TALKING POINTS -- SNIE 90/91-3-82: IMPLICTIONS OF THE FALKLANDS CONFLICT FOR TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN LATIN AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001300020007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2007
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 5, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For R [ease 2007/05/03: CIA-RDP85TOO176R001300020007-4
SECRET
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5 August 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : Assistant NIO for Latin America
SUBJECT : Talking Points -- SNIE 90/91-3-82: Implications of the
Falklands Conflict for Territorial Disputes in Latin America
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for co breaking out regarding other territorial
disputes in the hemisphere.
2. The key findings of the intelligence community were:
a. The Falklands conflict has heightened irredentist rhetoric in
some Latin American countries but, on balance, has had a dampening effect
on prospects for an outbreak of hostilities elsewhere in the hemisphere.
b. Neither Argentina nor Chile is likely to initiate military action
over the Beagle Channel during the next year or so.
c. Even if a conflict broke out, Peru and Bolivia are not likely to
attack Chile; nor would Ecuador attack Peru.
d. Internal developments--not disputes elsewhere--are more likely to
determine whether fighting breaks out elsewhere in the region. With
regard to key disputes involving Venezuela and Guyana, Guatemala and
Belize, and Nicaragua and Colombia, domestic and international
considerations will continue to restrain these governments from using
force.
e. Moscow and its surrogates are not likely to gain much from the
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f. 4dditional hemispheric hostilities would adversely
affect US interests in the region, "Cost Latin American countries would
continue to look to the US to play a role in resolving intraregional
3. The draft generated little controversy within the intelligence
community. Several issues, however, did provoke some discussion and warrant
attention:
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 Approved For 0 Release 2007/05/03: SYPC --PP85TOO176R 01300020007-4
a. Potential Soviet arms sales to Latin America. As various drafts
evolved, the prticipants expressed growing skepticism that Argentina would
turn to the USSR for arms. In the end, the group concluded that "the
staunchly anti-communist regime is unlikely to turn to the Soviets for
military equipment unless no other sources are available".
b. Argentine attack on the Beagle Channel. All agreed that logic
argues strongly against Argentina int'iating hostilities, but some
representatives--particularly INR--argued that the draft should not overly
discount the possibility for irrational action. Much the same point
should be kept in mind with regard to prospects for conflict breaking out
over other disputes in the region.
c. International mediation of the Beagle Channel dispute. Initial
drafts stated almost flatly that Argentina would continue delaying tactics
to frustrate papal mediation, but recent information prompted some
rewriting to reflect more flexibility in the Argentine position.
4. An overview map and more detailed maps showing each border dispute
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in the Beagle Channel area will accompany the text.
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