PROPOSED WEEKLY MEETING OF THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00362R000700320001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 136
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 18, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1946
• Content Type: MF

peat, I'AB >s etfngs have been scheduled only when suf-
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I, fiber 2996
OR 0?' MYTRAL INTEU IG?CE
Ao acted. Reesentiy this proaadvx'e has resulted
with resultant confusion and eiold action.
of a r gularly scheduled meetiar day, it has
diftliCUlt to set an early data convenient to a12 mm-
a 4ecis ou to bold the meeting has been mom.
th'e , recd d that day afternoon at 11430
the sob sdul,ed time for U B meitings . In that w this
be ruorvad by an camber's, and it will be easy to a el the
ban 'ors to no _ buisi es to transact. In addition, thin wilt
dm sufficient time to arrange and prepare for an
out ml t# a when z oea try, sash with a shorter
a more positive and quicker action.
Tburedey afternoon is suggested for the following rea$onss
for the IAB mmlt-
I't # Fridy to take any action prior to the rend.
cis3t,'.
It wUtes the possibility that members may not be able
to std bseau$ of a long weekend beginning Friday.
. Id now& in the above r mmendatiorr.
Distribution:
ICAPS +:~
Secretariat
Executive Registry
Central Records - 2
the following Wednesday if required as a re-
JMw d. Ls J.
8tsretary, N.I.A.
1f al? =aC7F 'ages 4-7
JSL: IH
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CONFIDENTIAL COPY NO. 7
I.A.G. 1st Meeting
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
Minutes of Meeting held in Room 5132
Now War Department Building
on Monday, 4 February 1946, at 3:30 P.M.
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Director
of Central Intelligence, in the Chair
MEMBERS PRESENT
Mr. Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State in Charge of
Research and. Intelligence
Brig. Gen. John Weckerling (representing
Lt. Gen. Hoyt Vandenberg, Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, WDGS)
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis,
Chief of Naval Intelligence
Brig. Gen. John A. Samford,
Acting Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intellir,,once
ALSO PRESENT
Capt. Thomas F. Cullen, USNR
Capt. W. B. Goggins, USN
Mr. L. L. Montague, Department of State
Col. E. P. Mussatt, USA
Col. C. P. Nicholas, USA
Col. W. A. Perry, USA
SECRETARY
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Department of State
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CONFIDENTIAL
1. PROPOSED POLICIES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE GROUP
The paper was discussed paragraph by paragraph.
ADMIRAL INGLIS questioned whether paragraph 3, on the
composition of the Intelligence Advisory Board, permuted other
officials of the State, War and Navy Departments, such as the
Director of Naval Communications, to participate in meetings of
that Board. After discussion and amendment
a. Concurred in the paper as amended at the meeting. (Sub-
sequently circulated as N.I.A. 1.)
b. Agreed that the wording of paragraph 3 does not preclude
membership by heads of other intelligence agencies of
the State, War and Navy Departments, but that each case
will be decided on its merits by agreement between the
Director of Central Intelligence and the permanent mem-
bers of the Intelligence Advisory Board.
2. PROPOSED TENTATIVE ORGANIZATION OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE' GROUP
The paper was discussed and amended.
Concurred in the paper as amended, subject to a, revision
of Appendix 1IA" so that the totals would be approximately
40 each for State and Navy, and 80 for War. (Subsequently
circulated as N.I.A. 2.)
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. ;%
CONFIDENTIAL COPY NO. 24
I.A..B. 2nd Meeting
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA
For the Meeting to be held in Room 5132-C,
New War Department Building,
on Tuesday, 26 March 1946, at 1530
1. POLICY ON LIQUIDATION OF THE STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
(Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence,
23 March 1946, same subject, for the Members, I.A.B.)
References: a. C.I.G. Directive No. 1.
b. Report of ad hoc committee established
pursuant reference a.
For consideration of the Memorandum by the Director
of Central Intelligence, 23 March, enclosing draft
directives on the above subject.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Secretary, N.T.A.
CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET COPY NO.
I.A.B. 2nd Meeting (LIMITED DISTRIBTUION)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
Minutes of Meeting held in Room 5132-C
New War Department Building
on Tuesday, 26 March 1946, at 3:30 P.M.
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Director of
Central Intelligence, in the Chair
MEMBERS PRESENT
Mr. Ludwell L. Montague (representing Mr. Alfred
McCormack, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State in Charge of Research and Intelligence)
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-2, WDGS
Commodore Charles J. Rend (Representing Rear Admiral
Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval Intelligence)
Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant Chief of
Air Staff, Intelligence
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau
of Investigation
ALSO PRESENT
Mr. Kingman Douglass, Central Intelligence Group
Central intelligence Group
` Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence
Group
Colonel Willis A. Perry, USA, Central Intelligence Group
SECRETARIAT
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National Intelligence
Authority
I Assistant Secretary
OICURgat No.
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I .A.B. 2nd Meeting
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1. POLICY ON LIQUIDATION OF THE STRATEGIC SERVICES UNIT
The directives proposed for submittal to the National
Intelligence Authority were read and minor amendments agreed
upon.
ADMIRAL SOUERS . emphasized that the intention was not to
absorb SSU as an entity within the Central Intelligence Group,
but rather to assure the careful liquidation of the Unit,
over a period of months, so as to utilize its services during
that period and to permit the preservation and transfer to
permanent departments and agencies of SSU elements found to
be of continuing usefulness.
GENERAL VANDENBERG asked whether under the contemplated
liquidation procedure, the G-2 of U.S. Forces, in the China
Theater would be protected from the liquidation of the SSU
unit now in China before other arrangements could be made by
G-2 to provide for those operations considered essential by
G-2.
ADMIRAL SOUERS said that this was an example of the
departmental interests which the proposed liquidation directives
were designed to protect. He recalled that General Vandenberg
had recently forwarded to C.I.G. a plan for post-war intelligence
in China as prepared by G-2, USFCT. In the course of planning
post-war intelligence coverage in that area, it might be found
desirable to charge C.T.G. itself with responsibility for
filling certain gaps. However, C.I.G. could not enter such
fields directly except by authorization of the National Intel-
ligence Authority, and in the meantime it would be the task of
the Director of Central Intelligence to insure that no avail-
able and necessary services were discarded, through liquidation
of SSU, until services as good or-better could be provided to
take their place.
COMMODORE REND proposed a revision of the paper designed
to clarify its language, but after Admiral Souers explained
the reasons for the present language of the paper, Commodore
Rend expressed his agreement.
MR. HOOVER said he was glad to see that the directives
provided for gradual rather than abrupt liquidation, since
this would more readily permit the retention of valuable
elements by the Government. He thought the objectives were
very satisfactorily expressed.
After concluding discussion,
THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-
Concurred in the draft directives as amended (subsequently
submitted to the National Intelligence Authority as
N.I.A. 3).
2. C.I.G. WEEKLY SUMMARY
ADMIRAL SOUERS reported that plans for issuance of a
C.I.G. Weekly Summary were in hand. The Central Reports Staff
had worked up several practice issues. However, it was clear
that if the Weekly were to fulfill its real function--and be
more than a rehash of preceding Daily Summaries--two or three,
seasoned intelligence officers with specialized experience
would have to be added to the staff. He was attempting to
strengthen the present staff with this in mind, by negotiations
with the several departments.
Took note of the above comments.
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3. J.I.C. PAPERS
THE DIRECTOR said that arrangements had been made with
the Joint Intelligence Committee for C.I.G. to receive copies
of appropriate J.I.C. papers. In reply the Secretary of J.I.C.
had, suggested that all C.I.G. papers be furnished to his office
for file and for the use of the Joint Intelligence Staff.
Admiral Souers was willing to send appropriate C.I.G. papers
to the Secretary of J.I.C., but felt that many papers of C.I.G.
would not be of benefit to J.I.S. and should therefore not be
sent.
THE Ii ~'J I-LIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD,.-
Concurred with Admiral SouersT proposed policy.
4. SPECIAL AGENTS
GENERAL VANDENBERG inquired how soon the Central Intel-
ligence Group would be in a position to interview the individ-
uals who are now presenting themselves as prospective special
agents abroad. General Vandenberg said there were a number of
these candidates, and that he was using a few of them. He is
anxious to turn such activities over to the Central Intelligence
Group, however, as soon as possible, because of the danger that
agents from different agencies may get crossed up in the field.
