SUGGESTED OPENING REMARKS TO NSCID #5 WORKING GROUP PREPARED BY R. S. TOD
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CIA-RDP85S00362R000600170022-3
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T
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11
Document Creation Date:
December 14, 2016
Document Release Date:
May 1, 2003
Sequence Number:
22
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Publication Date:
July 29, 1957
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
itSuggested Opening Remarks to NSCID 5 Working Group Prepared by
I have called this meeting of the entire Working Group because
careful study of the Navy proposal reveals that we are faced with a
fundamental difference of opinion respecting the authority, of the
Director of Central Intelligence and the responsibility of the
Central Intelligence Agency in the field of clandestine activities
abroad. It is also indicated that the Army is generally in agreement
with the Navy position and that the Air Force is not opposed to such
position. No progress can be made in revising NSCID #5 until such
fundamental differences of opinion have been resolved.
The CIA position is based on these fundamentals:
1. The Director of Central Intelligence is
THE COORDINATOR of all U.S. clandestine activities
conducted outside the United States and its possessions.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency is the
NATIONAL CLANDESTINE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES and as
such has PRIMARY responsibility for the conduct of all
espionage, counterespionage and related clandestine
activities outside the United States and its possessions.
3. As the National Clandestine Service of the
United States, the Central Intelligence Agency has PRIMARY
responsibility for all liaison relationships with foreign
intelligence and security services with respect to
CLANDESTINE matters.
4. For obvious and practical reasons it has been
provided that other Departments and Agencies may conduct
such DEPARTMENTAL espionage, counterespionage and related
clandestine activities as they deem necessary to carry out
their assigned missions AFTER reaching agreement with the
Director of Central Intelligence and SUBJECT to his
continuing coordination.
It was the obvious intent of Congress in passing the National
Security Act of 1947 that the United States would have a SINGLE
clandestine service, and this view has been strongly supigrally
every Task Force and Committee who have investigated the intelligence
community; the most recent being the President's Board of Consultants
who have informed the President that the intelligence effort of the
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United States needs "STRONG CENTRALIZED DIRECTION" and have recommended
to him that the Director of Central Intelligence "exercise a more
comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility within the
intelligence commuftter-- The Navy proposal would create four or more
co-equal and competing clandestine services operating on a basis of
mutual cooperation rather than "strong centralized direction".
/t should be obvious, although some may have overlooked the fact,
that any proposed revision of NSCID #5 will be submitted to the National
Security Council the Director of Central Intelligence as his
recommendation for the coordination of intelligence activities pursuant to
his statutory responsibilities set forth in the National Security Act.
It should also be remembered that the Intelligence Advisory
Committee was established to advise the Director of Central Intelligence;
he may or may not follow such advice; his only responsibility is to
indicate to the National Security Council that he has the concurrence
or non-concurrence of the members of the IAC and in either event, he
has sole responsibility for any recommendation he may make to the Council.
It is provided that he will refer the problem to the Secretary of
Defense if one or more of the military services disagree with his
position, but he is not required to secure the concurrence of the
Secretary of Defense before be can submit recommendations to the Council.
It should be clear to all that the Director of Central Intelligence
would not make a recommendation to the National Security Council that
would contravene the intent of Congress and be in opposition to the
recommendations made on this subject by all groups and committees who
have investigated the intelligence community.
I now wish to clarify our position with respect to "agreed
activities" and the field of counterintelligence.
The "agreed activities" provision was never intended to be a
stepping stone to the creation of a multiplicity of clandestine
services in the United States; it was designed to provide for a
relatively limited degree of clandestine activity on the part of other
departments and agencies, primarily the military services, to meet
certain specific departmental requirements that they could not meet by
overt means. There has never been any intention on the part of the
Director of Central Intelligence to prevent the military services from
meeting their legitimate departmental requirements in the clandestine
field but he cannot provide "strong centralized direction and exercise
a more comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility" unless
these agreed activities are subject to his coordination.
With respect to the field of counterintelligence, we realize fully
that the term, as used by the military services, includes many activities
that are in no way clandestine; the Director of Central Intelligence has
no concern with such non-clandestine activities, insofar as NSCID #5 is
concerned. When we are in a position to resume our work on the revision
of this directive, I believe we can find the words necessary to make
this point clear.
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I will now repeat the CIA position and then ask each representative
here to state whether the department or agency he represents is in
agreement or in opposition to that position. If any one or more of the
IAC member agencies are in opposition to such position, we will then
submit the matter to the IAC for discussion as no effective revision of
the paper can be made until these fundamental issues have been resolved.
1. The Director of Central Intelligence is
THE COORDINATOR of all U. S. clandestine activities
conducted outside the United States and its possessions.
