REPORT ON INSPECTION PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN POSSIBLE US-USSR AGREEMENT BANNING PRODUCTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF LONG-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2006
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: July 11, 1958
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECRET
TS #141799
IAC-D-119/2
11 July 1958
Limited Distribution
Copy No. Z..7.
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
112p.21.1.2ak:Lopection P?!oblcriste: involved in Posoible
nanapinionsma.....01?MNIK?^?11.004? MD.
US-USSR _Agreement Banning Production and
aze 12Lar....lent of Long-Range Bantic Missilas
Jaar.c. N111.11?1?M. AKA ..rtmagdorar
References: IAC.0-119, 26 MFLy 1958
IAC-D-119/1, 3 July 1558
IAC-M-351, item 3
1. Attached is a copy of Mr. Dulles' letter to Mr. Farley of the
State Department, transmitling the above report, which was discussed
at the IAC meeting on 8 July.
2. We are also enclosing copies of a revised "Foreword" and
page 4 for this report, which were insert:ed in the copies sent to Mr.
Farley and should be substituted for corresponding pages in the copies
of the report which you hold. These pages were redrafted to take
account of the IAC discussion and certain remarks by General Schweizer.
With respect to page 4, please note that the former paragraph 4 c has
been converted into a footnote an is now referred to as an assumption
rather than as a fact or estimate.
25X1
S TAT
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t) Leff
Secretary
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TS #141799
0 IAC.D-119/Z
11 July 1958
Limited Distribution
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D. C.
Office of the Director
10 July 1958
Mr. Philp J. Farley
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Farley:
I am forwarding two copies cf a report on "Problems and Feasi-
bility of an Inspection Program for a Poeible US-USSR Agreement to
Ban Production and Deployment of Long Range Ballistic Missiles,"
which was prepared to meet a specific requirement of the Department
of State, as outlined in your letter to me of 23 May.
This paper was drafted by an ad hoc working group of technical
experts, including a number of Department of Defense officers and
representatives of missile contractors who are not associated with the
intelligence community. Consequently, this report should not be con-
sidered or used as an intelligence paper which has been formally
approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee or the Central
Intelligence Agency.
I wish also to note that, during their discussion of this paper at
the IAC meeting on 8 July, various IAC members emphasized that this
report should be treated as one prepared solely to meet a specific re-
quest, and that certain statements contained therein should be used with
caution and only in the context of the entire report. It was pointed out,
for example, that the validity of the assumption in the footnote to para-
graph 4 b would depend on the extent to which many pertinent factors
were taken into account, including: number and location of targets,
degree of hardness of bases, dLi5per sal and alert status of defense
forces, defense and early warning systems, yield of weapons, CEP,
reliability of ICBM systems and the nature and effectiveness of other
available weapons systems.
Sincerely,
/6/
Allen W. Dulles
Director
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LIM7T7D 11130
9 July 1958
FOREWORD
The material in this study is based on a symposium held at
CIA on 9 and 10 June 1958 and on supplementary discussions held
during the month of June. Tab A is a list of individuals who
participated in the symposium and discussions. These individuals
contributed significantly to the substance of this report; the
opinions, conclusions and recommendations included herein are
the viewi of Members of the task force. Therefore, this report
should not be considered or used as an intelligence paper which
has been formally approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee
or the Central Intelligence Agency.
Tab C is an annotated agenda for the symposium and Tab D is
a summary of a briefing presented at the symposium covering those
aspects of the USSR and its long range ballistic missile program
appropriate to the problem at hand.
The findings in this report are considered to be preliminary.
5.0-P
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Nome
h. FACTS BEARING ON THE MEM:
c. National Intelligence Estimates* imly that the USSR could have
available the following long range ballistic missiles:
Time
Number
700 nm
1960
700
1000 nm
1960
100
1.962
200
ICBM
1960
100
1961-2
500
h. The attainment of the capability to neutralize the US SAC**
retaliatory forces through attack by long range ballistic
missiles would represent such a military advantage to the
USSR as to encourage the deliberate evasion of a US-USSR
inspection agreement, particularly if coupled with the
development of a highly effective Soviet sir defense system
against manned bombers. Furthermore, the desire to *thieve
a significant operational capability in anticipation of an
inspection agreement may be so great that the USSR might
bend every effort to attain the desired strike capability
earlier than estimated (see 4.a. above) and might delay
completion of an inspection agreement until this is
accomplished. However, the USSR would know that US detection
of evasion - or even a strong suspicion of evasion - would
raise grave dangers of strong US reaction.
5. DISCUSSIONI
a. In considering the problem it is necessary to distinguish
between the activities and facilities involved in the pro-
duction and deployment of long range ballistic missiles under
normal conditions and those involved under conditions of an
inspection agreement. Many of the activities which would
be carried out under normal conditions are almost unique
to these types of activities and could be detected by an
inspection system; however, under conditions or an inspection
agreement, may of these unique activities would be eliminated.,
and the concealment of others could be attempted.
zoriet .,-.ilities and Probable Pro ams in the
** Solely for the purposes of this paper it is assumed that roughly
200 to 500 long range ballistic missiles together with the requisite
launching capabilities sufficient to salvo this number of weapons
would be a likely Soviet requirement to neutralize SAC. The current
and projected medium bomber capabilities supplemented by long range
ballistic missiles would be Deeded to neutralize the NATO retaliatory
force.
