NATIONAL P0LICY ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMITTEE TO IMPLEMENT SUCH POLICY

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP85S00362R000600110017-5
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 19, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 27, 2006
Sequence Number: 
17
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 4, 1957
Content Type: 
MF
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP85S00362R000600110017-5.pdf155.11 KB
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Approved For Release 2006/1102 - DP85S003621 SC J,.LAf 113 CENTRAL QNTELLEGENCESZENCY OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR 4 jut 1957 )OCR& FOi" : Mr . Jame E; S S. Lay E~aecutive Secretary National Security Council SUBJECT National policy on counterintelligence and the Establishment of a Coa-ittee to implement such Policy 1 . I desire to ackr4wledge your memorandum of 1 May i95 (p entitled "National Policy on Counterintelligence and the Establislnt of a Coaanittee to Implement such Policy," with whicri was enclosed a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense) entitled as above, dated 25 April 1951 The Secretary of Defense proposes the organization of a new committee of nine charter members together with an NSC observer and Ad Hoc members as appropriate, with a permanent working staff to determine foreign counterintelli- gence policies and plans. This committee, according to the proposal, is to concern itself chiefly with the policy aspects of counterintelligence and security, with particular reference to "overseas activities and operations and to counterintelligence relations with international and foreign national counterintelligence organizations 3. 1 concur in the view expressed by the Secretary of Defense that our security requires the most effective utili- zation of all Uuited States counterintelligence capabilities. Tnt protection of important Au*rican overseas military installations and personnel requires that we exercise the utmost vigilance and coordinate our actions toprovide against espionage and infiltration by a potential ,600110 - M001 1 Y-49 ?v1OPUCD SECRET 30032?' Approved For Release 2006/11/27: CIA-RDP85S00362R000600110017-5 Approved For Release 2006/ Y -RDP85S003 28,000600110017-5 4. The objectives sought can, I believe, be sore rapidly and efficiently achieved by using existing aeachinaery for the task rather than by creating still another inter- departmental cittee and staff. 5. Counterintelligence or counterespionage is a segment of intelligence operations. It is impossible properly to counter a potential enemy's action vit2out positive intelli- gence as to his intentions, capabilities and techniques. In the Intelligence Advisory Committee we now have a coordisa- ting mechanism in the foreign intellipnce field. To strip that Cs ittee of its jurisdiction over foreign counter- intelligence and to form a new body for this purpose, create unnecessary and confusing duplication. If the new would conmlittee, as is appax-ently contemplated, should undertake to enter into relations with intelligence and security services abroad, parallel with the relationships which have been maintained with these services for many years, it would prejudice existing foreign intelligence liaison activities. Such relationships are not susceptible of committee dement. 6. Wejabe:?ship on the Intelligence Advisory Committee, with two exceptions, is practically identical with that proposed for the new cxwsnittee. Elaseente of the Department of Defense are represented on the Intelligence Advisory Comittee, by the Intelligence Chiefs of the Mawy Air Force and of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Ex , and Crff ice of xcept fo fpr the Special Investigations of the Air Force, theyse are also responsible for the direction of counterintell3genos matters in their respective Departments. While the Offics of the Secretary of Defense is not normally represented on the Intelligence Adv isory Ccmdittee, both the Off ice of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Special Invvstigutious of the Air Force could be invited to join with the In el i- gene Advisory Cotmmittee whenever counterinto ligenee policies and operational coordination mutters are under consideration. 7. if the Secretary of Defense considers that the present chprtex' of the Intelligence Advisory Coemittee is not adequate for the purposes he has in 81ad to receive and submit to mom' I sl~ oi- is Co~.ttee for its corsidaration~ Intelli.g~ence Advi sory ttse present directpiw+ea. I sat c ~y P~posed eiosats tp on"., ident that the fore - going procedure trould accomplish the Secretary of DafejAs ?s EGRET Approved For Release 2006/11/27: CIA-RDP85S00362R000600110017-5 Approved For,[r elease 2006/11/27 :K9t RDP85S00300060011001.7-5 objectives in the most expeditious, efficient, ecoaosaical and secure manner. 8. I as submitting this; report in shy aepacity as Director of Central Intelligeb