GLOSSARY OF INTELLIGENCE TERMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 25
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: March 6, 2006
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 22, 1955
• Content Type: NOTES

Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
V, C-D-98
22 August 1955
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Glossary of Intelligence Terms
1. There is circulated herewith a memorandum from
the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff, recom-
mending the establishment of an IAC ad-hoc committee to
compile a glossary of terms used in NIE's.
2. In arriving at a decision on this matter, the IAC
may wish to consider the advisability of not limiting the com-
pilation of terms to those used in NIE's.
3. This matter will be placed on the agenda of the IAC
meeting scheduled for 30 August.
Secretary
NSC and JCS review(s) completed.
IAC-D-98
22 August 1955
CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
91 1w
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
IAC-D-98
19 August 1955
DDIM-20-55
16 August 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT: Glossary of Intelligence Terms
1. There has been, for some time, a need for a glossary
of IAC agreed intelligence terms used in National Intelligence
Estimates.
Z. Therefore, it is recommended that an ad-hoc committee
of the Intelligence Advisory Committee be appointed to compile such
a glossary for LAC approval.
/s/ EDWIN T. LAYTON
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for Intelligence
The Joint Staff
CONFIDENTIAL
IAC-D-98
19 August 1955
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
~vw 14e
IAC-D-97/ 1
Final
28 September 1955
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
IAC Task Force on President's Proposal to Exchange
Military Blueprints with the USSR
Attached is the report of the Task Force as amended and
approved by the IAC on 27 September 1955.
Acting Secretary
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
 cL^I's bCT
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
Nwe *4
IAC-D-97/ 1
Final
28 September 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT : Report by the IAC Task Force on the President's
Proposal for Inspection
REFERENCE : IAC-M-209, IAC-M-Z10, IAC-D-97
1. The President's proposal sets in motion a series of
expanding problems involving the formulation of an inspection
system to provide warning of attack, negotiations for the adoption
and implementation of this system, and formulation and negotiation
of an arms limitation agreement together with an inspection system
to insure compliance. While there are uncertainties concerning the
exact form which the solutions will take as they are developed under
the cross-examination of U. S. and allied interests, to say nothing
of Soviet demands and conditions, these uncertainties do not
obscure the key problem in the proposal, which is that of devising
an inspection system for security against surprise attack.
2. It is the IAC's problem at this time to make sure that the
resources of the intelligence community are properly marshalled
to meet the requirements of the planners and negotiators. These
requirements can be summarized under three major headings,
current intelligence reporting, intelligence estimates, and intelli-
gence support for the planning of the inspection system itself.
Current Intelligence Reporting:
Mr. Stassen has requested current intelligence support and
is receiving this support through established channels. No IAC;
action is required.
Estimates as Required:
National Estimates have been provided to Mr. Stassen at his
request. He will presumably continue to make such requests as the
need arises, whether in support of the development of the plan or
in support of the U. S. negotiators.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
 cTrPRT
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
lft~ 1%W
IAC-D-97/ 1
Final
28 September 1955
Intelligence Support for the Planning of an Inspection System:
For the development of the inspection plan Mr. Stassen has
appointed eight task forces to consider the following aspects of the
.broad program: Army, Navy, Air, Atomic Energy, Industry and
Power, Steel, Budget and Finance, and Communications. He has
asked the Department of Defense to develop studies and recommenda-
tions and to participate in the work of the task forces, at the same
time drawing his guidance for the major outline of the plan, including
guide-lines of definition, from the Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, who in turn are drawing on the military depart-
ments.. It is Mr. Stassen's intention that the task forces work
directly with the appropriate executive departments and agencies in
developing their parts of the inspection system, including the list
of intelligence targets for inspection.