T-O.P
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11 July 1958
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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Re ort. on lauection P:,..oblcone involved in Possible
IzzEm..4.11.9.22...nertt Banning Production and
71.1.22rS.Of LOn Z.Rari
References: IAC.13-119, 26 Mal, 1958
IAC-D-119/1, 3 July 1958
IAC-M-351? item 3
1. Attached is a copy of Mr. Dulles' letter to Mr. Farley of the
State Department, transmitting the above report, which was discussed
at the IAC meeting on 8 July.
2. We are also enclosing copies of a revised "Foreword" and
ap...R.3 for this report, which were insorf:ed in the copies sent to Mr.
Farley and should be substituted for corresponding pages in the copies
of the report which you hold. These pages were redrafted to take
account of the IAC discussion and certain remarks by General Schweizer.
With respect to page 4, please note that the former paragraph 4 c has
been converted into a footnote and is now referred to as an assumption
rather than as a fact or estimate.
Attachments - 2
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JOHN HEIRES
Secretary
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TS #141799
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11 July 1958
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Washington, D. C.
Office of the Director
10 July 1958
Mr. Philp J. Farley
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D. C.
Dear Mr. Farley:
I am forwarding two copies of a report on "Problems and Feasi-
bility of an Inspection Program for a Possible US-USSR Agreement to
Ban Production and Deployment of Long Range Ballistic Missiles,"
which was prepared to meet a specific requirement of the Department
of State, as outlined in your letter to me of 23 May.
This paper was drafted by an ad hoc working group of technical
experts, including a number of Department of Defense officers and
representatives of missile contractors who are not associated with the
intelligence community. Consequently this report should not be con-
sidered or used as an intelligence paper which has been formally
approved by the Intelligence Advisory Committee or the Central
Intelligence Agency.
I wish also to note that, during their discussion of this paper at
the IAC meeting on 8 July, various IAC members emphasized that this
report should be treated as one prepared solely to meet a specific re-
quest, and that certain statements contained therein should be used with
caution and only in the context of the entire report. It was pointed out,
for example, that the validity of the assumption in the footnote to para-
graph 4 b would depend on the extent to which many pertinent factors
were taken into account, including: number and location of targets,
degree of hardness of bases, dispersal and alert statue of defense
forces, defense and early warning systems, yield of weapons, CEP,
reliability of ICBM systems and the nature and effectiveness of other
available weapons systems.
Sincerely,
/5/
Allen W. Dulles
Director
TOP SECRET
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T -0 -P S-E-C-R-E-T
FOREWORD
53p secret
9 Jay 1958
The material in this study is based on a symposium held at
CIA on 9 and 10 June 1958 and on supplementary discussions held
during the month of june. Tab A is a list of individuals who
participated in the symposium and discussions, These individuals
Iontributed significantly to the substance of this report; the
opinions, conclusions and recommendations included herein are
the viewi of members of the task force. Therefore, this report
should not be considered or used as an intelligence paper which
has been formally approved by the Intelligente Advisory Committee
or the Central Intelligence Agency.
Tab C is an annotated agenda for the symposium and Tab D is
a summary of a briefing presented at the symposium covering those
aspects of the USSR end its long range ballistic missile program
appropriate to the problem at hand.
The findings in this report are considered to be preliminary.
11.0-P 8-E-C-R-E-T
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Now *0.4
FACTS BEAR= ON THE FROMM:
National Intelligence Estimates* *A, that the USSR could have
available the following long range ballistic missiles:
Time
Number
700xm
1960
700
1000 roe
1960
100
1962
200
ICER
1960
100
1961-2
500
b. The attainment of the capability to neutralize the US SAC**
retaliatory forces through attack by long range ballistic
missiles would represent such a military advantage to the
USSR as to encourage the deliberate evasion of a US-USSR
inspection agreement, particularly if coupled with the
development of a highly effective Soviet air defense system
against manned bombers. Furthermore, the desire to achieve
a significant operational capability in anticipation of an
inspection agreement may be so great that the USSR might
bend every effort to attain the desired strike capability
earlier than estimated (see 4.a. above) and might delay
completion of OA inspection agreement until this is
accomplished ftwever, the USSR would know that US detection
of evasion - or even a strong suspicion of evasion -would
raise Brave dangers of strong US reaction.
3. pascussiams
a. In considering the problem it is necessary to distinguish
between the activities and facilities involved in the pro-
duction and deployment of long range ballistic missiles under
normal conditions and those involved under conditions of an
iespection agreement. Nagy of the activities which would
be carried out under normal conditions are almost unique
to these types of activities and could be detected by an
inspection syatesu however, under conditions of an inspection
agreement, many of these unique activities would be eliminated,
and the concealment of others could be attempted.
?4""SEnrclriZirere ilities and Probable Pro am in the
21214!4.1411-1212112j1.2._e
43-76-1iMr"reglITIZIFIW-1058.
** Solely for the purposes of this paper it is assumed that roughly
200 to 500 long range ballistic missiles together with the requisite
launching capabilities sufficient to salvo this number of weapons
would be a likely Soviet requirement to neutralize SAC. The current
and projected medium bomber capabilities supplemented by long range
ballistic missiles would be needed to neutralize the NATO retaliatory
force.