2. The Central Intelligence Agency is the NATIONAL
CLANDESTINE SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES and as such has
PRIMARY responsibility for the conduct of all espionage,
counterespionage and related clandestine activities outside
the United States and its possessions.
3. As the National Clandestine Service of the
United States, the Central Intelligence Agency is responsible
for all liaison relationships with foreign intelligence and
security services that concern CLANDESTINE matters.
4. For obvious and practical reasons, it has been
provided that other departments and agencies may conduct such
espionage, counterespionage and related clandestine activities
as they deem necessary to carry out their assigned missions
after reaching agreement with the Director of Central Intelligence
70-i*ject to his continuing coordination.
I will now call for a specific statement of concurrence or
opposition from each agency represented here. After we have "counted
heads" on the basic issue, I will then be pleased to hear any
clarifying remarks which any of you may care to make.
1. State
2. AEC
3. Air Force (A-2)
4. Air Force (OSI)
9. FBI
5. Army
6. Navy
7. JIG
8. Sec. Def.
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DRAFT
LKT - 25 ally 1957
COMMENTS ON THE ONI DRAFT OF
NSCID 5
GENERAL COMMENTS
The key paragraphs are the following:
Paragraph 1 dealing with espionage;
Paragraph 2 dealing with counterespionage;
Paragraphs 3c and 7 dealing with coordination; and
Paragraph 12 dealing with liaison.
If these are resolved, all others should present no particular
difficulty. Further, it would appear that the text is sufficiently
extensive to cover the proposed "national policy on counterintelligence"
referred to in the Defense papers.
CIA POSITION
Reference Para. 1:
Navy version would result in four or more co-equal, competing
clandestine services contrary to the obvious intent of Congress in
passing the National Defense Act and contrary to every Task Force and
Committee that has investigated the intelligence community.
CIA position: One aigtional Agency to conduct all
foreign espionage to meet the needs of the Departments and
Agencies. Exception: Military Commander abroad to collect
by espionage information necessary for accomplishment of
mission when information not otherwise available, provided
that collection operations are coordinated in the over-all
collection effort.
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Reference Paragraph 2:
ONI version would result in much duplication and conflicting
counterintelligence operations and vastly increase the difficulty of
coordination.
CIA Position: The Agency as a national clandestine service
must have counterintelligence responsibilities abroad on the
order of the FBI domestic responsibility. All Departments and
Agencies responsible for counterintelligence protection of
their own information, personnel and installations against
espionage, subversion and sabotage provided clandestine
collection activities coordinated in the over-all clandestine
collection effort.
Reference Paragraph 3:
ONI definition is that used in the dictionary of U. S.
Military Terms for Joint Usage, February, 1957.
CIA Position: Agency definition is preferred Itr we can
certainly live without the other. In view of military use and
ma even international understanding, there may be some advantage
to adopting the military terminology but not preclude the use of
CIA definition for our own purposes and for indoctrination.
Reference Paragraph 4:
CIA Position: Paragraph not necessary; repitition of
principles already covered in NSCID 1.
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Reference Paragraph 5:
CIA Position: Adjustments should present no difficulty.
Reference Paragraph 6:
ONI version dealing with coordination would result In a
debating society.
CIA Position: DCI coordinates intelligence and counter-
intelligence collection in accordance with DCID 5/1 procedures.
Reference Paragraph 7:
CIA Position: DCI is the only one who can coordinate covert
and overt. No objection to inclusion of inter-departmental
committees.
Reference Paragraphs 8 and 9:
Mutuality aspects can be accepted or easily adjusted.
Reference Paragraphs 10 and 11:
Adjustment should present no difficulty.
Reference Paragraph 12:
ONI version of liaison arrangements would nessitate a debating
society and occasion endless confusion.
CIA Position: The Agency as the National clandestine service
must have primary responsibility for liaison with foreign
clandestine services. Military Commanders and other Departments
and Agency conduct liaison as required by their missions with
foreign services provided that liaison on clandestine matters is
coordinated with the CIA.
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Reference Paragraph 13:
First 2 sentences of the ONI version should present no
difficulty.
Sub c. of original CIA version should be retained. The
third sentence of the ONI version can be adjusted.
