ISRAEL-LEBANON: IMPLICATIONS OF AN INDEFINITE STAY IN LEBANON

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00153R000200060039-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Sequence Number: 39
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF ?
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
I
7 July 1983 ^
THE DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
7 July 1983
NOTE FOR: Mr. Don Gregg
S NOTE FOR: Amb. Steven Bosworth Assistant to the Vice President
Director, Policy Planning Staff for National Security Affairs
FROM . Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman, NIC
FROM . Charles E. Waterman
Vice Chairman, NIC
A projective and somewhat unorthodox
analysis done by of our office
on the implications of a long Israeli/
Syrian stay in Lebanon.
A projective and somewhat unorthodox
analysis done by of our office
on the implications of a long Israeli/
Syrian stay in Lebanon.
Charles E. Waterman
Attachment
'Charles E. Waterman
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STAT
I I
STAT
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Israel-Lebanon: Implications of an Indefinite Stay in Lebanon
There is an increasingly good chance that Syria will not agree to
withdraw its forces from Lebanon. As a result, Israel seems determined to
keep its troops in southern Lebanon indefinitely. Prime Minister Begin
probably will order only a partial withdrawal to a line running approximately
25 miles north of the Israeli border town of Metulla (see map) -- the original
stated goal of last year's incursion before the IDF began the seige of
Beirut. In effect, Lebanon will be partitioned on a de facto basis into
Israeli and Syrian occupied zones with the Amin Gemayel government controlling
Beirut and the Phalange Party militia controlling its traditional Maronite
enclave around Jubayl north of Beirut.
This memorandum speculates on some of the longer term implications,
particularly for Israel, of a prolonged de facto partition of Lebanon. The
bottom line Judgment is that, while the costs of a semi-permanent occupation
for Israel are not inconsequential, they are manageable. Over time, moreover,
the links between Israel and the "North Bank" are likely to become more
extensive and, as a result, more difficult to sever. The Amin government will
oppose these trends but has little leverage to halt them. Moreover, the
central government and, more importantly, the Phalange militia is likely to
remain closely linked to Israel and the US rather then turn to others, e.g.
Syria, for support. For the US, this situation would be difficult, but not
intolerable.
Security Implications for Israel
A withdrawal to the 25-mile line will not solve all of Israel's security
problems in Lebanon but it could be a start towards bringing them under
greater control. According to most sources, the attacks on IDF troops in the
south (averaging 5-10 incidents per week) are primarily the work of Lebanese
elements indigenous to the area, not outside Palestinian infiltrators. While
a partial pullback would reduce IPvulnerability by shortening some supply
lines and removing Israeli forces from the volatile Shuf region south of
Beirut, it would not halt attacks on Israeli personnel in the border area.
Over time, however, the Israelis would be likely to impose draconian
security procedures on the occupied area similar to those they have used
This memorandum was prepared by A/NIO/NESA. It has not
been coordinated within the intelligence commun y and is intended as informed
speculation in order to stimulate thinking. It is not finished intelligence
or a hard prediction.
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successfully elsewhere when confronted with sustained guerrilla/terrorist
resistance. The Lebanese may be a tougher nut to crack but they also are
vulnerable to extreme measures. While the local populace seems to be
increasingly opposed to the Israeli presence and the various Lebanese leftist
factions have long experience with small unit fighting, Israel has a proven
track record of being able to bring unrest within manageable proportions.
Forced expulsions, use of local surrogates like Major Haddad's forces, and
ruthless counterintelligence operations will doubtless have some effect on the
situation.
A major impact of such moves will be to reduce the cohesiveness between
the south and the rest of Lebanon. As the IDF seeks to gain greater control
over the area it will be forced to more rigorously restrict travel in and out
of the area. The Lebanese government will protest such moves, especially to
the US, but has little leverage on Tel Aviv.
Demographic Aspects
There are no reliable population figures for Lebanon -- the last census
was taken by the French in 1932. The most recent GOL estimate for total
population is 2.6 million. Perhaps 1 million live in greater Beirut. One
recent estimate places the population of Lebanon south of the 25-mile line at
about 500,000. The majority of those are Lebanese Shia Muslims but there also
are substantial numbers of Palestinians around Sidon and Tyre, some Lebanese
Druze in the eastern areas and a small Lebanese Christian minority along parts
of the border.
These 500,000 Lebanese will increase the Arab population under Israeli
rule and occupation to 2.3 million compared with 3.2 million Jews (roughly
600,000 Arabs inside pre-1967 Israel plus 1.2 million in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip).
The Lebanese Arabs would have little in common politically with the
Palestinians, however, especially since Israel would probably continue to
acknowledge the principle of Lebanese sovereignty over the south, unlike its
policy toward the Golan and West Bank. Moreover, the Lebanese Shia, who have
developed a strong dislike for the Sunni Muslim Palestinians in their midst,
are even less likely to seek meaningful political cooperation with the Sunnis
inside Israel and the West Bank.
In sum, the Israelis are not likely to face a united Arab front from
Lebanese and Palestinian Arabs but rather a divided population over which Tel
Aviv can continue to exert political dominance. Even within southern Lebanon
Israel will not face a united population but a deeply fractured community.
