LIST OF NIE STUDIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000600010001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 160
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: LIST

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IAC-D- 100/ 1
Validity Studies of National Estimates
Validity Study of NIE 71-54: Probable
Developments in North Africa, published
31 August 1954 (8 Dec 1955)
Validity Study of NIE 70: Conditions and
Trends in Latin America Affecting US
Security, published 12 December 1952
(8 Dec 1955)
IAC-D-100/2 Validity Study of NIE 64-55: Communist
Prospects in Malaya and British Borneo,
published 24 May 1955 (10 ,Ja.n 1956)
IAC-D-100/3 Validity Study of NIE 12-54: Probable
Developments in the European Satellites
Through Mid-1956, published 24 August 1955
(10 Jan 1956)
IAC-D-100/4 Validity Study of NIE 24-54: Probable
Developments in Italy, published 16
November 1954 (7 Feb 1956)
IAC-D-100/5 Validity Study of SE-48: Capabilities and
Probable Courses of Action of the Republic
of Korea with Respect to the Armistice in
Korea, published 13 October 1953
(7 Feb 1956)
IAC-D-100/6 Validity Study of Estimates Regarding Soviet
Policy with Respect to Berlin: NIE 81,
"Probable Soviet Courses of Action with
Respect to German y Through Mid-1954,
ARMY, DOS and USAF re iev s 22 May 1953; NIE 11-55, "Probable Soviet
completed. R
MOR I/C:: C) F pp.
1 026',3657-5884J 20
espouse to the Ratification of the Paris
Agreements," 1 Mar 1955; NIE 11-3-55,
"Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses
of Action Through 1960, " 17 May 1955; and
NIE 11-13/1-55, "Review of Soviet Foreign
Policy in the Light of the Geneva Foreign
Ministers' Conference," 6 Dec 1955
(28 Feb 1956)
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IAC-D-100/7 Validity Study of NIE 11-7- 55: Soviet
Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US
and Key Overseas Installations and Forces
Through 1 July 1958, published 23 June 1955
(20 Mar 1956)
IAC-D-100/8 Validity Studies of NIE 76, Probable Develop-
ments in Egypt, and of the Egyptian section of
NIE 36-54, Ptobable Developments in the
Arab States, in the light of NIE 36. 1- 5 5 , published
15 November 1955 (20 Mar 1956)
IAC-D-100/9 Validity Study of NIE 74: Probable Developments
in Burma Through 1943, published 20 Feb 1953
(10 Apr 1956)
IAC-D-100/ 10 Validity Studies of NIE 23-54: Probable
Developments in West Germany, published
20 Dec 1954; and NIE 23-55: West Germany
and the Reunification Issue, published 28 June
1955 (17 Apr 1956)
IAC-D-100/ 11 Validity Study of NIE 79: Probable Developments
in South Asia, published 30 June 1953
(9 May 1956)
IAC-D- 100/ 12 Validity Study of NIE 100-4-56: Communist
Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the
Gffshore Islands and Taiwan Through 1955,
and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions
with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan
(24 May 1956)
IAC-D-100/ 13 Validity Study of NIE 27. 1-54; Probable
Developments in Spain, published 17 May 1954
(%Llhlished 17 May 1 ) // .?~.:.. /gig
IAC-D-100/ 14 Validity Study of the Libyan Section of NIE 71-54:
Probable Developments in North Africa, published
31 August 1954 (25 June 1956)
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IAC-D-100/ 15
IAC-D- 100/ 16
Validity Study of NIE 32-55: The Outlook
for Greece, published 18 January 1955
(27 June 1956)
Validity Study of NIE 22-55: Probable Develop-
ments in France, published 29 March 1955
(11 July 1956)
IAC-D-100/17 Validity Study of NIE 63. 1-55: Probable
Developments in North Vietnam to July 1956,
published 19 July 1955; and NIE 63. 1-3-55:
Probable Developments in Vietnam to July
1956, published 11 October 1955 (20 July 1956)
IAC-D- 100/ 18
IAC-D-100/ 19
IAC-D-100/20
IAC-D-100/21
IAC-D-100/22
Validity Study of NIE NIE 91-54: Probable
Developments in Argentina, published 9 March
1954 (20 July 1956)
Validity Study of NIE 31-2-55: Yugoslavia's
International Position, published 7 Sept 1935
(27 July 1956)
Validity Study of NIE 65-55: Probable Developments
in Indonesia Through 1955, published 1 March 1955
(9 August 1956)
Validity Study of NIE-83: Conditions and Trends
in Tropical Africa, published 30 December 1953
(16 August 1956)
Validity Study of NIE 71-55: Probable Develop-
ments in French North Africa (insofar as it
relates to Algeria), published 29 Nov 1955
(10 Sept 1956)
IAC-D-100/23 Validity Study of NIE 92-54: Probable Develop-
ments in Bolivia, published 19 March 1954
(12 Sept 1956)
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a+ we-,
IAC-D-100/24
IAC-D-100/25
Validity Study of NIE 11-3-55: Soviet Capabilities
and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through
1960, published 17 May 1955 (20 Sept 1956)
Validity Study of NIE 43-55: The Prospects of
the Chinese Nationalist Government, published
1 Nov 1955 (10 Oct 1956)
IAC-D-100/26 Validity Study of NIE 52-55: Probable Develop-
ments in Pakistan, published 15 Mar 1955
(15 Nov 1956)
IAC-D-100/27
IAC-D-100/28
Validity Study of NIE 93-55: Probable Developments
in Brazil, published 15 Mar 1955 (11 Jan 1957)
Validity Study of NME 34-54: Probable Develop-
ments in Iran Through 1955, published 7
December 1954 (24 Jan 1957)
IAC-D-100/29 Validity Study of NIE 71-55: Probable Develop-
ments in French North Africa (insofar as it
pertained to Morocco), published 29 November
1955 (1 Feb 1957)
IAC-D-100/30 Validity Study of NIE 66-54: Probable Develop-
ments in the Philippine Republic, published
23 Mar 1954 (15 Feb 1957)
IAC-D100/,31 Validity Study of SNIE 12-3-56: Probable
Developments in Soviet-Satellite Relations,
published 27 Nov 1956 (21 Feb 1957)
IAC -D -100 / 32 Validity Study of NIE 11-6-54: Soviet Capabilities
and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile
Field, published 5 Oct 1954, and its Supplement,
NIE 11-12-55, Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities
and Probable Programs, published 20 Dec 1955
(21 Mar 1957)
IAC-D-100/33 Validity Study of NIE 13-56: Chinese Communist
Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action
Through 1960, published 5 Jan 1956 (21 Mar 1957)
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IAC-D-100/34
IAC-D-100/35
IAC-D-100/36
IAC -D -100/ 37
IAC -D -100/ 38
IAC-D-100/39
IAC-D-100/40
IAC-D-100/41
IAC-D-100/42
IAC-D-100/43
IAC-D-100/44
IAC-D-100/45
Validity Study of NIE 100-3-56: Sino-Soviet
Policy and Its Probable Effects in Under-
developed Areas, published 24 April 1956
(1 Apr 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 80-54: The Caribbean
Republics, published 24 Aug 1954 (26 Apr 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 36. 5-56: The Outlook
for US Interests in Libya, published 19 June 1956
(9 May 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 63-56: Probable Develop-
ments in North and South Vietnam Through
Mid-1957, published 17 July 1956 (17 May 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 36. 2-56: The Outlook for
Iraq's Stability and Foreign Policies,
published 17 July 1956 (7 June 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 31-56: Yugoslavia's
International Position, published 24 July 1956
(13 June 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 71-55: Probable Develop-
ments in French North Africa, (insofar as it
pertained to Tunisia), published 29 November 1955
(25 June 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 62-54: Probable Develop-
ments in Thailand, published 7 Dec 1954
(25 June 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 11-5-55: Air Defense of
the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1955-1960, published
12 July 1955 (22 July 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 21-55: Probable Develop-
ments in the United Kingdom, published
8 Feb 1955 (5 August 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 22-56: The Outlook for France,
published 10 July 1956 (16 Aug 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 71. 2-56: Outlook for Algeria,
published 5 September 1956 (16 Aug 1957)
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IAC -D -100 /46
IAC-D-100/47
IAC -D -100 / 48
IAC-D-100/49
IAC-D-100/50
IAC -D -100/ 51
IAC-D-100/52
IAC-D-100/53
IAC-D-100/54
Validity Study of NIE 100-5-55: Implications
of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist
Bloc and the Free World, 14 June 1955 (26 Aug 57)
Validity Study of NIE 63. 3/1-55: Probable
Developments in Laos to July 1956, published
20 December 1955 (12 Sept 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 65-56: Probable
Developments in Indonesia, published
7 August 1956 (13 Sept 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 43-56: The Prospects
of the Government of the Republic of China,
published 9 October 1956 (13 Sept 1957)
Validity Study of SNIE 36. 7-56:' Outlook for
the Syrian Situation, published 16 November 1956
(16 Sept 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 23-56, "Political Outlook
in West Germany, " published 17 April 1956;
NIE 11-3-56, "Probable Short-Term Communist
Capabilities and Intentions Regarding Berlin, "
published 28 February 1956; and NIE 12 - 57,
"Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure, "
published 19 February 1957 (5 Nov 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 36. 1-55: The Outlook
for Egyptian Stability and Foreign Policy,
published 15 November 1955 (12 Nov 1957)
Validity Study of NIE 31-57: Yugoslavia's
Policies and Prospects, published 11 June
1957 (26 Nov 1957)
Validity Study of ICBM Estimate Made in
NIE 11-5-57: Soviet Capabilities and
Probable Programs in the Guided Missile
Field, published 12 March 1957 (26 Dec 1957)
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IAC-D-100/55
IAC-D-100/56
IAC-D-100/57
IAC-D-100/58
IA.C-D-100/59
IAC-D-100/60
.IAC-D-100/61
IAC-D-100/62
IAC-D-100/63
IAC-D-100/64
Validity Study of NIE 92-56: The Outlook for
Bolivia, published 11 September 1956 (7 Jan 1958)
Validity Study of ME 64-56: The Political
Outlook in Malaya Through 1960, published
24 January 1956 (15 Jan 1958)
Validity Studies of SNIE 42. 1/2-56 and
NLE 42. 1-56, published 30 October 1956 and
7 February 1956, respectively (30 Jan 1958)
Validity Study of NIE 11-4-56: Soviet Capabilities
and Probable Courses of Action Through 1961,
published 2 August 1956 (30 Jan 1958)
Validity Study of NIE 12-57: Stability of the
Soviet Satellite Structure, published 19 February
1957 (11 Feb 1958)
Validity Study of NIE 10-56: Anti-Communist
Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
published 12 April 1955 (7 Mar 1958)
Validity Studies of NIE 82-55, Probable Develop-
ments in Guatemala, published 26 July 1955, and
NIE 80-57, Political Stability in Central America,
published 23 April 1957 (1 May 1958)
Validity Study of NIE 92: Israel, 11 August 1953
and of Other Important Estimates on Israel in
Estimates Prepared Since April 1956
(7 May 1958)
Validity Study of NIE 27. 1-56: Probable Developments
in Spain, published 12 June 1956 (21 May 1958)
Validityftudi,es of NIE 91-56: The Outlook for
Argentina, published 17 July 1956; and SNIE 91-57,
The Outlook for Argentina, published 12 November
1957 (6 Aug 1958)
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IAC-D-100/65 Validity Study of NIE 100-57: Sino-Soviet Foreign
Economic Policies and Their Probable Effects
in Underdeveloped Areas, published 26 March 1957
(6 Aug 1958)
IAC-D-100/66 Validity Study of NIE 62-57: Probable Developments
in Thailand, published 18 June 195 7 (10 Sept 1958)
IAC-D-100/67 Validity Study of NIE 34-57: The Outlook for Iran,
published 23 Jan 1957 (10 Sept 1958)
IAC-D-100/68 Validity Study of NIE 51-57: Consequences of
Economic Crisis in India, published 8 Oct 1957
(10 Sept 1958)
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IAC-D-100/68
10 September 1958
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Validity Study of NIE 51-57:
Consequences of Economic Crisis in India,
published 8 October 1957
The attached validity study of NIE 51-57 was noted by the IAC
on 2 September 1958 (IAC-M-359, item 9 c).
Secretary
SECRET o~~DOZ
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IAC-D-100/67
10 September 1958
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NME 34-57:
The Outlook for Iran,
published 23 January 1957
The attached validity study of NIE 34-57 was noted by the IAC
on 2 September 1958 (IAC-M-359, item 8 b).
Secretary
SECRET
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IAC-D-199/67
10 September 1958
Validity Study of NIE 34-57:
The Outlook for Iran,
published 23 January 1957
NIE 34-57, "The Outlook for Iran, " was written in January 1957
to cover developments in Iran "over the next few years. " It was then
estimated that the Shah's regime could remain in power for the next
two years or so but that its ability to govern effectively beyond this
time would depend greatly upon the success of plans for economic
development and progress in social and' political reforms. These
estimates have proved to be valid, although today we perhaps have less
faith in the political benefits of general economic development. In
other respects as well the estimate has remained generally valid,
although in need of updating as it nears the end of its period.
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IAC-D-100/66
10 September 1958
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 62-57:
Probable Developments in Thailand,
published 18 June 1957
The attached validity study of NIE 62-57 was noted by the IAC
on 19 August 1958 (IAC-M-357, item 7 c)
Secretary
SECRET
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IAC-D. 100/66
10 September 1958
Validity Study of NIE 62-57:
Probable Developments in Thailand,
published 18 June 1957
1. A virtually complete change in the top Thai leadership has
taken place since publication of NIE 62-57. The estimate called
attention to the intense rivalry between the Phao and Sarit factions.
It stated that the chances of the 1947 coup group maintaining a working
relationship were "about even" and that "the most likely outcome of
a major change in leadership would be Sarit's ascendency to dominant
leadership."