TO-P
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INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY
TS #141793
IAC -D-119/1
3 July 1958
Limited Distribution
Copy # AA
COMMITTEE
PROBLEMS AND FEASIBILITY OF AN INSPECTION PROGRAM
FOR A POSSIBLE US-USSR AGREEMENT TO BAN PRODUCTION
AND DEPLOYMENT OF LONG RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES
1. The atte..ched report was prepared by a special working
group under the chairmanship oi
CIA, in order to meet
a requirement of the State Department, as outlined in IAC-D-119,
26 May, and discussed at the IAC meeting on 27 May (IAC-M-343.
item 4).
2. According to the "Foreword" to this report, it is to be
considered a CIA reply to the Department of State request and is
not intended to be an agreed or coordinated intelligence paper.
However, the IAC members indicated that they desired to be kept
appropriately advised regarding this working group's activities.
This report has therefore been placed on the agenda of the 8 July
IAC meeting, for noting.
JOHN HEIRES
Secretary
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3 J?03.7 1958
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matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of
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T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T
. PROBLEM:
To explore the feasibility of developing an inspection
program designed to disclose any significant Soviet vio-
lation of a possible US-USSR agreement to ban the production
and deployment of long range ballistic missiles0 epecifically,
a. TO estimate the type of inspection system that would be
needed for a high level of assurance.
b. To recommend what other studies should be carried out and
by whom.
2. CONCLUSIONS:
a. An inspection system can be designed to disclose any significant
Soviet violation of a possible US-USSR agreement to ban the
production and deployment of long range ballistic eissiles.
Such a system as described in paragraph e. below could be
assigned a reliability of 75% to 90%. Since the elements
of this system are mutually reinforcing, the elimination
or a reduction in scope of many of these elements vould
severely decrease the reliability assigned to the system
as a whole. This is particularly true of element c (13).
b. The earlier the inspection agreement* were concludei, the
simpler and more reliable it would be.
ce An inspection system with a reliability of 79% to 9or. for
detecting the production and deployment of a significant
missile threat vould require the following:
(1) A ban on the development, production and testing of long range
ballistic missiles and rocket engines.
(2) The prohibition or stringent international control of the
development, productions testing or use of vehicles for
spece operations.
Throughout this paper the term agreement ia used to
mean a US-USSR agreement to ban the production and deployment
of long range ballistic missiles together with an appropriate
inspection system such as defined in paragraph 2c.
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(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
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%we
The declaration of existing stockpiles production facilities
and deployment sites for all types of ballistic missiles,
including long range, short range and air defense.
The right to unrestricted access and Inspection of these
facilities and equipment, both declared and undeclared,
to ascertain hether a long range ballistic missile
capability is being concealed.
The destruction or stringent international contra of
existing long range ballistic missiles and their production
and launch facilities. (Existing missiles and facilities
might be converted under stringent international contra
to space exploration purposes.
The acquisition of representative samples of production
missiles and components for technical' analysis.
The contra over materials possibly unique to the production
of ballistic missiles (such as special stainless steels
and aluminum alloys) if such are established to exist after
technical analysis.
The right to unrestricted aerial and ground inspection
to detect possible violations of the agreement.
The right to unrestricted surveillance of the railroad
system and right to inspect suspicious rail shipments.
The right to unrestricted access to and inspection of naval
and merchant vessels to discover clandestine missiles and
missile launch facilities.
The right to unrestricted access to and inspection of ship-
yards capable of constructing or modifying vessels for
launching of missiles.
The right to unrestricted access to and inspection of any
other area, activity, or facility deemed suspicious.
The right to station on Sino-Soviet Bloc territory the
required number of US personnel and technical equipment
and US logistic support (transportation equipment, come.-
emmications? etc.) and freedom of movement needed to imple-
ment the inspection agreement.
- 2 -
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(14) The application of the system outlined above to the entire
Sino-Soviet
3. RECOMINDATI.05:
If the Department of State deems that the problem merits
further consideration, it is recommended that the fellowing
studies be undertaken:
a. The size, "weber and composition of inspection teams,
technical equipment, their logistic support, transportation,
communioations, etc., needed to ipplement the inspection
system. This could be based on the iutelligence on the
Sino-Soviet Bloc, particularly its missile program and
likely target areas.
b. The technical feasibility, requirements and problems at
inglosing a comparable system= the US and. other NATO countries
in order to assess similar aspects of the inspection agree-
ment which slii&t be encountered in imposing such an inspection
system on the Gino .Soviet Bloc.
0. The deeradation of the high assurance level which would
result trona reduction in scope of the inspection system
described above.
d. The techniques and. facilities outside the inspection
system needed to give assurance that violations of the
agreement, or its intent, are detected.
e. The feasibility, requirements and. problems involved in
processing, transmitting, and interpreting the information
acquired by the inspection system.
f. The degree of aerial inspection required uoder such an
agreement.
g. The feasibility and problems or designing a programer
space exploration under international control which will
einimise the diversion of space development results, space
vehicles, and their production and launch facilities for
icing range ballistic missile purposes.
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T-O-P S-B-C-R-R-T
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4. PACTS BEARING OB TEE PROBLEM;
a.