Mr. Stassen's schedule is as follows:
15 Oct. Task Forces complete their
parts of the plan
15 Oct. - 1 Nov. Consolidation into one draft plan
1 Nov. - 1 Dec. The draft plan in the hands of
the departments and agencies
of primary concern for official
review and comments. (It is
noted that Mr. Stassen will
submit the draft plan to the
Director of Central Intelligence. )
Submission to the President
The IACC has a clear and direct concern with an inspection
system the first purpose of which is to produce the intelligence
necessary for timely provision against surprise attack. The IAC
Watch Committee and its supporting staffs, for example, must have
an intimate knowledge of such a system arid the assurance that it
provides adequate coverage of all the places and activities which
can provide forewarning of attack. 1=:.n inspection list of such places
and activities would become an essential part of the watch list and
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
 ccf^DE'T
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
VAV~
JAC-D-97/ 1
Final
28 September 1955
the information produced by any inspection system would have to be
considered by the Watch Committee. As the Watch Committee and
its supporting staffs are concerned in the first objective of the
inspection system, so the estimates staffs are concerned in the
inspection system as a whole, with its prospect of unfolding to a
coverage of essential information on Soviet developments and capa-
bilities. Furthermore, the inspection system and its lists must be
carefully studied by all the IAC collecting service
The individual members of the IAC are already contributing
or will be asked to contribute to the development of the inspection
plan in accordance with Mr. Stassen's requests and departmental
instructions. When a consolidated draft of the inspection plan is
ready it will be submitted to the departments and agencies of primary
concern. At that time the IAC should take concerted action in ef-
fecting a coordinated review of and comment on the intelligence
aspects and portions of the draft plan, including the inspection lists.
There is one action, however, which it would seem prudent to take
at this time and which can be taken without prejudice to or inter-
ference with the development of the plan. In order to prepare for
the forthcoming review of the. consolidated inspection plan it would
be helpful to assemble a preliminary list of those critical intelli-
gence targets which pertain to the prevention of surprise attack.
The Watch Committee would be the natural facility in the IAQ for
this preparation.
When the consolidated draft of the inspection plan is ready,
the IAC should effect a coordinated review of its intelligence aspects,
including inspection lists, calling upon the Watch Committee for
assistance insofar as the plan is or includes an inspection ^tr^tem
which is to produce the intelligence necessary for timely provision
against surprise attack. Comment on the plan might well take the
form of a systematic estimate of the nature and degree of the
security which the proposed system would give the U. S. in the
light of the limitations inherent in the means of inspection, the
- 3 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
IAC-D-97/ 1
Final
28 September 1955
3. Should an inspection system of any magnitude be put into
effect, practical problems will arise involving manpower, organi-
zation, and administration within the intelligence community in
relation to the inspection system and its reporting. Consideration
of such problems, however, should await review of the plan.
4. Noting that the IAC members are participating or will
participate through their own departments in the development of
the inspection plan, the IAC Task Force on Inspection recommends
that:
a. The IAC coordinate the review of and the comment on
the intelligence aspects and pQrtions of the draft
inspection plan as cons9lid4ted by Mr. Stassen.
b. - The Watch Committee assemble departmental
intelligence targets lists which pertain to
intelligence necessary for timely provision
.against surprise attack, and undertake a pre-
liminary examination of the whole from the
point of view of their adequacy for the mission
of the Watch Committee.
co The IAC dissolve its present Task Force on
Inspection.
/s/
Chairman
IAC Task Force on Inspection
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
aJL,Vl\Li L
IAC-D- 97/1
9 September 1955
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
IAC Task Force on President's Proposal to Exchange
Military Blueprints with the USSR
1. Attached is the report of the Task Force prepared
pursuant to IAC-M-209, Item 9 a, 23 August 1955, as amended
by IAC??M-210, Item 1, 30 August 1955.
2. This item will be placed on the Agenda of the IAC meeting
scheduled for 1045 hours, Tuesday, 20 September.
Secretary
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
IAC-D-97/ 1
9 September 1955
MEMORANDUM FOR: ' The Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT . Report by the LAC Task Force on the President's
Proposal for Inspection
REFERENCE : IAC-M-209, IAC-M-210, IAC-D-97
1. The President's proposal sets in motion a series of
expanding problems involving the formulation of an inspection
system to provide warning of attack, negotiations for the adoption
and implementation of this system, and formulation and negotiation
of an arms limitation agreement together with an inspection system
to insure compliance. While there are uncertainties concerning the
exact form which the solutions will take as they are developed under
the cross-examination of U. S. and allied interests, to say nothing
of Soviet demands and conditions, these uncertainties do not
obscure the key problem in the proposal, which is that of devising
an inspection system for security against surprise attack.
2? It is the IAC's problem at this time to make sure that
the resources of the intelligence community are properly marshalled
to meet the requirements of the planners and negotiators. These
requirements can be summarized under three major headings, cur-
rent intelligence reporting, intelligence estimates, and intelligence
support for the planning of the inspection system itself.
Current Intelligence Reporting:
Mr. Stassen has requested current intelligence support and
is receiving this support through established channels. No IAC
action is required.
