A USSR WITHOUT ANDROPOV

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00153R000100060026-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 20, 2008
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: March 28, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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28 PARCH 1983
A USSR WITHOUT ANDROPOV?
NIC/AG
Comments or queries may be directed to the author,
Office of Soviet Analysis in the Directorate of Intelligence.
This informal CIA contingency memorandum has been coordinated
within the National Intelligence Council and discussed with the
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KEY JUDG14ENTS
A USSR Without Andropov?
Althnnnh Andrnnnv hac been in office only four months,
it prudent to
consider what the consequences Might e it a par e the political scene.
-- The succession to Andropov would of course depend on political and
economic conditions in the USSR at the time, and on the international
environment.
-- If he died suddenly now, the result would probably be a more difficult
succession than the transition from Brezhnev to Andropov. There would
be a sharp struggle over the direction of policy and the selection of a
replacement, with secretary Chernenko and Defense Minister Ustinov the
leading contenders.
Should Ustinov win out, he would probably follow the general strategy
Andropov has adopted.
-- Ustinov would likely advocate repressive measures to keep the labor
force in line, while urging disciplinary actions against incompetent
officials and some changes in the incentive structure and in economic
management to stimulate economic growth.
-- Like Andropov, Ustinov would probably be more inclined than was
Brezhnev to challenge US interests in the Third World and less willing
to make concessions to the US in pursuit of improved relations.
Ustinov's military connection probably would increase the weight of
military voices in foreign policy deliberation.
If Chernenko succeeded, he would probably move in the direction of
restoring the domestic status quo that prevailed under Brezhnev.
-- To ensure social stability, Chernenko would probably attempt to
conciliate the population by relaxing performance standards for workers
and by giving greater attention to the consumer sector of the
economy. To placate the institutional elites who support him, he would
reduce pressure on officials to improve their work, slow the pace of
personnel changes, and refrain from economic reorganizations
threatening entrenched bureaucratic interests.
-- Since this program would offer little promise of raising GNP growth
rates, Chernenko would probably be more concerned than Ustinov to place
constraints on military spending and perhaps more flexible in arms
control negotiations.
Whoever succeeded Andropov, his power probably would be more severely
limited than in previous successions, and his policies consquently more dependent
on the preferences of his Politburo colleagues. The diffusion of power and the
depth of divisions within the Politburo could temporarily reduce the regime's
ability to respond effectively to domestic and foreign challenges.
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A USSR Without Andropov?
0
Al+hn,,nh Vi,,-4 i Anrlrnnny h%c hoon in nffira fnr nnly four mnnthc~
it prudent
to consider what impact his departure would have on Soviet politics and
policy. The outcome and nature of a succession to Andropov would of course
depend on political and economic conditions in the USSR at the time, and on
the international environment. This contingency memo examines how Andropov's
departure might affect the Soviet Union if he died suddenly tomorrow.
Andropov's sudden death very likely would result in a "deep" succession
characterized by sharp conflict within the leadership. Since the late 1970s,
and especially over the last year, evidence has accumulated that Soviet
leaders have become more pessimistic about the domestic problems they face
than they have been for the past quarter of a century. They would
consequently regard the choice of a new party head at this juncture as a
decision of the utmost importance for the future of the regime and the
country--as was the case when Brezhnev died. The situation would be
complicated this time, however, by the absence of a candidate for the top job
well qualified in terms of political standing and policy views acceptable to
other key leaders. The man currently best positioned to succeed by virtue of
experience and overlapping membership in the Politburo and Secretariat,
Chernenko, has taken positions on a number of important issues that are
outside the mainstream of Politburo opinion and he lacks the confidence of
several senior leaders.
For this reason, a succession taking place now probably would be more
wrenching and difficult than was the succession of Andropov. Chernenko's
ascendency would by no means be assured, and the possibility exists that the
process of selection itself would be irregular, with one faction or another
calling on the military and KGB to block Chernenko's bid. Whoever the
successor, it is likely that his power would be severely shackled, and
divisions within the Politburo could temporarily reduce the regime's ability
to respond effectively to challenges at home and abroad.