National Intelligence Estimate,' imply that the USSR could
have available the following long range ballistic missiles:
Range
Time
Number
700 um
1960
700
1000 nu
1960
100
1.962
200
ICBM
1960
100
1961-02
500
b. The attainment of the capability to neutralize the US SAC
retaliatory forces through attack by long range ballistic
missiles would represent such &military advantage to the
USSR as to encourage the deliberate evasion of a US-USSR
inspection agreement, particularly if coupled with the
development of a highly effective Soviet air defense system
ageinst manned bombers. Furthermore, the desire to achieve
a significant operational capability in anticipation of an
inspection agreement may be so great that the USSR might
bend every effort to attain the desired strike capability
earlier than estimated (see 4.a. above) and might delay
completion of an inspection agreement until this is
accomplished. However, the USSR 'would know that US detection
of evasion - or even a strung suspicion of evasion - would
raise grave dangers of strong US reaction.
co We estimate that roughly 200 to 500 long range ballistic
missiles together with the requisite launching capabilities
sufficient to salvo this nuMber of weapons would be a likely
Soviet requirement to neutralize SAC. The current and pro-
jectelmelium bomber capabilities supplemented by long
range ballistic missiles would be needed to neutralize the NATO
retaliatory forces.
5. DISCUSSION:
a. In considering the ;emblem it is necessary to distinguish
between the activities and facilities involved in the pro-
duction and deployment of long range ballistic missiles under
normal conditions and those involved under conditions of an
inspection agreement. Many of the activities which would
be carried out under normal conditions are almost unique
to these types of activities and could be detected by an
inspection systeau however, under conditions of an inspection
agreement, many of these unique activities would be eliminetod,
and the concealment of others could be ettempted.
*Mit 11-5-57, Soviet Cepabilities and Probable Prop's= in the Guided
Massile Field, and SHIN 11-10-57, The Soviet ICBM Program, as revised,
g+5 Nky 1936.
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b. The great uncertainties concerning developments in weapons
systems in the distant future has caused us to limit the dis-
cussion of the problem to the period 1959 to 1963. Although
some of the factors pertinent to the problem within this time
period are not greatly effected by the passage of time, same
are of& more transitory nature and are more applicable to the
immediate future, while others become more important the looger
the afflictive date of an inspeeticuagxeement is delayed. The
dim:sacs which follows is therefore divided into three parts:
Considerations vhose importance is little effected by time
Considerations whose importance decreases with time
Considerations whose importance increases with time
e. eraM_"idtionswhoseJslittleaffted
time:
(1) Unrestricted development, production and testing of engines
and vehicles for "peaceful" space exploration could facilitate
the clandestine production and improvement of operational
sissiles and the develostaent of new missile systems. A
ben on space exploration would certainly contribute to a
highly imliabla inspection system. It is, however, con-
ceivable that a space exploration program under stringent 25X1
international control could be developed which would not
degrade the reliability of the overall inspection system
too severely.
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(5) If technical analysie of representative samples of Soviet
production missiles and componenta revealed the use of
unique materials (such as special stainless steels and
aluminum alloys), control over these materials would make
evasion of the inspection agreement more difficult.
(6) It is feasible to adapt short range ballistic missiles (Cy
proper clustering and staging) so as to achieve long maga
ballistic missile capabilities. Therefore, the inspection
of short range ballistic missile production and deplopecut
facilities would constitute an important element of an
effective inspectionweement.
d. Considerations whose importance decreases with time:
(1) It is unlikely that the Soviet missile industry is now
?remised to permit evasion of an inspection agreement.
It is probable that many of the components (except for
electronics) of Soviet long range ballistic missiles are
currently produced in the same plants which produce missile
engines and airframes. The Soviet managerial incentive systems
tend to create a large centralised industrial establishment
in which many of the compeoents which gp into one end item are
produced within the same complex.
(2) Soviet long range ballistic missile systems are probably
rawboned on non-storsgesble liquid fuels and radio-inertial
guidance. These characteristics are somewhat more amenable
to inspection than later developments considered wider e.
below.
(3) We believe that the USSR does not now have in being the long
range bealistic missile capability described in 4. c. above.
Since fixed and hardened long range ballistic missile launch
sites are moat easily detected while being constructed, an
inspection agreement effective in the near future would be
far more likely to reveal clandestinely constructed launch
facilities.
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So considerations whose importance increases with time:
(1) As time passes the USSR could develop new long range ballistic
missile systems and increase the reliability of these systems
significantly. Storageable liquid fuels and coepletely
inertial guidance systems could be introdemedand, large
numbers of these weapon systems could be produced and deployed
in the later part of the period under consideration. The
longer a, possible inspection agreement is delayed, the lover
is the confidence which can be assigned any inspection
system.
(2) Since long range ballistic missile launch sites are nost
amenable to inspection during construction, considerable
delay in the effective date of an inspection agreement
vould increase the likelihood of constructing, equipping
and concealing fixed sites before the agreement becomes
effective.
(3) Although under normal circumstaoces the test firing of
production engines and missiles would be indicative of
production and could be detected, with the passage of time
ballistic missiles and their engines could become so
reliable that they could be produced and "cold" tested
with little degradation in reliability under an inspection
agreement.
(4) With the passage of time other Beans of violating an in-
spection agreement could be developed. Imllistic missiles
could be deployed and operated from submarines and merchant
vessels in the future. It is also possible to adopt abort
range and air defense missiles and facilities to accomplish
part of the long rause missile mission.
