GREEK BASE NEGOTIATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00153R000300060021-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: May 10, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505 NIC No. 3423-83
10 May .1983
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert Blackwill
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
FROM Milton Kovner
National Intelligence Officer for Western Europe
SUBJECT Greek Base Negotiations
In response to your memo of 3 May 1983 td II offer
the following views on the US-Greek base negotiations.
During the summer of 1982 the Greek government, in a reversal of
its stance on the presence of US bases in Greece, determined that
Greek security objectives would be better served by retention of the
US facilities -- provided the price exacted for their continuation
would be tangible enough to justify its reversal of attitude to the
Greek public. The task must then have seemed manageable to
Papandreou not only because of his own personal popularity but
because he realized that for much of the consituency that elected
him the bases were less an ideological issue than an opportunity to
elicit from the US concessions on widely-shared Greek objectives --
a guarantee of the status quo in the Aegean or commitments for
material assistance to make credible a Greek deterrent. The
reversal of negotiating procedures of earlier rounds, i.e., a series
of restricted political discussions precedent to the technical
talks, was designed to achieve these Greek desiderata early on,
providing justification and rationale for the talks to follow. The
GOG took pains to imply that with these objectives in hand, the
contentious wrangling over particularist issues which characterized
previous negotiations would be avoided, a pledge initially made
easier by excluding from the discussions those more experienced
Greek negotiators who might have been prone to do so.
Clearly, Papandreou could not anticipate the toughness of the US
negotiating posture on the fundamental points at issue (attributing
failure to achieve similar objectives during the last negotiation to
the fecklessness of the previous government), his own waning
popularity in the face of.growing economic distress and austerity at
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SECRET
home, and the increasing anxieties of his own left wing and the KKE
as the preliminary talks dragged on without seeming result or
prospect of early resolution. The forces he himself encouraged to
take to the streets often in collaboration with the Communists, and
intended to demonstrate public antipathy to the presence of the
bases and to ameliorate US negotiating positions, coupled with his
own public rhetoric on the subject now threaten to limit his
options, unravel the broad coalition that has supported him, and
risk further alienation on his left.
Hence the optics appear to have changed for Papandreou, and so
too the stakes at issue. While the Administration -- and the
Congress -- will have righted, at least conditionally, the balance
with Turkey in Fiscal '84, the shape of any achievable agreement he
can now foresee will fall short of public expectations that he
himself engendered and, in conjunction with other disturbing
domestic issues, could prove insufficient to sustain his mandate
should he decide to make the issue a focus of early elections.
Despite his doubts and fears, I believe Papandreou wishes to
conclude an accord and will risk confrontation with the forces on
his left provided its terms reflect sufficient fidelity to his
party's earlier programmatic positions. The most critical issue, in
my view, is that of duration -- the most visible element of any
agreement on.which his already tattered credibility with the public
-1aAd perhaps: his political future -- will rest. Should he-achieve
;,satisfaction here, he would, I suspect, be prepared to back off on
the issue of balance on which congressional actions and textual
concessions already permit an interpretation of significant US
concessions. On the other hand, the absence of a clearly
identifiable and unequivocal termination date for the agreement
would be more difficult to rationalize in terms of earlier
positions.
Should the negotiations break down on the duration issue --
especially in the absence of other concessions on multi-year
assistance commitments, balance etc. -- it will not be without
political penalty for Papandreou. Karamanlis, who is known to
harbor strong reservations about Papandreou's governance, and the
political right will vent increasing criticism about the
government's ineptitude in general and its mishandling of the base
issue in particular. But it is unlikley that Papandreou himself
will bear the overwhelming weight of the attack on the base issue.
Anti-Americanism -- for our alleged patronization of Greece and
so-called tilt toward Turkey -- is widespread; and Papandreou's
assertion of Greek interests have given expression to a sublimated
Greek pride that even his most ardent opponents have thought long
overdue. Government resort to the media to explain Greek positions
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in their most favorable light, coupled with the strong support
Papandreou can expect from a party he still dominates, from the
Communists, and from the impulse for national unity on the issue
even from the right would, in my view, be sufficient to overcome the
anxieties that most Greeks -- including the military -- would feel
about the larger implications for Greece of a breakdown in the
negotiations. Early indications that the US was exploring
alternatives to our facilities in Greece, particularly in Turkey,
would only serve to exacerbate the situation and weld further
support for the government in its putative defense of Greek national
interests.
Given the prospect of prolonged stalemate, Papandreou might seek
to combine incentive with injury and, as an earnest of future
intentions, begin by requesting withdrawal of the VOA Relay Stations
at Kavalla and on Rhodes and the Area Telecommunications Facility
adjoining Nea Makri -- facilities which are not integral parts of
the current negotiations and whose legal status has either lapsed or
is uncertain. In similar vein, he might be tempted to impose
progressive restriction on selected operations at our facilities for
which explicit GOG approval is ambiguous or merely precedential.
Given the Greek penchant for deadlines, the GOG might also threaten
suspension of the talks if results are not achieved by a given
date. The options available to the COG are varied and none can be
excluded.
Should we hold firm on the issue of duration during the next
round, Papandreou could respond in two ways: (1) accept the limits
beyond which we are not prepared to go in the text and blunt its
inconsistency with long-stated Greek positions by asserting during
the process of Parliamentary ratification that the Greek Government
will not be prepared to continue the agreement beyond its five-year
term unless it or its successors are convinced of its value to
Greece; or (2) having determined the inability of the US to concede
on the matter, appeal to the President to call a national referendum
on the issue and pledge his government's acquiescence to the public
will. Less risky to his own political future than would be the case
of early elections on which the issue of the bases would inevitably
intertwine with others, a referendum would nonetheless emphasize his
incapacity for leadership, even if its results were in support of
the government s position. The dilemma is a stern one for
Papandreou, and given his temporizing nature, one cannnot exclude a
third option: a unilateral declaration that the talks have failed, a
freezing of all operations at the bases not expressly authorized by
the Greek government and, against the backdrop of their limited
effectiveness, a call for a new round of talks in the fall.
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