The Current Alignment of Forces on the Politburo
At present, Andropov probably does not command a reliable majority whose
support he can count on across the board. Leaders associated with the foreign
policy - military - security apparatus appear to constitute the core of his
strength. These probably include Defense Minister Ustinov, First Deputy
Premier and Foreign Minister Gromyko, and First Deputy Premier Aliyev, a
former KGB official. Ukrainian party boss Shcherbitskiy is also reported to
be a strong backer.
Apparently ranged against these leaders is a group of party and
government-based leaders that includes Chernenko, Premier Tikhonov, and Kazakh
party boss Kunayev. These leaders were closely associated with Brezhnev in
the past, and they evidently believe the basic thrust of Andropov's policies
poses a threat to the institutional and political interests they represent.
The remaining four Politburo members are probably "floaters" who support some
of Andropov's policy initiatives while opposing others.
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These groupings in the Politburo do not necessarily constitute stable
alliances that will endure. Since leadership alliances are based on each
leader's perception at a given point in time of how he can best protect his
institutional power base, further his political career, and advance the
policies he favors, they tend to shift as circumstances change. Andropov's
death would consequently create a fluid situation from which new groupings
could emerge.
The issues
The fundamental question underlying policy debate following Andropov's
departure would be whether to move further in the general direction he has
taken or to return to the status quo that prevailed under Brezhnev. Despite
elements of policy continuity, Andropov has made tentative moves to chart a
new course. The measures he has effected or. advocated have defined the policy
options before the leadership more clearly than previously and heightened
friction within the Politburo.
An important element of Andropov's strategy for revitalizing the economy
has been the enforcement of higher standards of performance for Soviet
officials and greater emphasis on merit than on seniority as a criterion for
advancement. Brezhnev's indulgent cadres policies, which gave party workers
virtual tenure, appear to be undergoing a fundamental revision.
Support for this change in personnel policy is probably strong in the
military and KGB, where concern about an erosion of official discipline has
been especially keen. In addition, many young and ambitious party workers,
frustrated by the slow rate of promotions under Brezhnev, are probably glad to
see Andropov getting rid of dead wood and opening up career opportunities for
those better qualified in terms of education and technical expertise.
But the drive-to curtail official corruption and incompetence has created
a climate of insecurity among many elites. Many older party and government
workers, especially within the regional party apparatus and the economic
bureaucracy, reportedly feel threatened. Even within the Politburo, leaders
such as Leningrad party boss Romanov may feel vulnerable to charges of
malfeasance or impropriety.
Other leaders are probably apprehensive about the broader implications of
tightening party discipline. Already uneasy about Andropov's ties to the KGB
and his appointment of career KGB officers as Minister of Interior and First
Deputy Premier, they may see his drive to purify the party as a move to
enhance the KGB's role at the expense of the party apparatus. Chernenko, in
particular, has implicitly warned against carrying the anti-corruption
campaign too far.
To spur labor productivity, Andropov has relied both on harsher
punishment of "laggards," and on greater incentives for high worker output.
His advocacy of a more differentiated wage policy, the decision to raise
retail prices on some consumer goods, and his effort to tighten control over
labor mobility, represent movement away from Brezhnev's more lax and
egalitarian policies--which in effect guaranteed even unproductive workers a
job and an income sufficient to buy basic necessities.
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Chernenko's speeches have indicated that he disagrees with Andropov about
how to keep the labor force in line. He has put forth a "populist" program of
his own that stresses the need to raise the standard of living for the
population as a whole rather than for the most productive element. He has
urged the party to be more responsive to public opinion, paid relatively
little attention to the need for tightening discipline, and openly criticized
the frequent use of repressive measures against workers. Chernenko probably
fears, as Brezhnev evidently did, that a "wager on the strong" such as
Andropov is pushing runs the risk of provoking serious popular unrest.
Andropov's advocacy of a greater decentralization of economic
decisionmaking and hints that the economic bureaucracy needs reorganizing are
almost certainly controversial. Such steps would reduce the power of the
Council of Ministers and Premier Tikhonov.