2. Events to date have confirmed the basic estimate that the
nature of Thai politics and Thai domestic and foreign policies would
not change radically, at least in the short run, in the event of a shift
in leadership.
SECRET
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IAC-D-100/65
6 August 1958
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Validity Study of NIE 100-57:
Sino-Soviet Foreign Economic Policies and Their
Probable Effects in Underdeveloped Areas,
published 26 March 1957
The attached validity study of NIE 100-57 was noted by the
IAC on 5 August 1958 (IAC-M-355, item 6).
Secretary
SECRET
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IAC-D-100/65
6 August 1958
Validity Study of NIE 100-57:
Sino-Soviet Foreign Economic Policies and Their
Probable Effects in Underdeveloped Areas,
published 26 March 1957
1. NIE 100-57 correctly estimated that the rate at which the
Bloc credits were extended would slow down. It also correctly
estimated that the Bloc trade programwould continueto expand.
2. However, we now believe that NIE 100-57 overestimated
the extent to which competing internal demands would restrict ex-
pansion of the Bloc foreign economic program. Moreover, it did
not foresee the number of opportunities which would develop in the
Free World. In particular, it did not recognize the extent to which
the underdeveloped countries would seize upon Bloc economic offers
as a means of playing off the West against the East.
SECRET
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IAC -D -100 / 64
6 August 1958
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
Validity Studies of NIE 91-56: The Outlook for Argentina,
published 17 July. 1956; and SNIE 91-57; The Outlook
for Argentina, published 12 November 1957
The attached validity studies of NIE 91-56 and SINE 91-57
were noted by the IAC on 5 August 1958 (IAC-M-355, item 5).
Secretary
SECRET
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Now
IAC-D-100/64
6 August 1958
Validity Studies of NIE 91-56: The Outlookfor Argentina,
published 17 July 1956; and SNIE 91-57: The Outlook
for Argentina, published 12 November 1957
1. NIE 91-56 correctly assessed the character of the pro-
visional government of General Aramburu and its intent to transfer
power to an elected civilian government. Moreover, it pointed out
that the Radical Party was the strongest contender in a national
election, although it did not foresee the split in this party.
2. SNIE 91-57 re-estimated the prospects for areturn to an
elected government on schedule in May 1958 contained in NIE 91-56,
and changed the estimate from "slightly better than even" to "even."
In view of the orderly manner in which the elections were conducted
and the President inaugurated, this estimate appears to have been
over-cautious.
SECRET
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IAC-D-100/63
21 May 1958
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Validity Study of NIE 27. 1-56:
Probable Developments in Spain,
published 12 June 1956
The attached validity study of NIE 27'. 1-56, was noted by the IAC
on 20 May 1958 (IAC-M-342, item 7 c).
Secretary
~daa07
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IAC-D-100/63
21 May 1958
Validity Study of NIE 27. 1-56:
Probable Developments in Spain,
published 12 June 1956
NIE 27. 1-56 has proved substantially correct. In some par-
ticulars it anticipated trends still developing at this moment, such
as the continuing of labor unrest. It correctly calculated that Franco
could retain power, and that oppositionist forces, although increasing
in restlessness, would probably remain weak. Although calling
attention to certain basic weaknesses in the Spanish industrial expansion
program, the estimate failed to judge the severity of inflationary
pressures that were developing and slightly underemphasized the
rapidity with which foreign credits might be exhausted.
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IAC-D-100/62
7 May 1958
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 92:
r i
Israel, 11 August 1953 and of Other Important Estimates
on Israel in Estimates Prepared Since April 1956*
The attached validity study of NIE 92 and of other important
estimates on Israel to estimates prepared since April 1956 was
noted by the IAC on 6 May 1958 (IAC-M-340, item 6),
Acting Secretary
SECRET 6 616,660,111-
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IAC-D-100/62
7 May 1958
Validity Study of NIE 92:
Israel, 11 August 1953 and of Other Important Estimates
on Israel in Estimates Prepared Since April 1956*
1. NIE 92 has held up well for the past five years; almost all
its conclusions remain valid. However, it overestimated the de-
terrent effects of US influence in preventing an outbreak of major
hostilities between Israel and the Arabs. It did not anticipate the
USSR's active involvement in the area.
2. The NIE's involving Israel prepared during the past two
years have generally stood up well, except in one significant respect.
The SNIE's produced in the fall of 1956, particularly SNIE 30-3-56,
SNIE 30-4-56, and SNIE 30-5-56, underestimated the likelihood of
Israeli armed intervention in Egypt either alone or in conjunction
with Anglo-French military action. While the focus at that time was
principally upon British and French activities, a better measurement
of Israeli interests and concerns as the Suez crisis developed might
have permitted an accurate and earlier judgment regarding Israeli
intentions in Sinai.
3. The estimates in NIE 30-2-57, NIE 36. 1-57, and SNIE
30-58 in regard to the Arab-Israeli question remain valid.
*The following estimates prepared during the past two years are
applicable:
SNIE 30-3-56, "Nasser and the Middle East Situation,
31 July 1956
SNIE 30-4-56, "Probable Repercussions of British-French
Military Action in the Suez Canal, "
5 September 1956
SNIE 30-5-56, "The Likelihood of a British-French Resort to
Military Action Against Egypt in the Suez Canal, "
19 September 1956
NIE 30-2-57, "Near East Developments Affecting US Interests,"
8 October 1957
NIE 36. 1-57, "The Outlook for Egypt and the Nasser Regime,
12 November 1957
SNIE 30-58, "Prospects and Consequences of Arab Unity
Moves," 20 February 1958
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IAC-D-100/61
1 May 1958
Validity Studies of NIE 82-55, Probable Developments in
Guatemala, published 26 July 1955, and NIE 80-57,
Political Stability in Central America, published
23 April 1957
The attached validity studies of NIE 82-55 and NIE 80-57
were noted by the IAC on 29 April 1958 (IAC-M-339, item 5).
Acting Secretary
SECRET 9
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IAC-D-100/61
1 May 1958
Validity Studies of NIE 82-55, Probable Developments in
Guatemala, published 26 July 1955, and N1E 80-57,
Political Stability in Central America, published
23 April 1957
NIE 82-55, and that portion of NIE 80-57 which treated of
Guatemala, correctly estimated developments up to the unpre-
dictable assassination of Castillo Armas.
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IAC-D-100/60
7 March 1958
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 10-55:
Anti-Communist Resistance Potential in the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
publish-ed 12 April 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 10-55 was noted by the
IAC on 4 March 1958 (IAC-M-331, item 9 c.
Secretary
SECRET 6
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IAC-D-100/59
11 February 1958
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 12-57:
Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure,
published 19 February 1957
The attached validity study of NIE 12-57 was noted by the
IAC on 4 February 1958 (IAC-M-327, item 6 c).
Secretary
SECRET 6 d 44 !/
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IAC-D-100/59
11 February 1958
Validity Study of NIE 12-57:
Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure,
published 19 February 1957
1. The main conclusions of NIE 12-57 still appear to be valid;
for example, the estimates that Soviet policy would emphasize the
security of the Satellite regimes and Soviet leadership, that the USSR
was determined to remain in Eastern Europe, and that Poland's
success in maintaining its semi-independence would be a key factor
affecting future developments in the Satellites. However, to the
limited extent that it is now possible to assess the validity of the
projections made in this estimate, three of its judgments now
appear to have been somewhat inaccurate.
2. NIE 12-57 underestimated the ability of the USSR and its
Satellite regimes to restore order to the Satellite area relatively
quickly and efficiently after the upheavals of October 1956. Thus,
although stating that another revolt was unlikely, the estimate fore-
paw "greater strains" on Party unity within the Satellites than had
existed prior to October 1956 and predicted that Soviet policy is
"unlikely to reduce" tensions in Eastern Europe "or even to restore
the degree of acquiescence prevailing earlier." We point out in
NIE 12-58 that the USSR and its Satellite regimes have succeeded
in effect in stabilizing the situation in the Satellites and reducing
tensions, though we continue to anticipate "an atmosphere of change
and ferment more highly charged than under Stalin. "
3. The estimate also appears to have erred in suggesting
that Soviet policy toward Poland would be directed toward undermining
the Gomulka regime (in part through a rebuilding of the pro-Soviet
faction in the Polish Party) and toward restoration of a "more re-
liable Communist regime." We now believe that the USSR has
probably withdrawn its open support of the pro-Soviet faction and
that the USSR's acceptance of the Gomulka regime appears to be a
long-range adjustment rather than a temporary accommodation.
4. Finally, we appear to have overestimated the likely role
of Communist China as a factor influencing the Soviets toward a more
liberal policy in the Satellites.
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30 January 1958
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 11-4-56:
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1961,
published 2 August 1956
The -attached validity study of NIE 11-4-56, "Soviet Capa-
bilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1961," published
2 August 1956, was noted by the IAC on 28 January 1958 (IAC-M-326,
itexin-b).
Secretary
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30 January 1958
Validity Study of NIE 11-4-56:
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1961,
published 2 August 1956
1. Since this estimate covered a five-year period, it is pre-
mature to assess the validity of many of its judgments. Viewed in an
eighteen-month perspective, however, the estimate's major judgments
concerning Soviet capabilities and policies appear to have been sound.
In particular, it correctly stressed even more than the preceding
Soviet estimates the flexibility of the post- Stalin regime and the broad
lines of Soviet external policy. On the other hand, some of its specific
appraisals have had to be revised in producing NIE 11-4-57, and other
possible developments were insufficiently emphasized or not anticipated.
2. Internal Political Developments. NIE 11-4-56 was properly
skeptical of the stability of the top leadership. It did not anticipate
that aspect of the power struggle which involved the Party's reassertion
of its ascendancy over other elite groups, but it did point to continuing
factional divisions, personal intrigues, and policy disputes. The
conclusion that any struggle for power would be resolved without
violence or a weakening of regime control also appears validated by
the outcome of the 1957 purges.
3. Most of the judgments concerning other internal political
matters still appear to be sound. The estimate did not stress,
however, the growth of critical thinking and disaffection among Soviet
students and the intelligentsia, which more recent evidence indicates
has been taking place.
4. Economic Developments. Primarily because the targets
of the Sixth Five-Year Plan were generally regarded as feasible,
NIE 11-4-56 revised upward the rate of economic growth foreseen
in its predecessor, NIE 11-3-55. In the light of the abandonment
of the Sixth Five-Year Plan and the relatively modest goals set for
1957 and 1958 this upward revision appears to have been too high,
as was also the projection of industrial growth. NIE 11-4-56 also
failed to predict that a somewhat higher priority would be given to
consumption programs.
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30 January 1958
5. Bloc Developments. The estimate clearly erred in
predicting that the transition to a new post-Stalin policy in Eastern
Europe could be completed "without serious disruption." This
mistake arose primarily from a failure to appreciate the growth
and significance of disunity and conflicting loyalties within the
Polish and Hungarian Communist parties. The aims of post-Stalin
Satellite policy, however, were correctly appreciated, as was
Communist willingness to abandon liberalization if it produced a
fundamental challenge to the Communist regimes. While the basic
unifying factors in the Sino-Soviet alliance were properly appraised,
little attention was paid to the increasing stature of Communist
China within the Bloc; on this point NIE 11-3-55 was a more useful
estimate.
6. Foreign Policy. The judgment that "peaceful coex-
istence" would continue to characterize the Soviet approach to
foreign affairs appears to have been a valid one. The estimate
correctly described the use of the peace and anti-colonialism
campaigns and of traditional methods of diplomacy, and Soviet
stress on the underdeveloped and uncommitted areas. Its judg-
ments of the Soviet position on Germany and disarmament have
been borne out. NIE 11-4-56 did not, however, fully anticipate
Soviet concentration upon the Middle East in 1957, and too great
a weight may have been given to Soviet respect for the vital nature
of Western interests in that area. Finally, NIE 11-4-56 did not
foresee the extent to which Soviet technological achievements would
bolster Soviet self-confidence and perhaps lead to more venturesome
policies.
7. Military and Scientific. The validity of many of the
estimates made in the military chapters of NIE 11-4-56 cannot be
adequately tested at this time. The broad picture of Soviet military
strengths and capabilities presented in NIE 11-4-56 appears to have
been generally valid. However, on the basis of evidence accumu-
lated over the intervening months, several important projections
appear to have been in error: (a) NIE 11-4-56 projected a more
rapid Soviet buildup in heavy bombers than we now believe has
actually occurred, and somewhat underestimated the number of
jet medium bombers the USSR would add to its forces; (b) the
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30 January 1958
estimate predicted a much higher rate of long-range, conventional
submarine construction for 1957 and after than actually occurred;
(c) subsequent evidence indicates that the performance character-
istics of certain Soviet long-range bomber types were somewhat
overestimated; and (d) new evidence leads to the conclusion that the
USSR is probably developing an IRBM of somewhat shorter range than
estimated in NIE 11-4-56, and that it as well as the first Soviet
operational ICBM probably will be available earlier than previously
estimated. So far as concerns manpower strengths, we now tend to
believe that the bulk of the reductions from Korean War peaks probably
largely preceded rather than followed the announcements of 1955 and
1956. In any event, we believe that Soviet military manpower strengths
have over the past decade varied considerably more than indicated in
previous estimates.
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30 January 1958
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Studies of SNIE 42. 1/2-56 and NIE 42. 1-56
The attached validity studies of SNIE 42. 1/2-56, "Probable
Political Developments in the Republic of Korea Through 1957,''
published 30 October 1956, and NIE 42. 1,56, "Probable Develop-
ments in the Republic of Korea Through Mid-1957,
published
7 February 1956, were noted by the IAC on 28 January 1958
(IAC-M-326, item 5 c).