Estimates as Required:
National Estimates have been provided to Mr. Stassen at his
request. He will presumably continue to make such requests as the
need arises, whether in support of the development of the plan or
in support of the U. S. negotiators.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
IAC-D-97/ 1
9 September 1955
Intelligence Support for the Planning of an Inspection System:
For the development of the inspection plan Mr. Stassen has
appointed eight task forces to consider the following aspects of
the broad program: Army, Navy, Air, Atomic Energy, Industry
and Power, Steel, Budget and Finance, and Communications. He
has asked the Department of Defense to develop studies and recom-
mendations and to participate in the work of the task forces, at the
same time drawing his guidance for the major outline of the plan,
including guide-lines of definition, from the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who in turn are drawing on the military
departments. It is Mr. Stassen's intention that the task forces work
directly with the appropriate executive departments and agencies in
developing their parts of the inspection system, including the list
of intelligence targets for inspection.
Mr. Stassen's schedule is as follows:
15 Oct. Task Forces complete their
parts of the plan
15 Oct. - 1 Nov. Consolidation into one draft plan
1 Nov. - 1 Dec. The draft plan in the hands of the
departments and agencies of
primary concern for official
review and comments. (It is
noted that Mr. Stassen will
submit the draft plan to the
Director of Central Intelligence. )
Submission to the President
The IAC has a clear and direct concern with an inspection
system the first purpose of which is to provide intelligence security
against surprise attack. The IAC Watch Committee and its sup-
porting staffs, for example, must have an intimate knowledge of such
a system and the assurance that it provides adequate coverage of all
the places and activities which can provide forewarning of attack.
An inspection list of such places and activities would become an es-
sential part of the watch list and the information produced by any
inspection system would have to be considered by the Watch Committee.
2 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
1"01 VW
IAC-D-97/ 1
9 September 1955
As the Watch Committee and its supporting staffs are concerned in
the first objective of the inspection system, so the estimates staffs
are concerned in the inspection system as a whole, with its prospect
of unfolding to a coverage of essential information on Soviet develop-
ments and capabilities. Furthermore, the inspection system and
its lists must be carefully studied by all the IAC collecting services,
The individual members of the IAC are already contributing
to the development of the inspection plan in accordance with Mr.
Stassen's requests and departmental instructions. When a consoli-
dated draft of the inspection plan is ready it will be submitted to the
departments and agencies of primary concern. At that time the IAC
should take concerted action in effecting a coordinated review of and
comment on the intelligence aspects and portions of the draft plan,
including the inspection lists. There is one action, however, which
it would seem prudent to take at this time and which can be taken
without prejudice to or interference with the development of the
.plan. In order to prepare for the forthcoming review of the consoli-
dated inspection plan it would be helpful to assemble a preliminary
list of those critical intelligence targets which pertain to the pre-
vention. of surprise attack. The Watch Committee would be the
natural facility in the IAC for this preparation.
When the consolidated draft of the inspection plan is ready,
the IAC should effect a coordinated review of its intelligence aspects,
including inspection lists, calling upon the Watch Committee for
assistanrp insofar as the plan is or includes an inspection system
to provide intelligence security against surprise attack. Comment
on the plan might well take the form of a systematic estimate of the
nature and degree of the security which the proposed system would
give the U. S. in the light of the limitations inherent in the means
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
IAC-D-97/ 1
9 September 1955
3. Should an inspection system of any magnitude be put into
effect, practical problems will arise involving manpower, organiza.
tion, and administration within the intelligence community in rela-
tion to the inspection system and its reporting. Consideration of
such problems, however, should await review of the plan.
4. Noting that the IAC members are participating through their
own departments in the development of the inspection plan, the IAC
Task Force on Inspection recommends that:
a.
b.
The IAC coordinate the review of and the comment on
the intelligence aspects and portions of the draft
inspection plan as consolidated by Mr. Stassen.
The Watch Committee assemble departmental
intelligence targets lists which pertain to the
prevention of surprise attack, and undertake
a preliminary examination of the whole from the
point of view of their adequacy for the mission of
the Watch Committee.
c. The IAC dissolve its present Task Force on
Inspection.
/s/
Chairman
IAC Task Force on Inspection
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
*V 1%W
IAC-D-97
3.8 August 1955
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
C F o r c e n e ident i s Proposal to Exch e
Military Blue=jntsw .th the USSR
1. The IAC directed the Task Force to prepare terms of
reference as its first order of business, and to submit them
for IAC aprrovval. (IAC-M-205, Item 9, 26 July 1955, as amended
by IAC-M-206, Item 10)
2. Attached are the terms of reference drafted by the
Task Force for IAC consideration.