ADMIRAL SOUERS stated that he wanted to be completely
prepared to conduct such operations before interviewing or
hiring any individuals. He does not want to confuse the
permanent program with the existin' operations of SSU. One
of the biggest problems will be to f _ ?d the appropriate man
to head this operation, who can then l,.tilize the servies of
these individuals on a professional basis, In the meantime,
Admiral Souers would prefer that existing agencies conduct
their operations in this field until a permanent program has
been decided upon by the N.I.A. and established. He feels that
one of the most urgent elements in this program is the use of
ordinary business,, scientific and professional men and travellers
who are going abroad. This will not be a "cloak and dagger"
type of operation, but will require careful organization.
GENERAL VANDENBERG expressed the belief, and Admiral
Souers agreed, that all such clandestine operations should be
under a single directing head.
THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-
Took note of the above discussion.
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CONFIDENTIAL COPY NO. 12
I.A.B. 3rd Meeting
(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
Minutes of Meeting held in Room 4252,
New War Department Building,
on Monday, 8 April 19 6464 at 3:00 p.m.
Mr. Kingman Douglass, Acting Director of
Central Intelligence, in the Chair
MEMBERS PRESENT
Mr. Alfred McCormack, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State in Charge of
Research and Intelligence
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, WDGS
Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval
Intelligence
Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant
Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
ALSO PRESENT
USA, Central 25x1
IUSN, Central
SECRETARIAT
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary,
National Intelligence Authority
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
1. 1947 BUDGET FOR INTELLIGENCE WORK OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
MR. McCORMACK submitted the letter in Enclosure
for consideration.
"An
MR. DOUGLASS asked for the comments of the other members
on the suggestion in Mr. McCormack's letter.
GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that the Secretary of State had
considerable influence in the Congress and might well be
able to secure the requested appropriation if he so desired.
Therefore, until the Secretary of State requests assistance
from the other N.I.A. members, General Vandenberg is very
reluctant to advise the Secretary of War to take any action.
General Vandenberg noted that Admiral Souers in the last
N.I.A.. meeeting had already expressed the opinion, from the
viewpoint of C.I.G., that more than $2,000,000 was required
for State Department intelligence. General Vandenberg under-
stood that the Secretaries of War and the Navy had concurred
with Admiral Souers.
ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed with General Vandenberg that
N.I.A. action should not be taken until the Secretary of State
requested such assistance. Admiral Inglis asked whether
Mr. McCormack was representing the Secretary of State in
presenting this matter.
MR. McCORMACK explained that his action was not taken
on a specific request from the Secretary of State. In his
capacity as Special Assistant, however, Mr. McCormack felt
that it was his duty to do all in his power to secure the
appropriation which the Secretary of State had requested and
had not officially revised or withdrawn. He admitted that
there was some difference of opinion within the Department
of State as to the organization and even the need for intel-
ligence activities in that Department.
ADMIRAL INGLIS did not wish to comment upon any matters
of internal disagreement within the Department of State.
He felt, however, that the Central Intelligence Group should
take over from the Department the basic intelligence research
and analysis function.
MR. McCORMACK stated that he was not insisting that
any action be taken, but he thought it entirely appropriate
that the Board advise the N.I.A. what effect the reported
action of the House Appropriations Subcommittee, if sustained
by the Congress, would have upon the work of the Central
Intelligence Group.
GENERAL VANDENBERG believed that the N.I.A. would always
have difficulty in such cases until it has its own operating
funds. With such funds its recommendations regarding depart-
mental budgets will have more weight with Congress. So long
as its funds come from the various Departments, however, its
recommendations regarding budgets will not have great influence.
General Vandenberg questioned whether this Board should
become involved in this matter at this time, or whether it
would not be preferable to find out first what the Secretary
of State proposes to do.
MR. MoCORMACK believed that this Board has the authority
to advise the N.I.A. at this time on its own initiative.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
GENERAL VANDENBERG maintained that Admiral Souers had
already advised the N . I .A . of the C . I .G . views on this point;
the only question at present was whether that advice was
sufficient.
MR. DOUGLASS thought there was an additional question of
how much burden would be placed upon the 'War and Navy Depa:,rt-
ments to fill the gap created by the lack of a State Depart-
ment intelligence organization. He thought this might require
an increase in War and Navy Department budgets for intelligence.
ADMIRAL INGLIS pointed out that the Navy Department
intelligence budget had already been submitted. It might,
therefore, be harder to change that than to attempt to rot,-.._n
the State Department budget.
GENERAL VANDENBERG felt that if the State Department
intelligence budget was refused, Congress would react un-
favorably to a subsequent War and Navy Department request for
additional appropriations for the same purpose.
ADMIRAL INGLIS believed that the Board should either
suggest doing nothing, or recommend to the N,I.A, that the
research and analysis function be transferred from State to
C.I.G. In the latter case, he felt that the personnel assigned
to C.I.G. should be carefully screened and that the funds for
research and analysis should come from the State Department
for the 1947 fiscal year. He thought that C.I.G. should
have an independent budget for the 1948 fiscal year.
GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that the N . I .A . was alroc.d;;
in a difficult situation for the coming year, and questioned
whether the additional burden of a research and analysis unit
should be added during that time. He was in agreement,
however, with the ultimate desirability of having such a
research and analysis unit in C.I.G.
MR. DOUGLASS thought that the Secretary of State might
fool that $2,000,000 was enough to meet his needs and would
be reluctant to transfer anything to C.I.G. Mr. Douglass,
however, also agreed with the desirability of a research and
alalysis unit in C.I.G.
GENERAL VANDENBERG said that if the State Department
decided to decentralize intelligence, he did not thing that
Department could object to C.I.G. assuming the research and
analysis function.
GENERAL McDONALD thought that the N.I.A. should not do
,anything unless the Secretary of State requested its assistance.
MR. McCORMACK pointed out that so far as the official
record is concerned, the Secretary of State had requested
over $5,000,000 for intelligence, which the Bureau of the
Budget had reduced to about $4,000,000.
ADMIRAL INGLIS thought that C.I.G. could be properly
concerned about the loss of the $330,000 earmarked for its
operations.
GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that the C.I.G. had a proper
interest in this budget, but that the actions of C.I.G. should
depend on what action the Secretary of State planned to take.
General Vandenberg therefore thought that the first step should
be for the Director of Central Intelligence to discuss the
matter with the Secretary of State and find out his views
and proposed actions.
CONFIDENTIAL - 2
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CONFIDENTIAL
COLONEL NICHOLAS questioned whether the Director of
Central Intelligence, with the concurrence of this Board, could
not advise the Secretary of State of the detrimental effect
upon C.I.G., of the proposed cut in the budget.
GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed. He thought that if the Secre-
tary of State indicated that he felt further action in support
of his intelligence budget was unnecessary, this Board might
justifiably express its alarm at that time.
MR. McCORMACK suggested that his letter be tabled until
the Director of Central Intelligence had seen the Secretary
of State and until the House Appropriations Committee had
acted on the budget.
MR. DOUGLASS thought the solution might be to advise
Admiral Leahy of the situation.
GENERAL VANDENBERG thought the C.I.G. should find out
what the Secretary of State intends to do. If he intends
to accept the refusal of the budget without further action
on his part, the C.I.G. should express its alarm. However,
if the Secretary of State proposes to take all possible
action in support of his budget. General Vandenberg believed
that no further action was necessary by C.I.G.
MR. MCCORMACK noted that the great difficulty is the un-
certainty in the minds of his employees created by the action
of the House Appropriations Subcommittee. This uncertainty
causes the capable personnel to resign in favor of more secure
employment.
MR. DOUGLASS agreed to attempt to see the Secretary of
State as suggested.
ADMIRAL INGLIS suggested that the possibility of trans-
ferring the research and analysis function from State to the
C.I.G. might also be discussed with the Secretary of State.
GENERAL VANDENBERG expressed his willingness to concur
in such a transfer if State agreed to finance the operations
for the next year. He believed, however, that C.I.G: should
not oppose the State Department if it desired to retain that
function.
. ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he still considered the transfer
as the best ultimate solution.