Elsewhere in Lebanon a de facto partition will leave most of the
Christians under Phalange or Gemayel rule and most Muslims within the Syrian
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sphere. To some extent, therefore, a slightly tidier demographic picture will
emerge. This will undo some of the effects of the 1920 French colonial
decision to expand Maronite-dominated Mount Lebanon's traditional borders to
include the predominantly Muslim districts of Tripoli, the Bekaa and southern
Lebanon.
Two significant minority enclaves will remain. In the Syrian occupied
zone, Christians will still predominate in the central Bekaa town of Zahlah
(Greek Catholics) and in the mountains southeast of Tripoli (Maronites led by
former President Franjiyah). These areas are likely to be the target of
Phalangist irredentism. The other enclave will be the Druze Muslim minority
in the Shuf region south of Beirut. It will also be a Phalangist target once
the IDF withdraws to the 25-mile line but the Syrians are likely to try to
reinsert their influence into this area as well.
Economic Trends
Israel has already taken some moves to develop a closer economic
relationship with southern Lebanon. Haifa has been promoted as a duty-free
port of entry, diverting traffic from Beirut and increasing the south's
reliance on Israel. Over time this trend is certain to become further
entrenched. Practical realities will force the southerners to come to terms
with Israeli currency and products as ties with the rest of Lebanon erode.
The Lebanese could also become another source of cheap labor for Israel
much as West Bankers and Gazans have already been used. -Even before last
year's invasion Lebanese from Major Haddad's enclave crossed the "Good Fence"
every day to work in several northern Galilee kibbutzim.
A key economic issue will be water rights. The Litani River has long
been touted as the solution to Israel's growing water shortages. Any move to
divert Litani water would be very controversial but is an increasing
possibility.
Syria already controls the economy of the Bekaa. The Valley's most
famous crop, hashish, will remain a staple of Syria's large "illegal" economy,
as will smuggling. The far north of the country, known as the Akkar, has
become a refuge for surplus Syrian labor, especially Alawite Muslims, seeking
job opportunities. Some Lebanese claim up to 200,000 Alawites have emigrated
into the north from Syria since 1976.
A limited economic revival may take place in reunited Beirut but no
general economic reconstruction is likely. The Phalange dominated
"Marounistan" is already a functioning state within a state.
Domestic Israeli Political Fallout
Domestic criticism of the Israeli role in Lebanon is certain to continue
as long as the IDF stays in the south. Groups like Peace Now will strongly
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protest an indefinite occupation. The opposition Labor Party is already
advocating a complete pullback. The key variable, however, will be the
casualty level. If, as expected, the IDF gets a handle on the guerrillas in
the next 6-12 months, domestic unease will decline.
Moreover, the lack of a viable alternative to IDF occupation will weaken
the opposition. This would be particularly true if, after the IDF pulls back
to the 25-mile line, the Lebanese army proves to be ineffective in restoring
control over the Shuf.
On the other end of the political spectrum some ultra Zionists will push
for annexing the south. Already some members of the Tehiya party have argued
that the 1949 armistice line is artificial and does not represent the historic
northern border of Palestine. Other ultranationalists have spoken about
ancient Hebrew ties to southern Lebanon. While these groups are clearly now
on the extreme fringes of the Israeli body politic the past experience of
changing Israeli attitudes toward the West Bank, Gaza, Golan and even Sinai
indicates that a long occupation develops ideological justifications.
Regional Implications
A de facto partition of Lebanon will have profound regional
implications. Neither Tel Aviv nor Damascus is likely to take steps to
formalize the situation but both will use their Lebanese surrogates as
counterweights to the Amin Gemayel regime. Haddad or some other figure will
be Israel's front man in the south and some day-to-day governing tasks turned
over to him. Real power will remain in Israeli hands.
Amin's credibility as a national leader will erode but he will retain his
enclave in greater Beirut. He has no viable alternative to staying close to
the US. Many other Maronites in Lebanon will not be gravely alarmed by
partition. Some influential Phalangists have long favored de facto partition
since this would leave them with a smaller rump state with a Christian
majority. These hardliners have good ties with Israel and can be expected to
work to keep Amin off balance.
The Syrian-Israeli front line will remain tense. Air clashes, artillery
duels and other incidents are likely and there will always be a risk of full-
scale war. Nonetheless, the uneasy ceasefire could persist for a long time
since both sides would have a vested interest in maintaining control over
their spheres of influence and not rocking the boat. Over time a limited
disengagement might even prove possible. Meanwhile, Syria will continue to
extend its control over the Bekaa Valley and northern Lebanon -- areas it has
now occupied for over seven years.
A prolonged stalemate in Lebanon will tend to detract attention from
other Levantine issues, particularly the Palestinian problem. While Arab
pressure to "solve" the Palestinian problem will continue, Lebanese concerns
will inevitably distract diplomatic attention and resources. Lebanon will not
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eclipse Palestine as the Arab cause but it will complicate and confuse the
issue.
The ongoing PLO-Syrian feud will determine how much influence an
independent Palestinian movement retains in Lebanon. It is likely that some
kind of Palestinian presence will continue, especially in the Tripoli region,
but under greater Syrian control than in the past.
Finally, a prolonged Israeli occupation will complicate US-Israeli
ties. Irritants are bound to develop over lesser issues like Litani water
rights even if war-peace issues cool down. The US would be called on by both
Israel and the Beirut government to referee disputes and "punish" the other.
Israel would seek to keep these disputes contained in order to maintain a
basically positive relationship with Washington.
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