through newly developing procedures in support of the
Operations Coordinating Board, political intelligence is being in-
creasingly utilized in policy development and implementation.
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b. Political intelligence on the USSR and the Satellites has
continued to show some improvement, principally due to factors
such as revelations incident to factional struggles in the USSR, the
appearance of opposition forces in the Satellites and the greater
freedom of diplomatic and other forms of contact which have developed
in the post-Stalin period. With respect to Communist China, political
intelligence remains a major problem and is still highly inadequate for
an assessment of Communist China?s motives and possible future
actions.
c. Political intelligence during the past year was characterized
particularly by the unusual demands on resources generated by the
Middle Eastern and Eastern European crises. More active Soviet
participation in affairs of the Middle East and the expanding Soviet
"economic offensive" have created continuing burdens. Despite these
growing responsibilities, high-level governmental requests and es-
sential requirements of the intelligence community for political
intelligence have generally been met.
5. Economic Intelligence
a. Economic intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc has improved
as a result of exploitation of the greater volume of economic data
published by a number of Bloc countries during the year. This has
permitted the filling of important gaps in intelligence, and has pro-
vided a firmer basis for estimates of future economic activity. For
example, one important result has been a downward revision in
estimates of the Soviet population and labor force available to carry
out ambitious economic plans.
b. Serious deficiencies still remain, however, in the avail-
ability of information on some Bloc economic activities, particularly
those related to military production and programs. This latter de-
ficiency has led to the development of indirect research techniques
for estimating the extent, cost, and economic burden of Bloc military
programs. The economic estimates so obtained, while subject to a
substantial margin of error, do provide an independent check on
military estimates derived by conventional means. These economic
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Final
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estimates were helpful in arriving at estimates of the size and com-
position of the guided missile, air defense and heavy bomber weapons
systems. Similar techniques are being applied to the economic analysis
of the Soviet nuclear energy program.
d. An increasing volume of reports has been published on
current economic developments in the Blocs including special evalua-
tions of developments in Poland and Hungary, and appraisals of the
reorganization of the Soviet economy and its effect on economic capa-
bilities. Economic intelligence has also provided support to the
London disarmament negotiations, the Paris negotiations relating to
controls on trade with Communist China, the Washington talks on
US-Polish trade and assistance,
d. Interagency coordination of economic research through the
Economic Intelligence Committee of the IAC has continued. Coor-
dinated reports have been issued on Communist China0s trade and
transport, Sino-Soviet Bloc economic activities in underdeveloped
areas, and other subjects. The current status of economic intelligence
has been reviewed as a guide for programming by the individual agencies.
The EIC prepared a revised statement of "Priority National Economic
Intelligence Objectives" for guidance in economic intelligence col-
lection and production. CIA has arranged to provide annual production
data for certain Soviet industries in support of Air Force targeting
studies, thereby obtaining more efficient utilization of community
resources in this field of research,,
e. With respect to economic intelligence on Free World areas,
important shifts in emphasis have occurred. The prolonged crisis in
the Middle East, for example, resulted in greatly increased demands
on intelligence agencies for research on the economic affairs of that
area. As a result of the closing of Suez and the threat to pipelines,
additional research was directed to world-wide petroleum problems.
Special attention has been given to the economic problems of
countries susceptible to Sino-Soviet Bloc economic penetration and
to the inter-relations between economic development and political
factors in these countries.
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Final
3 September 1957
a, General. There has been continued improvement in
scientific intelligence on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Our understanding
has grown with respect to the quality and quantity of Soviet scientific
manpower and developments in-specific fields of basic and applied
science. As a result, we have greater confidence in our estimates
of Soviet technological capabilities. Further significant intelligence
was developed on the Soviet atomic energy program, particularly in
the fields of thermonuclear weapons development and testing and in
the production of fissionable materials. In addition, special studies
were prepared on several aspects of the general problem posed by
.possible international agreement for limitations on nuclear tests,
t e ess much critically=needed information remains unavailable
through present collection efforts. In recognition of this continuing
problem, an intensified effort has been made to develop and employ
new, technical means to collect and reduce technological data for use
in scientific intelligence estimates. In addition, the Priority National
Scientific and Technical Intelligence Objectives were revised during
the past year,
b. Capabilities and Trends of Soviet Science and Technology.