GENERAL VANDENBERG thought that the Director of Central
Intelligence might find out from the Secretary of State his
reactions to a recommendation by this Board that C.I.G.
assume this research and analysis function. General Va.ndonr_-er
thought that intelligence would be forthcoming if this
function was in either the State Department or the C.I.G.,
but he agreed that transfer to C.I.G. was the preferable
solution.
MR. McCORMACK expressed the belief that the Secretary
of State `has not yet formulated a definite opinion regarding
the ultimate form or composition of the intelligence activi-
ties in the State Department.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONF'IDENTIAL
After further discussion,
THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-
a. Agreed to recommend to the Director of Central
Intelligence that he:
(1) Advise the Secretary of State of the adverse
effect, upon the work of the Central Intelligence
Group, of a substantial reduction or deletion of
the 1947 appropriation for intelligence work in
the Department of State.
(2) Ascertain the views and proposed actions of the
Secretary of State regarding this appropriation.
(3) Ascertain, if the opportunity arises, the views
of the Secretary of State as to the possibility
that the intelligence research and analysis
function, for which this appropriation was re-
quested, might be transferred from the Department
of State to the Central Intelligence Group.
b. Agreed to defer further consideration of Mr. McCormack's
letter (Enclosure hereto) pending the above action
by the Director of Central Intelligence and further
information concerning the action of the House
Appropriations Committee on the 1947 budget for State
Department intelligence work.
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CONFIDENTIAL
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
April 8, 1946
Dear Col. Douglass:
The 1947 appropriation for the intelligence work of the
State Department is now before the Appropriations Committee of
the House of Representatives. The Secretary of State originally
requested an appropriation of over $5,000,000, which the Bureau
of the Budget then cut down to about $4,200,000. There was
a rumor in the press last week that the Appropriations Committee
might make a further drastic out and might even eliminate
the intelligence appropriation entirely.
The Director of Central Intelligence has recently ex-
pressed his concern for the continuance in the State Department
of a strong intelligence unit. That would not be possible if
a drastic cut in the appropriation were made, and I am there-
fore drawing your attention to the matter, with the suggestion
that you obtain the views of the Intelligence Advisory Board
as to whether a recommendation by the National Intelligence
Authority in support of the program of the Secretary of State
might not be in order.
Sincerely yours,
/s/ ALFRED McCORMACK
Col. Kingman Douglass
Acting Director of Central Intelligence
New War Department Building
Washington, D.C.
CONFIDENTIAL
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SECRET
I.A.B. 4th Meeting
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA
,-)16,9
For the Meeting to be held in Room 5106,
New War Departmcn.t Bui ldin
on Thursda ; 9 May at 1430
1. POLICY ON CLEARAN"E OF Pi O ?T. iL FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(C.I.G. 7 and C.I.G. 7/1)
For consideration of the amendments to C.I.G. 7 circulated
in C.I.G. 7/1.
2. PROVISION FOR MONITORING OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA BROAD-
CASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS
(C.I.G: 1/1 and 1/2)
For consideration of the amendments to C.I.G. 1/1 pro-
posed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, as circulated
in C.I.G. 1/2.
3. DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON USSR
(C.T.G. 8 and C.I.G. 8/1)
For consideration of the amendments to C . I . G. 8 proposc.,d
by the Chief of Naval Intelligence and circulated in
C.I.G. 8/1.
JAMES S. LAY, JR.,
Secretary, N.T.A.
ADCY Nt. -------------
Me drat h Clue.
0 Dac1ass
CHSt. Change to: TS C
ftd eelaew Date:
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SECRET COPY NO.
I-.A.B-. 4th Meeti.nF,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
Minutes of Meeting held in Room 5106
New War Department Building
on Thursday, May 19k6, at 2:30 P.M.
Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Director of
Central Intelligence, in the Chair
MEMBERS PRESENT
Dr. William L. Langer, Special Assistant to
the Secretary of State in Charge of Re-
search and Intelligence
Lt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Assistant Chief
of Staff, G-2, W.D.G,S.
Commodore Charles J. Rend (representing Rear Ad-
miral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of Naval In-
telligence)
Brig. General George C. McDonald, Assistant
Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence
Mr. D. M,'Ladd, for Items 1 and 2 (representing
Mr. J, Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal
Bureau of Investigation)
ALSO PRESENT
Ill
Mr. Kingman Douglass, Deputy Director, Central
Intelligence Group
Colonel M. N. Huston, G-2
Captain R. K. Davis, USN, O.N.I.
Colonel E. P. Mussett, A-2
Lt. Colonel I1 - x_ nT~~.Tnnmer, G-2
e.ntral Intelligence Group
SN, Central Intelligence Groui:
ntral Intelligence Group
(for Item 1), Central
USN (for Items 2-4), Central
Central Intelligence Group
Central Intelligence Group
SECRETARIAT
Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, National
Intelligence Authority
Mr. J. K. Tibby, Assistant Secretary
SECRET
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Class. Changed to: T$' C
Next Review Date: __-_______-
Aeth.: HR 10.3 -
Date:
.f . 4th Meeting
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1. POLICY ON CLEARANCE OF PERSONNEL FOR DUTIES WITH CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE GROUP
C0.I.G. 7 and C. G. 7/1)
The proposed amendments to C . I . G. 7, as contained in C., 1. G.
7/1, were taken under consideration.
ADMIRAL SOUERS was of the opinion that the screening com-
mittee recommended by the Chief of Naval Intelligence in C.I.G.
7/1 would be difficult to administer, and, in fact, was an un-
necessary duplication of other provisions of the paper, since
Paragraph 8 of C . I, G, 7 provided that no individuals could be
certified for duties with the Central Intelligence Group until
after a security inquiry which would include a records check of
member agencies of the I.A.B.
COMMODORE REND felt that it is impossible to do too much
in the interests of security. He saw no completely desirable
substitute for the proposed formal screening committee, even if
it were to involve some degree of duplication, and he was sure
that he spoke tAe views of the Chief of Naval Intelligence in
this connection.
ADMIRAL SOUERS agreed that all practicable security meas--
ures should be taken even if they involved extra work, but he
thought all such measures should be practical and capable of
efficient administration.
in the course of further discussion, in which other mem-
bers expressed satisfaction with the language of the section as
written, COLONEL BOBERG proposed as the basis of a generally
agreeable solution the revision of Paragraph 7 of C.I.G. 7 to
read:
V. Reports of investigations will be subject to review
in each case by the Security Officer, C.I.G., who will verif -
that member departments other than the nominating department
have cleared the'nomnee.. Final decision as to acceptability
of an individual for for "an assignment to the Central Intelligence
Group will rest with the Director of Central Intelligence."
The amendment was accepted.
The recommendations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and of the State Department were then considered. ADMIRAL SOUER3
said that he agreed with Mr. Hoover's criticism of Paragraph 9
of C. I'. G. 7 and believed that the remedy should be the addition
to that paragraph of the following provision:.
"In each case of clearance based on a previous satis-
factory character and loyalty investigation or on the basis
of a minimum of ten (10) years honorable Government service,
a chock of the appropriate records in the Department of Stato;
Federal Bureau of Investigation; Military Intelligence Service,
War Department, and Office of Naval Intelligence, Navy DoDart--
ment, will be made prior to the issuance of a clearance cer-
tificate."
MR-. LADD and other members of the Intelligence Advisory
Board agreed to this change.
DR. LANGER set forth the purpose of the State Department
recommendations covering exceptional cases, but after discussion
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it was agreed that the provisions of C.I.G. 7 (Paragraph 13)
were satisfactory to all concerned. After accepting further
minor amendments offered by the Central Planning Staff,
THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:-
Approved C.I.G. 7, subject to the amendments above
(Enclosure to C.I.G. 7 subsequently issued as C.I.G.
Directive No. 8).
2. PROVISION FOR MONITORING OF PRESS AND PROPAGANDA BROAD-
CASTS OF FOREIGN POWERS
C-. C.I.G. 171 and C.I.G. 1/2)
ADMIRAL SOURS reviewed the history of the Foreign Broad-
cast Intelligence Service (FBIS). He noted the recommendation
in his own report (C.I.G. 1/1) that the service be continued
under C.I.G. direction and War Department administration, and
invited attention to the dissenting recommendation of the Assi_st-
ant Chief of Staff, G-2, in C.I.G. 1/2, that the project be.ad-
ministered by the Department of State or by the C.I.G. directly.
