INTELLIGENCE CONSUMER SURVEY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00153R000200030010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2007
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: September 1, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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?
FROM . H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
Vice Chairman, NIC
1. This is a copy of the galley proof of the Intelligence Consumer
Survey that will be issued in the next week or so. Please do not discuss
or quote this document outside of the NIC pending distribution by the
Directorate of Intelligence.
2. This survey contains a great deal of useful information concern-
ing your role in the intelligence community. You will find some useful
perspectives on the view points and mind-sets of policymakers. We may
wish to discuss this at one of our Wednesday staff meetings after all of
us have had a chance to read it.
H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
cc: EXO/NIC
Each NIO
C/NIC
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425910001" ?
Directorate of
Intelligence
Intelligence Producers Council
Confidential
Confidential
IPC 82-10002
September 1982
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 Preface
One way to measure how well we in the Intelligence
Community are responding to the needs of our cus-
tomers is to ask them. This report is based on the data
from the most recent survey of intelligence consum-
ers. It is also the only such survey conducted on a
Community basis. Some 133 senior policymakers
from the later years of the Carter administration
completed the survey questionnaire. Of these respond-
ents, 36 also participated in personal interviews.
These activities provided the data from which were
derived the findings reported here.
A continuing effort must be made to improve our
understanding of consumer needs and to assure that
our response to those needs is the best possible. This
report provides some meaningful insights in this re-
gard. But the mere gathering of these data is not
enough. Each intelligence agency, manager, and ana-
-lyst must put forth the effort to understand the import
of these findings in the context of his own responsibil-
ities; to understand what the consumers need, and can
and cannot use; and to plan and conduct the intelli-
gence production effort to be responsive.
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Intelligence Consumer Survey (u)
Key Judgments The Consumer Survey is the first Intelligence Community investigation of
how senior policymakers value and use intelligence products. The Survey
queried 154 senior officials that served in the Carter administration, 133 of
whom returned the questionnaire and completed the essay responses.
Subsequently, 36 were interviewed by members of the Consumer Survey
Working Group.
The major findings of the Survey, based on analysis of data from the
questionnaires, essays, and interviews, show:
? Senior policymakers tended to know relatively little about intelligence or
the intelligence process and relied on staffs or internal intelligence offices
to obtain and present the products they needed.
? Systems developed by intelligence managers to determine policymakers'
needs did not always work well and sometimes prevented policymakers
from articulating their requirements. Delivery systems sometimes created
delays in providing intelligence products to policymakers on a timely
basis.
? Senior policymakers at State, Defense, and the NSC were regular users
of intelligence and were often influenced by it; but in other agencies,
intelligence products were not as well received or read.
? Policymakers valued current intelligence but were often critical of
analytic and estimative products or intelligence directly related to policy
issues.
Policymakers were generally satisfied with the quantity of materials they
receive, but they complained that some products were not relevant, not
timely, and therefore, not useful.
? The producer-consumer relationship had a direct bearing on the extent to
which policymakers were satisfied with intelligence. Policy officials often
preferred to deal directly with analysts or experts, but they indicated that
the initiative in establishing relations was up to producers.
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 The Consumer Survey Working Group collated recommendations from
respondents and from its own data. To correct the problems surfaced in the
Survey, it recommends that intelligence managers:
? Develop a program to educate policymakers about intelligence.
? Develop more flexible and responsive arrangements whereby the consum-
ers can task the Intelligence Community, and clarify the role of the
NIO/DIO/NSIO.
? Improve distribution and delivery systems.
Intelligence producers should improve the quality and utility of products
by:
? Developing terms of reference for analysis in consultation with
policymakers.
? Eliminating levels of review that fail to enhance the product.
? Improving presentation of precis, key judgments, and summaries for the
most senior officials.
? Determining if self-initiated products are meeting the needs of
consumers.
Because the producer-consumer relationship is so critical, intelligence
managers should:
? Ensure direct contact between analysts, supervisors, and managers with
. key consumers.
Finally, the Working Group recommends that periodic Community surveys
be undertaken to determine:
? If the requirements for intelligence and uses of intelligence by policymak-
ers have changed over time.
? If specific changes made in intelligence systems have produced the
desired effects.
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 Intelligence Consumer Survey (U)
Background
There have been several attempts in the past 10 years
to survey intelligence consumers on how well they
were served by the Intelligence Community or its
product. These attempts, unfortunately, did not have
much impact on either the intelligence producers or
their consumers. In late 1980, members of the Re-
source Management Staff (RMS) embarked on an
effort to survey key policymakers dealing with Third
World issues. They wished to interview as many
outgoing members of the Carter administration as
possible, devised a limited questionnaire, and deliv-
ered it to about a dozen intelligence users.
In January 1981, it was apparent that the RMS
project was a major undertaking. The Director of
RMS and the Director of the National Foreign
Assessment Center (NFAC) agreed to continue the
project under the aegis of the Interagency Working
Group on Intelligence Production.
In the ensuing months, the Working Group on the
Consumer Survey formulated a project that went
considerably beyond the original RMS effort. The
purpose of the project was to provide intelligence
The selection criteria of the policymakers to be sam-
pled were relatively simple:
? Policymakers had to be deputy assistant secretaries,
equivalents, or above incumbent during the Carter
administration. (A list of participants is contained in
appendix B.)
? They had to be national policymakers.
? They had to be recipients of intelligence from more
agencies than their own.
The Working Group selected 154 policymakers to
survey, and in June 1981, began hand-delivering the
questionnaires accompanied by a letter from the DCI
requesting participation in the project. By August 133
responses had been returned.
The selection criteria for the personal interview phase
of the project was more complex. It entailed examina-
tion of the multiple-choice responses for anomalies,
intelligence gaps, and extremes of satisfaction or
dissatisfaction. Each completed questionnaire was
evaluated using a computer algorithm that considered
all this information in addition to the respondent's'
willingness to participate in a followup interview. This.
resulted in 36 interviews.
production managers with consumer perceptions of
the value of the intelligence product. The plan was to
survey national policymakers using a broad question-
naire with a series of related multiple-choice and
essay questions, followed by personal interviews of
selected respondents to the questionnaire.
The Working Group constructed the questionnaire
with the help of OMS psychologists, to ensure that the
responses would be valid and suitable for analysis by
appropriate software and statistical procedures. The
final questionnaire, which was coordinated with many'
intelligence managers throughout the producing com-
munity, contained multiple-choice and essay ques-
tions. The multiple-choice questions together with the'
aggregate answers are contained in appendix A.
Findings
An analysis of the data obtained in this project
enables us to cite a series of important findings. These
major findings reveal some important lessons about
the quality and utility of intelligence to national-level
policymakers.