The first National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 11-6-5;) devoted
exclusively to this subject was completed during the year, The
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Scientific Estimates Committee, in collaboration with the Joint Atomic
Energy Intelligence Committee, the Guided Missile Intelligence
Committee and the Economic Intelligence Committee within their
respective spheres, coordinated the basic studies from which the
estimate was prepared,
C. Atomic Energy
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during the past year has permitted a reasonably accurate determina-
tion of the status and trend of Soviet nuclear weapons developments.
This information indicates a concerted effort in thermonuclear weapons
development as well as marked progress in weapons design permitting
more efficient or economical use of fissionable materials. There was
also one nuclear test probably associated with a guided missile firing.
No information on the physical characteristics or numbers of USSR
nuclear weapons,
characteris ics o e ivery ve is es, or materia s pro uctn
has. become available.
double
our previous figures for the uranium output of East Germany and
Czechoslovakia. The start of major uranium mining activity in
Hungary (interrupted by the revolution) and an expansion in other
Satellites has been noted. The magnitude of the uranium mining
effort within the USSR remains an enigma.
ere is still insufficient information to reduce the margins o un-
certainty that exist in our estimates of Um235 production.
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an expansion of plutonium production. The location of weapons
manufacturing facilities remains unknown as does the allocation of
fissionable material among possible weapon types.
Soviet announcements indicate a severe cutback in their
originally planned nuclear electric power program for the period
1957-1960, suggesting technical difficulties. Adequate information
on plant locations and the progress of their construction is still
lacking. Evidence has been received on the construction and char-
acteristics of a nuclear powered icebreaker. We have little evidence
on Soviet'efforts to apply nuclear propulsion to submarines, aircraft,
and missiles although open publications continue to express interest
in these developments.
In summary, we have made significant gains in our atomic
energy intelligence, but there remain many critical gaps which re-
.quire attention to resolve uncertainties 'about foreign weapons
programs, the implications of a nuclear test moratorium, and
other important problems.
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d, Guided Missiles
Significant information on the Soviet guided missile program
has been obtained in all basic categories during the past year. This
data proved 'valuable in the production of a new national intelligence
estimate on the Soviet program, In particular, additional data on
developments in the Soviet research and development program con-
tributed to our knowledge of Soviet surface-to-surface guided missiles.
Definite associations were also established between the Soviet guided
missile and atomic energy programs.
Although the information received during the past year has
increased our general knowledge of the Soviet guided missile program,
we still lack specific information regarding the characteristics of
missile systems in existence or under development. There is almost
a complete lack of evidence on Soviet missile production capabilities
and facilities and on operational deployment. Specific evidence is
lacking on Soviet military doctrine pertaining to the current and
future relationship of guided, missiles to a balanced military program,
The intelligence community, recognizing the overriding im-
portance of guided missile intelligence, is continuing energetically
both to strengthen the community approach and to stimulate indi-
vidual action in this field, The Guided Missile Intelligence Committee
(GMIC), the established interagency mechanism, is increasing its
efforts to close existing intelligence gaps. Along these lines, GMIC
recently established a subcommittee to coordinate more effectively
collection guidance,
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e. Biological Warfare
The first community-wide estimate (1954) in the field was
revised and updated. The current publication estimates the almost
certain existence of an active Soviet biological warfare program and
.assesses Soviet capabilities in offensive and defensive biological
warfare. Although progress has been made in BW intelligence
through -improved analysis of material at hand and through new informa-
tion, little progress has been made in determining the scope and mag-
nitude of the Soviet BW effort, particularly, with respect to offensive
biological warfare.
f. Chemical Warfare
An agreed statement of general conclusions on Soviet offensive
and defensive chemical warfare capabilities was developed on the
working level of the intelligence community. The statement concludes
that the USSR has a well-established and capably-staffed CW research
and development program but points out wide gaps in our knowledge
with respect to the.over-all Soviet CW program.
g. Electronics
A coordinated study on tech
i
n
cal characteristics of Sino?
Soviet Bloc radars was completed and served as a basis for the first
community-wide estimate of their operational capabilities.