On the second point, Admiral Souers could not agree with Ge.noro>J.
Vandenberg that the Central Intelligence Group should administer
such a service directly. The C.I.G. is not an independent agency
and thus is not empowered to sign contracts, nor does it have
technical personnel readily available. While the C.I,G. was
authorized to perform such services of common concern as the
National Intelligence Authority determines can be more effici~.e.nt-
lyac complished centrally", he believed the most efficient pro-
cedure in this case was probably that outlined in C.I.G. 1/1.
GENERAL VANDENBERG agreed it would be difficult for the
C-.I.G. to assume direct administrative control of FBIS at this
time. Yet he felt that the position of the War Department should
be a-o.orociated and understood. As he saw it, the War Department
had accepted the interim responsibility for administering FBIS
until the end of this fiscal year, in order to serve the many
Government agencies interested in the product of monitoring.
Now, more than ever, it was clear that the bulk of the i.nfor-
mat _o.n obtained by this means was not primarily related to m
tary intelligence; rather it related to political and economic
intelligence, and for this reason was surely of greater interest,
to the Department,of State than to the War Department. He
doubted whether G-2 could continue to justify requests for FBIS
apj.propriations for these reasons, and he felt there should be no
delay in placing the administration of FBIS in an agency of
primary interest, such as State, or in C.I.G. as a centralized
service.
ADMIRAL SOUERS noted that the disposition proposed in
C.h.G. 1/1 would require the approval of the National Intelli-
gence Authority, Should the Authority agree that the War Dep~part-
ment was the appropriate agency to administer the service, it
could be presumed that the Secretaries of State, War, and the
Navy could defend the conclusion in relation to appropriations.
GENERAL VANDENBERG thought it would be easier for the throe
Secretaries to defend the service within State or C.I.G. than in
the War Department.
ADMIRAL-SOUERS said he had originally thought the State De-
paartr:7e.nt would be,the ideal lodgment for FBIS, and in fact he
believed the former Special Assistant for Research and IntellJ_-
gc.nce (Mr. McCormack) had once held the same view. However, there
had recently been so much question as to the scope of the opera-
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artments.
GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he was confident C.I.G. would
do that, especially since Army officers in C.T.G. are always
subject to detail and rot,-at-ion. He thou gilt t -lat the War Depart-
ment's viewr%oint would be represented because of the years of
Army. training each Army officer in C. I, G. wo"i.ld slave. Re
thought that~C.I.G. personnel should ex~-ress their own views and
not pattern then after tie of someone in an outside
agency.
ADMIRAL I NGLIS thought that the idea was to assign people
to C.I.G. in order to form a 1_nk with the des,art?_lents, to
utilize the sources therein, cared have the benefit of the con-
bined thinking of all depart .gents .
"TER -1~~ _;_
GE14 AL VANDEN I I G thought that Admiral Ils b~pD -17
could be 0ained by having re )resentatives detailed to 0,R.E.
MR. I. AY pointed out that the procedure to be followed by
each represeiitative-, in clearing papers was a matter for decisj on
by each I.A.D. membe . Admiral Inglis could instruct his rep=pre-
sentati.ve not to v3te until 'Ad -:i.ral Inglis had a,,.,-roved each
estimate.
ADMIRAL ITSGLT S said that he was willing to appoint a repre-
sentative part-tine, but that this rep ntative would act
only as a messenger.
see this system tried.
M.R. EDDY said that he would like to
He thought that each I.A.D. member might designate deg>uty
who was well trained and could bring papers to the respective
I,A.D. members for clearance when necessary.
,-? ve :lis re--)resenta-
T r R
GETvER~ ~L C,~u-~MRI_ i1~LITd said that he would gi
tive the responsibility for deciding whether to act on an
estimate or to clear it with General Chamberlin.shGeneralt ,re-
Chamberlin felt, however, that this arran
vent C.I.G. research personnel fro; working closely with G-2
research sections.
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GENERAL CIIAMEERLIN then ex1 ressed the belief that C.I.G. es-
tirnates sent to the President should not show a di :: eating
o,:in1on.
ADMIRAL INGLIS thought that the President should know of
any dissenting opinions, although he hoped that any differences
could be reconciled before the estimates were issued. He felt,
however, that estimates should not be held up unduly in an effort
to reconcile divergent views.
GENERAL CI `1MEERLIN said that if each pa::er were handled in
detail it would defeat the purpose of C. 1. G. , since every word
or shade of meaning would be questioned.
ADMIRAL IN.VGLIS noted that this was the procedure used in
the Joint Chiefs cf Staff. Although it had not worked perfectly,
he felt that for every example where this procedure had failed
to work there were ten examples where it had worked.
GENERAL CHBERLIN noted, however, that the Joint Chiefs
of Staff has no head or coy sander, as is the case in C.I.G.
MR. LAY pointed out that the wording; of N.I. ~. Directive
No. 1 requires only that "substantial dissent" should be noted
in C.I.G. estimates, which was intended to preclude discussion
of every word or shade of Deanino.
ADMIRAL INGLIS said that the concept of T.I.A. was that
all departments would, be re :resented in all matters. The
Director of Central intelligence is the executive responsible
for carrying out the policies of the N, I.A. The I.A.B. is more
than merely an adviser. All through the N. I. s. and C.I.G.
structure it was intended that there be equal representation of
all departments.
GENERAL VA IdDLTTr;; c,RG pointed out that At is a matter of
I . minutes that the INT. I.i=~, is the agency responsi-
record in N.~~'~
ble to the President, and not the Director of Central
Intelligence.
GENERAL CHAMiBERLIN noted that the Director of Central
Intelligence is not responsible to the I.A.B., but rather to
the N . I . A .
GENERAL VANDENBERG pointed out, however, that the N.I.A.
has delegated to the the right to concur for the N.I. ?i.
members.. Therefore, in the final analysis the I.A.B., by this
delegation, has a measure of responsibility for the success of
C.T.G. activities.
GENERAL CILLMB RLIN questioned how this would work, since
many other agencies of the Government were involved.
ADMIRAL INGLIS noted that this was covered by the fact
that other agencies sat as members of the I.A.B. on matters of
interest to those a,;encies.
After further discussion of detailed amendments to the ?,n-
closure to C.I.G. 16;1,
THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:
Concurred in the issuance of the Enclosure to C.I.G.
16/1 subject to amendment to read as follows:
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"I. To implement the provisions of Para r :h 6 of
N.I.A. Directive .T:~. 1, each me rber of the In-
telligence Advisory Board will des _gnate a
:ersona,l representative to remain -.ssi,ned to
his office and detailed as liaison to the Pro-
jects Division of the Intel].ig;ence Staff of
the Office of Reports and Estimates of the
Central intelligence Groutp.
2. These representatives will, as their chiefs
direct, either concur in C.I.G. intelli ,encc
estimates or :resent dissenting o J.nions.
3. Each iritells,_ence estimate issued by C..i.G.
will e1.. :per have the concurrence of all I. A, i3.
members or will 1 .have any substantial dissent
ai-;:,ended as a ippart of the estimate or follow as
provided in 4 below.
4. This procedure will not be i:,err it Led to prevent
the .` resentation of any estimate on the re-
quired date. If concurrence or d: ssenti_ng
opinions cannot be obtained in time to rieet
deadlines for cosir_>letion and submission of es -
tir:ates, such estimates will be submitted to-
Gether with a st::,.teraent that only limited
coordination has been attained and substantial
dissent, if ally, will be submitted at a later
date.
"5. C.Z.G. will afford de..gnated re ..resentatives
complete d;p nor tunity to rti~ci ,t ~e in all
has es of the development of est .. rages .
L
(Su'aseouently is ued as C.I.G. Administrative Order
IT
.0 r
. 2; .
3. PLAN FOE COORDINATION OF BIOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE
GENERAL VANDEIBERG gave a brief des?cri ._,ti_ >n of the :lean
recommended in C.I.G. 17.
GENERAL CEUITIBBRLIN raised the question as to whether ara-
gral_ph 2-c of the ,: roposed C.I.G. Directive would .author:_ze
biographic intelligence d,-,ta of one de -,art ment to be .jade
available to another d part. gent .