In nationality policy, Andropov has revived theoretical formulations
associated in the past with efforts to increase cultural and political
restrictions on non-Russians. By doing so, he may have provoked the
opposition of some party leaders in non-Russian republics, several of whom sit
on the Politburo as members or candidates and some of whom have been political
allies of Chernenko.
In foreign policy, although there may be a fairly high degree of
consensus within the Politburo regarding broad objectives, there are
apparently disagreements over tactics and priorities. Andropov's speeches,
for example, by stressing more than those of Chernenko the need to support
Third World "national liberation" movements, suggest that he is more inclined
to challenge US interests in the Third World. Considering the suggestions in
Chernenko's past speeches that he places a relatively high priority on
detente, it is conceivable that he has questioned whether the introduction of
SA5s in Syria, the generally more aggressive sale of advanced armaments to
Third World countries, and the testing of new ICBMs possibly in violation of
SALT, have created unnecessary stumbling blocks to improving relations with
the US.
The question of East-West trade probably remains a bone of contention.
The shift toward more autarkic policies began before Brezhnev died, as concern
grew that Soviet dependence on grain and technology imports could make the
USSR hostage to Western economic pressure. Leaders such as Andropov and
Shcherbitskiy implied that Brezhnev had mistakenly attempted to substitute
economic relations with the West for domestic solutions to economic
problems. Chernenko, by contrast, staunchly supported increased trade with
countries outside the bloc, and is probably still more favorably disposed
toward an expansion of East-West trade.
Finally, the leadership is apparently divided over strategic issues. The
somewhat higher priority Andropov's speeches have attached to providing for
military needs compared to the public statements of Chernenko, the key role
Ustinov reportedly played in the coalition that put Andropov in office, and
reporting that some leaders are uncomfortable about Chernenko's views on
national security, raise the possibility that Chernenko has clashed with
Andropov and his allies over military issues. It is true that Ustinov and
Andropov have publicly recognized the need for greater constraints on military
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priorities than have some professional military officers. But they are
apparently more concerned than Chernenko to satisfy perceived military needs.
The Candidates
All previous successors have been both Secretaries and Politburo members,
but each of the two men who currently sit on both ruling bodies--Gorbachev and
Chernenko--has serious handicaps as a contender. Gorbachev's limited
experience at the national level and relatively narrow job responsibilities,
chiefly for agriculture, would seem virtually to disqualify him.
Nor is Chernenko an ideal candidate from the point of view of other
leaders. Having spent most of his career as a staff man, he lacks any
significant experience in line party leadership or in supervising the
economy. He has been Andropov's chief critic and key figures such as Ustinov
and Gromyko are said to have misgivings about his leadership ability.
In these circumstances, the leadership could defy precedent in its
selection of a successor. If this happened, Ustinov would be the most likely
choice. He has had lengthy experience in the crucial defense industry sector
and in foreign policy, and he earlier served in the secretariat for several
years. His views on military spending are more acceptable to the military
than are those of Chernenko, but he has also demonstrated sensitivity to the
needs of the civilian economy. His advanced age would not necessarily be a
liability, since his colleagues might prefer a "caretaker" to hold power
temporarily until a younger man could be groomed for the job.
Although Ustinov has now been Minister of Defense for seven years, as a
former party official he probably would not be seen by other leaders as posing
a threat to the hegemony of party institutions. In fact, his military
connection could give him a significant advantage. Because of the substantial
congruence of outlook among many top civilian and military leaders, some
civilian Politbduro members lacking access to compartmented military
information probably defer routinely to the military command's judgment about
what is needed to protect national security interests. Ustinov, using reports
prepared by the military, would consequently be in a position to challenge the
viability of Chernenko's program.
Alternatively, Moscow party boss Grishin could be a compromise choice
acceptable to all factions. It is even conceivable that the Politburo would
reach outside the core of senior Moscow-based leaders to select a regional
figure such as Shcherbitskiy.
