SUGGESTED OPENING REMARKS TO NSCID #5 WORKING GROUP PREPARED BY R. S. TOD

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CIA-RDP85S00362R000600170022-3
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RIPPUB
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T
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11
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December 14, 2016
Document Release Date: 
May 1, 2003
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22
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Publication Date: 
July 29, 1957
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MFR
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Approved ForRelease 2003/SENEt-RDP85S0030K000?50E892i917 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD itSuggested Opening Remarks to NSCID 5 Working Group Prepared by I have called this meeting of the entire Working Group because careful study of the Navy proposal reveals that we are faced with a fundamental difference of opinion respecting the authority, of the Director of Central Intelligence and the responsibility of the Central Intelligence Agency in the field of clandestine activities abroad. It is also indicated that the Army is generally in agreement with the Navy position and that the Air Force is not opposed to such position. No progress can be made in revising NSCID #5 until such fundamental differences of opinion have been resolved. The CIA position is based on these fundamentals: 1. The Director of Central Intelligence is THE COORDINATOR of all U.S. clandestine activities conducted outside the United States and its possessions. 2. The Central Intelligence Agency is the NATIONAL CLANDESTINE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES and as such has PRIMARY responsibility for the conduct of all espionage, counterespionage and related clandestine activities outside the United States and its possessions. 3. As the National Clandestine Service of the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency has PRIMARY responsibility for all liaison relationships with foreign intelligence and security services with respect to CLANDESTINE matters. 4. For obvious and practical reasons it has been provided that other Departments and Agencies may conduct such DEPARTMENTAL espionage, counterespionage and related clandestine activities as they deem necessary to carry out their assigned missions AFTER reaching agreement with the Director of Central Intelligence and SUBJECT to his continuing coordination. It was the obvious intent of Congress in passing the National Security Act of 1947 that the United States would have a SINGLE clandestine service, and this view has been strongly supigrally every Task Force and Committee who have investigated the intelligence community; the most recent being the President's Board of Consultants who have informed the President that the intelligence effort of the Approved For Release 200340/REURDP85S00362R000600170022-3 se oes--.07 Approved Foil%lease 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP85S00362M00600170022-3 United States needs "STRONG CENTRALIZED DIRECTION" and have recommended to him that the Director of Central Intelligence "exercise a more comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility within the intelligence commuftter-- The Navy proposal would create four or more co-equal and competing clandestine services operating on a basis of mutual cooperation rather than "strong centralized direction". /t should be obvious, although some may have overlooked the fact, that any proposed revision of NSCID #5 will be submitted to the National Security Council the Director of Central Intelligence as his recommendation for the coordination of intelligence activities pursuant to his statutory responsibilities set forth in the National Security Act. It should also be remembered that the Intelligence Advisory Committee was established to advise the Director of Central Intelligence; he may or may not follow such advice; his only responsibility is to indicate to the National Security Council that he has the concurrence or non-concurrence of the members of the IAC and in either event, he has sole responsibility for any recommendation he may make to the Council. It is provided that he will refer the problem to the Secretary of Defense if one or more of the military services disagree with his position, but he is not required to secure the