The Consumer
Senior policymakers-at the Deputy Assistant Secre=
tary level and above-are the most important custom-
ers of national intelligence. This is the group on which
the Consumer Survey focused-consumers of finished
intelligence. The Consumer Survey also confirmed
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Confidential
that senior officials in the national security decision-
making system-the NSC Staff, State, and De-
fense-were the heaviest recipients of intelligence and
generally the heaviest users. There was a second
echelon of users at Treasury, Commerce, and Energy
and a third level at peripheral agencies, who received
a much smaller slice of intelligence and where use of
intelligence is more limited. At all echelons, these
officials were not necessarily aware of the full range
of intelligence support available to them or received
by their offices since they often did not receive
intelligence products directly. Instead they obtained
their intelligence from:
? Their own staffs, who selected items for them or
briefed the principals and often wrote reports based
on a compilation of intelligence and other material.
These staff officers were not normally intelligence
officers.
? Some kind of intelligence liaison officer or briefing
team, composed of intelligence professionals, who
selected material based on a continuing dialogue
about their needs and concerns.
? Slightly more than 50 percent of the respondents
spent at least one-half hour a day reviewing intelli-
gence; almost 70 percent claimed that intelligence
frequently influenced their policy decisions; and
almost half believed that they could have benefited
from better intelligence in formulating policy.
What Consumers Know About Intelligence
Senior policy officials-including some who had had
considerable experience in national security decision-
making-consistently expressed a lack of knowledge
about intelligence agencies and functions. They also
expressed a desire to know more about the system that
served them. Many said they would have benefited
from a better introduction to intelligence when they
first took office. Significantly, only a very few took
the initiative to find out more about intelligence on
their own.
Specifically, policymakers said that they needed to
know more about:
? How they could task the system to respond to
specific questions as well as general judgments or
assessments on larger issues.
? How to obtain material that already existed in the
system and how to find out what was available.
? How to arrange for a dialogue with individual
analysts or experts.
Consumers who were served by a departmental intelli-
gence organization knew relatively little about other
production in the Intelligence Community. They de-
pended on the agency that served them directly to
provide appropriate products from all sources. They
assumed that this was being done and seldom took
initiatives to seek additional intelligence on their own.
Policymakers did not always recognize intelligence or
understand how much they were given. Because
policymakers and their staffs try to integrate intelli-
gence with other information they receive, the unique
character of intelligence frequently becomes lost.
Thus, policymakers often did not realize that intelli-
gence material was included in the papers prepared by
their staffs and they found it difficult to identify or
separate intelligence from other materials. Perhaps
the most extreme case was one senior official who
thought he had received no intelligence of value-a
problem aggravated by the extent to which his staff
hac' filtered the substantial amount of intelligence
actually delivered to his office.
Tasking and Delivery Systems
The Consumer Survey sought to determine how
policymakers made their needs known to intelligence
producers and if they believed they were receiving
what they had requested. This usually did not involve
levying a specific request, but rather conveying a
sufficient amount of information to intelligence pro-
ducers so that they could make the right decisions
about what to produce. There were problems in the
production tasking mechanisms and in the delivery
systems as well.
Some systems developed by intelligence managers to
determine what policymakers need are not working as
well as they might. Policymakers believe they have
only limited ways of making their requirements
known:
? Only 30 percent of senior policy officials in this
study relied on the National Intelligence Officer
system to levy requirements and obtain intelligence.
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An analysis of the data from DoD participants There were mechanical problems in the intelligence
showed that the system that had been used by DIA delivery system. Intelligence officials at the Deputy
to determine Defense Department reader require- Assistant Secretary level or higher rarely read intelli-
ments did not accurately reflect senior consumer gence products without an initial screening by a staff
needs and was not used by a large proportion of its officer. Further, staffs generally sought to condense
? Policymakers were not satisfied with the existing
means of tasking intelligence collectors and
producers. '
0
material for their often-harried bosses. This screening
system was even more restrictive for sensitive or
codeword material. Such products required handling
Other problems uncovered in this area include:
ity between what senior officials needed and what ?
intelligence analysts provided.
by special couriers, reading in special facilities, or
storage in specially secured areas. Thus, sensitive or
codeword reports often were not read or, if read, were
not used.
Almost 70 percent of senior policy officials relied on
their staff or intelligence liaison to task intelligence
producers, and it appears that this system tended to
"filter" requirements and create, in part; the dispar-
? The desire of policy officials to have better, more
frequent and more direct access to analysts was one'
of the most consistent and strongly expressed obser-
vations made in the survey. Policymakers indicated ?
that they desired the opportunity to have direct
contact with expert analysts-as distinct from intel-
ligence managers-both to obtain information and
to explore various facets of a subject.
? Some policymakers reported that working through
liaison groups was the most effective way to arrange
briefings or dialogue with the working level ana-
lysts, and thus obtain the most relevant information.
The combination of filters between policymaker and
analyst, inefficiencies in established requirements
mechanisms, and general ignorance about the inner
workings of intelligence resulted in a system that
made it difficult for policymakers to articulate their
requirements in terms meaningful to intelligence pro-
ducers. This system also inhibited producers' under-
standing of what products would be most relevant and.
useful. '
' Even though no specific questions were asked regarding the
National Intelligence Topics (NITs), it may be significant that in
the essays and interviews, NITs were not cited as an effective
means of making the intelligence needs of policymakers known to
intelligence producers and collectors.
A reliance on liaison or staffs to obtain the appropri-
ate material from existing stocks of intelligence
products, but a realization that staffs, and some-
times liaison, were often unaware of what was
already available.
The lack of a feedback mechanism by which policy-
makers could tell intelligence producers what they
thought about products. Policymakers often admit-
ted they only had to pick up a telephone or write a
note to provide such feedback, but seldom did.
? Problems with distribution lists, mail points, and
delivery systems within the consumer agencies
themselves that sometimes mishandled, mis-
addressed, or misrouted intelligence.'
Policymakers used whatever systems were at hand to
make their needs known and seldom tried to develop
closer contact with intelligence producers. Where
contacts had been established with NIOs or with
producing components, these became institutionalized,
as the normal way of doing business. Policymakers
often said that they would have liked a greater
dialogue with the Intelligence Community, but most
failed to take the initiative. They assumed that exist-
ing delivery systems had to be accepted and used. In
other words, they took whatever they got.
'This information was not obtained from the consumers directly
but was uncovered by the Working Group in tracking specific
complaints of consumers in the essays and interviews.
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Evaluation of Intelligence
General Comments. A significant number of senior
policymakers-indeed an overwhelming majority of
,senior recipients in State, Defense, and at the NSC
Staff-read intelligence regularly and almost 70 per-
cent said that intelligence frequently influenced them
in policymaking. The other side of the coin, however,
is also significant. Many senior officials outside State,
Defense, and the NSC Staff, while regular recipients
of intelligence products, were not regular readers of
intelligence. Collectively they were much less influ-
enced by intelligence in policymaking than consumers
in State, Defense, and the NSC.
In their narrative comments, policymakers stressed
the need for timeliness and relevance in intelligence,
and their responses to the questionnaire showed that
products like the NID, DIS, or State Morning Sum-
mary were highly valued.