Secretary
SECRET 6 d d C l3
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30 January 1958
.Validity Studies of SNIE 42. 1/2-56: Probable Political
Developments in the Republic of Korea Through 1957,
published 30 October 1956; and NIE 42. 1-56:
Probable Developments in the Republic of Korea Through
Mid-1957, published 7 February 1956
1. The major judgments of the two outstanding previous
estimates on the Republic of Korea were sound.
2. SNIE 42. 1/2-56, Probable Political Developments in
the Republic of Korea Through 1957 (30 October 1956), was based
largely on a number of contingencies which have not yet materialized,
including the prolonged illness or death of Rhee, the subsequent
political problems, and major reductions in US aid. However, we
believe that the estimate continues to be valid.
3. NIE 42. 1-56, Probable Developments in the Republic
of Korea Through Mid-1957 (7 February 1956), was valid in nearly
all respects. It miscalled the outcome of the Vice Presidential
election which followed by three months the publication of the
estimate. It asserted: "Whatever candidate /Rhee/ eventually
favors for Vice President will almost certainly win-," However,
Rhee's favored candidate, Yi Ki-pong, was defeated by Chang Myon,
who was in Rhee's disfavor.
4. NIE '42. 1-56 was also inaccurate with regard to an
important sector of the economy. It stated: "If weather conditions
continue favorable, the ROK could have about 100, 000 metric tons
of rice annually available for export in 1956 and 1957, with a
potential foreign exchange value of as much as $ 17 million." The
1957 crop was excellent, but none will be exported due to increasing
domestic consumption. In fact, the ROK is expected to be a heavy
importer of grain during the 1957-58 crop year.
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15 January 1958
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 64-56;
The Political Outlook in Malaya Through 1960,
published 24 January 1956
The attached validity study of NIE 64-56, "The Political
Outlook in Malaya Through 1960, "1 published 24 January. 1956,
was noted by the IAC on 14 January 1958 (IAC-M-324).
Secretary
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IAC-D-100/55
7 January 1958
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Validity Study of NIE 92 - 56:
The Outlook for Bolivia,
published 11 September 1956
The attached validity study of NIE 92-56,. "The Outlook
for Bolivia, " published 11 September 1956, was noted by the
IAC on 7 January 1958 (IAC-M-323, item 8 c).
Secretary
4f~~
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7 January 1958
Validity Study of NIE 92-56:
The Outlook for Bolivia,
published 11 September 1956
1. The previous estimate (NIE 92-56) correctly forecast
the general situation in Bolivia during 1956-1957, pointing toward
a ,continuation of the MNR regime in power with some economic
progress.
2. The estimate anticipated the latent threat to internal
stability represented by labor-leftist leader Juan Lechin. However,
it underestimated Siles' capabilities for obtaining the popular support
which enabled him to counteract the threat to his position and pro-
gram posed by Lechin in mid-July 1957.
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26 November 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 31-57:
Yugoslavia's Policies and Prospects,
published 11 June 1957
The attached validity study of NIE 31-57, "Yugoslavia's
Policies and Prospects," published 11 June 1957, was noted by
the IAC on 19 November 1957 (IAC-M-316, item 4 d).
Secretary
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26 November 1957
Validity Study of NIE 31-57:
Yugoslavia's Policies and Prospects,
published 11 June 1957 *
1. Some of the conclusions in NIE 31-57 now appear to have
been at least partly in error. The estimate was published just prior
to the ouster of Tito's enemy in the Kremlin, Molotov, and was
written for the most part during the period of strained Soviet-Yugoslav
relations which followed the Hungarian revolt; many basic Yugoslav
attitudes concerning the USSR were submerged during that period.
Moreover, at the time of NIE 31-57's publication, intelligence con-
cerning Yugoslav foreign policies was scantier than at present; and
the implications of the October events in Eastern Europe and the
resultant Soviet-Yugoslav polemics loomed larger in June 1957
than they do at present. At any rate, the rapid improvement in
Yugoslav-Soviet relations during the summer and fall of 1957 was
not foreseen in the ~ June estimate.
2. In general, the estimate revealed a tendency to under-
rate the basic Yugoslav desire for rapprochment with Bloc countries;
it did not fully assess the long-run impact of the Hungarian revolt
on the Yugoslav attitude toward Eastern Europe (resulting in
Belgrade's desire for slow change and stability in the area); and
it reflected a wrong assessment of the Yugoslav estimate of Soviet
and Western intentions.
This validity study is restricted to those portions of NIE 31-57
which dealt with Yugoslavia's external affairs. A validity study
of the estimate's conclusions concerning internal affairs will
follow the next general estimate on Yugoslavia.
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26 November 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 31-57:
Yugoslavia's Policies and Prospects,
published 11 June 1957
The attached validity study of NIE 31-57, "Yugoslavia's
Policies and Prospects," published 11 June 1957, was noted by
the IAC on 19 November 1957 (IAC-M-316, item 4 d).
Secretary
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26 November 1957
Validity Study of NIE 31-57:
Yugoslavia's Policies and Prospects,
published 11 June 1957 *
1. Some of the conclusions in NIE 31-57 now appear to have
been at least partly in error. The estimate was published just prior
to the ouster of Tito's enemy in the Kremlin, Molotov, and was
written for the most part during the period of strained Soviet-Yugoslav
relations which followed the Hungarian revolt; many basic Yugoslav
attitudes concerning the USSR were submerged during that period.
Moreover, at the time of NIE 31-57's publication, intelligence con-
cerning Yugoslav foreign policies was scantier than at present; and
the implications of the October events in Eastern Europe and the
resultant Soviet-Yugoslav polemics loomed larger in June 1957
than they do at present. At any rate, the rapid improvement in
Yugoslav-Soviet relations during the summer and fall of 1957 was
not foreseen in the. June estimate.
2. In general, the estimate revealed a tendency to under-
rate the basic Yugoslav desire for rapprochment with Bloc countries;
it did not fully assess the long-run impact of the Hungarian revolt
on the Yugoslav attitude toward Eastern Europe (resulting in
Belgrade's desire for slow change and stability in the area); and
it reflected a wrong assessment of the Yugoslav estimate of Soviet
and Western intentions.
* This validity study is restricted to those portions of NIE 31-57
which dealt with Yugoslavia's external affairs. A validity study
of the estimate's conclusions concerning internal affairs will
follow the next general estimate on Yugoslavia.
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12 November 1952
Validity Study of NIE 36. 1-55:
The Outloo1 for Egyptian Stability and Foreign Policy,
Published 15 November 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 36. 1-55, "The Outlook for
Egyptian Stability and Foreign Policy," published 15 November
1955, was noted by the IAC on 12 November 1957 (IAC-M-315,
item 5 c).
Secretary
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12 November 1957
Validity Study of NIE 36. 1-55:
The Outlook for Egyptian Stability and Foreign Policy,
published 15 November 1955
The estimates contained in NIE 36. 1-55 have held up well in
view of the many dramatic events that have occurred since the
paper was published. The estimate failed to anticipate the vigor
and determination with which the Soviets have pressed their
campaign to develop their position in Egypt. It did not discuss the
possibility of nationalization of the Suez Canal.
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IAC-D-100/51
5 November 1957
Validity Study of NIE 23-56, "Political Outlook in West
Germany," published 17 April 1956; NIE 11-3-56,
"Probable Short-Term Communist Capabilities and
Intentions Regarding Berlin," published 28 February 1956;
and NIE 12-57, "Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure,"
published 19 February 1957
The attached validity study of NIE 23-56, "Political Outlook
.in West Germany," published 17 April 1956; NIE 11-3-56,
"Probable Short-Term Communist Capabilities and Intentions
Regarding Berlin," published 28 February 1956; and NIE 12-57,
"Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure, " published 19 February
1957, was noted by the IAC on 5 November 1957 (IAC-M-314,
item 6 c).
Secretary
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5 November 1957
Validity Study of NIE 23-56, "Political Outlook in West
Germany," published 17 April 1956; NIE 11-3-56,
"Probable Short-Term Communist Capabilities and
Intentions Regarding Berlin, " published 28 February 1956;
and NIE 12-57, "Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure, "
published 19 February 1957.
1. The projection of main trends in NIE 23-56 has stood up
well. The paper was too conservative on Adenauer's chances to
obtain a majority in the recent elections, and overestimated the
attraction to West Germans of parties advocating a more independent
course in foreign relations. This estimate was influenced by the
greater appeal which Soviet policy was exercising in West Germany
during the period after Geneva and prior to the outbreaks in Poland
and Hungary.
2. The estimate on Berlin, NIE 11-3-56, has proven to be
generally correct. NIE 12-57, insofar as East Germany is treated
(para. 22), has also proven to be sound.
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16 September 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of SNIE 36. 7-56:
Outlook for the Syrian Situation,
published 16 November 1956
The attached validity study of SNIE 36. 7-56, "Outlook for the
Syrian Situation, " published 16 November 1956, was noted by the
IAC on 10 September 1957 (IAC-M-306, item 8). .'
Secretary
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16 September 1957
Validity Study of SNIE 36. 7-56:
Outlook for the Syrian Situation,
published 16 November 1956
SNIE 36.7-56 was produced during the Suez crisis last fall
as a short-term paper. The estimate proved to be accurate in all
major respects and most of its judgments are still valid today.
Its assessment of the internal situation in Syria (Paras. 3-5) and
of Soviet policy toward Syria (Paras. 6-10) has been confirmed by
subsequent developments.
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IAC-D-100/49
13 September 1957
Validity Study of NIE 43-56:
The Prospects of the Government of the
Republic of China,
published 9 October 1956
The attached validity study of NIE 43-56, "The Prospects of
the Government of the Republic of China, " published 9 October 1956,
was noted by the IAC on 27 August 1957 (IAC-M-304, item 6 c).
Secretary
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13 September 1957
Validity Study of NIE 43-56:
The Prospects of the Government of the
Republic of China,
published 9 October 1956
1. The conclusions of NIE 43-56, dated 9 October 1956, have
been generally borne out by events. However, the short-term
estimate of a decline in the Republic of China's morale and interna-
tional fortunes was somewhat overstated. Subsequent Soviet actions
in Hungary as well as Chinese Communist domestic difficulties have
aided the National Government in maintaining both its morale and
its formal international position.
2. Although a growth in anti-American sentiment was
indicated, the possibility of anti-American riots was not explicitly
discussed.
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IAC-D-100/48
13 September 1957
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Validity Study of NIE 65-56:
Probable Developments in Indonesia,
published 7 August 1956
The attached validity study of NIE 65-56, "Probable Develop-
ments in Indonesia, " published 7 August 1956, was noted by the
IAC on 27 August 1957 (IAC-M-304, item 5 c).
Secretary
SECRET ~l G~Z
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13 September 1957
Validity Study of NIE 65-56:
Probable Developments in Indonesia,
published 7 August 1956
1. NIE 65-56 failed to anticipate several important developments
of the past year and underrated the chances of others. While we did
foresee continuing instability and unresolved problems, we estimated
that there would be slow economic progress and moderately favorable
prospects for slow advance toward a modern democratic state. In fact,
Indonesia has undergone a series of adverse developments during the
past year.
2. The estimate underplayed the force of regionalism and
did not anticipate recent moves toward provincial autonomy. Although
it pointed out the army's lack of cohesion and lack of responsiveness
to civilian authority, it did not warn that these regional movements
would be led by army elements.
3. NIE 65-56 estimates that "the All government will probably
remain in office for at least the next year. " The Ali government
remained in office considerably less than a year, and during at least
the last three months of its tenure it was largely ineffective. The
estimate did not anticipate Sukarno's attempt to reorganize the
Indonesian political system.
4. The analysis of PKI prospects and strategy has proven
generally valid, although it did not anticipate the sequence of events
which have enabled the PKI to increase considerably its influence and
strength by posing as the supporter and champion of Sukarno's plans
and programs.
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12 September 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 63.3/1-55:
Probable Developments in Laos to July 1956,
published 20 December 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 63. 3/1-55, "Probable
Developments in Laos to July 1956, " published 20 December 1955,
was noted by the IAC on 20 August 1957 (IAC-M-303, item 10 d).
Secretary
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12 September 1957
Validity Study of NIE 63. 3/1-55:
Probable Developments in Laos to July 1956,
published 20 December 1955
Although N1E 63. 3/1-55 correctly estimated that neither side
was likely to initiate large-scale hostilities, it incorrectly predicted
a gradual buildup in the scale and intensity of hostilities in northern
Laos through the first half of 1955. Moreover it estimated that
there was little likelihood of an effective cease-fire. In these latter
respects it failed to foresee the investiture of Souvanna Phourna in
the spring of 1956 and his soft line toward the Pathet Lao which
resulted in a cease-fire in August and subsequent emphasis on
political negotiations.
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26 August 1957
Validity Study of NIE 100-5-55:
Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for
the Communist Bloc and the Free World
published 14 June 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 100-5-55, "Implications of
Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the
Free World, " published 14 June 1955, was noted by the IAC on
20 August 1957 (IAC-M-303, item 6).
Secretary
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Z6 August 1957
Validity Study of NIE 100-5-55:
Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for
the Communist Bloc and the Free World
published 14 June 1955
1. This estimate dealt in general terms with the effects of
increasing nuclear capabilities on public attitudes and national
policies in the Communist and non-Communist world. Many of
its judgments involved long-term attitudinal trends which cannot
yet be measured or checked with any preciseness and with
contingent situations that have not yet arisen. In general we
believe that its conclusions remain sound and the succeeding
estimate, NIE 100-4-57 reaches many similar judgments, although
with somewhat differing emphasis as to the most important effects
of the nuclear situation.
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16 August 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 71. 2-56:
Outlook for Algeria,
published 5 September 1956
The attached validity study of NIE 71. 2-56, "Outlook for
Algeria, " published 5 September 1956, was noted by the IAC
on 13 August 1957 (IAC-M-302, item 4 c).
