PROSPECTS FOR MOROCCO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001500120020-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: July 1, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of Secret
Central
Intelligence
MASTER FILE COSY
-_~t_uo~_nn19tY[ MI Ui
tiU IGU
Oil MARK oil
Prospects for Morocco
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Memorandum to Holders
Secret
NI IIM 82-10004
July 1986
Copy 468
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SECRET
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF
NI JIM 82-10004
PROSPECTS FOR MOROCCO
Information available as of 14 July 1986 was used in
the preparation of this Memorandum, approved for
publication on 15 July 1986 by the Acting Chairman
of the National Intelligence Council.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
Review of the Economic Dilemma and Prospects
for Recovery ...................................................................................... 7
External Relations ............................................................................. 8
The Domestic Scene ......................................................................... 11
Implications for the United States ................................................... 14
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SCOPE NOTE
This Memorandum to Holders is an update of NI IIM 82-10004,
Prospects for Morocco, issued May 1982. In this paper, we examine
those events and conditions that have developed since 1982 that could
have a direct bearing on Morocco's stability and the future of
US-Moroccan relations. Although this Memorandum is limited to a
two-year outlook, it considers problems and possible developments that
could pose dangers over a longer term. Emphasis has been placed on the
strains in Moroccan society, and, while pertinent forces for stability
have been considered, a fuller discussion of the historical and cultural
factors for stability is presented in the original Memorandum.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
King Hassan II's proven ability to
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galvanize public support, and maneuver against 25X1
opponents should ensure his tenure on the throne over the next two
years. Furthermore, he has continued his strict control of the armed
forces and maintained
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its loyalty to the throne durin
g this period. Neither 25X1
existing fundamentalist groups nor opposition political parties are
capable of challenging the government.
Nevertheless, the King is likely to have some difficulty maintaining
the firm grip he has held on Moroccan society for the past decade.
While Hassan will seek to improve relations, growing pressures on the
King could prompt him to move in directions that could undercut US-
Moroccan ties
The economic ills that have plagued the country since the late
1970s and the stringent reforms-imposed by Morocco's creditors-
have generated public discontent and an increase in antiregime activity.
Prospects are bleak for significant economic recovery before the end of
the decade, and we are concerned that the King will not take the risky
steps necessary to restructure the economy:
- The country's indebtedness will necessitate strict austerity,
requiring deep spending cuts in some politically sensitive areas.
- Economic growth will be disappointingly slow, adding burdens
on the urban poor, a group prone to sudden violence.
- Expected levels of outside assistance, while essential to weather-
ing the crisis, will not be sufficient to speed recovery significant-
ly or ease hardships.
- A boost in export earnings from agriculture or phosphates could
brighten this prognosis, but neither is likely in the next two
years.
- Falling oil prices, dollar rate declines, and a good harvest this
year have been a temporary boon, but they reduce pressure to
hold the line on reforms.
Popular disaffection, conditioned by high expectations in the
1970s, has spread to many segments of Moroccan society. The hardest
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pressed have turned in growing numbers to Islamic fundamentalism.
Nonetheless, there is little organization among the fundamentalists, and
no leader with broad appeal is likely to emerge. The King is a legitimate
religious leader in his own right, and a revolution similar to Iran's is
highly unlikely. However, the fundamentalist movement in Morocco
will continue to prove troublesome for the regime:
- The majority of fundamentalist sympathizers are concentrated
in major cities, where conditions over the next two years are
likely to deteriorate, perhaps causing civil unrest.
We believe King Hassan is aware of the difficult road ahead and is
seeking to lessen his vulnerability. A union with Libya in 1984-even at
the cost of friction with the United States-and tentative steps toward
better ties to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have been calculated
to gain maximum foreign assistance and diplomatic support and the
safest international ground from which to combat domestic pressures.
The danger in this strategy is that it avoids addressing the roots of
Morocco's socioeconomic predicament
Rabat's alliance with Libya yielded some initial strategic and
economic benefits. There is no question that Morocco has gained
considerably from the removal of Libya as a major benefactor of the
Polisario in the Saharan war. It is doubtful that the King expected much
more than this from the unlikely "union," and he probably feels that he
has already achieved his most immediate and pressing goals from the al-
liance. There have been a variety of economic benefits, but these are of
secondary importance and have not reached the levels popularly hoped
for. The union has been largely inactive over the past year and is
unlikely to be revived anytime soon
The union has aggravated Maghreli- -relations, pushing Algeria
closer to Tunisia and into a defensive military posture toward Morocco
and Libya. Although all sides are pursuing diplomatic options to contain
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tensions in the Western Sahara dispute, the conflict is no nearer
resolution and is likely to remain unresolved for the period of this
estimate.