Since policymakers are reactive or event-oriented, it is,
not surprising that national-level decisionmakers val-
ued current intelligence more highly than other kinds
of products.
Consumers were consistently critical of predictive
intelligence-estimative intelligence in NIEs and
other publications that tended to forecast events-or
intelligence directly related to ongoing policy
decisions.
There were several aspects of predictive/policy intelli-
gence that were criticized by policymakers in the
survey. Consumers said they found that such material
was often produced too late to be useful, frequently
did not relate to the actual policy questions under
review, or often was coordinated-or "watered
down"-to the point where the product was not as
useful as it might have been if conflicting points of
view had been stated explicitly.
Consumer perceptions of raw intelligence tended to
polarize around two extremes, liking and using it
frequently and disliking it and not using it at all.
? Consumers received raw intelligence on a very
timely basis, often at the same time as intelligence
analysts. If consumers were under heavy time pres-
sure-in the midst of a deepening crisis, for exam-
ple-they were eager to obtain raw reporting and
more willing to forego analysis from intelligence
producers.
? Raw intelligence was preferred by some consumers
who indicated that they were quite capable of
performing their own analysis.
? Many consumers who used raw intelligence noted
that the volume they received was often excessive
and that they had no way of separating the few
useful reports from the large number they received.
Evaluation by Category. The Consumer Survey was
designed to provide some insights about consumer
views on the quantity and utility of intelligence in
various categories, geotopical as well as functional.
Because the Consumer Survey did not ask for a
specific measure of satisfaction from consumers, our
conclusions about satisfaction remain somewhat sub-
jective. An empirical measure of "overall" satisfac-
tion, however, was derived from responses to a combi-
nation of several survey items. This indicator of
satisfaction provided an index for determining how
wel! consumers thought they were being served by the
Intelligence Community. - -
Consumer views on quantity of intelligence were the
easiest to obtain, although as noted earlier senior
officials often were not aware of the total amount of
material received by their staffs. Some consumers
indicated that they received too much intelligence, but
the interview data revealed that this complaint related
primarily to raw reports. Policymakers seemed gener-
ally satisfied with the amount of current intelligence
and basic data they received. Nevertheless, some
42 percent overall said that they did not get enough
material directly related to policy, and 35 percent said
specifically that they did not receive enough predic-
tive or analytical material.
Senior officials who had a broad range of topical and
geographic interests or responsibilities believed that
coverage of the Third World needed improvement. In
ANN
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 contrast, those officials who had specific responsibil-
ities related to the Third World were more satisfied
with the amount of intelligence, although they noted a
particular deficiency in regard to intelligence on Latin
America. They blamed this shortfall impact on the
1 k f human source intelligence in the area. Analy-
o
current concern were not useful. Because policymak-
ers were "task-oriented"-that is, often caught up
totally in the issue of the moment-the timing of
intelligence support was critical. Intelligence products
that arrived too early, or too late, were not used.
ac
sis of the questionnaire revealed, however, that con- Current intelligence received the highest marks in
sumers were not receiving a sufficient amount of terms of utility because it was concise, timely, and
scientific and technological intelligence, largely be- related to "front burner" issues. Policymakers also
cause of distribution rather than production problems. commented favorably on event-monitoring intelli-
gence from task force operations in covering fast
Policymakers' comments about the quality of intelli- breaking events, and alert memos that warned of
gence were somewhat more difficult to pin down. imminent events with serious consequences for the
Consumers were satisfied with the Community's abili- United States.
ty to digest and compress large amounts of material in
current publications and they were impressed with the
large volume of carefully organized data presented in
basic research work. However, consumers faulted the
Community for the quality of its analysis. Criticism
ranged from a lack of cogent, thoughtful judgment to
an inability to assess reasonable alternative outcomes
of events. Beyond this, the respondents could offer few
ideas about how to improve the quality of analysis.
In the interviews, policymakers noted-in contrast to
their criticisms of published material-that they were
impressed with the expertise of intelligence analysts in
those situations where they were able to deal with
them directly. Thus, briefings and oral presentations
got high marks in terms of quality, and policymakers
were obviously impressed with the flexibility and
depth of knowledge of Community analysts. An anal-
ysis of the data on the quality of intelligence by region
yielded few surprises. Intelligence on the USSR and
Europe was rated high in quality; intelligence on the
Third World ranked much lower. Similarly, the quali-
ty of military intelligence received high praise, while
political and economic intelligence was not considered
as high in quality.
The most important factors in regard to the utility of
products related to relevance, timeliness, and concise-
ness. Senior policy officials made it clear that they
had only limited time to spend with intelligence, and
that summaries, key judgment statements, or precis
were extremely valuable. They also complained in
interviews and in their narrative comments that pa-
pers that were too long or did not relate to an issue of
Basic intelligence-factual data, in-depth material,
and descriptive intelligence-was also considered to
be of great utility even though it was used more by the
staff than by the policymaker. Many consumers com-
mented that there was a need for more factual data,
particularly on the Third World. Some consumers
were critical of biographic reporting, complaining that
it was not useful because it was static and not
sufficiently comprehensive or insightful. Nevertheless,
intelligence ratings of utility by both region and topic
ranged from "fairly useful" to "very useful" with few
exceptions.
In the interviews, the Working Group tried to deter-
mine why policymakers gave their lowest marks for
utility to predictive, analytic, and policy-related intel-
ligence. The major cause of dissatisfaction was rele-
vance. The responses indicated a discrepancy between
the materials the Intelligence Community thought the
policymakers needed, and the information the policy-
makers actually wanted.
Evaluation by Product. The Consumer Survey defined
the intelligence product to include both written intelli-
gence materials of various kinds and oral intelligence, ' o
normally in the form of intelligence briefings. Nearly 0
all senior policy officials who participated in the
survey indicated that they usually received both oral
and written intelligence and generally preferred a mix
1 rather than reliance on only one form.
?o
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Clearly, the most widely used intelligence publica-
tions are those that contain current intelligence. A
great majority-about 85 percent-of those who re-
ceived the NID said they read it regularly; those who
received the State Morning Summary also were
steady readers of that publication. Where consumers
received both, they expressed a preference for the
State product because it was often more timely, more
policy relevant, and its articles had more depth.
Defense Department policymakers were slightly less
avid readers of DIA's current intelligence-69 per-
cent of those receiving the DIS read it regularly-but
were much heavier users of current intelligence brief-
ings. Almost everyone at the NSC Staff who received
the CIA and State current intelligence products read
them regularly. Consumers outside State, Defense,
and the NSC Staff did not regularly receive or read
current intelligence.
A second widely read-though often criticized-se-
ries of publications are those published by the Nation-
al Intelligence Council-NIEs, SNIEs, IIMs, and
Alert Memos. About 85 percent of the survey
respondents said they received some or all of these
products, and 67 percent claimed to have read them
regularly. State, Defense, and the NSC Staff were
heavy readers of the NIC publications; others read
them less than half the time,
Other periodicals received mixed reviews and were of
varying utility to consumers. The CIA's IEEW was
received by about two-thirds of the survey respond-
ents, and about half of those reported that they read it.
frequently; other CIA serials were read by less than
half of those who received them.