Secretary
SECRET "~?625
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IAC-D-100/45
16 August 1957
Validity Study of N1E 71.2-56:
Outlook for Algeria,
published 5 September 1956
NIE 71. 2-56 has proved incorrect in its most important
estimate: that there was a somewhat better than even chance
for an Algerian settlement within a 12-month period. The main
causes of that miscalculation were: (a) an overestimate of
France's willingness to face the realities of the Algerian
situation, (b) a failure to estimate the Mollet government's
adoption of an increasingly rightist policy toward Algeria, and
(c) the unforeseen armed intervention at Suez and the subsequent
intensely nationalistic French reaction. On the other hand, the
NIE did state that the Suez controversy would delay a settlement;
it correctly estimated a widened and intensified conflict if a
settlement were not achieved; and it was generally accurate in
predicting the position and policies of the Algerian nationalists.
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IAC-D-100/44
16 August 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 22-56:
The Outlook for France,
published 10 July 1956
The attached validity study of NIE 22-56, "The Outlook for
France, " published 10 July 1956., was noted by the IAC on
13 August 1957 (IAC-M-302, item 4 c).
Secretary
SECRET ~, 4c02
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ter'Wil
IAC-D-100/44
16 August 1957
Validity Study of NIE 22-56:
The Outlook for France,
published 10 July 1956
The conclusions of NIE 22-56 for the most part remain
valid; some were projected over the longer run and their
validity has not been fully tested. Warnings were given
regarding future economic difficulti es, but the present
financial problem developed in a manner which was not specifically
foreseen. The NIE correctly stated that an Algerian settlement
was unlikely in the near future, and that the French pacification
effort could be continued for some time; the longer-range
prediction of a trend toward a settlement "during the next
several years" still appears valid.
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IAC-D-100/42
22 July 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E ADVISORY C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 11-5-55;
Air Defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1955-1960,
published 12 July 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 11-5-55, "Air Defense
of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1955-1960," published 12 July 1955,
was noted by the IAC on 16 July 1957 (IAC-M-298, item 7 c).
Secretary
SECRET 6 6Oa2
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IAC -D -100 /42
22 July 1957
Validity Study of NIE 11-5-55:
Air Defense of the Sino-Soviet Bloc, 1955-1910
published 12 July 1955
We have examined the future projections set forth in
NIE 11-5-55, and find them to have been generally valid. Evidence
accumulated over the two-year period since completion of the
estimate indicates that, as predicted, Soviet air defense programs
have in fact emphasized the development and production of air defense
guided missiles, improved fighter aircraft, and improved radar
equipment. While more than half the period covered by NIE 11-5-55
is still in the future and therefore cannot be assessed as to validity,
our present estimate of Bloc air defense trends over the next
several years remains in close agreement with that made in 1955.
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IAC-D-100/41
25 June 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 62-54:
Probable Developments in Thailand,
published 7 December 1954
The attached validity study of NIE 62-54, "Probable Develop-
ments in Thailand, " published 7 December 1954, was noted by the
IAC on 18 June 1957 (IAC-M-294, item. 6 b).
Secretary
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_MW Imi
IAC-D-100/41
25 June 1957,
Validity Study of NIE 62-54:
Probable Developments in Thailand,
published 7 -December 1954
1. NIE 62-54 has proven to be a generally sound estimate.
Several internal developments were not foreseen in detail, including
the introduction of the "democratization" program in September 1955
and its effects on the 1957 elections, the downgrading of Phao's
strength in 1955 and 1957 and the ascendancy of Sarit.
2. The estimate foresaw the possibility of a Thai reassessment
of their foreign policy, although the developments which appear to be
bringing it about are somewhat different from the contingencies
discussed.
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IAC-D-100/40
25 June 1957
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Validity Study of NIE 71-55:
Probable Developments in French North Africa,
(insofar as it pertained to Tunisia)
published 29 November 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 71-55, "Probable Develop-
ments in French North Africa" (insofar as it pertained to Tunisia),
published 29 November 1955, was noted by the IAC on 18 June 1957
(IAC-M-294, item 4 b).
Secretary
Vqr
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IAC-D-100/40
25 June 1957
Validity Study of NIE 71-55:
Probable Developments in French North Africa,
(insofar as it pertained to Tunisia)
published 29 November 1955
NIE 71-55 (published 29 November 1955) correctly evaluated
the strength of Tunisian nationalist pressures for independence, and
predicted the impact which French concessions in Morocco would
have in Tunisia. However, it failed to estimate accurately the
rapidity with which Tunisia would achieve its independence, largely
because of the swift change in French policy.
Irnr
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IAC -D -100 / 39
13 June 1957
INTELLIGENCE A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study- of NIE 31-56:
Yugoslavia's International Position,
published 24 July 1956
The attached validity study of NIE 31-56, "Yugoslavia's
International Position, 1' published 24 July 1956, was noted by the
IAC on 11 June 1956 (IAC-M-293, item 3 c).
Secretary
SECRET
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I.A.C-D-100/39
13 June 1957
Validity Study of NIE 31-56:
Yugoslavia's International Position,
published 24 July 1956
Though many of the details in the discussion in the last
estimate on Yugoslavia (NIE 31-56, dated 24 July, 1956) have been
outmoded by the events in Poland and Hungary and by the subsequent
change in Soviet attitudes toward Yugoslavia, the general conclusions
and descriptions of Yugoslav policies and motivations contained
therein remain valid.
S'E
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IAC -D -100 / 38
7 June 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 36. 2-56:
The Outlook for Iraq's Stability and Foreign Policies,
published 17 July 1956
The attached validity study of NIE 36. 2-56, "The Outlook
for Iraq's Stability and Foreign Policies," published 17 July
1956, was noted by the IAC on 4 June 1957 (IAC-M-292,
item 5 c).
Secretary
SECRET
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IAC-D-100/38
7 June 1957
Validity Study of NIE 36.2-56:
The Outlook for Iraq's Stability and Foreign Policies,
published 17 July 1956
Although it has been found desirable to reassess the
outlook for Iraq in the light of the Suez crisis and other recent
developments in the Middle East, that review has confirmed
the analysis contained in NIE 36. 2-56 in virtually all major
respects.
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IAC-D-100/37
17 May 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 63-56:
Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam
Through Mid-1957,
published 17 July 1956
The attached validity study of NIE 63-56, "Probable Develop-
ments in North and South Vietnam, published 17 July 1956, was
noted by the IAC on 14 May 1957 (IAC-M-289, item 6 c).
Secretary
SECRET 6 64d,33
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IAC-D-100/37
17 May 1957
Validity Study of NIE 63-56:
Probable Developments in North and South Vietnam
Through Mid-1957,
published 17 July 1956
The conclusions of N1E 63-56, dated 17 July 1956, have been
generally borne out by events with the following exceptions:
a. The progress in establishing an adequate
administrative and control apparatus was overstated.
Subsequent DRV criticism has indicated that at the time
the land reform program was initiated the party structure
in many of the rural areas was weak and that many party
members at the time were nationalists rather than hard-
core Communists.
b. The degree of opposition and passive resist-
ance was understated and no allowance was made for
the eruption of open resistance within North Vietnam.
The conclusion that the regime would remain in firm
control has proven to be correct.
c. Economic progress in 1956 was greater than
estimated, particularly in rice production.
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9 May 1957
Validity Study of NME 36. 5-56:
The Outlook for US Interests in Libya,
published 19 June 1956
The attached validity of NIE 36. 5-56, "The Outlook for US
Interests in Libya," published 19 June 1956, was noted by the IAC
on 7 May 1957 (IAC-M-288, item 7 b),
Secretary
SECRET d jims
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IAC-D-100/36
9 May 1957
Validity Study of NIE 36. 5-56:
The Outlook for US Interests in Libya,
published 19 June 1956
NIE 36. 5-56 has generally held up well and remains useful as
a basic estimative analysis of Libya and US interests therein.
However, it has to some extent been outdated by the recent British
decision to make drastic reductions in its military and financial
commitments in Libya and other base areas and by the repercussions
of the Suez crisis. It should therefore be used only in conjunction
with SNIE 36. 5-57, in which these and other later developments are
taken into account.
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IAC-D-100/35
26 April 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y . C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 80-54:
The Caribbean Republics,
published 24 August 1954
The attached validity study of NIE 80-54, "The Caribbean
Republics," published 24 August 1954, was noted by the IAC on
23 April 1957 (IAC-M-286, item 5 c).
Secretary
SECRET ~ O O D 3L
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IAC-I)-100/35
26 April 1957
Validity Study of N1E 80-54:
The Caribbean Republics,
published 24 August 1954
1. NIE 80-54 raised the question as to whether existing regimes
could bring themselves to promote sufficient social and economic
progress to maintain a modicum of stability in the area or whether
static repression would lead to an eventual violent explosion. Since
1954 developments have been along the line of the first alternative,
although, as predicted, there has been no substantial improvement
in basic conditions. The Communists in the area have tended to play
the game more cautiously than prognosticated in NIE 80-54.
2. NIE 80-54 estimated that Somoza and Perez Jiminez were
unlikely to become reconciled to the continued existence of the
Figueres regime in Costa Rica, and identified this antagonism as the
greatest present threat to stability and order in the region. It did not
specifically predict the filibustering attack on Costa Rica early in
1955, with their covert support, or Perez Jiminez? subsequent with-
drawal from Central American affairs. Neither did it predict the
improvement in Costa Rican-Nicaraguan relations subsequent to the
assassination of President Somoza of Nicaragua. NIE 80-54 pointed
up the instability in Honduras which eventually led to the fall of the
government, but it did not anticipate the collapse of the Magloire
regime in Haiti. The 1954 estimate did not foresee the transfer of
the target of non-Communist subversive activity from the Central
American region to Cuba. Perhaps one reason for this failure was
the degree of confidence with which the political fortunes of Batista
were viewed at that time.
: Urr
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IAC-D-100/34
1 April 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 100-3-56:
Sino-Soviet Policy and Its Probable Effects in
Underdeveloped Areas,
published 24 April 1956
The attached validity study of NIE 100-3-56, "Sin.o-Soviet
Policy and Its Probable Effects in Underdeveloped Areas," published
24 April 1956, was noted by the IAC on 26 March 1957 (IAC-M-282,
item 8 b).
Secretary
SECRET ~ t~D
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1 April 1957
Validity Study of NIE 100-3-56:
Sino-Soviet Policy and Its Probable Effects in
Underdeveloped Areas,
published 24 April 1956
1. The general conclusions of the estimate appear to be valid.
Bloc credits have expanded rapidly, though Bloc trade not related
to its credit arrangements has increased more slowly than was im-
plicitly assumed. The strengthening of non-Communist markets
during 1956 has led to a substantially smaller economic dependence
on the Bloc for Burma, and Bloc trade declined significantly with
Argentina and Cuba.
2. The political effects of Bloc policy in the uncommitted
states in the Middle East and Asia appear to have been accurately
estimated. Some of them seem to have become more wary of the
implications of close ties with the Bloc, in part because of events
in Hungary. Nevertheless, the appeal of Bloc trade and aid
remains strong in most of the area.
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IAC-D-100/33
21 March 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 13-56:
Chinese Communist Capabilities and Probable
Courses of Action Through 1960,
_published 5 January 1956
The attached validity study of NIE 13.56, "Chinese Communist
Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through 1.960, " pub-
lished 5 January 1956, was noted by the IAC on 19 March 1957
(IAC-M-281, 19 March 1957, item 6 c).
Secretary
SECRET /M037
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IAC-D-100/33
21 March 1957
Validity Study of NIE 13-56:
Chinese Communist Capabilities and Probable
Courses of Action Through 1960,
published 5 January 1956
1. NIE 13-56 was a study of Chinese Communist capabilities
and probable courses of action from 1955 through 1960. As of the
end of 1956 the general conclusions and estimate's appear to be still
valid.
2. NIE 13-56 did not anticipate the rapidity with which the
regime would institute agrarian collectivization, or that such a
sweeping undertaking could be accomplished without initial wide-
spread peasant resistance or a serious fall in agricultural output.
However, the new collectives have not been fully tested and
despite its improving control mechanisms, potential peasant
dissatisfaction remains a problem, particularly in case of poor
harvests.
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IAC-D-100/31
21 February 1957
Validity Study of SNIE 12-3-56:
Probable Developments in Soviet-Satellite Relations,
published 27 November 1956
The attached validity study of SNIE 12-3-56, "Probable
Developments in Soviet-Satellite Relations," published 27
November 1956, was noted by the IAC on 19 February 1957
(IAC-M-278, item 5 c).
Secretary
SECRET 4
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IAC-D-100/31
21 February 1957
Validity Study of SNIE 12-3-56:-
Probable Developments in Soviet-Satellite Relations,
published 27 November 1956
Insufficient time has passed to permit an assessment of the
validity of this estimate. Its main conclusions still remain valid,
although it appears to have underestimated somewhat the probability
of a Soviet return to a harder policy, which seems implicit to recent
Soviet actions.
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IAC-D-100/30
15 February 1957
Validity Study of NIE 66-54:
Probable Developments in the Philippine Republic,
published 23 March 1954
The attached validity study of NIE 66-54, "Probable Develop-
ments in the Philippine Republic," published 23 March 1954, was
noted by-the IAC on 12 February 1957 (IAC-M-277, item 5 c).
Secretary
SECRET ~ 0,0
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IAC-D- 100/29
1 February 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 71- 55:
Probable Developments in French North Africa
(insofar as it pertained to Morocco),
published .29 November 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 71-55, "Probable Develop-
ments in French North Africa," (insofar as it pertained to Morocco),
published 29 November 1955, was noted by the IAC on 29 January
1957 (IAC-M-276,, item 8 c).
Secretary
SECRET b 0 oN-j
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IAC-D-100/29
1 February 1957
Validity Study of NIE 71-55:
4 f
Probable Developments in French North Africa
(insofar as it pertained to Morocco),
published 29 November 1955
NIE 71-55 (published 29 November 1955) failed to estimate
accurately the rapidity with which Morocco would achieve its
independence. France was compelled to make concessions during
the past year which NIE 71-55 had not anticipated. However, the
NIE correctly predicted that serious difficulties would arise over
definition of Morocco's independence within a "framework of
interdependence.