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7m Geographic Intelligence
b, As a consequence of Soviet activities in Antarctica, conducted
in association with the International Geophysical Year Program, at-
tention has been directed to the appraisal of advantages that might be
gained by the USSR from its Antarctic operations, particularly with
respect to its possible territorial aspirations and bipolar geodetic
research as an aid to its long-range guided missile program,
C. Collection
1e Priority National Intelligence Objectives
In accordance with NSCID No, 4 the list of Priority National
Intelligence Objectives was again revised (DCID 4/6). First Priority
Objectives continued to emphasize Sino-Soviet strategy, intentions
or plans related to the 'initiation of hostilities. The highest priority
was also assigned to Soviet capabilities for nuclear attack, defense
against air (including missiles) attack, and the clandestine delivery
of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons against the U. S. or key
U. S. overseas installations. These priority objectives provide the
basic guidance for reappraising collection requirements and planning
intelligence production throughout the intelligence community. They
have also furnished a stimulus and framework for the development
of more refined priority objectives in the economic and scientific
and technical fields, as well as in the sphere of international communism.
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2. The Foreign Service
a, The Foreign Service continued t
intelligence information.
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the general quality of the reporting remained high, despite
increased consumer demands and budgetary limitations which both
imposed personnel shortages and restricted the travel and representa-
tion funds available. Nevertheless, deficiencies in reporting exist at
a few posts. These are occasioned in part by the increasing demands
on officers' time arising from official and private visitors and special
pressures created by developments such as the Suez or Hungarian
crises. The eleven new posts opened during the past year have already
increased the amount of information provided to the Department. Of
indirect benefit to the over-all foreign intelligence program was the
stimulus to greater coordination provided by a Presidential directive
to all American Diplomatic Missions, In essence, this directive
reiterates the role of the Chief of Mission as the President's personal
representative abroad, and vests with him, as the senior American
governmental representative, responsibility for supervision and
leadership in connection with activities of all U. S. agencies and re-
presentatives affecting relations between the U. S. and the country to
which he is accredited.
b. The standard of the reporting on the Sino-Soviet Bloc re-
mained high, particularly in the light of the difficulties under which
most U. S. missions operated in Moscow and other Soviet Bloc
capitals, Reporting officers continued to be handicapped by inter-
ference with their travel.
C. Over-all reporting on Sino-Soviet Bloc countries was
materially aided by peripheral reporting and information obtained
from friendly foreign ministries. Foreign offices or missions of
these friendly countries, for example, have provided information
to U. S. Embassy officers on political developments in areas such
as Albania and Bulgaria,
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d. Trade fair reporting shed considerable light on Sino-Soviet
Bloc industrial production. Information obtained from visitors to
Sino-Soviet Bloc countries has been a valuable source of economic data.
e. In the Far East, although political reporting on Communist
China in general remains a serious problem, reporting on that area
from the Consulate General at Hong Kong was especially valuable,
particularly the post's excellent analysis of economic and political
developments. Gaps in information on North Vietnam and North Korea
continue. A limited amount of information on North Vietnam is re-
ceived from friendly foreign missions or sources in that area. In-
formation received through such exchanges with foreign governments
has been valuable.
The Service Attache System
a. The Service Attache System continues to be a major source
of intelligence information, particularly military. During the past
year certain new collection procedures were developed, especially
with respect to travel, and a substantial number of intelligence-
gathering opportunities created by crisis situations in various parts of
the world were successfully exploited. Additional emphasis was also
placed on the selection, training and guidance of attaches.
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b, Severe security restrictions within the Bloc continue to
hamper Service Attache collection activities. Nevertheless, valuable
intelligence resulted from attache reports from Moscow on order of
battle, military equipment, surface-to-air missile sites and other
installations.
Accurate and valuable intelligence was likewise furnished through
attache reporting on local crises, such as the fall of the Colombian
dictator, Rojas Pinilla.
c. New Naval Attache offices were opened in Tel Aviv and
Hamburg, while steps are being taken to open offices in Capetown,
reopen the Bucharest office and augment the Naval Attache office
in Warsaw. Air Attache activities in the Soviet Bloc and peripheral
areas received continuous emphasis, including increases in resources
where possible and planning for opening a new office in Rumania.