Of the remaining publications-including memoran-
dums, assessments, and research papers-CIA's were
the most widely circulated, but readership at senior
levels outside State, Defense, and the NSC Staff was
limited. State Department publications were received
and read with consistency in the Department and at
the NSC, but DIA publications tended to be used
mostly in DOD.
After discussing these patterns of use with the senior
level policymakers we interviewed and after reviewing
the comments contained in their narratives, the
Working Group concluded that:
? Senior policy officials were satisfied with current
intelligence support.
? Community products were less useful if policymak-
ers thought they had been "watered down" in their
coordination or if they failed to detail areas where
the Community could not agree.
? More specialized publications or material contain-
ing more depth and detail were not widely used by
senior officials directly, but rather were digested for
them by their staffs.
The Producer-Consumer Relationship
There was no consistent pattern to the producer-
consumer relationship, either by agency or by level of
responsibility. The relationship between intelligence
producers and consumers directly affected the con-
sumers perception of intelligence support. Where poli-
cymakers had good relations with intelligence produc-
ers-especially with individual analysts or where they
were directly supported by a professional intelligence
liaison staff that facilitated bringing analysts and .
consumers together-policymakers seemed to be able
to make requirements known and obtain the intelli-
gence they found useful.
Consumers expected intelligence producers to take the
responsibility for establishing and maintaining the
producer-consumer dialogue; policymakers often pro-
fessed ignorance about how to do it themselves. If
there is to be a dialogue, intelligence producers must
not only establish it, but must keep it going. Policy
officials were generally passive recipients of intelli-
gence-along with an enormous amount of other
information.
The Consumer Survey addressed many aspects of the
intelligence producer/policy consumer relationship.
During the interviews and in their essay responses,
some respondents made specific recommendations to
correct serious deficiencies they had identified in this
relationship. The Working Group, in reviewing the
data, developed a number of ideas of its own. The
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 recommendations outlined here represent a collation
of these ideas and are designed to stimulate discussion
by intelligence managers. The recommendations are
aimed at improving. intelligence support to the na-
tional decisionmaking apparatus; an additional rec-
ommendation concerns the utility of further surveys
of this type. The bulk of these recommendations are
directed toward individual intelligence managers. We
recommend, moreover, the establishment of an inter-
agency working group for addressing those problems
that are conducive to centralized solutions.
The Consumer Survey clearly indicates that the ma-
jority of consumers are very satisfied with the support
provided by the Intelligence Community. Were the
Community to do no more than maintain this relative
level of performance, it would more than justify its
budget. There are, however, areas in which its contri-
bution to the decisionmaking process could be im-
proved substantially. To improve the Community's
responsiveness would not be a costly undertaking, but
it would require important changes in the way its
production elements have grown accustomed to doing
business.
The Survey suggests that the Community does best
when it describes, and not nearly as well when it seeks
to analyze and predict. This in effect was the message
consumers were conveying in the high marks they
gave to current, crisis monitoring, basic, and military
intelligence, and the relatively low ratings accorded
predictive/analytic intelligence directly related to pol-
icy issues.
Historically, intelligence managers have dealt with
specific problcrns as they arose without seeking ge-
neric solutions. More comprehensive and perhaps
daring approaches will be required if the Community
wishes to play a greater role in the full spectrum of
policy formulation.
The Working Group recommends that the Intelli-
gence Community, as a whole, take action on a
variety of issues to better serve the consumer by:
? Developing a program to educate senior policymak-
ers and their staffs about intelligence, the intelli-
gence process, and the intelligence bureaucracy.
This ought to be done as an administration takes
office and then be continued as personnel in key
positions change.
? Learning more about who actually uses the intelli-
gence product and how products are handled in
policy offices, especially outside the NSC/State/
Defense cluster.
? Assuring that policymakers are aware of existing
Intelligence Community bibliographic systems for
publications and documents and that they know how
to use them to obtain material already in print or
retrieve intelligence publications-especially sensi-
tive items-when they are needed.
Problems in tasking and delivery systems also figured
significantly in the Survey. The Working Group
recommends:
? Developing more flexible and responsive systems for
articulating consumer needs. This would include
formal mechanisms (such as the NITs and DCID
1/2), as well as informal arrangements for dialogue
between the .consumers and producers .
? Determining the appropriate division of labor and
responsibility between the NIO/DIO/NSIO struc-
ture and the intelligence production offices. The
lines of authority between these two entities are not
at all clear.
? Improving communication in the tasking process.
The present system has too many "filters" that
often serve to change the nuance and priority of
requests. Ideally, analysts and consumers ought to
be able to discuss consumer requirements to ensure
that the product is relevant and timely.
? Reviewing and overhauling distribution systems to
ensure that customers receive the appropriate publi-
cations, that delays in mailrooms are kept to a
minimum, and that codeword or other sensitive
material is handled as expeditiously as possible.
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The Working Group recommends that production
managers also undertake efforts to improve the quali-
ty and utility of the intelligence product by:
? Improving the relevance of the analytic product by
developing terms of reference in consultation with
policy consumers, and by ensuring that in-depth
analysis and research actually meet the needs of
policymakers.
? Taking action to ensure that products arrive on
policymakers' desks when they can be used.
? Eliminating levels of review that fail to enhance the
quality or utility of the intelligence product.
Policymakers' comments about the utility and quanti-
ty of raw intelligence suggest that individual produc-
ers should:
needs known or provide feedback more effectively.
The Working Group, therefore, recommends that:
? Production managers ensure direct contact between
their analysts and key consumers.
? Production supervisors and managers should be
expected to establish and maintain contacts with
key policy officials at appropriate levels.
? The establishment and maintenance of consumer
relations should be an integral part of performance
evaluations.
The role of the NIO/DIO/NSIO be more precisely
defined.
Our final recommendation relates to the desirability
and utility of surveys of this kind. The Working
Group recommends that this survey be replicated
within the next two years, and periodically thereafter.
This would serve at least two important purposes:
It would provide intelligence producers with an
empirical mechanism for gauging the effects of
changes made in the intelligence products and the
tasking and delivery systems.
It would enable intelligence-producing agencies to
see how requirements for intelligence and uses of
intelligence fluctuate over time.
? Ensure that policy consumers receive a more appro-
priate quantity of raw reporting suited to their
individual needs, rather than a "dump" of total ?
incoming take.
The suggestions already made in regard to overhaul-
ing distribution systems and reviewing production 1 Detailed comments about future surveys are con-
-requirements will also contribute to improving the tained in appendix C.
quality and utility of the product. In addition, howev-
er, the Working Group recommends that production This information is Confidential.
managers review the existing product mix to
determine:
? If some better method of presenting precis, key
judgments, or summaries can be provided on a
regular basis to senior officials.
