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Document Creation Date: 
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 17, 2008
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Publication Date: 
April 2, 1982
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PDF icon CIA-RDP85T00176R001000150038-9.pdf85.75 KB
Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP85TO0176RO01000150038-9~ /uSS f -EE The Director of Central Intelligence 2 April 1982 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT THE VICE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THE COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS THE CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SUBJECT: SNIE 12.,6-82, Poland's Prospects for the Next 12 to 18 Months 1. I am sending you this copy of a Special National Intelligence Estimate recently produced by the Intelligence Community on Poland's Prospects Over the Next 12 to 18 Months. 2. The take-off point for the SNIE is the imposition of martial. -law which so changed the country's political dynamics that a very broad assessment of the situation was necessary. In the process the SNIE became longer than we would have preferred. For that reason, let me highlight for you the SNIE's major findings: --The primary Soviet and Polish regime priority is control. --There is little prospect over the next year or so for political accommodation between the Jaruzelski regime and Polish society, although the regime may well approve certain cosmetic changes in martial law designed to secure a relaxation of Western sanctions. The likelihood is for continued or intensified repression. --The chances that unorganized violence will occur in the coming months are very high. However,-we think that the internal security forces are strong enough to keep any disturbances localized and . prevent nationwide disorder--if necessary with the support of some reliable military units. Thus the likelihood of a Soviet military intervention is slight. DERV ' CL BY SIGNER REVW ON 2 APR 1988 SECRET Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 000150038-9 Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 000150038-9 SECRET --The economic situation is still deteriorating, and it is problematic whether a disastrous further slide can be prevented. The key factor is a shortage of Western imports, which is exacerbated by the impact of Western sanctions. --Warsaw will be unable to make any significant principal payments on its $27 billion dollar debt for the foreseeable future, and will not meet much of the $2.5 billion dollars in interest due banks in 1982. The risk of default will continue to grow. --In short, the West cannot expect its pressure to lead to serious political liberalization in Poland over the near term. The most we can hope for is that the combination of Soviet and Polish need for Western economic cooperation, steadfast Western rejection of business-as-usual, and continued passive resistance to the authorities by the Polish population will have some moderating influence on the regime and maintain the possibility of long-term compromise within Polish society. Attachment: As stated Distribution: Orig - The President 1 - Each as listed - Chm/NIC (w/c off) - NIO/USSR-EE (u)/o,) ER Approved For Release 2008/06/17: CIA-RDP85TO01 76RO01 000150038-9