-_
GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that if the )*Jo,;ra .hi.c inte-11'
Bence data of one department was not available to other
, ^t '.
dupl_
de-.,art-,-:rents, such a systei, would cause a :Jrea ae'oJ J.
cation.
M. EDDY stated that he believed the word "res;onsibi.lity
should be left out of the first sentence of p ra r aph 2-c.
GEI ERAL VANDET,IE RG said that he was agreeable to th-J s
omission.
ADMIRAL INGLJIS said that he objected to the last sentence
in paragraph 2 of t-1-Le covering riemor andon by the Director of
Central Intelligence, since 0.14.1. does have a good index spsteri
and it is maintained up-p to date.
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MR. EDGAR stated that at the time the coverirLg; memorandum
was written he did not know that the Navy's index system had been
co pleted .
ADMIRAL INGLIS questioned whether this proposed Direct .-ve
would govern domestic coverage and, if so, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation should have a chance to express its views on the
matter under consideration.
GENER.AL VANDENBERG re-,)lied that the pa :er dld not govern
dor,aest; c coverage, and was for foreign Jio r phis intelligence
Only.
ADMIRAL INGLIS stated that the i.1,-, Jority of incu .r es made
to 0. N. I, were in the dourest: c f--.-1(3 and he felt that this .paper
was too elaborate a elan for the coordination of fore.gn
biographic :tntell gonce .
G N R.'iL V 1IDiI'BERG stated that if tl I n rthpaper
did not work, it could be recalled.
MR. EDGAR stated that it was desirable to get a ;-proval on
this pal..?-er in order to gain ,-,,roper coordination Ira the field.
GENERAL VANDENBERG stated that he should have cexltral
ti e in-
enc
machine records in order to poin~ out biographic lntellit)
f ormat:;_ on contained in other agencies,
ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed.
the
MR. EDDY stated t1-hat the " rovisa ons o ' ar: `;rapl~ 3-b of f t
covering Lie..orandui:i would cause too much work for the State
partment to undertake at this tiiae, sir_ce the State Department had
a mass of biographic information that dated back to 1790, and
that to reproduce tins information would. be a staggering Job.
MR. EDG R exr lamed that it was not the intent of this
paper to reproduce ell bio gra laid information presently on file
in the de )artm:.ents but rather C.I.G. would start anew from a
given date, and the information contained in the central file
would be only enough to indicate the type of 1ers.anali.t~ whose
name appeared on each card. This would make it possible to decide
whether it was desirable to obtain further details from the de-
4C having the basic file on a , ven individual.
MR. HECK stated that the State Department drew from a wider
scope than would be rL ,-n, r i t or 2tande:.rd for_..:? hx d that one
c c. >
or two leer cent of the naaes in State Deartraeflc . yle. wout' d '.-)c
gency
covered by standard report forms. He su~~-gested that each a ,
concentrate on an assigned area of responsiuilltb%.
GENERAL CI iMBERLIN said that he was heartily in favor of
a central f:;.le which could be consulted rather than having to
contact all of the agencies in each case on which infor.7.aation
right be desired.
GENERAL VATTDLTTBERG said that to have to o to the files :)f
each agency on each case would tale a lot of ui.a.necessary time.
MR. HECK reiterated that such a central f '..le would show
only a small per cent of the names presently on file .n the. State
Depar mdnt
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GENERAL. VAANDENBERG stated that the central file proposed.
would be starting anew, and, while he realized it would be.slow in
building up, eventually it would be of benefit to all concerned.
MR. HECK stated that he believed that if the information
contained on these cards got ,_luch beyond a name stage, it would
involve too much duplication.
GENERAL VANDENBERG said that there would naturally have to
be some duplication. However, at the present time, with the
volume of files in the agencies and no central index system, no
one knows exactly what we do have.
MR. HECK felt that this proposal would -put a heavy burden
on the departmental agencies, since it would require additional
people to extract the information and put it on standard cards.
GENERAL CHAMBERLIN suggested that each time an agency made
a summary for its own index, it send a copy to C.I.G.
ADMIRAL INGLIS suggested that to eliminate workload, cards
for C.I.G. be prepared on each new report from the field or wiien-
ever departmental agencies took action to prepare a summary--as,
for example, in answer to a request. He thought that on this
basis the C.I.G. file would be very useful five years from now.
GENERAL VANDENBERG said that was all C.I.G. asked the
agencies to do.
MR. EDGAR said that C,I.G. would be willing to receive the
standard form on new field reports, and copies of completed
summary reports which are ire-glared by the agencies in answer to
a request. He said that in the latter case C.I.G. would be
willing to make up the central file card.
MR. HE.-l- pointed out that this would mean that C.I.G. had
a very incomplete file, representing only about five per cent of
the State Department's files.
MR. EDGAR expressed the belief that, if C.I.G. received all
completed summary reports, it would have information at least on
personalities in which there is an active interest.
ADMIRAL INGLIS agreed that would be true in many cases, but
pointed out that it would be a long time before any reliance
could be felt that C.I.G. 's list was co..iplete.
MR. EDDY stated that he believed this file should be called
the central index.
MR. EDGAR stated that he believed the name of the file
should indicate that it contained more than just names.
MR. EDDY suggested that the file be called a"reference
index file",
ADMIRAL INGLIS recommended that the phrase "nor does any
department keep a master index of their own biographic files
in ;;paragraph 2 of the covering memorandum b1 the Director of
Central Intelligence, be omitted.
The Enclosure to C.I.G. 17 was then discussed and amend-
y
ments thereto agreed upon by Board.
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THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:
a. Agreed that the phrase "nor does any department keep
a master index of their own biograpiyi.c files", :.t
the end of paragraph 2 of the covering; mer orandui.z of
C.I.G. 17, should be deleted.
b. Concurred in the recornr.7endation in paragraph 3-b of
the covering; memorandum of C, I. G. 17, subject to in-
sertion of the word "index" between "reference" and.
"file" on the second line. thereof.
c. Concurred in the Enclosure to C.I.G. 17, subject to
the following amendments :
(1) Delete the word "responsible" from the second
line of paragraph 2-c.
(2) Reword the first sentence of paragraph 3-a to
read as follows: "Tire chief of mission of each
embassy, legation or foreign post has the
over-all responsibility, in accordance with the
principles of this Directive, for coordinating;
tk,4e collection of biographic intelligence in
11
his geographical area.
(3) Delete paragraph 3-b-(7)
(4) Delete paragraph 5-b.
(Subsequently issued as C,I.G. Directive No. 16),
4. NATIONAL, INTELLIGENCE REQUIREME vTS--CHINA
C.I.UT 1~
MR. EDDY suggested that this item be postponed until the
next I.A.B. .meeting,
GENERAL CHAMBERLIN agreed, since he had not had sufficient
time to study this paper. He expressed the belief, however, that
the titles of Parts I and Il of the proposed N.I.A. directive
were reversed.
MR. EDGAR asked if, since the proposed directive had the
concurrence of representatives of the .-I.A. ., the Board would
authorize use of the directive, pending final approval, as a
basis for the preparation by an interde art _iental group. of a
collection directive.
GENERAL CHAMBERLIN said that he would like to know what
collection responsibilities. are involved before deciding what
information should be collected.
MR. EDGAR explained that it was felt that the collection
people must know what information the researchers want before
they can decide on the assignment of collection responsibilities.
ADMIRAL INGLIS said that although he'felt the wording could
be improved, he was prepared to approve the directive as ~t
stands.
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After further discussion,
THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD:
a. Agreed to defer consideration of C.I.G. 19 until a-
d, 7 N
meeting; next Thursda ove~giber 1gk6 .
b. Pending final approval, authorized the use of the
Enclosure to C.I.G. 19 as a basis for the prepara-
tion by an interdepartmental group_) of a collection
directive.
5. STATUS OF N . I . A. 6
ADMIRAL INGLIS asked what was being done on N.I.A. 6, in
view of the appointment of the Atomic Energy Co~l..1-ssion.
MR. LAY explained that N.I.A. 6 was presently awaiting
approval by the President, and that General Vandenberg
taking steps to get a decision on this Datter.
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,,.' ?. 32
ST
- S
I, A. B. 10th Meeting;
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA
COPY NO.
For the Meetin to be held in Room 2169
New War Department Building P.M.
on Thursday, 7 November 146 at 2--50
1. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE RE( ,UIREMENTS - CHINA.