? If production initiated by the Intelligence Commu-
nity is meeting the needs of policymakers.
Many of the issues uncovered in the Consumer Survey:
derive directly from problems in the relationship
between producers and consumers. The ultimate re-
sponsibility for this relationship rests with production
managers at all levels. The Working Group believes
that this relationship should be nurtured and en-
hanced. This would ensure that intelligence producers'
would understand more readily the needs of consum-
ers, and policymakers would be able to make their
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425910015
425910-PPG
Appendix A
Survey on Intelligence Consumer Production
1. How regularly did you use intelligence?
(circle one)
2. How often did intelligence influence your
policy decisions? (circle one)
3. How often did you formulate policy with the
belief that you would have benefited from
better intelligence? (circle one)
4. On the average, how much time did you
devote daily to reviewing intelligence? (circle
one)
5. To what degree did you rely on your
subordinates to screen the intelligence that you
received? (circle one)
6. In what form did you ordinarily receive
'intelligence? (circle all that apply) - -
132
133
133
133
132
18
64
133
133
92
-_82
133.
7. In what form did you usually prefer to 132
receive your intelligence? (circle one)
8. Listed below arc five commonly used
methods for seeking intelligence. Indicate how
often you used each of the methods.
a. Direct contact with Agency Directors or 126
Deputy Directors
a. Almost daily or daily
b. About weekly
c. About monthly
d. Less often than monthly
e. Never
a. Always
b. Frequently
c. Occasionally
d. Rarely
e. Never
a. Always
b. Frequently
c. Occasionally
d. Rarely
e. Never
a. More than one hour
b. One-half hour to an hour
c. More than five minutes but less than a half hour
d. Five minutes or less
a. My subordinates screened all of the intelligence I
received.
b. My subordinates screened some of the intelligence I
received.
c. My subordinates screened none of the intelligence I
received.
a. Formal intelligence publications
b. Oral presentations by intelligence officers either
from your own organization or an outside intelligence
agency
c. Oral presentations by subordinates other than
intelligence officers
d. Written presentations prepared for you by intelli-
gence officers either from your own organization or an
outside intelligence agency
e. Written presentations prepared for you by subordi-
nates other than intelligence officers
f. Other (specify)
a. In oral form
b. In written form
c. In some combination of oral and written form
d. Other (specify)
1. Almost daily or daily
2. About weekly
3. About monthly
4. Less often than monthly
S. Never
Confidential
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?
b. Direct contact with National Intelligence 128 6 1. Almost daily or daily
Officers (NIOs), Defense Intelligence Officers 22 2. About weekly
(DIOs), or Signals Intelligence National Intel- 17 3. About monthly
ligence Officers (SINlOs) 35 4. Less often than monthly
20 5. Never
c. Direct contact with other intelligence offs- 121 24 1. Almost daily or daily
cers 24 2. About weekly
22 3. About monthly
23 4. Less often than monthly
7 S. Never
d. Through the Intelligence liaison office in 124 40 1. Almost daily
your organization 29 2. About weekly
12 3. About monthly
11 4. Less often than monthly
9 5. Never
e. Through action (written or telephone) by 119 29 1. Almost daily
your staff 32 2. About weekly
19 3. About monthly
13 4. Less often than monthly
8 5. Never
9. Indicate how often you levied requests for
each of the following types of intelligence
information?
a. Basic factual data-for example, geograph- 128 4 1. Almost daily or daily
ic, biographic, etc. 33 2. About weekly
36 3. About monthly
23 4. Less often than monthly
5 5. Never
b. In-depth analytic studies of specific issues 129 2 1. Almost daily or daily
15 2. About weekly
35 3. About monthly
44 4. Less often than monthly
3 5. Never -
c. Current reporting on topics of continuing 128 27 1. Almost daily or daily
interest 27 2. About weekly
25 3. About monthly
18 4. Less often than monthly
2 5. Never
d. Additional information on an issue that was 126 7 1. Almost daily or daily
covered in an intelligence publication 31 2. About weekly
25 3. About monthly
34 4. Less often than monthly
3 5. Never
e. Other (specify) 14 14 1. Almost daily or daily
7 2. About weekly
14 3. About monthly
36 4. Less often than monthly
29 5. Never
10. Indicate how often you levied requests for
intelligence on each of the following agencies.
a. State Department 124 15 1. Almost daily or daily
19 2. About weekly
15 3. About monthly
24 4. Less often than monthly
27 5. Never
 d. NSA
e. Army. Navy, or Air Force Intelligence
L Other (specify)
11. In general, how satisfied were you with the
answers to your requests for intelligence (circle
one)
12. In this questionnaire, raw intelligence is
defined as direct reporting by intelligence
collectors with no more than brief annotation
or comment provided by Headquarters ele-
ments. Examples are attache cables, NSA
reporting of individual items, CIA Information
Reports, Defense Intelligence Reports (IRs),
State cables, and FBIS reports. As an intelli-
gence consumer, how often did you receive raw
intelligence as a part of your input from the
Intelligence Community? (circle one)
13. Listed below are publications of the major
ons an
a s
i
d
x-
intelligence producing organ
zat
i
i
125
120
19
131
- 131
60
X16
16
12
9
3
point scale corresponding to how often you
read any publication you received of the type
listed. (Please enter a rating from I to 6 in the
blank to the left of each publication.)
Intelligence Community Publications
a. National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), 124
Interagency Intelligence Memorandums
(IIMs), Special National Intelligence Esti-
mates (SNIEs), or Alert Memorandums
1. Almost daily
2. About weekly
3. About monthly
4. Less often than monthly
5. Never
1. Almost daily
2. About weekly
3. About monthly
4. Less often than monthly
5. Never
1. Almost daily
2. About weekly
3. About monthly
4. Less often than monthly
5. Never
1. Almost daily
2. About weekly
3. About monthly
4. Less often than monthly
5. Never
1. Almost daily
2. About weekly
3. About monthly
4. Less often than monthly
5. Never
a. I was totally satisfied.
b. I was generally satisfied.
c. There was room for substantial improvement.
d. I was completely dissatisfied.
e. Not applicable.
1. Almost daily
2. About weekly
2. About weekly -
3. About monthly
4. Less often than monthly
5. Never
1. Always
2. Frequently
3. Occasionally
4. Rarely
5. Received but did not read
6. Did not receive
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O O
..'d0
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a
c. International Economic and Energy Weekly 123
(IEEW)
d. Other periodic reviews-for example, Afri- 126
ca Review, Latin America Review, Western
Europe Review, Strategic Intelligence Month-
ly Review, Quarterly Report on the Health of
Foreign VIPs, Science & Weapons Daily
Review, etc.
e. Intelligence Assessments, Memorandums, 127
Research Papers
DIA and Department of Defense Publications
g. Defense Intelligence Summary (DIS)
125
h. Defense Intelligence Notices, Appraisals,
and Warning Reports
122
j. Scientific and Technical Reports (from FTD, 123
FSTC, NISC, etc.)