3. This matter has boon placed on the agenda of the IAC
meeting scheduled for 10:45 Tuesday, 23 August.
Secretary
IAC-D-97
18 August 1955
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
SECRET IAC-D-97
18 August 1955
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The IAC asked the Task Force to study US intelligence require-
ments and implications of any program designed to implement the President's
proposal for a US-Soviet exchange of military blueprints and aerial
inspection.
The President's Pro_osal
"I propose, therefore, that we take a practical step, that
we begin an arrangement, very quickly, as between ourselves
ienediately. These steps would include:
"To give to each other a complete blueprint of our
military establishments, from beginning to end, from one
end of our countries to the other, lay out the establish-
racants and provide the blueprints to each other.
"Next, to provide within our countries facilities
for aerial photography to the other country -- we to provide
you the facilities within our country, ample facilities for
aerial reconnaissance, where you can make all the pictures
you choose and take then to your own country to study, you
to provide exactly the same facilities for us and tyro to malte
these examinations and by this step convince the world that
we are providing as between ourselves against the possibility
of great surprise attack, thus lessening danger and relaxing
tension."
2. The President's proposal falls under the general heading of
"security," as opposed to disarr.anent; more specifically under the
IAC-D-97
SECRET 18 !ugust 1955
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
SECRET IAC-D-97
18 August 1955
heading; of "military security," security of the nation against military
attack by the USSR. More specifically still, the President's proposal
aims at providing against the element of surprise in the event of attack
or as he stated, "great surprise attack." The President's proposal
would superimpose on existing means of intelligence collection a method
which would provide evidence from direct observation, although limited
by the media themselves.
3. It is noted that the President's proposal calls for the
exchange of a "complete blueprint of our military establishi:.ents," and
for "aerial reconnaissance" which appears to be restricted to aerial
photography. Since such limitation nary be more implied than intended,
the task force proposes to consider other means of inspection as well.
2- . "Great surprise attack" is interpreted to mean any surprise
attack which would jeopardize the basic strengths and interests of the
United States. (Minor border clashes or incidents would not be included.)
Such an attack would involve direct assault to the full extent of Soviet
military capabilities, including the use of mass destruction weapons
(atomic, biological and/or cheriical)R
5. The President's proposal calls for a bilateral arran,erient
between. the US and the USSR in order to "convince the world that we
are providing as between ourselves against the possibility of great
surprise attack." Because one cannot separate US security realistically
from intelligence of Soviet-controlled and closely allied areas and
because one cannot separate US security realistically from that of
allied powers, especially those wherein US forward bases are located,
the IAC believes that the areas to be inspected may 80 beyond continental
limits of the US and the USSR.
II. DEFINITION OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROBLEM!
To develop the intelligence requireaents necessary to insure the
US afainzst a surprise attack by the USSR and to analyze the possibility
of their satisfaction under any conditions for exchange of information
and any conditions for mutual inspection.
IAC-D-97
SECRET 18 August 1955
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
%141 Nw~
SECRET IAC-D-97
18 Aiagaust 1955
as Method of Procedure- First to establish the requirements
and then to define e media, if possible, in such fashion as to
provide information constituting an acceptable ninimun of protection
against surprise attack.
b. The requirements should be developed and organized in a
manner which will cover: first,,the strictest interpretation of the
proposal, viz. surprise attack from the USSR proper against the US
proper; second, successively broader interpretations which would
(1) expand the area from which surprise attack could be launched
to include Soviet allied and satellite territory, (2) expand the
target of attack to tu.clude US forward bases and US allies, and
(3) provide for protection against the secret development of relatively
greater Soviet military capabilities.
III. ASSUMPTIONS
a. The Soviet Union accepts the President's proposal.
b. The Task Force is not concerned with the various con-
tingencies that will arise in the course of negotiations, but only
with the determination of those intelligence requirements and the
conditions for their satisfaction adequate to insure advance
knowledge of preparations for attack.
IV. DISCUSSION
A. Intelligence Requirements
rrrw .w .w.
1. Inasmuch as this secti=on of the study goes to the heart of
our military intelligence problem with respect to the Coi:monist power,
it is proposed that each service develop its own lists in accordance with
II (2) above, and that these lists then be consolidated under the appropri-
ate headings. As for exauple, the first list:
- 3 -
LAC-D-97
SECRET 18 August 1955
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
low VW
SECRET IAC-D-97
18 August 1955
Attack against the continental US from bases within the USSR:
a. Bases from which air attacks could be launched against
the US.
b. Order of Battle of Long-Range Air forces.