(5) If signfificant nulbers of missiles mere already deployed, and
concealed before the inspection agreement ware reached, they
would be subject to deterioration over time. The confidence
which Soviet military commanders could have in the perfameance
of these missile systems and their launching crews mould
decrease, especially if these systems could not be tasted
and their crews tratemil4Frasclice live firings.
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TAB A
Participants in the Symapsium arid SUbseousont Discussion'
Name Organisation
25X1 1 1,5
1, 2
I CIA
I CIA 1 3
Nr. J. man:net State 4
25X1 1
Col. NI. Am Cristadoro, Jr., USAF AC, 26
co]. Jo C. Manger, USAF SAC, NIKE
25X1 OA. C. J. Masser. MAT ARDC, BM
Bea
Col. 11. N. Ball, USAF ARM, END
25X1 Col. R. K. Jacobson, USAF ARDC, END
Mrs N. N. Jenkins INC
Col. E. Mclerlarul, Jr., USAF 01110
R. D. Owen Stats
25X1
CIA
Co]. T. A Rodgs, USAOCRD
Mr. W. A. Smith ORD
Mr. Im D. Weiler State
Cmd. C. G. Welling, USN ORD-N
25X1 Colo J. A. Wetzel, USAF ARDC, END
I I
Col. N. W. Wood, USA DCS-OPS
Notes:
3.
2,5)
25X1
1. Symposium at CIA, 9 and 10 June 1958.
2. Discussions in San Diego, California, on 19 June 1958.
3. Discussions in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, on 17 June 1956.
4. Symposium at CIA, 10 June 1958
5. Discussions at Al END Liaison Officio, The Pestagonf 11 Jo* 1958.
6. Discussions at ARDC, 1161, 'noel:food, California, 16 June 1958.
7. Symposium at CIA, 9 June 1958.
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13-11-C-R4.T
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Washington
may 23, 1958
Dement. Dulles,
The Department of State is curreitly =mining the
problems involved in a possible US.DOSR agreement to ban
the production and deployment of long range ballistic
missiles. In order to explore tbmielgoatasms it is
necessary to evaluate the feasibility, of developing an
inspectionpcorem deeigaed to disclose any Soviet
violations of the agreement.
On the basis of preliminary conversations with
representatives of your agency, it gas concluded to
approach the problem of inspection in the following
manner%
a. Select a group of individuals from governoi
meat knovledgeable on the subject.
b. Convene a, symposium of these individuals.
c. Prepare a report suemulAing the pertinent
conclusions of the meeting.
I should like to request, if in your view it is
feasible, that CIA. sot as executive agent for this under.
taking. The Department will assist in any csaypossible,
especially in Obtaining the services of individuals who
maybe selected.
Sincerely yours,
Philip J. Farley
The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles, Director,
Central Intelligence Agway.
B.B.C.R.E.T
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T?C04 8.4.4?11.4?T
PROMOS AND INAELI2aLTBI OF Al INOPNCTION
PROCIRAN FOR A YOW3Ele WWI= MEM= TO BMq
PRCOINTION AND BRIPLOINZOT OF WM RAM BALLIVISC =NUM
Mgla
TRW NUNRIAL CONTAINS I3WORNATICX AFFIX= TEN
ISAMU DOWSE OF MN UNIT= STA = WITHIN Tag
NW= OF MN NEMO= IAWB, TITIN 18, IBM,
excs. 793 AND 794, THN TRAIMBSION OR REVNIATION
CV WHICH IN ANY MN= TO AN INItUTHOR=D BEM
111 PROHIBIT= NI LAW.
MORAL INTELLIONVOI AGENCY
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3 July 1958
FOREWORD
The material in this study is based. on a symposium held
at CIA on 9 and 10 June 1958 and on supplementary discussions
held during the month. of June. Tab A is a list of individuals
vho participated in the symposium and discussions. These
individuals contributed significantly to the substance of this
report; however, the opinions, conclusions and recommendations
included herein are the responsibility of C/A. Therefore,
this paper is to be considered a C/A reply to the Department
of State request (see Tab B) and is not intended to be an
agreed nor coordinated intelligence paper.
Tab C is an annotated agenda for the symposium and Tab D
is a summary of a briefing presented. at the symposium covering
those aspects of the USSR and. its long range ballistic missile
program appropriate to the problem at hand.
The findings in this report are considered to be pre-
Limizari
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%so S-Z4-11404 TAB C
zbete atVW ja:Las? uent Discussions
25X1
tem
1. Introduation
SmomiAnd
2. 1Stge Problem
Why State Department needs this,
milers it fits, sausitivity
3. Outline of the Task
Mbst is wanted: Bat to be an "agreed"
Intelligence poser, just background for
State4 let intend to design inspection
system at these Rosario; just consider
feasibility of designing one. Discuss
facilities processes, activities in-
volved in Producing, deploying and
operating..-Peculiar ta. long range ballistic
missiles. How "inspectable" are they?
By utast means (general)? Is problem mirth
further study? If so, 'Oat and howl Re-
marks about outline of agenda. Ebt only
vbst OS is doing but otber alternatives-
Backgromud on the MIR (Ste Tab D.)
