CAN THE SOVIET UNION "STAND DOWN"?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00153R000300010015-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 23, 2008
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: April 22, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000300010015-2
22 April 1982 ILLEGIB
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Herbert E. Meyer
SUBJECT: Can the Soviet Union "Stand Down"?
1. Stopping the Soviet arms build-up--or at least slowing its momentum--
is a key goal of the US. Either of two factors, or a combination of both,
could bring some success in the coming years: a genuine arms-limitation
agreement, or a unilateral decision by the Russians as part of a strategy to
cope with mounting economic problems.
2. Given the nature and structure of the Soviet system, there is reason
to believe that any effort to cut defense spending would be inherently more
difficult in that country than in the US. Indeed, it is an irony of planned
economies that while the power to order resource shifts is immense, the system's
lack of flexibility tends to frustrate effective response. General Bill Odom--
one of the few scholars who has written explicitly on this subject--argues that
because of the Soviet five-year planning cycle, even with the best of intentions
by Moscow, "two or three five-year plan periods would be required for a significant
change in the Soviet points on the guns-versus-butter curve."
3. An assessment of the Soviet system's capacity to shift resources from
the military sector would be of immense value to US policymakers. It would enable
them to judge where pressure on the Russians would be useful, how much pressure
should be applied, and the practical limits of a Soviet response.
4. Among the questions our assessment would grapple with are these:
a. How would a shift of resources away from the Soviet military
sector actually be managed?
b. What practical problems--e.g., employment--would such a resource
shift entail?
c. What are the realistic parameters of any such shift?
d. How long would it take, given the best of Soviet intentions?
e. How would such a shift alter the US-Soviet relationship?
5. I've talked with) and it turns out that he himself has
been giving some thought to the issue. In fact, it is who tipped me
off to Bill Odom's articles. calculates that an assessment could be
completed within several weeks, assuming that SOVA can provide some horsepower
and assuming an outside consultant can be made available.
Q;~,
Herbert E. eyer
Orig Cl By Signer
Rvw 22 April 1988
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Approved For Release 2008/01/23: CIA-RDP85TO0153R000300010015-2