There must be a significant increase in Morocco's internal prob-
lems before instability develops. We do not believe this is likely because
the King's astuteness, and the firm social
anchoring of the monarchy are likely to contain domestic pressures
during the next two years. In the unlikely event that Hassan dies or loses
control, however, we think the following conditions are most likely to
emerge:
- The survival of the monarchy but with powers substantially
circumscribed.
- The accession of Hassan's oldest son ruling under strict guidance
from palace counselors and military leaders.
- The continuation of Morocco's basic policies, tempered with
greater responsiveness to popular demands, and possibly less
orientation toward the United States
We think there is only a remote chance that radicals hostile to the
United States could wrest control of the country from established
military and civilian groups or demand extremist reforms for the
basically conservative, moderate majority of the population. Should this
happen, US facilities and treaty relationships with Morocco would
almost certainly be dismantled
Hassan's union with Libya has strained Moroccan-US ties and
additional stresses could develop:
- We do not believe King Hassan wants to dismantle US-
Moroccan ties or to allow further erosion of cooperation.
However, we believe the search for economic relief, for protec-
tion against the Islamic right, and for better position on the
Saharan issue will continue to override with increasing frequen-
cy all other considerations.
- Moroccan officials are already sensitive about US aid levels and
warming relations between Washington and Algiers.
- Should the Moroccan internal scene continue to deteriorate,
King Hassan
could hinder US access agreements, increase ties to Libya,
provoke Algeria, or challenge Spain's control of its enclaves in
Morocco, all of which could seriously compromise US-Moroccan
relations.
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DISCUSSION
1. The basic factors influencing Morocco's stability
have not changed dramatically since the publication of
the Interagency Intelligence Memorandum in 1982.
Some problems have worsened, however, and new
developments have complicated the picture:
- Continued social, economic, and political diffi-
culties over the past four years have increased
the possibility for eventual major political change
in the country.
- The popular unrest and dissident activity pre-
dicted in the 1982 Memorandum was manifest in
widespread riots in 1982 and 1984, as unmet
expectations and the hardships of austerity mea-
sures have worn down public tolerance. We
believe Morocco's protracted economic difficul-
ties and the political disaffection they are creat-
ing have produced significant new problems for
the Moroccan regime, including the rise of the
religious right. They have made more urgent the
need for solutions to such longstanding problems
as the Saharan conflict and the erosion of public
trust in the country's political system.
- The King's initiation of a union with Libya in
1984 was a popular move and helped divert
attention from domestic ills. The union has yield-
ed strategic benefits for Morocco, but it has not
been free of problems and by 1986 became
largely inactive.
-A crackdown on both the left and the right
opposition elements following major riots in 1984
has temporarily sidelined those activists.
2. The persistence of the discontent generated by
the socioeconomic predicament is forcing the King
toward solutions-such as the alliance with
Libya-that carry their own risks and may further
alter the reasonably stable, moderate pattern of Mor-
occo's regional and international posture.
Review of the Economic Dilemma and Prospects
for Recovery
3. Prospects for the Moroccan economy appeared
far better in the early 1970s when economic growth
and development were apace or ahead of population
growth. The popular and official expectations generat-
ed then have contributed to Morocco's current prob-
lems. Overly ambitious development spending in the
1970s, then the collapse of the world phosphate mar-
ket, and a persistent drought that began in 1979,
stifled the economy. Heightened popular expectations
made belt-tightening an especially perilous undertak-
ing. Consequently, efforts to correct the economy have
been switched on and off in reaction to popular
outbursts, thus slowing the rate of recovery and ham-
pering efforts to lower expectations. These problems
have been exacerbated by a widening gap between
rich and poor, massive unemployment and underem-
ployment, and a tradition-bound political systemC
distrusted by the average
4. At the heart of Morocco's economic dilemma is
the rapid population growth that has nullified the
minimal economic advances of the past four years.
The growth rate of approximately 3 percent per year
continues unabated, despite efforts to expand popula-
tion control programs. The country's population will
be about 40 million by the turn of the century. The
population is predominantly young (over half are
under 20 years old), increasingly literate, and inclined
to abandon the traditional life of the countryside for
the seeming promise of a modern urban setting, where
overtaxed public services, inadequate housing, and
poor employment opportunities are quick to breed
political dissatisfaction. =
5. Economic Outlook. We estimate that real GDP
growth will be about 3 percent through 1986-a slight
improvement over 2.5 percent during recent years-
but a rate of expansion insufficient to deal with the
growing unemployment problem. The small improve-
ments in economic performance over the past several
years have largely been in the agricultural sector,
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which remains vulnerable to drought conditions only
periodically alleviated during the past five years,
including 1986.