Nevertheless, Chernenko has important political assets. The ranking
Secretary with Politburo standing, by now he has had broad experience in a
wide range of party work and in foreign policy, and he enjoys considerable
support at the Central Committee level. It would perhaps be more difficult to
deny him the top post now than when Brezhnev died. Brezhnev's gradual
physical decline gave Chernenko's opponents time to prepare. By promoting
Andropov to the Secretariat six months before Brezhnev died, they were able to
block Chernenko's bid. This time Chernenko's detractors have not yet
positioned a challenger, and Andropov's sudden death would leave them without
an immediately available logical candidate.
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Impact on Policy
If no candidate were able to establish a strong claim to succeed, power
would be more compartmented than during previous successions. Chernenko, in
particular, probably would have to make major concessions to gain the
acceptance of Ustinov and his allies. Chernenko's freedom to act
independently would be severely constrained, and it is conceivable that
Ustinov would be made Chairman of the Defense Council. This diffusion of
power could produce instances of uncertainty, inconsistency, or poor
coordination in Soviet policy.
Nevertheless, all Politburo members probably share certain perceptions
that would restrain the behavior of competing factions. Their authoritarian
political culture has conditioned them to believe the concentration of fairly
broad--if ill-defined--power in the hands of. the General Secretary is needed
to present a united front to the world and to maintain regime hegemony at
home. Soviet leaders also see it in their collective interest to keep their
deliberations secret and to confine the arena for debate to the Politburo
itself. These attitudes probably would prevent the power struggle from
reaching crisis proportions that could significantly impede the regime's
execution of policy in the event of an international or domestic emergency.
A Chernenko succession would have the most immediate effect on cadres
policy. Chernenko would probably act to bolster elite security, as Brezhnev
did in 1964 following Khrushchev's disruptive reorganizational schemes and
reshuffling of personnel. Chernenko would provide assurances that removals
from office would be kept to a minimum, and that vacancies would be filled
largely by regular promotions within institutions rather than through cross-
posting or leapfrogging of lower-level officials into high posts. He would
downplay the anti-corruption campaign and make clear that party control of the
KGB remained a central element of regime policy.
In order to placate the government bureaucracy, Chernenko would probably
oppose proposals for reorganizing economic management that involved any
significant diminution of the authority of central ministries. At the same
time, it is likely that he would seek the support of non-Russian leaders by
advocating a more even-handed nationality policy, while appealing to consumer
interests by emphasizing the primacy of the food program and by advocating a
greater diversion of resources to consumer-oriented industry and an expansion
of agricultural imports.
Since Chernenko's domestic program would probably offer even less promise
than Andropov's of boosting GNP, he would be more concerned to place limits on
military spending and consequently somewhat more flexible in INF and other
arms control negotiations. It is a good bet that he would urge greater
caution in supporting Third World clients and insurgencies, in order to avoid
damaging the prospects for an improvement in East-West relations or risking
military confrontation with the US.
Should Ustinov succeed, he probably would follow the general strategy
Andropov has adopted. His military background and his past statements suggest
that he would rely heavily on coercive measures to ensure social stability,
while placing a high premium on the need to bolster executive discipline. He
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probably would urge some changes in the incentive structure to stimulate
economic growth.
Like Andropov, Ustinov probably would act more assertively than Chernenko
in exploiting opportunities to expand Soviet influence in the Third World, and
would be somewhat less inclined to make compromises in pursuit of improved
relations with the US. His past statements suggest, however, that he might be
less sanguine than Andropov about the prospects for relaxing tensions with
China.
Ustinov's primary loyalty is to the party, and his succession would not
constitute a military takeover. Nonetheless, his military connection probably
would increase the weight of military voices in policy deliberation,
especially with regard to foreign affairs. It is conceivable that Ustinov
would rely more heavily than Chernenko on arms sales and military assistance
programs as instruments of Soviet policy, and that he would push more strongly
for a more centralized Warsaw Pact command structure. This could further
enhance the role of the professional military in dealing with Eastern Europe
and the Third World.
Other possible candidates have not expressed their policy preferences as
clearly as have Ustinov and Chernenko. Any successor, however, probably would
be motivated by political opportunism more than by any desire for consistency
with past positions. To a considerable degree, his policies would reflect his
need to pay close heed to the personal and institutional interests of those
Politburo members on whose support he depended.
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