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IAC-D-100/28
24 January 1957
Validity Study of NIE 34-54:
Probable Developments in Iran Through 1955,
published 7 December 1954
The attached validity study of NIE 34-54, "Probable Develop-
ments in Iran Through 1955, " published 7 December 1954, was noted
by the IAC on 23 January 1957 (IAC-M-275, item 6 c).
Secretary
.E ,4 d
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IAC-D-100/28
24 January 1957
Validity Study of NIE 34-54:
Probable Developments in Iran Through 1955,
published 7 December 1954
NIE 34-54 has held up well in most respects for a period
considerably beyond its formal date of expiration; most of its
main judgments still appear to remain basically sound. However,
in stressing the continuing importance of popular discontent and
restlessness, the estimate failed to anticipate the extent to which
the Shah has thus far been successful in controlling such tendencies
and strengthening his own control of the government. In particular,
it did not anticipate that the Shah would solve the leadership problem
by installing a puppet cabinet. Similarly, the estimate failed to
anticipate that the Shah would adhere to the Baghdad Pact despite
the lack of real popular support for such a move and despite US
unwillingness to provide prior security and increased aid commit-
ments which might be used to justify Iranian adherence.
S 14
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I_AC-D-100/27
11 January 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 93-55:
Probable Developments in Brazil,
published 15 March 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 93-55, "Probable Developments
in Brazil, " published 15 March 1955, was noted by the IAC on 8 January
1957 (IAC-M-273, 8 January 1957, item 8 c).
Secretary
SECRET 66ONO
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LAC-D-100/27
11 January 1957
Validity Study of NIE 93-55:
Probable Developments in Brazil,
published 15 March 1955
1. NIE 93-55 correctly forecast the broad political and economic
developments in the 1955-1956 period, i. e., that Kubitschek would be
elected, that chronic political tension would continue, and that there
was little chance that the new administration would be able to deal
effectively with Brazil's deep-seated and politically dangerous economic
difficulties.
2. The unanticipated military split resulting from Lott's
November 1955 preventive coup led to an incorrect estimate of the
attitude of the military toward the new administration. Instead of the
armed forces united in opposition to the new administration, the latter
has army support.
3. Partly as a result of army influence in the present regime
and partly because of the US decision to provide substantial economic
assistance to Brazil, a moderate political course, rather than further
evolution to the left, as suggested in NIE 93-55, has thus far prevailed.
4. Documentation obtained during 1956 has revealed that NIE
93-55 greatly exaggerated the actual membership of the Communist
Party in Brazil.
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IAC-D-100/26
15 November 1956
Validity Study of NIE 52-55:
Probable Developments in Pakistan,
published 15 March 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 52-55, "Probable Developments
in Pakistan, " published 15 March 1955, was noted by the IAC on 13
November 1956 (IAC-M-266, 13 November 1956, item 9 c).
Acting Secretary
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IAC-D-100/26
15 November 1956
Validity Study of NIE 52-55:
Probable Developments in Pakistan,
published 15 March 1955
This estimate has been borne out by events in most respects, and
its basic analysis of the situation appears to remain valid. However,
it has inevitably become outdated in some respects. With the disappear-
ance from the political scene of Ghulam Mohammed, the character of
the ruling group has changed somewhat, particularly in the emergence
of Mirza as the dominant figure. The restoration of parliamentary
government, the series of political maneuvers leading to Suhrawardy's
elevation to the premiership, and the approach of general elections
under the new constitution have added new dimensions to the struggle
between the ruling group and its rivals. While Pakistan's economy
remains precarious, its immediate situation and prospects have im-
proved somewhat over the last year and a half, in part as a result of
US action. In the foreign affairs field, the ending of the honeymoon
period in US-Pakistani relations, the development of the Bloc campaign
to woo the Arab-Asian nations, and the increasing articulateness of
popular feeling on international questions have all made Pakistan
likely to be somewhat more restrained in its pro-Westernism than was
indicated in NIE 52-55.
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10 October 1956
Validity Study of NIE 43-55:
The Prospects of the Chinese Nationalist Government,
published 1 November 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 43-55, "The Prospects of the
Chinese Nationalist Government, " published 1 November 1955, was
noted by the IAC on 10 October 1956 1%AC-M-259, 9 October 1956,
item 6
Secretary
L DC~S
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IAC-D-100/25
10 October 1956
Validity Study of NIE 43-55:
The Prospects of the Chinese Nationalist Government,
published 1 November 1955
The major estimates in NIE 43-55 either have proven to be
correct or we continue to believe that they are valid. In particular,
although the international position of the Nationalist Government has
deterioriated as additional countries have recognized Communist
China, the Nationalists have maintained domestic stability and they
have succeeded in maintaining a rate of economic growth greater
than the rate of population increase.
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20 September 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 11-3-55:
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses
of Action Through 1960,
published 17 May 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 11- 3- 55, "Soviet Capabilities
and Probable Soviet Courses of Action Through 1960, published 17
May 1955, was noted by the IAC on 19 September 1956 (IAC-M-256,
19 September 1956, item 6 b).
Secretary
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20 September 1956
Validity Study of NIE 11-3-55:
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Soviet Courses
of Action Through 1960,
published 17 May 1955
Since the estimate covered a five-year period, many of its
particular statements are not subject to a test of validity. The events
of the intervening year and the work done on the successor paper,
NIE 11-4-56, permit the conclusion that during its useful life this
estimate was basically a sound guide for the most important judgments
affecting Soviet capabilities and policy. Like the two previous Soviet
estimates, NIE 11-3-55 failed to appreciate the range of the post-
Stalin regime's flexibility in both internal and external policy. In
addition, a number of specific estimates have had to be revised in
producing NIE 11-4-56, and in other respects possible developments
were. insufficiently emphasized or not anticipated at all. The following
more important defects are noted:
1. If current calculations are correct, NIE 11-3-55
underestimated the rate of Soviet economic growth over the
period 1955-1960, and implied that military expenditures
would constitute more of a problem for Soviet planners than
is now. believed to be the case. Changes in these estimates
which were recorded in NIE 11-4-56 resulted from new data
available on 1955 plan fulfillment, on the Sixth Five-Year
Plan, and from the study of military costs done for the first
time in connection with NIE 11-4-56.
2. NIE 11-3-55 failed to anticipate moves to reduce
the size of Soviet military forces, although it apparently
carried total military strength at too low a figure for 1955.
3. The rate of introduction of new heavy bomber types
to mid-1956 was substantially overestimated, and the build-
up in jet medium bombers may have been somewhat under-
e stimated.
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20 September 1956
4. The paper estimated that the Soviet reaction to
the initiation of West German rearmament would be more
forceful than has in fact proved to be the case, and at-
tached too much weight to the possibility of a Soviet with-
drawal from East Germany in exchange for neutralization
of a united Germany.
5. There was a failure to anticipate the scale and
scope of the Soviet program of trade and aid for under-
developed countries.
6. The estimate did not adequately anticipate the
scale and nature of Soviet activities in the Middle East.
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12 September 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 92-54:
Probable Developments in Bolivia,
published 19 March 1954
The attached validity study of N1E 92-54, "Probable Develop-
ments in Bolivia, " published 19 March 1954, was noted by the IAC
on 11 September 1956 (IAC-M-255, 11 September 1956, item 5c).
Secretary
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12 September 1956
Validity Study of NIE 92-54:
Probable Developments in Bolivia,
published 19 March 1954
NIE 92-54 proved to be generally sound. It correctly fore-
cast the course the MNR regime would follow during 1954-56,
both domestically and in its external relations. Among minor
deficiencies it proved a little too optimistic on economic progress,
somewhat too pessimistic on the political stability of the MNR and
unduly apprehensive over the adverse political consequences of
continued inflation.
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10 September 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 71-55:
Probable Developments in French North Africa,
(insofar as it relates to Algeria)
published 29 November 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 71-55, "Probable Develop-
ments in French North Africa, " (insofar as it relates to Algeria),
was noted by the IAC on 5 September 1956 (IAC-M-254, 5 September
1956, item 7 c).
Secretary
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10 September 1956
Validity Study of NIE 71-55:
Probable Developments in French North Africa,
(insofar as it relates to Algeria)
published 29 November 1955
The primary defect in NIE 71-55 as it pertained to Algeria
was failure to anticipate the rapidity with which the Algerian
nationalist drive toward independence would develop. This, in
turn, was in large measure due to the unexpected French grant
of "independence" to Morocco and Tunisia.
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16 August 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE-83:
Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa,
published 30 December 1953
The attached validity study of NIE-83, "Conditions and Trends
in Tropical Africa," published 30 December 1953, was noted by the
IAC on 14 August 1956 (IAC-M-252, item 7 c).
Secretary
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16 August 1956
Validity Study of NIE - 8 3:
Conditions and Trends in Tropical Africa,
published 30 December 1953
1. We believe that developments in Tropical Africa have
generally supported the estimates set forth in NIE-83, which was
the first National Intelligence Estimate on the area. There was a
tendency to underestimate the speed with which political consciousness
would develop and nationalist movements would gain momentum in some
territories. Thus, the predictions concerning the ability of the colonial
powers to maintain control over their Tropical African dependencies,
while correctly identifying the forces at work and valid for the period
between NIE-83 and the present, now require some restatement and
modification. Similar miscalculations of the rate of growth of African
discontent and aspirations also affected the short-term validity of the
regional estimates on French West Africa, the French Cameroons,
and Uganda. However, the regional estimates in general had a high
degree of validity.
2. Two aspects of the estimate were not developed in sufficient
detail. While we noted that Western colonial policies in Africa might
become a touchstone of relations between the Arab-Asian states and
the West, we failed to forecast the role which the Arab-Asian states
have rapidly come to play in African affairs. In addition, certain
estimates were made concerning the foreign policies which would be
pursued by African colonial territories once they had become inde-
pendent, but we did not call attention to the incentives to irredentism
and expansionism which are likely to influence future relations among
the African states themselves.
3. With the exceptions noted above, we believe that our estimates
were an accurate forecast of trends in the area. Despite the modifica-
tions of detail which are inevitable after a lapse of three years, the
analysis of political, racial, economic, and social problems remains
fundamentally correct. Moreover, although we did not forecast a
more active Soviet policy, we did point out the opportunities which
the area presented to the USSR.
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9 August 1956
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY C O MM I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 65-55:
Probable Developments in Indonesia Through 1955,
published 1 March 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 65-55, "Probable Developments
in Indonesia Through 1955, " published 1 March 1955, was noted by the
IAC on 7 August 1956 (IAC-M-251, item 15 c),
Secretary
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9 August 1956
Validit.y.Study of NIE 65-55:
Probable Developments in Indonesia Through 1955,
published 1 March 1955
1. One of the major conclusions of NIE 65-55, "that a government
dominated by: the Masjumi will probably emerge following the elections"
has been proven invalid by events. This conclusion was based on the
estimate that the election would be a three-cornered race between the
Masjumi, the PNI, and the PKI, and that the Masjumi would win the most
seats in the Parliament. We believed it would be able to form a coalition
government either with one or more of the smaller parties or by drawing
away the right wing of the PNI. In fact, however, the Masjumi received
a somewhat smaller popular vote than the PNI and the same number of
seats. Moreover, instead of there being but three major parties, the
election resulted in four: PNI, Masjumi, NU, and PKI. In this situa-
tion it was the PNI rather than the Masjumi that played the leading role
in organizing a cabinet. The major factor in this incorrect estimate of
the outcome of the elections was a failure to appreciate the strength of
NU, which was able to gain a sufficiently large share of the Moslem votes
to reduce Masjumi strength substantially and to become the third largest
party.
2. The other major conclusion, that Communist popular strength
was increasing and that the Communists would not resort to force during
the period of the estimate has proven valid.
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27 July 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 31-2-55:
Yugoslavia's International Position,
published 7 September 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 31-2-55, "Yugoslavia's
International Position," published 7 September 1955, was noted
by the IAC on 24 July 1956 (IAC-M-248, item 3 b).
Secretary
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27 July 1956
Validity Study of NIE 31-2-55:
Yugoslavia's International Position,
published 7 September 1955
1. This estimate, written from the vantage point of September
1955, was a little too cautious, but was essentially valid as of the time
it was written. It placed more stress on Tito's desire to maintain a
flexible position between the two major power blocs than we do at
present in the light of recent developments. However, it emphasized
that the development of Yugoslav-Bloc ties would continue and indicated
that this process would probably include "cautious moves toward re-
establishment of party-to-party ties." Yugoslavia's actual moves
during the intervening period have not materially varied from. those
predicted in NIE 31-2-55.
2. The principal shortcomings of NIE 31-2-55 were its failure
to anticipate how far and fast the Soviet leaders would go along lines
likely to reduce Yugoslav suspicions about them and how willing Yugo-
slavia would be tb; accept evidence that Soviet policy had indeed changed.
Although we expected that the_. USSR would make continuing efforts to'
convince the Yugoslavs of its good faith, NIE 31-2-55 did not :foresee
such developments as the violent denunciation of Stalin and Stalinism in
the Bloc. These developments in fields outside the narrow scope of
Yugoslav-Soviet relations per.-se have almost certainly done much to
convince Tito and his colleagues that Soviet policy was in fact
developing along lines desired by them and .that there would no longer
be "groat personal danger" in closer relations with the USSR. On its
side, Yugoslavia has accepted special bonds of friendship and common
interest with the USSR without waiting for the development of a
"significant" weakening of Kremlin control over the Satellites and the
emergence, of conditions in which Yugoslavia would have a "real voice
in Communist affairs." In short, the Russians have given more and
Tito has demanded somewhat less than we foresaw in NIE 31-2-55.