Produetica, Racket Engines
'or each of the engines describe facilities
involved in production. Procedures ant
facilities for productiom testing. Bow
much testing is absoluteloneetagar$1
a. Liquid Rocket Engines
Storable vs non...storable Awls
(ities, Jupiter, Thor, Titans Otbers)
b. Solid Rocket Engines
Discuss maandecture of fuels,
alternatives 4
(Polaris, )inuteman, Others)
6. Produetion, Airframe end Assembly
For each of the missiles describe Dacilities
involved in production. ProeidurSo and
facilities Or testing.
CI
Mr. Laurenoe D. Mellor,
State
25X1
Waal
Yana
25X1
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!tan
7.
8.
9.
aniONIMINO0001....
a. Solid Types
(Polaris, Minuteman, Others)
b. Liquid Types
(Atlas, Jupiter, Thor, Titan, Others)
Production, dround Support Equipment,
guidance, Viols, Etc.
Discuss production of ground sport
equipment, guidance equipment (inertial)
and other), nose cone, earbeed, transport
equipment, liquid fuels (storebles vs non,
storable')
Summation and Recomendations on Production
Deployment dround
Consider problems of mobile vs fixed sites,
Site selection, *Instruction (herd vs soft)
guidance stations, logistics, maintenance,
transportation, storable* vs non-storable..
Panel
Panel
Panel
10. Deployment, Submarine and Surface Ships Lane].
11. .Inspection for production and deployment
in an environment of "peaceful" space
exploration.
Problems of distinguishing vehicles, launch
realities activities, etc., involved in
peaceful rocketry from those involved in
attaining strike capability. Nilitary data
derivable tram peaceful space program.
12. General Discussion Other Problems
Problems of "unique" materials, clustering
shorter range missiles, reliability.
13. Summary and Recommendations
Should further study be devoted to this.
If so, 'abet and by 'Whom?
Necessary conditions for inspection.
Roe rellaWAtiambi system be?
Possibilities for evasion.
Inspecting the inspection system.
SUbsecuent Discussions
1. Nose Cone
Facilities and unique materials,
Alternative re-entry concepts,
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Panel
Panel
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2. tbique Materials
3. Problems and Feasibility of Clustering
Shorter Range Miamiles
Reliability, solids Ins liquids.
4. Deployment, 263bile ye Fixed Sites.
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'vier T-O?P 8-11-Vreit-E-T TAB D
Some Aspects of the USSR Pertinent to a Possible Ban on the Production
end Deployment of Long Range Ballistic Nissiles
(A Briefing Delivered on 9 JUne I958)
1. In order that you may apply your special knowledge and
experience to the prOblems of long range missile production ant
deployment in the USSR, I will present some brief remarks about the
USSR with respect to its geography, its industrial and scientific
base, and the status of its long range ballistic missile program.
2. The USSR is about 21 time the size of the US, and its
population is about 200 greeter. Although its climatic conditions
vary widely, glares part (about half) of its 7.5 million square
miles is subject to permafroet. oonditions. The green lines on
Figure 1 show the areas of the USSR which are subject to permafrost
conditions, as well as the inland waterways and ports stiCh are sUb-
ject to freezing conditions for extensive time periods.
3. The economy of the USSR is strong and varied and is second
in size to that of the US, Soviet output of goods and services is
about 450 of that produced in the US; however, it devotes a much
larger share of its output to investment and military activities.
In fact, industrial investment in electric poser, metallurgical
base and producers goods way actually be greater than that of the
US this year. Its expenditure =military activities in dollar
terms is about equal to ours.
4. Although a great part of the output of machinery produation
is concentrated in the western 'third of the country, there are
significant industrial Ciaterflt along the Transiberiam Railroad and
on the Pacific Coast. Figure 2 shows the major centers of machine
building in the UOSR.
5. For transportation the USSR depends more heavily on rail.
roads than does the US. The base map of Figure 1 shows the Soviet
railroad network. In terms of ton-miles, tons originated, and
locomotives, the USSR is approximately equal to the US and, Canada
put together. However, because of its limited highway network,
goods moved by motor vehicles is only one eighth that of the US.
6. The USSR is expanding its technical and scientific capa-
bilities rapidly, particularly in those areas critical to industrial
and military power. Although its over-all scientific capabilities
may not be equal to ours, it has been able to make comparable achieve-
ments and, to forge ahead in some areas of military and industrial
significance by concentrating its efforts in these fields. ihr
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example, the nueber of university level graduates employed in
scientific and technical fields already exceeds that in the US
and will be about 44 greater than that in the US in 19629
79 Nov that I have presented& broad, though someahst abbrs.
viated background of the Soviet Ubion, I will briefly describe our
keouledge and estimates of the Soviet long range bellistic missile
program, in the fields of testing, production and deployment.
8. The history of Soviet guided missile development starts
with the thorough exploitattma of Oman scientists and technicians
after the Second World War. Building on this knowledge, Soviet
scientists and technicians have devalopedamissiIe program which
has progressed steadily, and have test.fired some 300 to 400 ballistic
missiles of ranges of 75 to 1,000 ras and approximately 10 ICSWearth
satellite whittles to date. I do not have to emphasise to this group
what this kind of experience nwess in terms of current and future
capabilities.