1. Always
2. Frequently
3. Occasionally
4. Rarely
5. Received but did not read
6. Did not receive
1. Always
2. Frequently
3. Occasionally
4. Rarely
5. Received but did not read
6. Did not receive
1. Always
2. Frequently
3. Occasionally
4. Rarely
5. Received but did not read
6. Did not receive
1. Always
2. Frequently
3. Occasionally
4. Rarely
5. Received but did not read
6. Did not receive
1. Always
2. Frequently
3. Occasionally
4. Rarely
5. Received but did not read
6. Did not receive
1. Always
2. Frequently
3. Occasionally
4. Rarely
5. Received but did not read
6. Did not receive
1. Always
2. Frequently
3. Occasionally
4. Rarely
5. Received but did not read
6. Did not receive
1. Always
2. Frequently
3. Occasionally
4. Rarely
5. Received but did not read
6. Did not receive
1. Always
2. Frequently
3. Occasionally
4. Rarely
5. Received but did not read
6. Did not receive
 Question
k. Other DIA or Defense reports (specify)
1. State Morning Summary
in. INR Current Analysis Series and Situation
Reports-for example, Arab/Israeli Sit. Rep.,
Soviet Highlights, etc.
n. INR Intelligence Reports-for example,
Current Analyses, Assessments, and Policy
Assessments
o. INR Analyst Briefs
p. Other State reports (specify)
q. NSA SIGINT Summary
r. Daily Area Event Summaries
s. Periodic Topical Summaries
Respondents
Percentage
Choices
48
17
1. Always
13
2. Frequently
4
3. Occasionally
10
4. Rarely
4
5. Received but did not read
52
6. Did not receive
120
41
1. Always
3
2. Frequently
4
3. Occasionally
7
4. Rarely
0
5. Received but did not read
45
6. Did not receive
120
18
1. Always
21
2. Frequently
18
3. Occasionally
11
4. Rarely
0
5. Received but did not read
33
6. Did not receive
121
15
1. Always
21
2. Frequently
24
3. Occasionally
15
4. Rarely
0
5. Received but did not read
26
6. Did not receive
118
11
1. Always
14
2. Frequently
15
3. Occasionally
14
4. Rarely
0
5. Received but did not read
47
6. Did not receive
26
12
1. Always
12
2. Frequently
12
3. Occasionally
0
4. Rarely
0
5. Received but did not read
65
6. Did not receive
116
16
1. Always
13
2. Frequently
17
3. Occasionally
10
4. Rarely
0
S. Received but did not read
45
6. Did not receive
112
8
1. Always
5
2. Frequently
13
3. Occasionally
11
4. Rarely
2
5. Received but did not read
62
6. Did not receive
113
5
1. Always
10
2. Frequently
20
3. Occasionally
12
4. Rarely.
1
5. Received but did not read
51
6. Did not receive
15 Confidential
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0 ?
t. Other NSA Reports (specify) 61 21 1. Always
10 2. Frequently
10 3. Occasionally
7 4. Rarely
0 S. Received but did not read
52 6. Did not receive
14. Characterize the quantity of each of the
following types of information that you re-
ceived.
a. Analyses and information originating out- 126 19 1. Excessive
side the Intelligence Community-for exam- 70 2. Sufficient
pie, newspapers, periodicals, academic re- 6 3. Insufficient
search, etc. 6 4. Did not receive
b. Raw intelligence reports 127 12 1. Excessive
68 2. Sufficient
11 3. Insufficient
9 4. Did not receive
c. Current intelligence-for example, report- 126 7 1. Excessive
ing on daily developments in such periodicals 79 2. Sufficient
as the NID, State Morning Summary, or DIA 6 3. Insufficient
DIS 9 4. Did not receive
d. Basic intelligence-for example, compila- 127 5 1. Excessive
tions of factual data, biographic information, 78 2. Sufficient
etc. 14 3. Insufficient
3 4. Did not receive
c. Predictive and analytic intelligence-for 126 5 1. Excessive
example, NIEs, Assessments, Memorandums, 57 2. Sufficient
Research Papers, etc. 34 3. Insufficient
4 4. Did not receive
f. Intelligence analyses specifically prepared to 126 2 1. Excessive
support the development of policy options or 47 2. Sufficient
operational planning - 42 3. Insufficient
9 4. Did not receive
15. Rate the overall quality (as distinct from
usefulness) of each of the following kinds of
information.
a. Nonintelligence analyses 121 3 1. Excellent
56 2. Good
28 3. Fair
5 4. Poor
7 5. Did not receive
b. Raw intelligence reports 124 11 1. Excellent
45 2. Good
33 3. Fair
2 4. Poor
9 5. Did not receive
c. Current intelligence 123 15 1. Excellent
59 2. Good
20 3. Fair
3 4. Poor
3 5. Did not receive
d. Basic intelligence data 122 17 1. Excellent
49 2. Good
22 3. Fair
3 4. Poor
9 5. Did not receive
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 e. Predictive and analytic intelligence studies 123 6
33
44
15
2
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
5. Did not receive
f. Intelligence analyses directly related to 123 7 1. Excellent
policy options 30 2. Good
32 3. Fair
20 4. Poor
l1 5. Did not receive
16. Rate the usefulness of each of the following
kinds of information.
a. Nonintelligence analyses 122 18 1. Very useful
59 2. Fairly useful
15 3. Not particularly useful
1 4. Not useful at all
7 5. Did not receive
b. Raw intelligence reports 126 21 1. Very useful
48 2. Fairly useful
23 3. Not particularly useful
0 4. Not useful at all
a . . 7 5. Did not receive
n L' c. Basic intelligence data 123 24 1. Very useful
01-01 57 2. Fairly useful
p 12 3. Not particularly useful
1 4. Not useful at all
-d v 7 5. Did not receive
ni d. Current intelligence reporting 126 36 1. Very useful
53 2. Fairly useful
8 3. Not particularly useful
1 4. Not useful at all
2 5. Did not receive
e. Predictive and analytic intelligence studies 124 25 1. Very useful
52 2. Fairly useful
19 3. Not particularly useful
1 4. Not useful at all
2 5. Did not receive
f. Intelligence analyses directly related to 121 33 1. Very useful
policy options. 38 2. Fairly useful
14 3. Not particularly useful
4 4. Not useful at all
11 5. Did not receive
17. Of the time you have spent on foreign
countries, indicate the importance in your
work of each of the following areas. (see map)
a. Western Europe=NATO countries 128 68 1. Very important
27 2. Fairly important
5 3. Not very important
b. Soviet-European Communist countries 127 56 1. Very important
28 2. Fairly important
16 3. Not very important
c. Latin America 128 27 1. Very important
38 2. Fairly important
36 3. Not very important
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 Question
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?