concurrence of the Secretary of Defense before be can submit recommendations to the Council. It should be clear to all that the Director of Central Intelligence would not make a recommendation to the National Security Council that would contravene the intent of Congress and be in opposition to the recommendations made on this subject by all groups and committees who have investigated the intelligence community. I now wish to clarify our position with respect to "agreed activities" and the field of counterintelligence. The "agreed activities" provision was never intended to be a stepping stone to the creation of a multiplicity of clandestine services in the United States; it was designed to provide for a relatively limited degree of clandestine activity on the part of other departments and agencies, primarily the military services, to meet certain specific departmental requirements that they could not meet by overt means. There has never been any intention on the part of the Director of Central Intelligence to prevent the military services from meeting their legitimate departmental requirements in the clandestine field but he cannot provide "strong centralized direction and exercise a more comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility" unless these agreed activities are subject to his coordination. With respect to the field of counterintelligence, we realize fully that the term, as used by the military services, includes many activities that are in no way clandestine; the Director of Central Intelligence has no concern with such non-clandestine activities, insofar as NSCID #5 is concerned. When we are in a position to resume our work on the revision of this directive, I believe we can find the words necessary to make this point clear. Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600170022-3 ;k611ET Approved Forltelease 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP85S00362K000600170022-3 I will now repeat the CIA position and then ask each representative here to state whether the department or agency he represents is in agreement or in opposition to that position. If any one or more of the IAC member agencies are in opposition to such position, we will then submit the matter to the IAC for discussion as no effective revision of the paper can be made until these fundamental issues have been resolved. 1. The Director of Central Intelligence is THE COORDINATOR of all U. S. clandestine activities conducted outside the United States and its possessions. 2. The Central Intelligence Agency is the NATIONAL CLANDESTINE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES and as such has PRIMARY responsibility for the conduct of all espionage, counterespionage and related clandestine activities outside the United States and its possessions. 3. As the National Clandestine Service of the United States, the Central Intelligence Agency is responsible for all liaison relationships with foreign intelligence and security services that concern CLANDESTINE matters. 4. For obvious and practical reasons, it has been provided that other departments and agencies may conduct such espionage, counterespionage and related clandestine activities as they deem necessary to carry out their assigned missions after reaching agreement with the Director of Central Intelligence 70-i*ject to his continuing coordination. I will now call for a specific statement of concurrence or opposition from each agency represented here. After we have "counted heads" on the basic issue, I will then be pleased to hear any clarifying remarks which any of you may care to make. 1. State 2. AEC 3. Air Force (A-2) 4. Air Force (OSI) 9. FBI 5. Army 6. Navy 7. JIG 8. Sec. Def. Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600170022-3 SECHIApproved For Release 200310512: CIA-RDP85S003621W00600170022-3 DRAFT LKT - 25 ally 1957 COMMENTS ON THE ONI DRAFT OF NSCID 5 GENERAL COMMENTS The key paragraphs are the following: Paragraph 1 dealing with espionage; Paragraph 2 dealing with counterespionage; Paragraphs 3c and 7 dealing with coordination; and Paragraph 12 dealing with liaison. If these are resolved, all others should present no particular difficulty. Further, it would appear that the text is sufficiently extensive to cover the proposed "national policy on counterintelligence" referred to in the Defense papers. CIA POSITION Reference Para. 1: Navy version would result in four or more co-equal, competing clandestine