C4 Production facilities for long-range aircraft.
d. Storage and assembly points for nuclear weapons.
a. Production facilities for nuclear weapons.
f. Launching facilities for Intercontinental Ballistic
Missiles.
g. Order of Battle for ICBM units.
h.. Production and storage facilities for ICBM's.
i. Fleet bases, submarine loadings and dispositions.
J. Order of Battle of Soviet long-range submarines.
k. Production and Storage facilities for BW and CWT agents.
The second list would be supplementary to the first: For example:
Attack against US forces and installations abroad from bases
within the USSR:
a. Army forces in forward areas.
b. Forward airbases in areas of the USSR adjacent to
locations of US forces abroad.
Co Order of Battle of Soviet ground forces.
d. Order of Battle of Soviet tactical airforces.
e. Military stockpiles in forward areas.
IAC-D-97
SECRET 18 August 1955
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
 ? Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
W
IAC-D-97
18 August 1905
f. Transportation system serving forward units.
(NOTE: The additional. supplementary lists would be similarly con-
structed to exhaust the possibilities mentioned in II b.
above.)
2. The individual iteris listed under the appropriate headings
would be accompanied by a brief Justification and explanation of its
critical character, such that the lists could serve as an initial hand-
book or ;uide, for the study of "blueprints," for purposes of aerial
photoe-raphy and interpretation, or for other means of inspectioana.
3. Consideration must be given to the degree of adequacy of
our intelligence relating to the USSR and consequently to the basis
for exploiting and utilizing the additional means of acquiring informa,-
tion under an inspection system.
a. Given the state of our knowledge of developments within
the USSR, can we draw up a list of intelligence requirements which
would insure adequate coverage of the danger points?
b. Would an extended period of "cut and try" be necessary
before we could rely on an inspection program to the degree anti-
cipated by the President's proposal?
B. Means of Inspection
1. Military Blueprints
A "complete military blueprint" is an exhaustive and accurate
listing of forces, their disposition, strength and equipment, and
installations of a military or military- supporting; nature.
a. What are the limitations inherent in such a means of
acquiring; information?
b. What are the possibilitie=s for deception and concealment?
c. Frequency of exchange
- 5 -
L'AC-D-97
SECRET 18 August 1955
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
SECRET IAC-D-97
18 August 1.955
d. Estimate of quantity
e. Methods of checking and confirming
f. How far would a complete military blueprint go in
satisfaction of the requirements?
G. If anything less than a complete blueprint is involved,
what is the minimum acceptable?
2. Aerial reconnaissance (ptatography)
a. What are the limitations inherent in such a means of
acquiring information?
V What are the optimum and minimum acceptable conditions
(altitude, equipment, freedom of movement) ?
c.
What are the possibilities for deception and concealment?
d.
targets?
What frequency is required for critical intelligence
o t
Estimate of quantity
f.
Methods of checking and confirming
6.
How far would aerial. photography go in satisfaction of
the requirements?
3. Relation between bluuprints and aerial photography and assesa-
ment of their combined results in fulfil7nont of intelligence requirements.
4. Other means of inspection, such as:
a. Aerial reconnaissance to include electronic, visual, and
other techniques in addition to photographo
b. Groind observer team .
IAC-D-97
SECRET 18 August 1955
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
W
SECRET IAC-D-97
18 August 1955
C. Ile-examination of US advance and early-warning-; capabilities
1. What provision must be made for most rapid processing and
communication of information obtained?
2. Assessment of possible advantages to be Gained for US intelli-
gence pis-compared with present situation.
3. Possible disadvantages.
D. Possible Implications
NOTE: The considerations which follow are more appropriately dealt
with in a National Estimate and not as part of the Task Force's
study.
1. Would implementation of the President's proposal be interpreted
in world opinion as effectively negating the possibility of nuclear warfare?
2. If so, does the proposal offer greater freedom of action to
the Co maunists In other fields of conflict or competition?
3. If the possibility of nuclear warfare has acted as an inhibitor,
what will be the effect of its apparent removal on "little" and "local"
wars or on the prosecution of Corriunist influence by means short of
limited war in critical and undecided areas?
V. CONCLUSION
Nature and degree of the security which would accrue to the US from
an implementation of the President's proposal.