d. Middle East-North Africa
e. Sub-Saharan Africa
f. Asia
.18. Of the times you have spent on foreign
topics, indicate the importance in your work of
each of the following subjects.
a. Political
b. Economic/Energy
c. Military
d. Scientific/Technological
e. Biographic
f. Other (specify)
19. Characterize the quantity of the intelli-
gence information you received on the follow-
ing areas and subjects.
a. Western Europe-NATO countries
b. Soviet-European Communist countries
c. Latin America
d. Middle East-North Africa
t?
e. Sub-Saharan Africa
Respondents
Percentage
Choices
128
59
1. Very important
24
2. Fairly important
16
3. Not very important
127
16
1. Very important
31
2. Fairly important
54
3. Not very important
127
50
1. Very important
36
2. Fairly important
13
3. Not very important
128
63 /
1. Very important
29
2. Fairly important
8
3. Not very important
128
62
1. Very important
27
2. Fairly important
11
3. Not very important
129
61
1. Very important
17
2. Fairly important
23
3. Not very important
126
34
1. Very important
38
2. Fairly important
28
3. Not very important
128
14
1. Very important
50
2. Fairly important
36
3. Not very important
9
88
1. Very important
11
2. Fairly important
0
3. Not very important
125
7
1. Excessive
76
2. Sufficient
14
3. Insufficient
3
4. Did not receive
125
6
1. Excessive
72
2. Sufficient
17
3. Insufficient
5
4. Did not receive
123
3
1. Excessive
50
2. Sufficient
29
3. Insufficient
18
4. Did not receive
124
2
1. Excessive
65
2. Sufficient
23
3. Insufficient
10
4. Did not receive
119
3
1. Excessive
50
2. Sufficient
19
3. Insufficient
28
4. Did not receive
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 f. Asia 120
Subject
a. Political 114
b. Economic/Energy 114
c. Military 115
e. Biographic 113
f. Other (specify) 12
20. Do you believe that you received all the 126
available intelligence on the areas and subjects
of interest to you?
21. How often do you believe intelligence 128
provided a unique input to your knowledge of
the areas and subjects of interest to you? (circle
one)
22. Rate the quality and usefulness of the
intelligence you received on each of the foreign
areas with which you worked.
Quality
1. Excessive
2. Sufficient
3. Insufficient
4. Did not receive
1. Excessive
2. Sufficient
3. Insufficient
4. Did not receive
1. Excessive
2. Sufficient
3. Insufficient
4. Did not receive
1. Excessive
2. Sufficient
3. Insufficient
4. Did not receive
1. Excessive
2. Sufficient
3. Insufficient
4. Did not receive
1. Excessive
2. Sufficient
3. Insufficient
4. Did not receive
1. Excessive
2. Sufficient
3. Insufficient
4. Did not receive
a. Yes
b. No (Please explain)
a. Always
b. Frequently
c. Occasionally
d. Rarely
c. Never
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
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?
23. Rate the quality and usefulness of the
intelligence you received on each of the follow-
ing subjects with which you worked.
Quality
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
i
1. Very useful
2. Fairly useful
3. Not particularly useful
4. Not useful at all
1. Very useful
2. Fairly useful
3. Not particularly useful
4. Not useful at all
1. Very useful
2. Fairly useful
3. Not particularly useful
4. Not useful at all
1. Very useful
2. Fairly useful
3. Not particularly useful
4. Not useful at all
1. Very useful
2. Fairly useful
3. Not particularly useful
4. Not useful at all
1. Very useful
2. Fairly useful
3. Not particularly useful
4. Not useful at all
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
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 a. Political
b. Economic/Energy
c. Military
d. Scientific and Technological
24. Did you ever operate without having
requested intelligence when, in retrospect, you
believe such support would have helped you?
If Yes, please indicate for which areas and
subject. (circle all that apply)
a. Western Europe-NATO countries
b. Soviet-European Communist countries
c. Latin America
d. Middle East-North Africa
e. Sub-Saharan Africa
L Asia
a. Political
b. Economic/Energy
c. Military
d. Scientific and Technological
C. Biographic
f. Other (specify)
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
1. Excellent
2. Good
3. Fair
4. Poor
29
1. Very useful
58
2. Fairly useful
11
3. Not particularly useful
2
4. Not useful at all
27
1. Very useful
60
2. Fairly useful
12
3. Not particularly useful
2
4. Not useful at all
41
1. Very useful
47
2. Fairly useful
10
3. Not particularly useful
2
4. Not useful at all
28
1. Very useful
55
2. Fairly useful
16.
3. Not particularly useful
1
4. Not useful at all
22
1. Very useful
56
2. Fairly useful
17
3. Not particularly useful
5
4. Not useful at all
40
1. Very useful
40
2. Fairly useful
20
3. Not particularly useful
0
4. Not useful at all
131
60
a. Yes
40
b. No
77
77
77
77
77
77
76
76
76
76
76
76
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Respondents Percentage Choices
25. Did you ever operate without intelligence 130 45 a. Yes
information because you believed that the 55 b. No
Intelligence Community could not properly
satisfy your needs?
If Yes, please indicate for which areas and
subjects. (circle all that apply)
a. Western Europe-NATO countries
b. Soviet-European Communist countries
c. Latin America
d. Middle East-North Africa
e. Sub-Saharan Africa
f. Asia
a. Political
b. Economic/Energy
c. Military
d. Scientific and Technological
e. Biographic
f. Other (specify)
26. Did you use intelligence information to
support you in negotiations?
56 34
56 30
56 21
56 46
56 14
56 30
54 41
54 39
54 32
54 32
54 20
54 11
128 72 a. Yes
28 b. No
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425910013
425910-P1 G
Appendix B
IC Survey Participants and
Their Agency Affiliations
Aaron, David L.
White House
Frosch, Robert A.
Ahmad, Sharon
State
Frost, Ellen
Allen, Lew Jr
DOD
Funk, Gerald
Armaeost, Michael
State
Furtado, Donald
Ashworth, George
ACDA
Gaffney, Henry H.
Askew, Reubin
Special Trade
Gast, Philip C.
Barrow, Robert H.
DOD
Goldman, Leslie J.
Barry., Robert
State
Goldschmidt, Neil
Baruch, Jordan J.
Commerce
Graves, Ernest Jr.
Berenson, Paul J.
DOD
Gregg, Donald
Bergsten, C. Fred
Treasury
Handyside, Holsey
Leon
Billings
State
Hanson, Thor
,
Blackman, Herbert
Labor
Haslam, Charles L.
Bond, Langhorne
Transportation
Hayward, Thomas B.
Robert L
Bovey
DOD
Hidalgo, Edward
.
,
Bowdler, William
State
Hodges, Luther H.
Morris
Brad
DOD
Holbrook,, Richard
y,
Brement, Marshall
White House
Holcomb, M. Staser
Harold
Brown
DOD
Huberman, Benjamin
,
Zbignew
Brzezinski
White House
Jones, David C.
,
Calio, Anthony J.