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20 July 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 91-54:
Probable Developments in Argentina:
published 9 March 1954
The attached validity study of NIE 91-54, "Probable Developments
in Argentina, " published 9 March 1954, was noted by the IAC on
17 July 1956 (IAC-M-247, 17 July 1956, item 10 c)o
Secretary
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20 July 1956
Validity Study of NIE 91-54;
Probable Developments in Argentina,
published 9 March 1954
1. NIE 91-54 did not anticipate the revolution which drove Peron
from power in 1955. We did not foresee that Peron would adopt a
virulent anti-Church policy such as developed after 1954, or the effects
of such a policy on the political scene. It overestimated Peron's
ability, through the policy of moderation followed after 1952, to repair
army loyalty shaken by the activities of Eva Peron prior to her death
in July of that year. NIE 91-54 also failed to give adequate weight to
the intentions and political determinations of the Argentine armed forces,
especially the navy. At the same time, it underestimated the negative
effects of Peron's policy of collaboration with the US on his support and
in providing, in connection with petroleum development, an issue with
patriotic overtones that lent itself to exploitation by his opponents.
2. The unforeseeable developments with respect to the Church
and the inadequacies of analysis indicated above produced the erroneous
conclusion that Peron, barring accidents or assassination, would be
safe through 1955. It was correctly anticipated that Peron's dis-
appearance would produce a struggle for power and that an army-backed
caretaker government would succeed him, but the implication in
NIE 91-54 that the navy would play a minor role rather than, as it now
does in fact, a determining one, was mistaken. The likelihood of larmy
disunity, which is a necessary condition of the navy's current political
significance, and the existence of navy leaders able and willing to
assume political power were not sufficiently considered.
3. Conclusidn;;a.s to the validity of our estimate that any suc-
cessor government to Peron would probably follow. the same general
internal and external policies must be reserved pending political
stabilization in Argentina.
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20 July 1956
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Validity Studies of:
NIE 63. 1-55, Probable Developments in North Vietnam
to July 1956, published 19 July 1955; and
NIE 63. 1-3-55, Probable Developments in Vietnam
to July 1956, published 11 October 1955
The attached validity studiee+'of NIE 63. 1-55, "Probable Develop-
ments in North Vietnam to July 1956," published 19 July 1955, and
NIE 63. 1-3-55, "Probable Developments in Vietnam to July 1956, "
published 11 October 1955, were noted by the IAC on 17 July 1956
(IAC-M-247, 17 July, item 9 c).
Secretary
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20 July 1956
Validity Studies of:
NIE 63. 1-55, Probable Developments in North Vietnam
to July 1956, published 19 July 1955; and
NIE 63. 1-3-55, Probable Developments in Vietnam
to July 1956, published 11 October 1955
1. The principal conclusions of NIE 63. 1-55 to the effect that
the DRV would not invade the South and would be unlikely to resume
widespread guerrilla activities in the South prior to the election
deadline have proven valid. Estimates that the "DRV will experience
no great difficulty in maintaining effective control of North Vietnam"
and that "the nationalist appeal of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV will
probably be reduced throughout Vietnam" also appear to be borne out
by events. As estimated, the Sino-Soviet Bloc has provided "sufficient
economic and technical assistance to meet minimum requirements for
stability and control. "
2. As estimated, the DRV, while covertly strengthening the
Pathet Lao movement, has refrained from launching an attack with
its own forces to seize Laos.
3. The estimate has proven correct in its conclusion that,
"The Communists now have few assets in Cambodia and will probably
be unable to develop a significant internal threat in that country until
their position is greatly strengthened in Laos or South Vietnam. In
the meantime, the DRV will probably continue its efforts to promote
friendly relations and to secure Cambodian neutrality."
4. The principal conclusions of NIE 63. 1-3-55 to the effect
that Diem would be able to cope with non-Communist dissident elements,
make further, progress in developing a more effective government, and
refuse to hold nationwide elections have generally proven valid. How-
ever, progress toward the creation of a new state in South Vietnam over
the past year has been somewhat greater than anticipated in
NIE 63. 1-3-55.
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20 July 1956
Validity Studies of
NIE 63. 1-55, Probable Developments in North Vietnam
to July 1956, published 19 July 1955; and
NIE 63. 1-3-55, Probable Developments in Vietnam
to July 1956, published 11 October 1955
The attached validity studiesi'of NIE 63. 1-55, "Probable Develop-
ments in North Vietnam to July 1956," published 19 July 1955, and
NIE 63. 1-3-55, "Probable Developments in Vietnam to July 1956, "
published 11 October 1955, were noted by the IAC on 17 July 1956
(IAC-M-247, 17 July, item 9 c).
Secretary
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20 July 1956
Validity Studies of:
NIE 63. 1-55, Probable Developments in North Vietnam
to July 1956, published 19 July 1955; and
NIE 63. 1-3-55, Probable Developments in Vietnam
to July 1956, published 11 October 1955
1. The principal conclusions of NIE 63. 1-55 to the effect that
the DRV would not invade the South and would be unlikely to resume
widespread guerrilla activities in the South prior to the election
deadline have proven valid. Estimates that the "DRV will experience
no great difficulty in maintaining effective control of North Vietnam"
and that "the nationalist appeal of Ho Chi Minh and the DRV will
probably be reduced throughout Vietnam" also appear to be borne out
by events. As estimated, the Sino-Soviet Bloc has provided "sufficient
economic and technical assistance to meet minimum requirements for
stability and control. It
2. As estimated, the DRV, while covertly strengthening the
Pathet Lao movement, has refrained from launching an attack with
its own forces to seize Laos.
3. The estimate has proven correct in its conclusion that,
"The Communists now have few assets in Cambodia and will probably
be unable to develop a significant internal threat in that country until
their position is greatly strengthened in Laos or South Vietnam. In
the meantime, the DRV will probably continue its efforts to promote
friendly relations and to secure Cambodian neutrality."
4. The principal conclusions of NIE 63. 1-3-55 to the effect
that Diem would be able to cope with non-Communist dissident elements,
make further progress in developing a more effective government, and
refuse to hold nationwide elections have generally proven valid. How-
ever, progress toward the creation of a new state in South Vietnam over
the past year has been somewhat greater than anticipated in
NIE 63. 1-3-55.
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11 July 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 22-55:
Probable Developments in France,
published 29 March 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 22-55, "Probable Develop-
ments in France," published 29 March 1955, was noted by the IAC
on 10 July 1956 (IAC-M-246, 10 July, item 5 c).
Secretary
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11 July 1956
Validity Study of NIE 22-55:
Probable Developments in France,
published 29 March 1955
NIE 22-55 proved invalid in these respects:
a. The estimate failed to appreciate the divisive
forces among the moderate parties that caused them to
split into center-left and center-right alignments in the
1956 elections. This in large measure was responsible
for the 50 percent increase in Communist seats in the
new Assembly, even though the same electoral law applied
in 1956 as in 1951 and the popular vote for the Communists
was, as estimated, almost the same as in 1951. (See
paras. 2, 25, and 21 with footnote. )
b. The impression given by the estimate was that
the Communists would remain in a greater degree of
political isolation than has in fact proved to be the case.
(Paras. 4, 30)
c. As was also the case in earlier estimates, NIE
22-55 has thus far proved distinctly pessimistic on the
prospects for French economic growth. Thus, it was
estimated in paragraph 38 that It. . . French economic
growth over the next four years is likely to be about equal
to that in 1950-1954, . . GNP is likely to rise by almost
three percent annually, and industrial production may in-
crease by almost four percent. . . ." Actually, GNP
increased in 1955 by 6. 3 percent while industrial production
increased by 10 percent. Although the 1956 rate of increase
is not likely to be as high as the 1955 rate, it will probably
substantially exceed the average annual figures given in
NIE 22-55.
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d. The estimate was overly pessimistic regarding
the outlook for French support of further supranational
European institutions. (Paras. 62-63)
e. NIE 22-55 overestimated the determination of
the French to remain in Tunisia and Morocco and to use
force in order to retain privileges. (Para. 66)
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27 June 1956
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Validity Study of NIE 32-55:
The outlook for Greece,
published 18 January 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 32-55, "The Outlook for
Greece," published 18 January 1955., was noted by the IAC on
26 June 1956 (IAC-M-244, 26 June 1956, item 6 c).
Secretary
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27 June 1956
Validity Study of NIE 32-55:
The Outlook for Greece,
published 18 January 1955
1. The judgments contained in NIE 32-55 were generally sound.
It correctly assessed the nature and importance of the effect which the
death or withdrawal of Prime Minister Papagos would have on the
general political situation. It did not estimate that Papagos' successor
would be `able to reconstitute a conservative grouping along the lines
of the Greek Rally and win new elections. In this connection the
estimate did not sufficiently take into account the role which the Palace
and the army can play in the final outcome of a Greek election. The
estimate's judgments on economic and military developments remain
generally valid.
2. The only major shortcoming of the estimate was its failure
to anticipate how far the Cyprus situation would deteriorate during
the estimative period. This was reflected in an incorrect prediction
that British influence in Greece would remain substantial and in a
failure to foresee the sharp rise in Greek-Turkish tension which has
taken place, together with the added internal political instability and
the increased strains in Greece's relations with the US and NATO
resulting therefrom.
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25 June 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of the Libyan Section of NIE 71-54:
Probable Developments in North Africa,
published 31 August 1954
The attached validity study of the Libyan section of NIE 71-54,
"Probable Developments in North Africa," published 31 August 1954,
was noted by the IAC on 19 June 1956 (IAC-M-243, 19 June 1956,
item 10 c).
Secretary
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25 June 1956
Validity Study of the Libyan Section of NIE 71-54:
Probable Developments in North Africa,
published 31 August 1954
1. With minor exceptions, the estimates concerning Libya
made in NIE 71-54 appear to have been. valid. The fundamental
factors noted in NIE 71-54 as affecting internal political stability
continue to do so. The analysis of Libyan external relations cor-
rectly assessed the prospects for passage of the US-Libyan Base
Agreement, further French-Libyan difficulties, the decline of
British influence in Libya, and Egypt's challenge to the Western
position in the kingdom.
2. NIE 71-54 (paragraph 66) did over-emphasize the extent
to which Turkey would successfully compete with Egypt for influence
in Libya. The estimate also did not anticipate the establishment of
diplomatic relations between Libya and the USSR or recent Soviet
gestures toward Libya.
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13 June 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 27.1-54:
r -- T
Probable Developments in Spain,
published 17 May 1954
The attached validity study of NIE 27. 1-54, "Probable Develop-
ments in Spain, " published 17 May 1954, was noted by the IAC on
12 June 1956 (IAC-M-242, 12 June 1956, item 4 c).
Secretary
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IAC-D-100/13
13 June 1956
Validity Study of NIE 27.1-54:
.^ I 1 I
Probable Developments in Spain,
published 17 May 1954
Over-all developments in Spain during the past two years have
not substantially altered the validity of NIE 27. 1-54. However,
events of the past six months have prompted us to be somewhat more
apprehensive concerning political stability, especially for the long
range, than we were in NIE V. 1- 54.
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24 May 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 100-4-55:
Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect
to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan Through 1955,
and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions
with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan,
published 16 March 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 100-4-55, "Communist
Capabilities and Intentions with Respect to the Offshore Islands and
Taiwan Through 1955, and Communist and Non-Communist Reactions
with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan," published 16 March 1955,
was noted by the IAC on 22 May 1956 (IAC-M-240, 22 May 1956,
item 7 c).
Secretary
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24 May 1956
Validity Study of NIE 100-4-55;
Communist Capabilities and Intentions with Respect
to the Offshore Islands and Taiwan Through 1955,
and Communist and ' Non-Communist Reactions
with Respect to the Defense of Taiwan,
published 16 March 1955
1. We believe that the statements in NIE 100-4-55 concerning
Chinese Communist objectives with respect to Taiwan remain valid.
Information currently available tends to confirm the estimates of
Chinese Communist military strengths and trends in capabilities.
2. Although it was estimated correctly that the Communists
would not attack Taiwan, events have not borne out the predictions
that "the Chinese Communists will probably undertake air, naval,
and artillery attacks against the Quemoy and the Matsu groups and
will probably attempt to seize lightly defended island outposts within
these groups" or that "they would make every effort to render the
Chinese Nationalist position on the offshore islands untenable by
bombardment, interdiction of supplies, and subversion."
3. The estimate generally under-rated the willingness of the
Chinese Communists to proceed cautiously and gradually toward
their objectives in the Taiwan Straits. It failed to anticipate the
shift in emphasis from military pressure to diplomatic and psycho-
logical means which occurred almost coincidentally with publica-
tion of the estimate.
4. The sections of the estimate dealing with reactions to
certain possible US courses of action have not been tested.
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9 May 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 79
Probable Developments in South Asia,
published 30 June 1953
The attached validity study of NIE 79, "Probable Develop-
ments in South Asia," published 30 June 1953, was noted by the
IAC on 8 May 1956 (IAC-M-239, 8 May 1956, item 9 c).
Secretary
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9 May 1956
Validity Study of NIE 79:
Probable Developments in South Asia,
published 30 June 1953
1. In general, the sections of NIE 79 dealing with India have
held up extremely well. While the estimate has to some extent
been outdated by such developments as the launching of the second
Five Year Plan and the major shift in Sino-Soviet Bloc tactics which
has taken place since it was produced, most of its judgments on
India still appear generally sound. NIE 79 specifically anticipated
India's resentment of US military aid to Pakistan and the increased
tension in the subcontinent which has ensued, and has thus far been
borne out in its judgment that these developments would neverthe-
less not result either in an India-Pakistan war or in an Indian
break with the West.