6. The prospects for economic recovery through the
remainder of the decade are not good:
- The continuation of this year's favorable weather
could mitigate this prognosis, if it prevails for a
number of years.
- Although Morocco has considerable potential in
phosphates, oil shale, and fish, it is unlikely to be
able to develop the latter two in the near term.
The phosphate market will remain weak over the
next two years and Morocco will face a more
competitive market in phosphates even if prices
rise significantly. Without its key foreign ex-
change earners-agricultural products and phos-
phates-driving a recovery, Morocco has no
prospects for relief in the near term.
- Assistance from its traditional aid donors-Saudi
Arabia, the other Gulf states, France, and the
United States-will be a critical factor in Moroc-
dismantling of the popular free universal educational
system, and a major trimming of an ambitious military
modernization plan. These reforms carry with them a
high risk of popular outbursts, which we believe are
likely to be more intense and widespread than the
violence that has erupted since 1982. This, in turn, will
broaden opportunities for opponents of the regime
External Relations
9. King Hassan is aware, in our view, of the risks
before him. He has not tackled Morocco's economic
dilemma directly, howeve
On the other hand,
the King likes to deal with foreign policy issues and in
10. King Hassan proposed a union with Libya in
1984 in order to blunt Libyan involvement with the
Polisario and to gain other political and economic
benefits from Qadhafi, who has occasionally given
generously to Arab leaders for accommodating his
passion for Arab unity. We believe Hassan viewed the
arrangement as a tactical alliance that, like other Arab
unity efforts over the last decade and a half, have
never involved meaningful political integration or
common defense and security policy. Indeed, Hassan
has been able to gain some benefits for Morocco while
successfully avoiding anything more than the trap-
7. Continued austerity will be required into the
next decade if Morocco is to right the economy. As a
result, only marginal economic growth and no im-
provement in the standard of living can be expected.
With limited financial reserves and a debt service ratio
that has reached 60 percent in 1986, Rabat has no
alternative but to seek continued debt relief, which
may only be forthcoming if the targets in the austerity
program are met. Morocco's commercial and official
creditors are working together and with the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) to require Morocco to
adhere to the austerity program and to strict financial
restructuring. Backtracking on reforms led the IMF in
June 1986 to declare that Morocco had violated its
agreement, and, unless it is able to resuscitate its
agreement with the Fund, Morocco's ability to obtain
further rescheduling or other additional resources will
be jeopardized.
8. Full adjustment will involve significant addition-
al belt-tightening by the Moroccan public, a partial
pings of an actual merger.
11. Luring Libya away from the Polisario has been
an important success for Morocco:
-- Although Algeria-the guerrillas' chief support-
er-has partially compensated for the withdraw-
al of Libyan financial and arms aid, Libya's
change in allegiance hurt Polisario morale and
has reinforced the guerrillas' dependence on
Algiers, which continues to keep a tight hold on
their activity and strategy. This has had little
impact on the military balance and has upped
the cost to Algeria.
-- Libya's withdrawal also removed a radicalizing
influence-however small-on the guerrillas and
continued Libyan arms support.
have fallen well short of King Hassan's
the potential yield of the merger, but, we
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Qadhafi and King Hassan
believe, they have generally satisfied Hassan's limited
expectations:
- Libya has become a larger purchaser of Moroc-
co's agricultural exports, and opened its markets
to Moroccan businessmen. Another benefit of the
union has been Libya's employment of about
20,000 Moroccan workers
13. King Hassan's calculation of the negative conse-
quences of the union with Libya is far less clear than
the gains he hoped to make. The King:
- Clearly anticipated a setback in his relations with
the United States, and a possible improvement in
US ties to Algeria, Morocco's chief regional rival.
Hassan probably did not foresee the depth and
persistence of US opposition.
- Made his overture to Qadhafi in the wake of two
years of disappointment over US assistance to
Morocco in a period of increasing need.
- May also have calculated that US geopolitical
interests in Morocco and the array of important
US agreements with his nation ensured that
negative repercussions would not be allowed to
go beyond certain limits.F_~
14. Whatever the exact cost-benefit calculations, we
believe King Hassan, and others who supported the
merger, view the initiative as a reasonable success and
are prepared to maintain the arrangement as long as it
continues to serve Morocco's interests. The relationship
has survived the strains and embarrassments that were
bound to arise in a marriage of convenience between
regimes of such different orientation. The security
hazards the Moroccans face as the result of a sizable
influx of Libyans are being monitored, but thus far
have not altered the Moroccan attitude that such risks
are tomorrow's problem and are, in any case, a
necessary gamble for partial alleviation of today's
pressing needs.