services contrary to the obvious intent of Congress in passing the National Defense Act and contrary to every Task Force and Committee that has investigated the intelligence community. CIA position: One aigtional Agency to conduct all foreign espionage to meet the needs of the Departments and Agencies. Exception: Military Commander abroad to collect by espionage information necessary for accomplishment of mission when information not otherwise available, provided that collection operations are coordinated in the over-all collection effort. Approved For Release 20e9ffilit IA-RDP85S00362R000600170022-3 Approved Foil%lease 20ALREIIA-RDP85S0035211t00600170022-3 - 2 - Reference Paragraph 2: ONI version would result in much duplication and conflicting counterintelligence operations and vastly increase the difficulty of coordination. CIA Position: The Agency as a national clandestine service must have counterintelligence responsibilities abroad on the order of the FBI domestic responsibility. All Departments and Agencies responsible for counterintelligence protection of their own information, personnel and installations against espionage, subversion and sabotage provided clandestine collection activities coordinated in the over-all clandestine collection effort. Reference Paragraph 3: ONI definition is that used in the dictionary of U. S. Military Terms for Joint Usage, February, 1957. CIA Position: Agency definition is preferred Itr we can certainly live without the other. In view of military use and ma even international understanding, there may be some advantage to adopting the military terminology but not preclude the use of CIA definition for our own purposes and for indoctrination. Reference Paragraph 4: CIA Position: Paragraph not necessary; repitition of principles already covered in NSCID 1. Approved For Release : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600170022-3 Approved For-Release no* IA-RDP85S003624000600170022-3 - 3 - Reference Paragraph 5: CIA Position: Adjustments should present no difficulty. Reference Paragraph 6: ONI version dealing with coordination would result In a debating society. CIA Position: DCI coordinates intelligence and counter- intelligence collection in accordance with DCID 5/1 procedures. Reference Paragraph 7: CIA Position: DCI is the only one who can coordinate covert and overt. No objection to inclusion of inter-departmental committees. Reference Paragraphs 8 and 9: Mutuality aspects can be accepted or easily adjusted. Reference Paragraphs 10 and 11: Adjustment should present no difficulty. Reference Paragraph 12: ONI version of liaison arrangements would nessitate a debating society and occasion endless confusion. CIA Position: The Agency as the National clandestine service must have primary responsibility for liaison with foreign clandestine services. Military Commanders and other Departments and Agency conduct liaison as required by their missions with foreign services provided that liaison on clandestine matters is coordinated with the CIA. Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600170022-3 ? Approved Fotiltelease 23E3aff CIA-RDP85S0036121k000600170022-3 - 4 - Reference Paragraph 13: First 2 sentences of the ONI version should present no difficulty. Sub c. of original CIA version should be retained. The third sentence of the ONI version can be adjusted. Approved For Release 2003/05/27 : CIA-RDP85S00362R000600170022-3 ? Approved Forlildlease 270a27 4400600170022-3 1ATIONAL .;ECU1WI7Y COUNCIL INTE14LIGENCEaliEeLEJ101_1. aTIONATIE AND COUNNRINNULCGSNOE ABROAD* Panan-; to the provisiorscltieution IO2(d) of the Na4lonat cwurity Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Qous-1)% oereny anr directs thatt ?:%omote Ohs over-aU Interests of the US 0 intelligence .Airccriun5J,,y the W.rector of Uontra. ?intelligence will in contultt.don 0.th the intelligence Advi3ory Conmitteet insure the coordlpatioa of et,pJ.onage and counterintelligence 4ctivities abroad except ;i_n thuaters of war wherc forces awe invo6,,ved,or when the k%-esidem-,; directss In which tIvent the provisicns of .paragraph 12 below shall apply,. ocrCkimatioo,omprices those coneeltative activities underrIken by upartven',-,e and Agencies to progico cooporation, resolve m4i.ua1 proolems9 ff(Mang Information eliminate unprofitable dup1Aion .1?411;4211,,, eVQ.1,ft a :o.A.Aus i.perandl on the parti w,l...1pants to fQrsstall actions rictrmental to the natIosal lAterast