The Army opened a new attache office in Haiti, is preparing to open
one in Malaya and has tentatively approved plans for opening offices
in Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and the Belgian Congo. However, Army
Attache staff cuts imposed by the Hungarian government and expulsion
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of a number of Service Attaches from the USSR have already handi-
capped the operations and, if continued, will further reduce
collection capabilities in those countries. Nevertheless, with
respect to over-all future capabilities, reviews during the past year
have emphasized the importance of the Attache System not only to
the Services but to the intelligence community as a whole, and the
Department of Defense thus far has continued to maintain generally
the personnel strength of the System.
4. Overseas Commands
a. Military overseas commands during the year continued to
collect a considerable volume of information on the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
United States Army Europe, which provided excellent coverage of
Soviet Army activities in East Germany and on Soviet troop movements
during the Hungarian Revolution, has also taken steps designed to im-
prove its capabilities for collecting Soviet Bloc scientific and technical
information,
U. S, Air Forces in Europe continued
throughout the period to provide good coverage of Suviet air units in
East Germany, but has most recently placed primary effort on a coor-
dinated collection action to obtain priority information on the Soviet
missile program. This latter effort has achieved considerable initial
success and shows promise of producing important intelligence.
C. Changes in command organization and disposition of forces
in the Pacific will result in significant adjustment of intelligence
resources and missions in that area. This reorganization will
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involve centralization of intelligence responsibilities. An increased
emphasis on the Asiatic Mainland and on Southeast Asia is planned.
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7. The Foreign Language Publications Program
The increase in availability of Soviet Bloc publications, pre-
viously prohibited for export, has continued. One of the highlights
of the period was the increase in military information included in
Soviet and Satellite periodicals, with Polish periodicals proving to
be a particularly fruitful source of data on Soviet materiel. The
Soviets have expanded the publication and release of handbooks con-
taining statistical data on whole segments of their economic develop-
ment. These handbooks have been translated for the intelligence
community. There appears to be a determined effort to release
selected Soviet Bloc published source materials on an exchange basis.
Scientific and technical open-source foreign literature has proved
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3 September 1957
valuable as a source of information for estimating foreign research
and development capabilities and reducing the change of technological
surprise. In order to insure the proper exploitation of this increased
volume for the intelligence community, steps have been taken to
augment the work of current facilities through external contractual
arrangements. The procurement of foreign language publications has
also been made more efficient through an active program of coordina-
tion of requirements in Washington and of collection in the field. The
exchange-of-publications programs of the several member agencies
of the Advisory Committee on Foreign Language Publications were
exploited to obtain scarce or otherwise difficult to procure titles.
Special reports on the Chinese Communist press in Peking and book
publication in Mongolia were submitted As the reporting
period closed, a paper was in preparation to evaluate the contribution
of foreign publications to intelligence research.
8. Geographic Intelligence Collection
b. Acquisition of special subject maps on areas of the Sino-
Soviet Bloc has trebled during the past year, and an exchange of
nautical charts has been initiated with the USSR. However, prac-
tically no topographic maps on these areas have been collected since
the end of World War II. Little progress was made during the year
in the collection of cartographic and geodetic information on the
Sino-Soviet Bloc urgently required for U. S. missile employment
and other military purposes.
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9. International Communism
The Committee on International Communism, established by the
IAC in January 1956, completed its examination of intelligence pro-
duction and collection in the field of international communism. It
concluded that while both fall far short of the ideal, both are reasonably
close to attainable limits at the present time. The Committee has for-
mulated a system of priorities designed to facilitate collection of
needed intelligence information. It has also agreed upon a new pro-
cedure for the development of coordinated clandestine collection re-
quirements to help fill existing gaps in intelligence on international
communism.
10. Programs in Electronics
a. ELINT (Non-Communications Electronic Intercept)
(1) The national structure for the direction and coordination
of the ELINT activities of the US established under the provisions of
NSCID 17 has grown in stature and capability. The National Technical
Processing Center has improved its ability to meet the ELINT pro-
cessing needs of the intelligence community. A statement of the
over-all US ELINT Objectives and General Intelligence Requirements
has been developed and approved. Within the framework of these
ELINT objectives and through active collaboration with the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and CIA, a consolidated list of the Specific ELINT
Collection Requirements has been developed and promulgated. The
Specific Requirements will serve as the basis for the planning, pro-
gramming, and conduct of all ELINT collection and processing
operations.