15. Qadhafi is unlikely to overturn the merger in
the wake of his deepening isolation as the result of the
US raids even though he has gained only marginally
from the arrangement. The initial rapprochement
with Morocco in 1983 was encouraged by the Saudis,
and the union a year later was wholly King Hassan's
idea. For Qadhafi, the union has been a manifestation
of his personal committment to Arab unity and an
unexpected opportunity to end Morocco's support for
Libyan dissidents.
Qa a fi has ai e , however, in i primary o jective
of enlisting Morocco into his anti-US campaign and
was frustrated by Morocco's lack of concrete support
in the aftermath of the US raid on Libya
16. Both leaders have exhibited surprising tolerance
toward one another so far. However, over the last
year, the relationship has become moribund and we
expect this to continue, largely due to the sheer weight
of the incompatibilities between the two countries.
17. We believe there are circumstances under
which the union would be likely to collapse abruptly
and openly. These include:
- Moroccan discovery of Libyan subversion or
resumption of significant aid to the Polisario.
- Libya's infringement on or efforts to undermine
Morocco's defense policies or relations with the
United States.
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Libya's discovery of a resumption of Moroccan
collaboration with Libyan dissidents.'
19. The Union and Shifting Alliances in the
Maghreb. Libya's diplomatic abandonment of the
Polisario Front in favor of the merger with Morocco
has been a significant blow to the Front and, thus,
Algeria. In reaction, the Algerians are strengthening
their military capabilities on borders with Morocco
and Libya, have replaced Libyan aid to the Polisario,
and have drawn closer to Tunisia, both to protect
Tunis against Libya's periodic menacing and to
counter the Rabat-Tripoli alliance which, from the
Algerian perspective, now has a sphere of influence in
Mauritania and Chad that wholly surrounds Algeria
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20. We do not believe that Morocco's relationship
with Libya or the merger's temporary polarization of
the Maghreb states will alter Algeria's longstanding
view that-despite its traditional rivalry with Rabat
for predominance in North Africa-a stable Morocco
best serves Algeria's fundamental interests. President
Bendiedid, even more than his leftist-oriented prede-
cessor Boumediene, appears committed to the view
that Algeria's prosperity and development depend on
a stable Maghreb, free of superpower involvement. It
is unlikely, therefore, that Algeria will attempt to
undermine the union by any means that would desta-
bilize Morocco internally. Algerian efforts in early
1986 to develop a rapprochement with Tripoli had, as
Algiers intended, a chilling effect on Libyan-Moroccan
relations and may stifle the worst aspects of the union
from Algeria's perspective.
21. We are less certain, however, of Algerian reac-
tion to a marked deterioration in Morocco caused by
domestic unrest, particularly under circumstances in
which Libya might have an advantage in manipulat-
' The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart-
ment of State, notes that Libya has never broken any of its so-
called unions with another Arab country, even in cases as with
Egypt or Tunisia of near armed conflict
ing events. Faced with these conditions, Algiers might
feel compelled to take more direct action to influence
political forces inside Morocco.
22. The Saharan War. Moroccan-Algerian rivalry
over their common frontier and hegemony predates
the Saharan dispute and will probably outlast it.
Morocco's 10-year-old struggle to acquire the Western
Sahara will remain the touchstone in Moroccan-Algeri-
an relations and the arena in which any significant
escalation in tensions between them is likely to take
place:
-- The struggle is also an increasing burden on
Morocco because of its financial difficulties, but
one so infused with national feelings that the
regime cannot afford without serious domestic
risks to scale back its military campaign or make
the compromises necessary for a quick political
settlement.
-- The conflict is no nearer a military or political
solution than it was in 1982, although the diplo-
matic and military fortunes of both Morocco and
the Polisario Front have changed since the publi-
cation of the Interagency Intelligence Memoran-
dum.)
23. The Moroccan strategy of walling in the disput-
ed territory through a system of fortified barriers or
berms has been militarily successful but costly.
Although Rabat's severe financier dif-
ficulties have thus far not seriously hampered its
ability to prosecute the war,
The operational readiness of the
military has been gradually degraded, and of greater
concern to the Moroccans, the modernization of the
armed forces has not kept pace with the Algerian
military, contributin to a shift in the military balance
in Algeria's favor
24. These costs will not alter Rabat's approach to
the conflict in the near term nor are they likely to
create any significant military vulnerability for Mo-
roccan forces, as long as Algeria does not substantially
escalate its support for the Polisario. However, over
the long term, Morocco probably cannot afford to
pursue vigorously its strategy of berm defense.