IAC-D-97
SECRET 18 August 1955
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
SECRET
IAC-D-96/3
21 March 1957
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Emergency Planning of the Scientific Estimates Committee
The attached report to the Chairman, IAC, by the Chairman,
Scientific Estimates Committee (SEC), relating to emergency
planning by the SEC, is circulated for information. This paper was
prepared in compliance with the recommendation in paragraph
IV, 2 e of IAC-D-96/2, 3 April 1956, as approved by the IAC
(IAC-M-237,, 17 April 1956, item 3 a).
Secretary
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
SECRET *40
C IAC-D-96/3
MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT : Emergency Planning of the Scientific
Estimates Committee
REFERENCES : a. IAC-D-96/2, 3 April 1956
b. IAC-M-237, 17 April 1956, item 3 a
1. Pursuant to the recommendation of paragraph IV, 2, e
of Reference a, which was approved by the Intelligence Advisory
Committee (IAC) as recorded in Reference b, the Scientific
Estimates Committee (SEC) submits its concept of an SEC wartime
plan of operation. In the judgment of the SEC, this paper provides
a framework for detailed planning to meet emergency situations
under anticipated types of warfare.
Assumptions
2. The National Security Council (NSC) will continue to look
to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) for national intelligence
advice and support under wartime conditions.
3. The IAC will continue to be charged with its present
mission and functions under emergency conditions.
4. The present subcommittee-IAC relationship will continue.
5. The joint responsibilities of Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) and the Department of Defense for the wartime conduct of
clandestine activities are not within the scope of this paper.
SEC Wartime Mission and Functions
6. The SEC mission will remain within the framework de-
termined by Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 3/4
(DCID 3/4), with the exception that production of NIS Chapter VII,
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
M SECRET NW,
IAC-D-96/3
21 March 1957
"Scientific,'' is expected to be greatly curtailed under wartime
conditions. Excluding those areas of responsibility assigned by
DCID 3/4 to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee
(JAEIC) and to the Guided Missile Intelligence Committee (GMIC),
the SEC will devote itself primarily to integration of scientific and
technical intelligence contributions to national intelligence estimates
and to coordination of intelligence with respect to foreign, chiefly
enemy, technological developments.
SEC 'Wartime Organization and Membership
7. The organization of the SEC will remain unchanged in a
wartime situation except for the addition of such ad hoc representa-
tion as may be deemed necessary for the duration of the emergency
by the regular committee members or by the IAC. For example, it
is understood that the wartime director of scientific research in the
national mobilization structure will be eligible for representation in
the SEC.
SEC Secretariat
?FMQ 8. CIA will continue to provide the executive secretary and
mission of the secretaries wi remain unc ange .
SEC Meetings
9. The chairman will call SEC meetings as required to
fulfill the committee's mission. The secretary will notify members
of the time and place of SEC meetings through the respective duty
officers of the SEC member agencies.
' See Annex for the SEC's present concept of its wartime mission.
- 2 -
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
NW SECRET
IAC-D-96/3
21 March 1957
Vital Documents
10. The secretariat has ensured storage
of SEC vital documents, including SEC agenda, minutes o
meetings, memoranda, reports, surveys, publications, agreed working
papers, and draft contributions to national intelligence estimates. It
will arrange for reproduction of such material as required for SEC
use.
/s/
Chairman
Scientific Estimates Committee
Enclosure: Annex
7 March 1957
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85SO0362R000500120006-3
 Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3
W SECRET AW-el
IAC-D-96/3
21 March 1957
ANNEX
EMERGENCY PLANNING OF THE
SCIENTIFIC ESTIMATES COMMITTEE
The SEC's Present Concept of Its Wartime Mission
Under wartime conditions the SEC will:
a. Coordinate national intelligence on foreign, chiefly enemy,
developments in science and technology as it contributes to our
knowledge of enemy potentials, exploitable vulnerabilities, and inten-
tions, with the proviso that designation of operational targets is not
generally comprehended in this function, although specific exceptions
may require SEC action. The SEC will be prepared to coordinate
current scientific and technical intelligence within its purview,
proi1i ce periodic and special reports on foreign, chiefly enemy,
developments in science and technology, prepare spot evaluations as
required, and make short-term projections.
b. Integrate scientific and technical intelligence contributions
to post-hostilities planning at the national intelligence level. This
function will normally be fulfilled in compliance with IAC action.
C. Provide scientific intelligence support within its sphere
of responsibility to appropriate levels, including that of the. wartime
director for scientific research, in the national mobilization
structure.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2008/03/03: CIA-RDP85S00362R000500120006-3