(2) Improved airborne, shipborne and ground intercept
coverage has provided new and significant data on ELINT targets
previously inaccessible or unexploited. Information from
ELINT activities has
improved in quality and quantity and provides valuable data other-
wise unavailable to U. S. collection sources. Improved collection
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and analysis techniques have contributed vital information to our
knowledge of Soviet missile activity. Information on radar
order-of-battle is now also more accurate and complete. It is
anticipated that ELINT collection capabilities will continue to improve
as more equipment becomes available and new methods of processing
and disseminating ELINT are developed.
b. Long-range Radar
The USAF program for exploiting the potential of long-range
radar for surveillance of Soviet missile activity
continues to contribute materially to missile intelligence collection.
A. long-range radar has recently been installed at Laredo, Texas, for
the purpose of monitoring the U. S. missile test firing program and
conducting associated research in its intelligence aspects. Modifica-
tions are being made to the high-power long-range radars which will
increase their effectiveness by extending range of surveillance and
accuracy of track data.
c. Soviet Bloc Jamming of Free World Broadcasts
The Department of Defense has initiated a surveillance and
analysis of Soviet Bloc jamming capabilities in the peripheral
European area.
11. Foreign Radio and Television Broadcasts
a. During the past year the foreign radio monitoring program
continued to provide significant current intelligence information.
This proved particularly valuable during the Hungarian and Suez crises.
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b. A field survey explored the suitability of sites for the
monitoring of North, East, and West Africa. Consumer requirements
for African coverage are currently being weighed to determine
whether an African monitoring station should be established within
the near future.
C. Television monitoring is expected to increase in importance
with the multiplying of foreign stations and the improvement in
technical facilities. Experiments are being conducted with recording
and photographic equipment for the monitoring of telecasts.
I
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14. Coordination of Information Processing
The Ad Hoc Committee on Information Processing agreed on
standards of quality and procedure for many phases of document
handling, and emphasized the importance of compatibility among
IAC document systems. Many important projects have been
initiated by the intelligence community during the past year in the
complex field of document storage, indexing and subject retrieval.
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IAC-D-55/l2
Final
3 September 1957
Most of these seek the development of film and electronic equipment
which will increase processing speeds and assure access to the
very large quantities of documents involved. The Committee has
made special efforts to advise the IAC agencies on developments in
this field.
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IAC-D-55/12
Final
3 September 1957
1. Review of National Security Council Iritelli
During the past year the intelligence community took action with
respect to various recommendations by the Presidents Board of Con-
sultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities. In this connection, the
IAC commenced a comprehensive review of all of the National Security
Council Intelligence Directives, and it is anticipated that suggested
revisions of these basic directives will be submitted for NSC approval
early in FY 1958.
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Annex A
IAC-D-55/12
Final
3 September 1957
ANNEX A
NSCID'S Relevant to Activities Covered by Annual Report
This annex provides references to those National Security
Council Intelligence Directives under which activities covered in
the various sections of the report were undertaken or to which
they were relevant. A list of NSCID's is attached to this annex
for convenient reference.
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Annex A
IAC-D- 55/12
Final
3 September 1957
List of National Security Council Intelligence Directives
NSCID-l' . Duties and Responsibilities (Revised 28 March 1952)
NSCID-2 Coordination of Collection Activities Abroad
(Approved 13 January 1948)
NSCID-3 Coordination of Intelligence Production (Approved
13 January 1948)
NSCID-4 National Intelligence Objectives (Revised 29 August 1956)
NSCID-5 Espionage and Counterespionage Operations
(Revised 28 August 1951)
NSCID-6 Foreign Wireless and Radio Monitoring (Approved
12 December 1947)
NSCID-7 Domestic Exploitation (Approved 12 February 1948)
NSCID-8 Biographical Data on Foreign Scientific and
Technological Personalities (Approved 25 May 1948)
NSCID-9 (Omitted for Security Reasons)
NSCID-10 Collection of Foreign Scientific and Technological Data
(Approved 18 January 1949)
NSCID-11 Security of Information on Intelligence Sources and
Methods (Approved 6 January 1950)
NSCID-12 Avoidance of Publicity Concerning the Intelligence
Agencies of the US Government (Approved 6 January 1950)
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Annex A
IAC-D-55/12
Final
3 September 1957
NSCID-15 Coordination and Production of Foreign Economic
Intelligence (A.pproved 13 June 1951)
NSCID-16 Foreign Language Publications (Approved 7 March 1953)
NSCID -17 Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) (Approved 16 May 1955)
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IAC-D-55/ 12. 2
19 July 1957
MEMORANDUM FOR : The Intelligence Advisory Committee
The Chairmen, IAC Subcommittees
Annual Report to the NSC on the Status
of the Foreign Intelligence Program
REFERENCE : IAC-D-55/12, dated 10 July 1957
1. As foreshadowed in the reference memorandum, we have
now received the attached memorandum from the NSC, requesting
the usual Annual Report to the NSC. As expected, the memorandum
calls for a report along the lines of last year's, but without the
material included in last year's Annexes B and C. The scope being
thus apparently clear, we do not believe we need any preliminary
meeting.