NASA
Katz, Abraham
Robert
Carswell
Treasury
I Katz, Julius L.
,
Robert
Cassidy
Special Trade
Klutznick, Philip
,
Chayes, Antonia H.
DOD
Knickerbocker, F.
Warren
Christopher
State
Komer, Robert W.
,
W. Graham
Claytor
DOD
Kramer, Frank
,
Denis
Clift
A
White House
Lake, W. Anthony
,
.
Dean
Clowes
Labor
Larson, Charles R.
,
Evelyn
Colbert
State
Leonard, Michael
,
Richard N.
Cooper
State
Lew, Ginger
,
George
Cunningham
Energy
Lewis, William W.
,
Davies, Thomas D.
ACDA
Linowitz, Sol M.
Lynn E.
Davis
DOD
Marshall, Andrew
,
Davis
Richard J.
Treasury
Marshall, Ray
,
Timothy
Deal
White House
Mathis, Robert C.
,
Deutch
John
Energy
Maynes, Charles W.
,
Dinneen, Gerald P.
DOD
McGiffert, David
Duncan, Charles W.
Energy
McHenry, Donald
Dyess, William J.
State
McIntyre, James
Ermarth
Fritz
White House
,
Falco
Mathea
K
State
Meyer, Edward C.
,
.
Frank
Richard
Commerce
Miller, G. William
,
Frieman, Edward A.
Energy
Molander, Roger
NASA
DOD
White House
Commerce
DOD
DOD
Energy
Transportation
DOD
White House
Energy
DOD
Commerce
DOD
DOD
Commerce
State
DOD
White House
DOD
State
State
Commerce
Commerce
DOD
DOD
State
DOD
DOD
State
Energy
State
DOD
Labor
DOD
State
DOD
State
Management and
Budget
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 Approved For Release 2007/07/11: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000200030010-6
is
0
Moose, Richard M.
State
Rentschler, James
Moyer. Homer E. Jr.
Commerce
Richardson, Ellio
State
Murphy, Daniel J.
DOD
Ridgway, Rozanne
State
Murray, Robert J.
DOD
Sanders, Edward G.
Management and
Murray. Russell
DOD
Budget
Nachmanoff, Arnold
Treasury
Saunders, Harold
State
Negroponte, John
State
Seidman, Hcrta L.
Commerce
Nemirow, Samuel B.
Commerce
Sewell, Duane C.
Energy
Newsom, David D.
State
Shulman, Marshall
State
Nimetz, Matthew
State
Slocombe, Walter
DOD
Nosenzo, Louis V.
State
Smith, Gerard C.
State
Oday, Paul
Commerce
Spiro, Robert H.
DOD
Odom, William E.
White House
Stivers, Ronald H.
DOD
OMalley, Jerome T.
DOD
Sullivan, Roger
White House
Otis, G. K.
DOD
Thomson, James A.
White House
Owen, Henry
White House
Utgoff, Victor A.
White House
Palmer, Stephen
State
Vandoren, Charles
ACDA
Pastor, Robert A.
White House
Vantrees, Harry L.
DOD
Perry, William J.
DOD
Vest, George S.
State
Pickering, Thomas
State
Volcker, Paul A.
Federal Reserve
Pierre, Percy A.
DOD
Wallich, Henry C.
Federal Reserve
Platt, Nicholas
DOD
Watkins, James D.
DOD
Poats, Rutherford
White House
Watson, Thomas C.
DOD
Press, Frank
White House
Wertheim, Mitzi
DOD
Quainton, Anthony
State
25X1
25X1
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Appendix C
Recommendations for Future Surveys
The first survey of this magnitude invariably brings to
light suggestions for methodological or procedural
changes. Predictably, we have discovered that some
things which were covered in this survey should have
been handled quite differently, other things which
were included possibly should not have been present
at all, and still other things which were excluded
should certainly have been included.
We believe it advisable to replicate this survey period-
ically. This would serve at.least two important pur-
poses. First, it would enable intelligence-producing
agencies to see if problems which were identified
during one administration are general and pervasive
enough to carry over into other administrations. Sec-
ond, and just as important, it would provide the
intelligence-producing agencies with an empirical
mechanism to gauge the effects of changes made in
either the content or the delivery systems used for
their products. Ideally, the responsibility for carrying
out this type of survey should rest with a group of I
individuals who collectively:
? Are familiar with survey methodologies,
? Are in step with current data-analysis techniques,
? Possess the computer power and software to handle
the data,
? Have no preconceived biases concerning the out-
come of such a study,
Have authority to make methodological decisions in
the interest of maximizing the objectivity of the
study, and,
? Are thoroughly familiar with the Intelligence
Community.
The study group must work closely with a panel of
senior representatives from each of the intelligence-
producing agencies, so that the views and concerns of
these agencies can be factored into the design and
analysis of the survey instrument itself.
The study group must agree on the exact charter,
purposes, goals, and objectives of the study and also
on the line authority for the study so that jurisdiction-
al questions may be resolved without unnecessary
debate. It is imperative that every member of the
working group know exactly:
? Who requested the survey,
? Why it was requested,
? What specific questions it should seek to answer,
? Who has responsibility for designing it and carrying
it out,
? Where the final decisionmaking authority lies in the
event of disagreement,
? What form the final report should take,
? For whom the final report will be written, and,
? What other mechanisms might appropriately be
employed for dissemination of the results.
The fact that these were not at all times clearly
understood by every member of the working group
during the current effort occasionally made it difficult
to progress smoothly through the various stages of the
project.
In general, the methodology we adopted for this effort
was a good choice and seems highly appropriate for
future studies. That is, an "objective" instrument of
carefully selected, structured items should be used in
combination with essay items and follow-up inter-
views, to collect the basic data for the survey. Certain-
ly, any future survey should attempt to collect data
from as much of the entire population of policymakers
as can be persuaded to participate in the effort. The
issue of "sampling" the policymakers should, there-
fore, not surface at all.
Specific changes to be made in the items on the
survey, or in the procedures and questions used in the
interviews should come from members of the working
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 . Approved For Release 2007/07/11: CIA-RDP85T00153R000200030010-6
group. Attention should be focused on any important
conclusions that are suggested but cannot explicitly be
supported by responses to particular. items on the
survey. Several conclusions have suggested themselves
to the members of the current working group but
cannot be reported as objective "findings" because no
hard data dealing specifically with these areas was
collected. The survey should be expanded to cover
such topics and should be narrowed in areas that did
not produce a distinct payoff insofar as the goals of
the survey were concerned.
Finally, the interview phase of the study, while it
produced data difficult to quantify, added immeasur-
ably to our understanding of the real issues underly-
ing the problems identified by the respondents in the
questionnaire. Our recommendations would include a
suggestion for expanding the topical scope of these
interviews as well as the actual number of interviews
held. With sufficient manpower, time, and resources,
it may even be feasible (and certainly desirable) to
interview every willing survey participant.
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