19)
For consideration of the recommendation contained
in C.I.G. 19, as agreed at the last I.A.B. meeting.
2. ESTABLISHMENT OF A CHANNEL BETWEF THE CENTRAL
INT CHIEFS OF STAFF
INTELLIGENCE GROUP AND THE JO
(C.I.G. 15)
For further consideration of the problems presented
in C.I.G. l5-
ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS IN TIFF, FIELD CF STATIC
INTELLIGENCE TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP
(C.I.G. 13 and C.I.G. 131)
For consideration of the committee report contained
in C.I.,G. 13/1.
JAMES S. LAY JR.
Secretary, N.I.A.
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SECRET COPY Not
T.A.B. loth Neeting
(LIMITED DISTRIBUTION)
CE.;iTTRAL INTE,LLIGFZ\TCE GROUP
INTFLLIGhfi?CE ADVISORY BOARD
Minutes of Meeting held in Room. 2169
Nevi War Detartmen t Bu
on Thursday, 7 November 1946 at 2:30 P.M.
VLt. General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, Director of
Central Intelligence, in the Chair
PdIB:nRS PRZSTT?T
-..-Mr. William A. Eddy, Special Assistant to' the
Secretary of State for Research and Irl-
telligence
/Maj. General Stephen J. Chamberlin, Director
o f Intelligence, W.D. G. S.
/Rear Admiral Thomas B. Inglis, Chief of ITaval
Intelligence
Brig. General John A. Samford, Deputy Assist-
ant Chief of Air Staff-2
ALSO P
IT! ~. :,, S~MY, T
" Mr. A. Sidney Buford, Department of State
kColonel E. J. Treacy, U.S.A.
Captain R. K. Davis, U.S.M.
Colonel E. P. Mussett, U.S.A.
L;Mr. Donald Edgar, Central Intelligence Group
SFC BETA RIB TT
Mr. Tames S. Lay, Jr., Secretary, M.I.A.
/30
IA 10th Meeting
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1. NATIONAL INTTLLIG3 TTCE REQUIREME TS--Cf?2iv'A
Gl T4 R
.L 01'x J. BLP, I1 sceid that he had difficulty understanding
the purpose of-this paper. If it was intended to cover over-all
long-range intelligence requirements, he felt that it was incom-
plete: If, however, it covered only some intermediate objective,
he did not have much to say except to suggest a few minor changes.
F .. 1';G~',R explained that this paper did not cover departmental
requirements, which it was assumed would be drawn up by the various
agencies. He pointed out, however, that.u-ncoordinated and uncorre-
lated sets of instructions were going out to the field which did not
completely fill national requirern.ents. Therefore, the only require-
ments put in this paper were those which are most important from a
national viewpoint. This paper covered only China as a trial area.
It did not attempt, however, to define the ultimate requirements
for national policy intelligence.
GFDTERAL CHAMBERLIN noted that only three subjects were covered ,
whereas there are many others of interest to the VJT,:r Department.
GENERAL VL11D BERG sain that the War Department was expected
to send those out, except in those cases ihcro C.I.G, might specif-
ically ask for additional information.
MR. EDGAR explained that at-the first interdepartmental meet-
ing on coordination of the intelligence effort, it ,i.,as agreed that
the first stop should be to develop a coordinated collection of in-
tclligence requirements area by area throughout the world. Each
agency representative was asked to turn in the requirements' it con-
s-dcred most important, These wore than synthesized by the Office
o Reports and Estimate,; in C.I.G. Some of the information required
was of interest to .mor-o than one department, end when the depart-
ments agreed., those requirements were put in the paper. If this
paper is approved, the collection representatives from all agencies
will look over. Part 11 in order to decide which field reepresenta-
ti ;-cs arc be.s t located to obtain the des ,-red. i.nfc rration and to at-
tempt to allocate those _recryui_rcments to the curio_ field a! cncics.
GENERAL OHAMBFRLIIT did not scac how coordination could be ac-
complished in thi?.s way unless the whole problem was solved.
NM. EDDY pointed o-t ti:let this was merely a test case, and
that this paper .m-J C,ht edically different a ; c.ar M eom now.
MR, EDGAR these requirements wouJ.d be reviewed
quarterly.
GE TERAL CHAMBT"?RLIN asked why other items of importance, such
as topographic data, were not included.
MR. EDGAR explained than no attempt had been made to include
static or basic intclligcncc1 Also, no scientific intelligence
r?..quiremcnts were included because it tiwas felt there was nothing
of interest in. this area.
ADMIRAL INGLIS noted that these requirements covered only those
that arc currently essential.
GENERAL CHTAMBFRLIN expressed the belief that this was intended
to be an attempt to coordinate the whole collection effort in China.
GENERAL VANDMNBERG said that it was impossible to do this until
the agencies had agreed on more basic issues, such as assignment of
primary responsibilities. Meanwwwhile, this was an attempt to move
forward as far as possible.
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 ADI'?IRAL IYGLIS said that lie was v.illinp to approve the paper
as it stands, but that he was also baffled by the wording ". essen-
tial elements of National Intelligcnce ". He thou at t ,ey~ were all
right, however, as targets for the next three months and as a trial
case.
1,21L. EDDY said that he was willing to approve the paper as it
stands.
GH:~NERAL VAN D] BH'RG said that the volue of this rarer ~~ o uld
depend upon the effort which all agencies put behind it.
GH TERAL C7 T TlF,TL113 LIN sai' that if the three items mentioned wore
.L I considered the moat i.m ortant, this tV'"ar Dcpartrec:nt would fulfill its
part of the effort as a matter of priority.
G71TE AL SA .'' 'ORD understood t].at this was an experiment in
eetrating current emphasis. He considered the paper all right as
it is.
GErrERAL CT=Ar:133PHLI_.N expressed the belief that t: e to r minolor,Y
was twisted.
IUZ. EDGAR explained that the first store had been to study na-
tional policy toward Mrira, on the theory that intelli ;exec should
operate for the policy-makers, to show then. v-'lrcthc.r the policy was
a success or needed change. It waas felt that tih_e essential cle--
ments were stated too broadly and were therefore broken down into
col ection lequireme;nts vv: is could be turned ovr.-- to the collca-
tion representatives to draft a collection directive. lc realized
that the terms used were somewhat different from mil to y usage,
but that the four ag ercy represent tive:s had ag,re: d u'ypon the pros-
ont terminology. C.I.~'. , howcvo n, did not feel str.-ron_gly about mak-
Ln.g a cha.n e it file t . r ir.olof:>_7. TZr. l'd ar s steel, rind it was
agreed, th t Esscntifl TE.le ents of M-;oational Intclligcn.ec' should
be changed to iced ',~Cu:^rcn.t Esse tials of Motion^.l I? Celli c.ncc .
GP TM AL CHAT?BT' ;.LPh seid that he 7i,oul.d -crcfcr not to approve
he paper until lie had seen the collection d _rec Five based 'thereon.
H-- n tot i y ? t H-- did agree tBnl,cVzv:~ ~_? t_~`a u the pa,p .:r Acs oll ri,rr ,h.t Os s a balls
for preparation of a .~l Cher collection directive.
ADMIT',AL IT'GIIS su ge sted thot the meeting of coll ection rep-
rescnta.tivcs be hold to l:,rc~e,k douu;r. the rcr,. i cr.:_ ;r._cs into r 1_loc-.-
t .ons to each agency. Lhese could t'. en b chced ~iit:i the I.A.B.,
.d when ap.p:L ovcL. ca:uh,h. eg_aey vfould issue dire -? _i.vcs to a.eeora,.plish
its port of --he missieer-I..
GT'TT'RAL VAlTD.BrRG asked if r: further I.A.D. mceting would be
necessary if the representatives of the egencics agreed on tlhe col-
lection directive.
ADMIRAL IT?'G1,IS did rat think it would be pi_ec;c-ssar7. to put the
paper on the agci::da fox Rothe meeting, but f :.lt thca.t it could be
dhccked informa:ll 7 wi'tl~ the I.A.B. members rid issued , s another
C.I.G. paper.
Tm. EDDY suggested _%xovrl of thee pe.rcr with the understanding
that distribution vr.;ould be withhold until essi7nrvcnt of collection
responsibilities v:as, agreed upon.