to uac4 othat,, bo effected at,, the lcfcs .4c1ieWn pactiv,11445, ?r. JteUn'igenoy shall conduct asp4ouai,4 opera:dors v10,1;01&? ed ;tates ad itc possossluns in, order to pai,lt4 4,(Ndlzcilients rela1ii41, '41,* National socuriI, i;Ipartmeats and other Aglul way GGadUal td,',i,A1M operations outsic4 -4.re United and. 1,-4,1 .peci3is1o,o4 im otii!I to satlsfy a4parLmerA46-, intelligeme finfttofi-S.'7.1-,ate and ii. pc 3 B sionso Approved For Rele Mar00362R000600170022-3 ' Approved For j p r RPITI.299KIR13%.1X.W?.14.9,9i (TOOPAZ9,9Buteide the United ttes and its possessions neoessary in the intefeste of nationak scuritr and in furtherance of its assigned miestogs? Depae-uents ani other Agencies shall conduct counterintelligence opera,ions o side the United itatos and its possessions neaessaay for Ihe see-a-114 or their commands activities and installationl and the exwution of heli assigned missics9/ FOL :,kie purpose of this caective: J-JhTa:oft the 7 - X o.s 6c:fined az, tho a :1 )r iiilt -.i.eans tivitice whiqlh_av thrted qwsi ol eiitgej5. nformkixl Qe tada- 10,01.13V-00 Op0.4 10116 against a foreigs pawerE .n del'ined as all activic4es, exclusivo -icc to d&t sc tho effectiveness of iz4ztoal, roreign anti to tho protootion of iaormattot against ( autvtwbion, and installationa Cr Aa 31.111,1 o.s. agoof nte1ligf4nce, 114iel1134,:ngo whir hal utility for inCeli vnoo .."17VIA n the acct4mp4a of (1)110140UB f;o5.,t1on requiremenAl and acsessments r!-CAL i.iL Or Included) ii?Jre,r) bail be responsiki e ice? Approved For Relea 1 75/ crJ, (4; indelvtu ant Ioerd formation on for4S:gn ret mat,e4L4,;,. 362R000600170022-3 F)!II-171611-1[L4 ;,,!?Pr?rYfcliiff*P81) %9R9?127.LiSiikiRkfn8?VWAFaKPNVftggl?QQel.e dination of clandestine intelligenee collection with overt col:lace/en breade He shall also insure in eoneultation with the Intelligehee Advisory ameittee that counterintelligence activity abroad is eeerdialted with the Departments, Agencies and interdepartment .l. ecommittees responsible for domestic onuntat'intelligence e The u.ot ef Central Intelligence shall invite Departments and Agencies Tiot permanent member of the intelligence, r.eivieory Committee whicie have C.0anterinteilio.ce .responsibilities abroad to participate in the Intelligenee Adv isory Committee deliberations then counterinte4 legenee mattere a.f.fecten:!; such responsibilities are under eonsideratioi,? 8,, in the nduct of espionage and counterintelligence activitiee,? bilateral arrangements shall be made as the national interes may requi among the Departments and Agencies concerned tS'oe cevee tc upp? these activities:, In a roreIn area other than a theater of war where 4e`e? orcee are inVOI vedk or when the President directs? the deeignat,ed rex,n eentaUele O1 the reetor9 01A, shall keep the senior representati4e, the latter may desires advised of U,So espionage and ceunterizieeieu gence eetAvities eondu ted in or from Lte area W: In a fereign area where J ilitary commands are sttied? the deeignated representative of the Director? Central intelitienhe Ageney, ehert keep the tesignated represceleatives of senior ua? mie.iOary eotheiarideie inlormed -a the espionage and counterintelligence opezatione emu- ted the Central Intelligenee Agency -'ee or from the areae (?.ilisor arrangements; eteueolished with fereign inteJJana servieet which affect eepionage or COUnteirnitelligarza Approved For Releate35/1eMrT0362R000600170022-3 11* 0.1:9()"1ioJ- = .APPrQvgcLEAr? ilaisiac4a4MIATAigIA-FIPF8,5,%10 Wil7C1942-3 Agencies concerned, in order to insure that such relationships are beaf)ficial to the over..all espionage and counterintelligence inieres to t- or the United :itatest, In theaters of war where U,S, forces are involveck or linen t? the FTcsident directs all resources of the Central Intelligenct , envy shalA be included in a CIA Component Force under the direct contand o,f ,ommanders of commands established by the Joint Chiefe of--;,taff. Ths-, CIA Component Force Germander shall provide espionage and unt intelli,gonle support to military operations in accordance vitil the requiremens of commands established by the joint Chiefs of Star, EXcptional esbionage or counterinteliigence operations, het,:aust cf thgAs- dellate or diplomatic implications,, ray be conducted bT the C tik Gmponent .:J'Orco ai:ter cooranatioh by the Wreotor of Central 1tite-.4jtgom with th int Chdefs of Staff Approved For Rel tPI 37777 S00362R000600170022-3