2. Viewed in retrospect, NIE 79 was probably somewhat
over-pessimistic in its assessment of the economic outlook,
particularly in its heavy emphasis on population pressure. With
the aid of two bumper crop years, India has already achieved a
rate of economic growth approximately double that of population
growth; the principal question now is whether India can achieve
the far more ambitious goals set out under the Second Five Year
Plan. However, we still agree with NIE 79's basic judgment that
even if the First Five Year Plan succeeded, India would still have
made only a start at solving the formidable economic problems
confronting it. And while the danger of population growth outstrip-
ping economic growth has receded for the present it will remain
a potential threat until and unless India can achieve a sustained
rate of economic expansion considerably higher than the present
one.
3. NIE 79's estimate that the Congress Party had an "ex-
cellent" chance of winning the 1957 elections is probably too
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9 May 1956
categorical in view of the uncertainties about voting behavior
revealed in recent elections in such similar countries as Pakistan,
Indonesia, and Ceylon. However, NIE 79's assessment of Con-
gress Party strengths and weaknesses still remains generally
valid.
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17 April 1956
Validity Studies of:
NIE 23-54, Probable Developments in West Germany,
published 20 December 1954, and
NIE 23-55, West Germany and the Reunification Issue,
published 28 June 1955
The attached validity studies of NIE 23-54, "Probable
Developments in West Germany," published 20 December 1954,
and NIE 23-55, "West Germany and the Reunification Issue,"
published 28 June 1955, were noted by the IAC on 17 April 1956
(IAC-M-237, 17 April 1956, item 6 c ).
Secretary
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17 April 1956
Validity Studies of:
NIE 23-54, Probable Developments in West Germany,
published 20 December 1954, and
NIE 23-55, West Germany and the Reunification Issue,
published 28 June 1955
1. NIE 23-54, "Probable Developments in West Germany,"
was approved by the IAC on 20 December 1954. In general, the
estimate remains valid, but on the whole both the pre-1957 and
longer-term politica. outlook for West Germany now appear to
be somewhat more uncertain than was estimated in NIE 23-54.
This estimate did not anticipate that the BHE and FDP would
leave the coalition, and did not foresee the increase of nationalist
tendencies. Moreover, the differences estimated in connection
with the Saar problem did not materialize.
2. NIE 23-55, "West Germany and the Reunification Issue,"
was approved by the IAC on 28 June 1955, shortly before the
Summit Conference. It was written at the time of some of the
early shifts in Soviet policy during the spring of 1955, but before
the much more relaxed atmosphere which developed after the
Summit Conference. Most of its major points still appear sound.
A few others, however, would require correction to correspond
to changes in the German atmosphere consequent to the Summit
and Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conferences.
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IAC-D-100/9
10 April 1956
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Validity Study of NIE 74:
Probable Developments in Burma Through 1953,
published 20 February 1953
The attached validity study of NIE 74, "Probable Developments
in Burma Through 1953," published 20 February 1953, was noted by
the IAC on 10 April 1956 (IAC-M-236, 10 April 1956, item 7 c).
ecre ary
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10 April 1956
Validity Study of NIE 74:
Probable Developments in Burma Through 1953,
published 20 February 1953
1. NIE 74 was primarily directed at the internal security
problem in Burma. This estimate accurately reflected the im-
provements in the security situation since the previous estimates
and it predicted correctly a slight improvement in prospects for
internal security and economic and political stability through the
rest of 1953.
2. _ In stating that ". . . Burma will probably continue to
accept /through 1953/ the assistance of the West in strengthening
its armed forces and its economy," the estimate failed to anticipate
the impact of the Chinese Nationalist troop issue on Burmese foreign
affairs. The TCA program was cancelled as of June 30,. 1953, pri-
marily because U Nu did not want to be in the position of accepting
US aid at the same time that Burma was attacking the US in the UN
on the issue of Chinese Nationalist irregulars in Burma. However,
the TCA projects already started were allowed to be completed and
the actual termination date of the TCA aid came well after the end
of 1953.
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20 March 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 11-7-55:
Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US
and Key Overseas Installations and Forces
Through 1 July 1958,
published 23 June 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 11-7-55, "Soviet Gross
Capabilties for Attack on the US and Key Overseas Installations and
Forces Through 1 July 1958," published 23 June 1955, was noted by
the IAC on 20 March 1956 (IAC-M-234, 20 March 1956, item 5 a).
Secretary
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IAC-D-100/7
20 March 1956
Validity Study of NIE 11-7-55:
Soviet Gross Capabilities for Attack on the US
and Key Overseas Installations and Forces
Through 1 July 1958,
published 23 June 1955
From a strictly intelligence standpoint, we are unable to test
the validity of most of the specific estimates made in NIE 11-7-55.
On the other hand, such evidence as we have concerning the Soviet
long-range bomber and air base development programs tends to
confirm the general trends indicated in that estimate, and no im-
1 ortant evidence has appeared to invalidate any of its major conclu-
sions. However, new intelligence on such Soviet weapons programs
as guided missiles and submarines suggests that the USSR might
give greater emphasis to those weapons systems in initial attacks
on US and key US overseas installations and forces, even though it
would still rely primarily on manned bombers through mid-1958.
This new evidence has been taken into account in the preparation of
NIE 11-56, and is especially reflected in our estimate of Soviet
capabilities for the latter part of the period covered by the new
estimate.
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28 February 1956
Validity Study of Estimates Regarding Soviet Policy
With Respect to Berlin
The attached validity study of the following estimates re-
garding Soviet policy with respect to Berlin was noted by the
IAC on 28 February (IAC-M-232, 28 February 1956, item 4 b):
NIE 81, "Probable Soviet Courses of Action With Respect to
Germany Through Mid-1954," 22 May 1953; NIE 11-55,
"Probable Soviet Response to the Ratification of the Paris Agree-
ments," 1 March 1955; NIE 11-3-55, "Soviet Capabilities and
Probable Courses of Action Through 1960," 17 May 1955; and
NIE 11 - 13 /1- 55, "Review of Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light
of the. Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference," 6 December 1955.
Secretary
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IAC-D-100/6
28 February 1956
Validity Study of Estimates Regarding Soviet Policy
With Respect to Berlin
1. Estimates regarding Soviet policy with respect to Berlin
were made in: NIE 81, "Probable Soviet Courses of Action with
Respect to Germany Through Mid-1954," 22 May 1953; NIE 11-55,
"Probable Soviet Response to the Ratification of the Paris Agree-
rnents," 1 March 1955; NIE 11-3-55, "Soviet Capabilities and
Probable Courses of Action Through 1960,1' 17 May 1955; and
NIE 11-13/1-55, "Review of Soviet Foreign Policy in the Light
of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference," 6 December 1955.
2. The statements concerning Berlin in these papers appeared
in different estimative contexts and are consequently not exactly
comparable. The first three estimates cited above considered
Soviet policy in Berlin in the context of the anticipated Soviet
response to West German rearmament. The latter estimate was
made after West German rearmament had already begun, and
after the attendant readjustment in Soviet policy had already be-
come apparent in its main outlines.
3. We believe that all of those estimates were correct in
their principal conclusion--that the USSR would be restrained in
its actions in Berlin by fear of precipitating general war, and
that it would not carry its pressure against the Western position
to the point of provoking a major crisis. At the same time, we
believe that the first three estimates were so expressed as to
permit the inference that the immediate Soviet reaction to West
German rearmament might include more severe pressures against
Berlin than we now believe likely.
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7 February 1956
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Validity Study of SE-48:
Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action of the
Republic of Korea with Respect to the Armistice in Korea,
published 13 October 1953
The attached validity study of SE-48, "Capabilities and
Probable Courses of Action of the Republic of Korea with
Respect to the Armistice in Korea," published 13 October 1953,
was noted by the IAC on 7 February (IAC-M-229, 7 February
1956, item 4 c).
Secretary
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7 February 1956
Validity Study of SE-48:
Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action of the
Republic of Korea with Respect to the Armistice in Korea,
published 13 October 1953
The last general estimate on the Republic of Korea was published
in 1948. Since that time there have been numerous estimates
dealing with the Korean War situation, with particular emphasis on
Communist capabilities and intentions. The last estimate dealing
with the ROK was SE-48, "Capabilities and Probable Courses of
Action of the Republic of Korea with Respect to the Armistice in
Korea, "dated 13 October 1953. This estimate was concerned
primarily with Rhee's capabilities and intentions unilaterally to
initiate military action in Korea and its principal conclusions
were as follows:
"The ROK has the capability, despite UNC surveillance
and countermeasures, to initiate courses of armed action
which would disrupt the armistice and might lead to the
resumption of full-scale hostilities. We believe that
despite some opposition there are enough ROK political
and military leaders who would obey any orders President
Rhee might issue to enable him to initiate unilateral
military action.''
"We believe that President Rhee will continue to
threaten unilateral renewal of hostilities to strengthen
his general bargaining position with regard to inter-
national discussions of the Korean problem. Moreover,
the possibility exists that President Rhee might initiate
military action against the Communists at any time."
Although the 'first quoted conclusions has not been subjected
to a test, we believe it remains valid. Rhee has continued to
threaten renewal of hostilities and we continue to believe that the
possibility exists that he might initiate military action at any time.
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7 February 1956
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Validity Study of NIE, 24- 54:
Probable Developments in Italy,
published 16 November 1954
The attached validity study of NIE 24-54, "Probable
Developments in Italy," published 16 November 1954, was
noted by the IAC on 7 February (IAC-M-229, 7 February 1956,
item 5 c).
Secretary
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7 February 1956
Validity Study of NIE 24-54:
Probable Developments in Italy,
published 16 November 1954
1. NIE 24-54 estimated developments in Italy through 1958.
Hence the validity of its judgments cannot now be fully determines.
In general, its principal conclusions appear to be still sound.
2. In particular, the social and economic weaknesses noted
in NIE 24-54 as basic to the Italian situation persist, and no sub-
stantial mitigation of these conditions is in sight. Developments
since the publication of NIE 24-54 have tended to substantiate
many of its other significant estimates, e. g.: (a) the Communists
would be unlikely to come to power either electorally or by force,
although the basic electoral appeal of the Communists would remain
great; (b) the Scelba government would probably be replaced by
mid-1955; (c), indications pointed toward a moderate leftward
swing in Italian domestic policy; (d) the Italian government would
attempt to implement economic and social reforms but obstacles
to implementation of far-reaching programs, including divisions
within the center coalition, would remain formidable; and (e)
the Christian-Democrats would improve their organization and
probably make some net electoral gains, while rightist parties
would. suffer a further recession in popularity.
3. Nevertheless, NIE 24-54 though recognizing difficulties
within the coalition did not anticipate the extent to which these and
other developments would increase the chances of political coop-
eration between the center parties and the Nenni Socialists.
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10 January 1956
Validity Study of NIE 12-54:
Probable Developments in the European Satellites
Through Mid-1956,
published 24 August 1954
The attached validity study of NIE 1Z-54, "Probable
Developments in the European Satellites Through Mid-1956, "
published 24 August 1954, was approved by the IAC on
10 January (IAC-M-225, 10 January 1956, Secretary's Note
3).
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10 January 1956
Validity Study of NIE 12-54:
Probable Developments in the European Satellites
Through Mid-1956,
published 24 August 1954
1. NIE 12-54 appears to have been in general an adequate
statement of the aims of the Soviet Union in the Satellite area and
of the probable courses of action of the Satellite regimes. With
the lapse of one year, however, certain modifications of 12-54
appear to be indicated.
2. In its political sections, NIE 12-54 lays great emphasis
on the firmness of Soviet control and the character of the control
system. While this emphasis was justified, there was little dis-
cussion of the problems which confronted Soviet policy makers in
their efforts to maximize the value of the Satellites to the USSR,
nor any appreciation of alternative approaches to these problems
which Soviet leaders might consider. The over-all effect of 12-54
is to imply inflexibility on the part of the Soviets at a time when in
fact the implementation of their policy was undergoing modification.
3. The estimates for the growth of GNP and for nonagri-
culture production for the years 1954- 1956 appear to have been
somewhat low. In the case of East Germany, however, the pro-
jected rate of economic growth appears to have been high. Whereas
we had estimated that by 1956 East Germany would replace Poland
as the leading contributor to Satellite GNP, we no longer believe
this to be the case. We now think that this will not take place even
by 1960. The estimate did not take sufficient account of the extent
and concreteness of projects for increased regional coordination
of planning to begin in 1956.
4. In the military field, NIE 12-54 overestimated per-
sonnel strength increases of Satellite ground forces and under-
estimated the combat effectiveness of ground and air forces,
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10 January 1956
including their political reliability. ME 12-54 estimated aug-
mentation of Satellite ground forces of 150, 000 men by mid-1955.
It is now believed that ground forces will increase in strength by
only 115, 000 by 1960. We believe this will occur despite
Satellite announcements of proposed strength reductions. As to
reliability, in NIE 12-54 we estimated the Satellite armed forces
through 1956 would remain questionable enough to place a sig-
nificant limitation on their usefulness in the event of general war.
On reconsideration, we now believe that their combat effectiveness,
including reliability, and especially that of ground forces, was sub-
stantially greater than estimated.
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10 January 1956
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of NIE 64- 55:
Communist Prospects in Malaya and British Borneo,
published 24 May 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 64-55, "Communist
Prospects in Malaya and British Borneo, published 24 May 1955,
has been approved by the Board of National Estimates and the
IA:C representatives, It will be placed on the agenda of the IAC
meeting scheduled for 17 January 1956, for noting.
Secretary
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10 January 1956
Validity Study of N1E 64- 55:
Communist Prospects in Malaya and British Borneo,
published 24 May 1955
1. Many conclusions of NIE 64-55, "Communist Prospects
in Malaya and British Borneo" still appear to be sound, particularly
those dealing with the effects of external contingencies and the de-
termination of the UK to prevent local groups under Communist
control from seizing power. The paper also estimated correctly
that the Communists would follow a policy of subordinating guerrilla
warfare to political penetration and subversion. However, because
of its focus on the military aspects of the Communist problem, the
discussion did not highlight a number of the more general racial
and nationalist problems in the area.