In answer to Yr. Eddy, MR. EDGAR said that the directives
would be distributed to ambassra.doYs end theater coml.11. nders through.
the oppr-oprietc dcpc_ertmcnts.
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T SI'CRr'T
After further discussion,
TIII" INT ILIG":TTCE ADVISORY BOI.RD:
a Agreed upon the following amendments to the Tnclosure
(1) Change TssentL-l Elements of Ietionol In-tell-i-
genco" to read Current Tsser.ticals of T,1- : tionaal Intclli^-
gence`' throughout the paper.
(2) In poragrcph 1, line 4, change ~~requiremcnts!-
to rend "objcctives~~.. -
b. Approve:-d the nclosurc to C.I.G. 19, as amended, ten-.
t,atively as a li s for the prep~:ara,tion of subsequent collec-
tion directive, with the u.;:idcrst,^i:r.din,a th .t distribution would
be withheld until the collection oircet' ve h, -d been arced upon,
tim C n- 2 1 -B1._77 ( T 7 7' `J`
2., ESTABLISI-BTD T OF j C A 2,I L , { C RAL
T ~' C:.I ii 3 0 T FF
Tl ~~ LLI G 7 C CyrJ T ' 1 D TI J C~II T
GFTjL'RAL VAR ENPD'lMG explained that consideration of this prob-
lem hod been deferred at previous r cctin,- , end requested
any further comments.
ADl!JI.RAL I:TGLIS said that the matter had been discussed in the
J.I.C. It was complicated problem, end it w, he rd to decide
whether J.I.C. or should discuss it further. Re said that
the Navy Department feels that one solution it Gc.ner:l Vendenbcrg's
original proposal, which goes much farther than fadr.ir :l Inglis'
proposal in C.I.G. 15. dmixcl Inglis circulated sketch showing
how the Nava thought Gc:ncre.l Van.denber{'s prokos l mi;ht be put
into effect. This involved moving the J.I.C. ard the J.I.S. into
the structure of'thc C.T.G, It .lso formed link between the
J . C . ~, end the Dire eto ' of Central Intelligence and between I. C . 3.
subcommittees end the C.I. G,. It' pro-;posed c i:e_ the, morrbcr-
ship of T.I,.C. to scrricc r'xrr?bcrs only, plus the. -d6it,i_on of the
Director of Centrca.l I ,ntelligen.cce as mea bass in, the se --re, m--n nner r s
on the I., ,,B. With the c11-. nge in membcrship it v,,- s Bugg stcd thet
the name be chra.nged to Joint Intelligence Do.erd (J.I.B.~ . Admiral
Inglis thought that in peacetime the Director of Cc rtra:1 Irte:lli.-
gcncc is responsible to the ? .I.:. , but that tl-l might be reversed
iii wartime to mral~c hire responsible to the I . C ~ S - Re felt the t this
proposal provided a nc~cssaary security wall a,roluni the military rc-
:tivities of J.I.C. The J.I.S. membership would Stay -L" o s.aa,-.c except
for the elimination. of the St _to Deportment V Liaison with
the St--ate Dc-pc .rtment, however, would ire continued, but through the
I.A.B. rather th,n the J.I.C.
ADI'IIRAL IYGLIS expl,ain.cd that for th p7>c;y, r tior, of intclli-
gence cstim tc>s the proposed T.I.S. would go both to.O,R.E. end,
for dep-a' rtmen.tal intelligence, to the other dep rtrrents. T.I.S.
would belong to the I.I. 3. , with later^.l communications with C,I.r.
MR. EDDY thought that might be can ultimo tc solution, but sug-
rr,ested a,ren interim step that the 1.I.3. serve. .s : n intelligence
:advisory sta:aff to the T.r,.E.
GENERAL CI I,TTB RLII' s:-.id that the h.^d not figured out a.. solutic:.n-
to the problc-m yet, but th -t he did havc some fund,-mental principles
which he felt should be considered. First of -11, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff roust remain an essentially military agen0y. General Chdm-
berlin felt, h.ovvever, th a.t General Eisenhower would be hcsitan.t to
change any existing., arrangements for coordination with the State
Department.
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ADMIP_~L ITTGLIS said that he would like to make it perfectly
clear that the iT:avy Department wants a link with the State Depart-
L,ient and considers it absolutely essential. There is no intent,
in the proposal he just outlined, to stop such coordination. It
was felt, however, that coordination. with the State Department
would be adequately assured through the T.A.P.
GT'YdRAL CIT. T,-13-JHHHLIT: noted that the mission of the Director of
Central Intelligence goes far beyond the scope of the J.C.S. Th.ere-
fore, nothing should-be done to circumscribe C.I.C. into a lesser
mission. This is a second fundamental which General Eisenhower
feels should be observed. Third, it would be bed to circumscribe
free and direct contact, especially in wa_~time, from the J.C.S. to
the President. there should be nothing in the arrangement,
as far as the mal~i: of war plans is concerned, which interpolates
a civilian agency between planning, agencies of the J.C.S., but, as
General Vandenberg noted, these T.C.5. agencies should not be denied
any intelligence necessary to enable them to perform their mission.
Fifth, no agencies other 11an strictly military should have access
to military plans. This should be . a riatttr of ri eh.t on the part of
military agencies, for security reasons. General Chamberlin said
that he was unable to figure out an orga :i_,ati on. which_ observed all
of those fundamental pri.nc i les. Ho felt, n_owever, that there was
great advantage in Admiral Inglis' original su gestion in C.I.G. 15,
sindo it would at least provide a piecemeal approach to the problem.
GETTERAL VAI`D. `TBL~RG said that the principles enunciated by Gen-
oral Chamberlin vwere.al :o the objectives for "'w; li_ch the C.T.G. was
striving. He pointed out that the C.I.G. proposal provided a wa-
tertight compartment for the military. I I c obse. ?ved , however, that
allied to that consideration is the fact that w, er planners must
have the best intelligence and that it must be co :.stantly supplied
to them.. Th.c intelli_ge ,ce agency, t:h.erefore, sh,oill d work right
along with the planners. Specifically, General ~'.anden.berg; noted
that Admiral In'lis' new proposal cstc'..blis1 cd a watertight military
compartment, but placed it next to the C.TG. , }r here it could draw
or. all aval1 atib1F. intelligence.
G?PT7TRAL CIiA1;1BEFLI1F noted that there: were sonic subj cots covered
by J.I.C. subcommittees which C.I,G. should not ve.
AD11IRAL ITTGLIS said that some could be put under the J.T.B<
and others; such as the Joint Intelligence ,tidy Publishing Doar-d
the Publications :tcview Subcommittee, could be rote ;rated into
,and
C.I.G.
1{'lF. EDDY said that he was willing to accept Admiral I=a. lis'
new proposal as an ultimate objective. He thou(? h,.t , however, that
it would be possible to procccd imricdietely to licuidatc the J.I.C.
subcomr,iittces and then follow that with. Admiral T7i ;lis' proposal.
GTFL F T, 7 LiL_?BtL:h,G felt that it would be c, -fi cult to justify
thc initial stet: proposed in C.I.G. 15 until a had been
presented for ap_orev-c.1.' He thought that tr plan. should
first be approved , r - in1 - - 11. and t;=-.Li tuue 1,ni t el step approved
for immediate ii,_j)ar_ He noted that l c process stopped
after the initial step 1..ed been taken, C.I.G, , o~ld be accountable
but not reaT)onsible.
ADMIRAL INGLIS said that one difficulty which had been dieccv-
ered in his proposal in C.I.G. 15 v,as that personnel assigned to
J.C.S. subcommittees m.a,.y not be assigned oddition al duties ww_i.,';i.olit
the approval of the J.C.S. He agreed with. General Vandenberg that
the ultimate objective should be presented at the. some time that
the initial step is submitted for app rov ,il.
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LTEDDY felt that the nuestior. of the ultimate objective 1r-
volved very broad cara.sideratio-s. T -e
pointed out th t1..ie: Ii e e.
three policy- forming groups -- rn.a.mely, the State Department in the
political field, the T.C.S. in the military field, end the State-
Wa.r-Yavy Coordinating Committee in metiers. Ye
thought that the relationship of those C-,-,ours should be carefully
c,nsidered and presented in any ultimate solution. He felt that it
might be premature to attempt to outline the ultimate objective.