9. The USSR is using two test ranges for long range ballistic
missilee.-one extending from the area of Stalingrad to about 1,000
mm east, the other extending from the area of the Aral Sea to about
3,500 nm nortamsurt.in the vicinity of the Kamchatka Peninsular. These
ranges are well-equipped and probably can support test programs well
into the futures
10. Although we know that Several plants and research institutes
in the Moscow-Leningrad area are involved in the Soviet missile
program, we have not as yet identified any as producers of
long; range ballistic missiles. Because of the distribution of Soviet
industrial facilities, we suspect that much of the missile production
program is located in the industrialarees of Central and Siberian
USSR, particularly in the Wale focused on Sverdlovek or in the
Novosibirak or Tashkent areas. Any of these areas could supply both
the Soviet missile test facilities and the more likely areseihr missile
launch Ines. lUrthermore, we shoUld recognise that the extensive
post-mer industrial expansion program Wed have created plants about
which we know nothing. These feats serve to emphasize the difficulties
ebleh would be involved in an inspection system.
11. Although we have no evidence of the existence of any operation-
al LaM4.4201 sites, on the basis of tasting activities -during 1957 and
1938, we believe that several operational sites could be completed
within the neat 12 to 15 months, if the program has been properly
planned. We believe that the Soviet IRSW-ICSM operational concept
will be based on the Soviet rail system..that these weapon system
will depend heavily on rail support and may even be rail =bile. The
parts of the Soviet rail system most heavily involved in either of
these concepts could comer an area of 2 million square miles. The
-2'
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pink lines on !Imre 1 give some indications of the distances and
ranges involved batmen targets in the US and possible laundhing
areas in the USSR.
12. The deployment aspect of the sahmarine laurchedmissile
is an extremely difficult prOblem. Although ve do not believe that
any of the 500 Soviet submarines are currently equipped to launch
long range ballistic missiles, 'we know the UBSR is developing new
types of svbmarines. These may be designed to launch ballistic
missiles*
13 lu summary, the Soviet Union has a strong scientific and
technical base 'which has demonetrated its capabilities ins, vide
variety of fields including electronics, aircraft and guided. missiles.
The Soviet industrial base has the capability to support the series
production of the long range ballistic missile systems Which Soviet
scientists and, technicians have developed* In addition, we estimate
that the Soviet nuclear energy program has progressed, to a point 'where
nuclear vex heeds doubtless be developed for long range missiles
as required.
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Naiw
FICHMS 2 HAS I= CWITHD PR011i THIS COW
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SECRET
IAC.D-119
26 May 1958
Limited Distribution
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Inspection Problems Involved in Possible US-USSR
Agreement Banning Production and Deployment
of Lona-Rap...se Ballistic Missiles
The attached memorandum from the Department of State, outlining
a proposed approach to the inspection problems referred to above, will
be discussed at the IAC meeting scheduled for 27 May.
Attachment
aa.rea,r :
bez,
-
e
4 ez.Z.
r
-TA 5
JOHN HEIRES
Secretary
.12,Pe?X", P.P/2)
SECRET
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2 5X1
STAT
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Noe
SECRET
0
Dear Mr. Dulles,
May 23, 1958
The Department of State is currently examining the problems
involved in a possible US-USSR agreement to ban the production and
deployment of long range ballistic missiles. In order to explore these
problems it is necessary to evaluate the feasibility of developing an
inspection program designed to disclose any Soviet violations of the
agreement.
On the basis of preliminary conversations with representatives
of your agency, it was concluded to approach the problem of inspection
in the following manner:
a. Select a group of individuals from government
knowledgeable on the subject.
b. Convene a symposium of these individuals.
c. Prepare a report summarizing the pertinent
conclusions of the meeting.
I should like to request, if in your view it is feasible, that CIA
act as executive agent for this undertaking. The Department will assist
in any way possible, especially in obtaining the services of individuals
who may be selected.
Sincerely yours,
Philip J. Farley
The Honorable
Allen W. Dulles, Director,
Central Intelligence Agency
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IAC-D-118
28 April 1958
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Wider Dissemination of MS and NIE Reports
References: a. NSCID No. 1
b. IAC-D-45/12, Revision 11 of Part II,
1 October 1957
1. CIA proposes that certain national intelligence publications
be given a wider dissemination to high-level government officials.
After a thorough review of the missions of the various departments
and agencies, the MS Committee selected the following additional
officials to receive NIS Chapters I (Summary Chapter) by reason of
their responsibilities in formulating and executing various aspects
of U.S. foreign policy, or because their responsibilities are affected
by the international position of the U.S.:
Secretary of Labor
Secretary of the Treasury
Secretary of the Interior
Secretary of Agriculture
Secretary of Commerce
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
Director, Office of Defense Mobilization
Director of the Budget
Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board
President, Export-Import Bank of Washington
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission
Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Director, National Science Foundation
Chairman, U.S. Tariff Commission
2. CIA has also been studying the problem of the dissemination
of ME's and SNIEls in order to determine if these publications should
be sent to a wider selection of these same officials, on a need-to-know
basis, in order to provide them intelligence support in matters in which
the responsibilities of their departments and agencies affect U.S.
SECRET ar6,4-2/3
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IAC-D-118
28 April 1958
national policy. The Secretary of the Treasury, Jirector of the
Budget, and the Director of the Office of Defens Mobilization now
receive these estimates. It is proposed that the IAC hereafter give
consideration to disseminating on an ad hoc basis specific estimates
to other officials on this list who might benefit from such intelligence
support.