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1ATIONAL .;ECU1WI7Y COUNCIL INTE14LIGENCEaliEeLEJ101_1.
aTIONATIE AND COUNNRINNULCGSNOE ABROAD*
Panan-; to the provisiorscltieution IO2(d) of the Na4lonat
cwurity Act of 1947, as amended, the National Security Qous-1)% oereny
anr directs thatt
?:%omote Ohs over-aU Interests of the US 0 intelligence
.Airccriun5J,,y the W.rector of Uontra. ?intelligence will in contultt.don
0.th the intelligence Advi3ory Conmitteet insure the coordlpatioa of
et,pJ.onage and counterintelligence 4ctivities abroad except ;i_n thuaters
of war wherc forces awe invo6,,ved,or when the k%-esidem-,; directss
In which tIvent the provisicns of .paragraph 12 below shall apply,.
ocrCkimatioo,omprices those coneeltative activities underrIken by
upartven',-,e and Agencies to progico cooporation, resolve m4i.ua1 proolems9
ff(Mang Information eliminate unprofitable dup1Aion
.1?411;4211,,, eVQ.1,ft a :o.A.Aus i.perandl on the parti
w,l...1pants to fQrsstall actions rictrmental to the natIosal lAterast
to uac4 othat,, bo effected at,, the lcfcs .4c1ieWn
pactiv,11445,
?r. JteUn'igenoy shall conduct asp4ouai,4 opera:dors
v10,1;01&? ed ;tates ad itc possossluns in, order to pai,lt4
4,(Ndlzcilients
rela1ii41, '41,* National socuriI, i;Ipartmeats
and other Aglul way GGadUal td,',i,A1M operations outsic4 -4.re United
and. 1,-4,1 .peci3is1o,o4 im otii!I to satlsfy a4parLmerA46-, intelligeme
finfttofi-S.'7.1-,ate and ii. pc 3 B sionso
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the United ttes and its possessions neoessary in the intefeste of
nationak scuritr and in furtherance of its assigned miestogs?
Depae-uents ani other Agencies shall conduct counterintelligence
opera,ions o side the United itatos and its possessions neaessaay for
Ihe see-a-114 or their commands activities and installationl and the
exwution of heli assigned missics9/
FOL :,kie purpose of this caective:
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Op0.4 10116 against a foreigs pawerE
.n del'ined as all activic4es, exclusivo
-icc to d&t sc tho effectiveness of iz4ztoal, roreign
anti to tho protootion of iaormattot against
( autvtwbion, and installationa Cr Aa 31.111,1
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whir hal utility for inCeli vnoo
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dination of clandestine intelligenee collection with overt col:lace/en
breade He shall also insure in eoneultation with the Intelligehee
Advisory ameittee that counterintelligence activity abroad is
eeerdialted with the Departments, Agencies and interdepartment .l.
ecommittees responsible for domestic onuntat'intelligence e The u.ot
ef Central Intelligence shall invite Departments and Agencies Tiot
permanent member of the intelligence, r.eivieory Committee whicie have
C.0anterinteilio.ce .responsibilities abroad to participate in the
Intelligenee Adv isory Committee deliberations then counterinte4 legenee
mattere a.f.fecten:!; such responsibilities are under eonsideratioi,?
8,, in the nduct of espionage and counterintelligence activitiee,?
bilateral arrangements shall be made as the national interes may
requi
among the Departments and Agencies concerned tS'oe cevee tc upp?
these activities:,
In a roreIn area other than a theater of war where 4e`e? orcee
are inVOI vedk or when the President directs? the deeignat,ed rex,n eentaUele
O1 the reetor9
01A, shall keep the senior representati4e,
the latter may desires advised of U,So espionage and ceunterizieeieu gence
eetAvities eondu ted in or from Lte area
W: In a fereign area where J ilitary commands are sttied?
the deeignated representative of the Director? Central intelitienhe Ageney,
ehert keep the tesignated represceleatives of senior ua? mie.iOary eotheiarideie
inlormed -a the espionage and counterintelligence opezatione emu- ted
the Central Intelligenee Agency -'ee or from the areae
(?.ilisor arrangements; eteueolished with fereign inteJJana
servieet which affect eepionage or COUnteirnitelligarza
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Agencies concerned, in order to insure that such relationships are
beaf)ficial to the over..all espionage and counterintelligence inieres to t-
or the United :itatest,
In theaters of war where U,S, forces are involveck or linen t?
the FTcsident directs all resources of the Central Intelligenct , envy
shalA be included in a CIA Component Force under the direct contand o,f
,ommanders of commands established by the Joint Chiefe of--;,taff.
Ths-, CIA Component Force Germander shall provide espionage and unt
intelli,gonle support to military operations in accordance vitil the
requiremens of commands established by the joint Chiefs of Star,
EXcptional esbionage or counterinteliigence operations, het,:aust cf
thgAs- dellate or diplomatic implications,, ray be conducted bT the C tik
Gmponent .:J'Orco ai:ter cooranatioh by the Wreotor of Central 1tite-.4jtgom
with th int Chdefs of Staff
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