2. NIE 64-55 foresaw an Alliance victory in the Federation's
first legislative elections, but did not predict so sweeping a victory
as actually developed. Accordingly, the discussion underplayed
the potential of the native non-Communist movements, and did not
indicate clearly that the native government would acquire a fairly
strong position for negotiation with the British and that the pace of
British concessions to a local government might exceed the "suc-
cession of small advances toward autonomy" (Para. 29) which
the estimate projected. In particular, the recent British willing-
ness to modify their position that an end to the state of emergency
is a precondition for further steps toward self-government would
seem to be at variance with the spirit if not the letter of the estimate
that: "the British authorities almost certainly will continue to
advertise and demonstrate their intention to retain ultimate power
in Malaya--.while gradually turning over civil responsibilities to
the local leaders--until the Communist threat has been extinguished.
(Para. 34)
3. The section on Singapore appears to have substantially
underestimated the rate of growth in Communist influence that
has taken place in the last six months. In particular, the mushrooming
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of Communist-influenced trade unions was not foreseen, The
substantial Communist influence exerted within the key PAP-
controlled unions has already largely invalidated the estimate
that Communists will be prevented "from gaining full control
of important mass organizations except for Chinese student
groups. " (Para. 47) The expansion of Communist strength
and capabilities has been great during the past half year, and
was not accurately charted by a basic estimate that "some ex-
pansion. . . appears likely." (Para. 47)
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8 December 1955
Validity Study of NIE 70:
Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US Security,
published 12 December 1952
The attached vali,dity:.study of NIE 70, "Conditions and Trends
in Latin America Affecting US Security, ".published 12 December 1952,
was noted by.the IAC on 6.December (IAC-M-221, 6 December 1955,
Item 4 c).
S ecretary
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8 December 1955
Validity Study-of NIE 70:
Conditions and Trends in Latin America Affecting US Security,
published 12 December 1952
1. The basic social, economic, and military conditions in
Latin America continue to be those described in NIE 70. Current
developments confirm the characterization of Latin America in
NIE 70 as an area experiencing accelerated social change accom-
panied by rapid, but unbalanced, economic development, and
consequently a region of political instability.
2. The key political estimate in NIE 70, a continuing trend
toward radical nationalistic regimes, has not been borne out by'
current developments. Instead, the present tendency is toward a
more moderate political orientation in Latin America. However,
the basic conditions which underlay the. political estimate in NIE 70
are still present and potentially effective.
3. The reversal of the trend toward radical nationalistic
regimes and the increased willingness of Latin America to co-
operate with the United States were caused by external as well as
internal factors. In some cases the United States exerted a
positive influence to reverse the trend toward extremism identified
in NIE 70 and other intelligence estimates. In Bolivia and Guatemala,
for example, contributions were made to the emergence and preser-
vation of moderate, anti-Communist leadership. Among other
external factors the end of the Korean War reduced Latin American
fears of involvement and encouraged a greater willingness to co-
operate with the United States. Internal factors centered in the
failure of radical and demagogic Latin American regimes to
satisfy the demand for more rapid material progress. In Argentina
and Brazil such regimes intensified social cleavages which pro-
voked reactions by military elements.
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Validity Studies of National Estimates
1. On 26 April 1955 the IAC adopted a procedure for two
kinds of review subsequent to the completion of NIE's: an
immediate post-mortem on each estimate, and validity studies
after the lapse of an appropriate interval to determine how good
the estimate was in the light of subsequent developments
(IA.C-M-194, 26 April 1955, Item 3).
2. In accordance with this decision, validity studies have
recently been undertaken on those estimates agreed by the Board
of National Estimates and the IAC representatives to be suitable
for such an analysis. The attached validity study of NIE 71-54,
"Probable Developments in North Africa, " published 31 August
1954, was noted by the IAC on 6 December (IAC-M-221,
6 December 1955, Item 3 c).
Secretary
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8 December 1955
Validity Study of NIE 71- 54:
Probable Developments in North Africa,
published 31 August 1954
1. NIE 71- 54 for the most part remains a basically valid
estimate. Various paragraphs dealing with the current situation
and short-term developments are out-dated in many respects, but
to no greater degree than would normally be anticipated as a re-
sult of the passage of time. Most of the longer-range estimates
cannot be tested at this early date, but so far they appear to be
generally accurate.
2. Current developments are tending to confirm the key
estimates in NIE 71-54 that: (a) there would be a continued growth
in nationalist activity in all three North African areas; and (b)
France would probably grant a degree of internal autonomy, first
in Tunisia and later in Morocco, but would not fully satisfy in-
creasing nationalist demands. As stated in the NIE, France has
sought to avoid concessions which would endanger its strategic
control or would destroy the privileged position of the settlers of
French descent.
3. However, NIE 71-54 failed to reflect adequately in
terms of timing two significant developments over the past year:
the early outbreak of nationalist violence in Algeria, and the
sharp acceleration of such violence in Morocco. The short-term
effect on Algeria of events in Tunisia and Morocco was not given
sufficient emphasis in the NIE. Moreover, lacking intelligence on
the development of the CRUA, a revolutionary faction within the
extremist wing of Algerian nationalism, we did not anticipate
violence on the scale of the November 1954 uprising in northeast
Algeria. With regard to terrorism in French Morocco, NIE 71-54
did not indicate sufficiently clearly the likely short-term effect of
nationalist pressure on the French.
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8 December 1955
4. With respect to Libya, much of the background discussion
is still basically 'valid, although various details have become out-
dated. NIE 71-54 correctly estimated such short-term developments
as successful conclusion of the US base agreement and increased
friction between France and Libya over the Fezzan. The longer-
range estimates might be worded somewhat differently if written
now, but we believe they remain generally accurate.
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September 7, 1978
PA/HO - Paul Claus sent-toc."
INR/DDR - Ms. LaBrie
SUBJECT: Request for Documents
/01
- 411d
?1-
Several members of our staff would like to review the following
documents:
IAC-D-50/4
National Intelligence Objectives
10 Jan. 1955
IAC-D-57/18
Post-Mortem on NIE 36.1-55
15 Nov. 1955
IAC-D-57/19
Post-Mortem on SNIE 30-3-55
29 Nov. 1955
IAC-D-57/21
Post-Mortem on NIE 30-4-55
20 Dec. 1955
IAC-D-98
Glossary of Intelligence Terms
22 Aug. 1955
IAC-D-98/1
Glossary of Intelligence Terms
12 Sept. 1955
IAC-D-55/10.2
NSC Status Report on Foreign
Intelligence Programs
16 July 1956
IAC-D-55/11
Memo for IAC and Chairman IAC
Subcommittee
- Subcommittee
AC-D-100/8 Validity Study
IAC-D-64
Jan. 1953
IAC-D-64/1
Jan. 1954
IAC-D-64/2
Jan. 1955
My extension has been changed once again; it is now 28517. Could
you call me or Ms. Lynn Fliakas (ext. 29477) when any documents are
available for pickup.
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TS #141679/d
Copy No. Z:
IAC-D-100/54
26 December 1957
I N T E L L I G E N C E A D V I S O R Y C O M M I T T E E
Validity Study of ICBM Estimate Made in NIE 11-5-57:
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in
the Guided Missile Field,
published 12 March 1957
The attached validity study of the ICBM estimate made in
NIE 11 T5-57, "Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in
.the Guided Missile Field;" published 12 March 1957, was noted
by the IAC on 17 December 1957 (IAC-M-321, item 8 c).
Secretary
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TS #141,679/d
IAC-D-100/54
26 December 1957
Validity Study of ICBM Estimate Made in NIE 11-5-57:
Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in
the Guided Missile Field,
published 12 March 1957
The estimate in NIE 11-5-57 was made in the absence of
evidence which could be associated directly with Soviet development
of an ICBM. Since its publication in March 1957, some evidence
relating to Soviet ICBM development has been acquired. In the light
of this new evidence, we believe that NIE 11-5-57 correctly esti-
mated that the.USSR attached a high priority to acquisition of an
ICBM capability, and that it possessed or was rapidly acquiring the
necessary data for solution of ICBM development problems. The
new evidence indicates, however, that we underestimated the scale
of effort and the rapidity with which the USSR was solving its
problems. On the basis of this evidence, we have now advanced the
estimated date of first operational capability from 1960-1961 (as
estimated in NIE 11-5-57) to sometime in the period mid-1958 to
mid-1959.
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IAC -D -100 / 43
5 August 1957
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Validity Study of NIE
Probable Developments in the United Kingdom,
published 8 February 1955
The attached validity study of NIF Z1-55, "Probable Develop-
ments in the United Kingdom, " published 8 February 1955, was
noted by the IAC on 30 July 1957 (IAC-M4300, item 7 c).
Secretary
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IAC-D-100/43
5 August 1957
Validity Study of NIE 21,55:
i 1
Probable Developments in the United Kingdom,
published 8 February 1955
NIE 21-55 has proven correct in most of its Judgments. It
pointed put, among other things, that fairly substantial changes
would be made in the military establishment. We correctly foresaw
some of the changes which have been made, although we did not
predict the extent to which the UK would revamp its concepts regarding
defense against nuclear attack and would shift to the nuclear deterrent
concept. We also failed to foresee the extent to which US-UK dif-
ferences would develop over the Middle East.
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TS #141565
IAC-D-100/32
21 March 1957
Copy No.
INTELLIGENCE AD VISORY COMMIT TEE
Validity Study of
NIE 11-6-54, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs
in the Guided Missile Field, 5 October 1954,
and its Supplement,
NIE 11-12-55, Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and
Probable Programs, 20 December 1955
The attached validity study of NIE 11-6-54, "Soviet
Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field,"
published 5 October 1954, and its Supplement, NIE 11-12-55,
"Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and Probable Programs,"
published 20 December 1955, was noted by the IAC on 19 March
1957 (IAC-M-281, item 3 b).
Secretary
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IMP Efi
TS #141565
IAC-D-100/32
21 March 1957
Validity Study of
NIE 11-6-54, Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs
in the Guided Missile Field, 5 October 1954,
and its Supplement,
NIE 11-12-55, Soviet Guided Missile Capabilities and
Probable Programs, 20 December 1955
1. Firm evidence is still extremely meager except in isolated
cases, and our present estimate suffers many of the same limitations
as did NIE 11-6-54. The fact that good correlation exists between
certain findings in the present estimate and its predecessors is not a
sound basis for establishing the validity of NIE 11-6-54. However,
in this new and complex field, where positive intelligence is still
minimal, the findings in NIE 11-6-54 are considered to have been
basically sound with respect to concept, scientific and technical
capability, and general trends of the Soviet guided missile program.
2. The importance of this field of intelligence warrants a
more extensive presentation than usual of our examination for
validity of those types of missile systems for which new intelligence
has become available:
a. Surface-to-Air
(1) NIE 11-6-54 estimated that a 10-12 nautical
mile system could be operational in 1954, which
could carry a 600 pound warhead to an altitude of
50, 000 feet. This system could be improved in
1955 to engage targets at 15-17 nautical miles, and
by 1958 could have a maximum range of 25 nautical
miles at 60, 000 feet altitude.
(2) NIE 11-12-55 did not change the above, but
stated additionally that this system was being in-
stalled around Moscow and had been at least partially
operational since 1955, predicting that all launching
sites would be operational by the end of 1956.
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21 March 1957
(3) NIE 11-5-57 has not changed these estimates,
except to estimate that the 25 nautical mile range at
60, 000 feet altitude has now been reached--one year
earlier than predicted in NIE 11-6-54. An estimate
is also made that all the sites around Moscow are
probably now operational.
(4) In this missile type, NIE 11-6-54, as supple-
mented, is considered to have been generally valid.
(b) Air-to-Surface
(1) NIE 11-6-54 and its supplement both estimated
that the USSR could have a subsonic missile of 50
nautical mile range for primary use against ship
targets operational in 1956-1957.
(2) NIE 11-5-57 cites evidence that a missile
of this type has reached at least final flight test
stage.
(3) In this missile type, NIE 11-6-54 is con-
sidered to have been generally valid.
(c) Surface-to-Surface (Submarine Launched)
(1) NIE 11-6-54 and its supplement estimated
that the USSR could have a subsonic, cruise-type
missile of 500 nautical miles maximum range for
use with a submarine in 1955. Several guidance
systems were estimated as possible and the ac-
curacies would vary with the guidance system used.
(2) NIE 11-5-57 did not change the above estimate.
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IAC -D -100 / 32
21 March 1957
(3) The amount of evidence obtained has been
meager. It tends to strengthen the previous
estimates, but does not permit an evaluation of
their validity.
d. Surface-to-Surface (Ballistic)
(1) NIE 11-6-54 estimated that the USSR could
have in 1954 missile systems of this type operational
to ranges of 350 and 500 nautical miles. Shorter
range missiles of unspecified ranges were also esti-
mated. A missile of 900 nautical miles range with
a 3000 pound payload was estimated for first opera-
tional use in 1957, or, at the earliest possible date,
in 1955.
(2) NIE 11-12-55 estimated that the USSR was not
developing a 500 nautical mile ballistic missile. It
also changed the estimated range of the 900 nautical
mile missile to 850-900 nautical miles and its first
operational date to 1955-1956.
(3) On the basis of new intelligence, NIE 11-5-57
reiterates the previous estimate on the 350 nautical
mile missile except that the missile accuracy is
believed better. Shorter range missiles are now
specified as 75 nautical miles and 175-200 nautical
miles. New intelligence leads us to believe that the
previously estimated 850-900 n. m. missile now has
a maximum range of 700 n. m., and refinements in
our calculations indicate that this missile carries a
6, 000 pound payload.
(4) NIE 11-6-54 and its supplement are considered
to have been generally valid regarding Soviet capa-
bilities to develop these missile types, but they
incorrectly estimated that the USSR intended to
maximize its range capabilities in the 500-900
nautical mile range band.
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