3. No specific formal action by the IAC is required in regard
to the dissemination of NIS Chapter I, as outlined in paragraph 1, since
the NIS Committee has determined the need-to-know of those US govern-
ment officials (IAC-D-45/12.17, Revised, 27 February 1956, as approved
by the IAC on 12 March 1956). However, with respect to the dissemina-
tion to such officials of NIEts and SNIE's, it is requested that the IAC
approve in principle the proposal outlined in paragraph 2. Potential
recipients of national intelligence publications may then be advised to
expect to receive and make any necessary arrangements for handling
of classified material of this general sensitivity. We would propose
initially to forward letters along the lines of the attached draft letter
to the officials named in paragraph 1 above. Specific recommendations
for the release of particular estimates to one or more of these officials
normally would be presented to the IAC for its consideration (in accord
-with paragraph 6 of the new NSCID No. 1, dated 1 April 1958) either
at the meeting at which an estimate is approved or at a later meeting
when the question of release to foreign governments is reviewed.
4. We believe that the recent NIE 100-58, "Estimate of the
World Situation, t' would be an appropriate estimate to distribute
initially to the officials listed above. Consequently the IAC at an
early meeting will be asked to (a) approve the principle of distributing
NIE's and SNIEts to certain US officials on an ad hoc basis as outlined
-
in the preceding paragraphs and (b) approve the release of NIE 100-58
to the officials indicated in paragraph 1.
Acting Secretary
2
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Attachment to
IAC-D-118
A 28 April 1958
The Honorable Sinclair Weeks
Secretary of Commerce
Washington 25, D. C.
Dear Mr. Weeks:
It has come to my attention that you do not now receive certain
national intelligence publications which I believe you and your principal
advisers might find useful in discharging your responsibilities relating
to foreign policy matters.
I plan to send to you from time to time two types of the most
authoritative intelligence publications produced by the U.S. Government.
These are National Intelligence Estimates, dealing with specific situa-
tions and problems abroad affecting U.S. national interests, and
Chapters I (Brief) of the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) which give
basic intelligence data and analysis on a country-by-country basis.
National Intelligence Estimates are frequently prepared at the
request of members of the NSC and generally deal with problems
affecting the considerations of that body. Hereafter, any of these
estimates which may touch upon your areas of responsibility will be
forwarded to you. For the present we are enclosing a copy of
NIE 100-58, "Estimate of the World Situation," which may be of
general interest to You.
The MS is used as the standard basic intelligence reference
by the Departments of State and Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and U.S. Intelligence agencies. I am enclosing the NIS Chapter I
as an example of this kind of intelligence. The accom-
panying MS Reference Guide will give you further particulars
regarding the MS program and its current status.
Sincerely,
Allen W. Dulles
Enclosures: Director
1. ME 100-58, "Estimate of
the World Situation"
2, Chapter I oni
3. MS Reference Uuide
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IAC-D-117
1 April 1958
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
Proposed Subject for Critical Collection
Problems Committee Consideration
The proposal outlined in the attached memorandum will be
placed on the agenda of an early IAC meeting (probably 8 April),
fol. review and action with respect to the specific recommendations
of General Schow (para. 4).
JOHN HEIRES
Secretary
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IAC-D-117
0 1 April 1958
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
Washington 25, D. C.
Mar 27 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR : Chairman, Intelligence Advisory Committee
SUBJECT : Proposed Subject for Critical Collection
Problems Committee Consideration (U)
1. An Earth Satellite Reconnaissance System appears to offer
an excellent potential for collection of high priority intelligence infor-
mation. To make this potential most responsive to national intelligence
requirements, two actions on the part of Intelligence Advisory Committee
collection agencies appear to be necessary.
a. To develop national intelligence collection require-
ments, in order of priority, which may be satisfied by a
Satellite system in consonance with its technological growth.
b. To guide the agency charged with development of
the system by suggesting the types of instrumentation and
data processing systems required to accomplish the col-
lection mission and by suggesting the phasing of their
development.
2. The payloads which should be considered include but need
not, be limited to:
a. Instrumentation capable of determining precise
geodetic data as required to assist all of the Services in
the performance of their respective operational missions.
b. High-resolution photography, and a means of
transmitting such photography to ground stations with
acceptable degradation.
c. COMINT
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1 April 1958
d. ELINT
e. Infrared
f. Instrumentation capable of providing information
required to enable accurate long range weather predictions.
g. Instrumentation capable of providing a fast and
reliable means of transmitting critical intelligence information.
3. Equal in importance to the instrumentation of the satellite
itself is the development of a photographic processing system which
will enable rapid and accurate evaluation of the mass of photography
of which a well-instrumented satellite may be capable. Development
of such a system concurrent with the development of photographic
capabilities appears to be mandatory.
? 4. It is recommended that the Intelligence Advisory Committee
charge the Critical Collection Problems Committee with the mission of:
a. Determining the intelligence collection requirements
which the Earth Satellite Reconnaissance System should be
used to satisfy.
b. Suggesting the types of instrumentation which should
be developed and the scheduling which will be most responsive
to highest priority intelligence needs.
c. Determining the requirements which a photographic
processing system must be designed to meet.
d. Recommending to the Intelligence Advisory Committee
appropriate courses of action for solution of the above problems.
/s/
ROBERT A. SCHOW
Major General, GS
ACofS, Intelligence
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