GLT:.E A`L VAT D_TBTRG t hought that it riir'ht be possible to show
the end objective in broad terms, ho-v,,, for it wL s now _,ossible to
go, and why the initial stop was bF ; r. taken.
ER. EDDY felt t' this v.ould require consider: ble time-consum-
ing staff work to r_-:~~?.:.re , Therefore, would like to see the first
step taken as soon is p- 035 )le.
G711TEP4U V,,J DL+iT13ERG- suggested hot if ther'c w ~r
c.zc1a1 aC;rc~-
m.ent, Admiral Inglis' new proposal could be used ~a.s the ultimate ob-
jective and the proposal in C.I.G. 15 as the initial sici , Tie s??, _
g sted that people from ICAPS -and the agencies be designated to
write up such. a proposal or consideration by the 7.1.A and tlhh_e
T.C.S.
GTTT IAL C IAi,RB~~:P~T,IT` stated that he coule not say at this time
that he approved the end result suggested by Admiral Inglis. Tae
thought a way should be found to get the intell.i,;er.ce from C.I.G.
without interpolating C. I . G. into the T . C. S. lie explained that he
was not opposed to General Vandenberg personally, but T.,as in general
doubtful of the wisdom of mixing up in the T.C.S. tl.;.e head of an
agency who repo_rted to civilian autra.orityy.
ADI1IRAL I TGLIT asked if, ir_ case of war, it Ica not b: desir-
able to have the Di_ ector of Central Ic:'~e1 i;_ ~ce. and the Ccntral
:telligence the commandl of the T.C.c.
GJRH Pa~L C ~~,1:3,lT;LIT said that i . case, of war lie thought that the
C.I.G. should be brought into the T.O.S. or_ and made re-
s on.sible for the whole intelligence effoYt. ITC granted that this
v,ould involve abolishin the T.I.C.
ADMIRAL ITT!GLIS expressed the belief that the T.C. ". would not
agree to abolish the T.I.C., any more than they would to the aboli-
tion of the ~Toint Gear Plar1.s Committec. f"e noted t).;.at at i:r?escr~t
the Director of Central Intelligence reported to the H~T.A. ?-His
proposal was that the Di ector of Central Iatclli once be ass4 gned
additional duties to servo the T.C.`: If at --r:.y time the Director
of Central Intelligence was not agreeable to the I.C.C. , the T.C.C.
could easily cancel the agreement.
IM. EDDY said that the a,-:,recd with this i ro as;aj-, but noted that
it must be subrl..ttcd to tlhc. TT. T.A . and the T. C..
GINERi:L V~;T D r'_3E G a . c.cd be ca,,,ro;e rac; felt t'ha t they would v,ant
to know what lay the initial step.
11 (_
P9Z. EDDY thou,-,...t that would be desirabie, but
It that i f they
could not agree on the ultimate ob j ect,_ve Si p should
be rccommardcd as improvin,r liaison bctv;ct.n C.I.G. and I.T.C.
G [ J!,RAL VA1 Da,.?3i`;RG said t" at he would li' e to wait a week o_r_
l.i.
so to see if staff members coup' not write sor?rcthirm v^'-_ich would
agrecablc to the I ..A .:3.
GT ERAL Ct'_A1TBERLIPT said the t Ia. c. cc, i.1.a riot see what progress
would be made, because "i_c was :~urdai;icrl~ally' opposed to the prim--
ciples involved in Admiral Inglis' new l;:,repposal,
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'till NNW
GENERAL VA1,DE TBERG said. that he felt it was the responsibility
of the T.A.B. to rccorumend approval of some plan. Ile su ested,
therefore, that if there was disagreement within the I.A.:., both
a majority and a minority report be submitted to the TT.I.A He
noted that nothing was being done about this situation at the pres-
ent time. He wanted to stop unnecessary duplication, and felt that
the solution of this problem was one of the best ways to avoid it,
G`TLRAL CHAMBEI'.L?ITT believed that the Director of Central In-
telligcnce should not be on the J.I.B.
ADMIRAL INGLZS felt that if the Director of Central Intelli-
Eonce is made responsible for furnishing intelligence, he must know
the purpose which he intelligence is to servo.
GENERAL CTIA aB I L p felt there was some way to provide for a
lateral communication with the Director of Central Intelligence
in order to obtain intelligence which would them go up through the
J.I.B. He thought that the initial step p.eoposed in C.I.G. 15 was
worth trying.
GaENERA VANDrYTERG said that this would put of thc:r the Director
"of Central Intelligence or the T.I.C. in an untenable -,-Position if it
lasted for long. He said that he would ar,.ree to that arran,cmeiit
for a short period, but that there must be a limit placed on its
duration.
ADPMTIRA'L INGLIS felt that the proposal in C~I.G, 15 was all
right as a first step, but that it would not solve the problem.
It would not tie C.I.G. in close enough with the tT,T: C'. , and it
would not eliminate all of the duplication.
GFTIE AL CHATh31,!2LTIT said that he could understand General
Vandenberg's objecti.on.s, He thought, therefore, that General
Vandenberg's suggestion for preparation of a staff paper was
best. It would then be possible to see what points could be
agreed on, and for put up a minority report on those points that
are not agreed. _Te said 'that he thoufgrt it was a responsibility
of the T.I.C. to get intelligence from the C.I.G. .1-e hoped to
see a solution. He thought that the I.I.S. should work with the
.I.G. to get intelligence, provided security of military infor-
mation was not jeopardized.
GENERAL VANDIT BERG felt that this would lead to the same di_f-
ficulty that the .I.C, is now encountering with the Toint ,'.Tar
Plans Committee, in not knowing what is wanted. he felt strongly
that if C.I.G. was asked for intelligence without being familiar
with what was involved, it would put out intelligence without giv-
ing it proper weight or considering the ra.mificacior.s or-including
all of the intelligence that might be evsilable.
GETTER.AL CHATIBFRL:CN did not think that C.I.G. should be taken
into military planning.
GENERAL VAHDEhBE:,,G pointed out that Admiral Inglis' new pro-
posal would provide a vaterti.ght military compartment within C.T.G.
ADMIRAL INTGLIS said that there must be d watertight compart-
ment somewhere. The question is just where it sh.ould be estab-
lished.
After further discussion,
THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY "BOARD :
Designated the following individuals :as representatives
to. work with the Interdepartmental Coordinating and Planning
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Ow Say
Staff of C.I.G. in drafting proposed recommendations to the
N.I.A. and the J.C.S. on'the relationship between C.I.G. and
the J.C.S., including,?if necessary, a majority and minority
report:
For Mr. Eddy:
Mr. Merritt B. Booth
Mr. A. Sidney Buford
For General Chamberlin: Colonel F.. J; Treacy, Jr.
Colonel L. L. Williams
Colonel J. K. Dickey
For Admiral Inglis: Captain R. K. Davis
Captain F. S. Habecker
For General McDonald: Colonel F. P. Mussett
Colonel L. C. Sherman
For Secretariat, J.I.C.: Captain R. U. Hyde
3. ASSIGNU, MT, _T OF FUNCTIONS lLT THE FIEID OF STATIC
BINTELLI WCE TO T_ E CNTRAL INTEL IGT.NCE GROIJ
(C.I G. ]3 and C. ,G. 13/1) GENERAL VANDENBERG said that ICAPS was now trying to solve the
basic issues in the subject papers. Therefore, even if this specif-
ic study wore cancelled as proposed in C.T.G. 13/1, this would not
mean that further action on the subject would not be taken.
ADMIRAL INGLIS said that he was willing to concur in C.I.G.
13/1, but that he wanted the record to show that the Navy will go
just as far as other participating departments in collaborative
efforts in this field.
GENNERAL CHA1!. BERLIN said that he would like to state some' prin-
ciples which he felt should govern the solution of this problem.
First of all, he felt that each department should be supreme in its
field of primary responsibility. For example, in its field of pri-
mary responsibility he did not think that the War Department could
assign its functions to another agency because the War Department
is charged by law with performing them. General Chamberlin thought,
therefore, that the first thing to do was to assign areas of primary
responsibility to each department. Then matters which are not in
the field of these primary responsibilities should be ,assigned to
C.I.G. He thought that those assignm