2. In order to meet the 1 September deadline, which is
somewhat more generous than we had feared, we propose the
following work schedule:
Friday, 2 August: contributions due in IAC Secretariat
Monday, 19 August (approximately): coordination
sessions begin
Submission to IAC preferably on 27 August, possibly
on 3 September
3. Please call the lAC Secretariat if this schedule raises
any problems.
Acting Secretary
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W Attachment to
IAC-D-55/ 12. 2
19 July 1957
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
Washington
July 16, 1957
SUBJECT : Status of National Security Programs on
June 30, 1957
REFERENCES: A. NSC 5611
B. NSC 5707/8
The President has directed that the departments and agencies
responsible for the several national security programs prepare
annually reports on the status of those programs for the information
of the President and the National Security Council. As requested by
the President, these reports should emphasize primarily trends as of
the reporting date in comparison with the date of the preceding report
(in this case, June 30, 1956) and similar dates in future years so far
as they can be reasonably projected. Such trends should be expressed
in terms of an integrated appraisal of the status of each program in
achieving the objectives set forth in applicable national security policies,
particularly NSC 5707/8. This appraisal should take into account not
only developments in the U. S. program but also developments else-
where in the Free World and in the Soviet Bloc which affect the ability
of the program to achieve policy objectives. The President has further
directed that each status report be as concise as possible consistent
with adequate presentation.
Accordingly, it is requested that the Central Intelligence Agency,
in consultation with other departments and agencies as may be appro-
priate, and with the assistance of the NSC Staff, submit not later than
September 1, 1957, a report on the status of the foreign intelligence
program as of June 30, 1957. The content of this report should follow
the general lines of Part 7 of NSC 5611 but should exclude Annexes B
and C.
/s/
JAMES S. LAY, Jr.
Executive Secretary
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IAC-D-55/12. 1
10 July 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director/Plans
Assistant Director /National Estimates
Assistant Director/Current Intelligence
Assistant Director/Research and Reports
Assistant Director /Scientific Intelligence
Assistant Director/Operations
Assistant Director /Central Reference
Assistant Director/Basic Intelligence
SUBJECT : Annual Report to the NSC on the Status
of the Foreign Intelligence Program
REFERENCES : IAC-D-55/ 11 (Final), 18 August 1956
IAC-D-55/ 11, 22 June 1956 (with Attachment)
ATTACHMENT : Memorandum for the IAC and Chairmen,
IAC Subcommittees from Secretary, IAC,
10 July 1957
1. Through the attached memorandum we have alerted the
lAC agencies and subcommittees to the probable requirement that
the intelligence community submit to the NSC by 15 August a report
on the status of the foreign intelligence program for the fiscal year
ending 30 June 1957. At this time we have no guidance as to the
scope and content of this report other than that given in the annexed
memorandum.
2. We hope that your office, as a component of CIA, will
submit an appropriate contribution to this annual report. However,
as was suggested in connection with similar contributions to last
year's report, you may find it desirable to utilize any IAC subcom-
mittees under your cognizance in the drafting of such a report so that,
if feasible, a consolidated contribution may be submitted. Because
of the relatively short time which may be available for completion
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10 July 1957
of this report, we believe that you will also wish to initiate action
on the preparation of any contributions prior to the receipt of the
formal request from the NSC.
3. As soon as it becomes available, we shall furnish you
with a copy of the NSC's formal request for further guidance. We
shall also advise you as to the timing of any preliminary meeting
scheduled to discuss in more detail the procedure to be followed
in preparing and coordinating this report.
JOHN HEIRES
Secretary
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