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25. The strategy of the Polisario and Algeria is to
wear down Moroccan will and eventually make the
financial and diplomatic costs sufficiently heavy to
force King Hassan to compromise. For the next year,
the Polisario is likely to wage the war as they have
over the past two years: near-daily guerrilla harass-
ment of the berm, accented every few months by a
larger assault intended to breach the wall and inflict
26. Neither Morocco nor the Polisario will be able,
in our view, to break the current deadlock if they
continue to pursue their respective strategies. Joint
UN-OAU sponsored talks among Morocco, Algeria,
and the Polisario, although unlikely to produce any
significant movement toward a settlement, will give all
sides a clearer reading of each other's willingness to
compromise and thus provide a new baseline from
which the tactics of all sides will be formulated. As
long as the talks continue, a significant escalation of
hostilities is unlikely. Indications in mid-1986 that
both Rabat and Algiers may be interested in revitaliz-
ing the near moribund settlement process do not
reflect, in our judgment, any substantial weakening in
the objectives of either side, and thus hold little
promise that durable progress is in the offing. =
27. Should Algeria decide to escalate the conflict
either because of Polisario losses or because the stale-
mate had become intolerable, it might choose to
support an increase in the frequency and size of direct
Polisario assaults inside the berm; or engage directly in
covert military activities. Also possible but less likely,
Algiers could authorize the Polisario to use terrorist
tactics inside Morocco, or allow the Polisario to enter
Morocco directly from Algerian territory to the north
of the berm,
The Domestic Scene
28. King Hassan's handling of Moroccan foreign
policy has been popular and fairly successful in divert-
ing public attention from economic concerns:
- Moroccans broadly welcomed the union, not
because of any special affinity for Libya, but
because of the economic opportunities it offered.
- Advances on the ground in Western Sahara also
buoyed national spirit, which is deeply invested
in the drive for complete sovereignty over the
territory
29. This salutary effect has already begun to dissi-
pate, however, as the realities of economic austerity
have become sharper and the exaggerated promise of
the Libyan union has assumed more realistic propor-
tions. Moreover, successes in the Sahara have been a
double-edged sword: the average Moroccan now be-
lieves the struggle is virtually won, thus leaving King
Hassan with little room for gaining additional popular
credit. He still, however, faces the escalating burden of
the campaign and the hurdle of a final settlement,
which will almost certainly require a potentially un-
popular compromise on Morocco's part
30. King Hassan is a master at distracting public
attention, galvanizing support, and maneuvering
31. The exploitation of any of these issues could
complicate US-Moroccan relations, and, under the
worst circumstances, could elicit strong anti-American
feelings, particularly if grumbling over US assistance
levels continues to fester.
32. Potential Political Challenges. Little has
changed among Morocco's established opposition polit-
ical parties since the publication of the 1982 IIM.
None, including the legalized Communist and Socialist
parties, is capable of seriously challenging government
policies or of channeling popular discontent toward
constructive political actions. Most of these groups are
part of the elite political system
-and thus have little standing as popular, repre-
sentative bodies. The appeal of Islamic fundamental-
ism has broadened substantially since 1982 as the
process of modernization and economic uncertainty
have alienated large numbers of Moroccans.
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4u. i ese brakes on the development o a popular
religious upheaval will not, in our view, shield the
regime from other potentially destabilizing affects of
fundamentalism. In Morocco, religious sentiment is
easily linked to secular issues, and as the host of
current economic and political grievances become
increasingly subsumed under the banner of Islam, the
King's maneuverability will shrink.
41. The Reliability of the Military. King Hassan's
careful management of the Moroccan military estab-
lishment since the coup attempts of the early 1970s will
43. Since Dlimi's death, King Hassan has turned
increasingly to Minister of Interior Driss Basri, who is
now widely regarded as the second most powerful
man in Morocco. Basri is not from the military, which
is the best indication of the King's own concern about
having a counterbalance to the military and his suspi-
cion of its reliability. Basri does have control over the
police, security and intelligence services, and the civil
guard, and was recently awarded the politically sensi-
believe this approach will perpetuate the officer corps'
investment in the status quo and its loyalty to the
throne.
44. Morocco's economic problems will require ex-
traordinarily skillful handling if unrest in the military
is to be avoided. The shortage of funds will almost
certainly, during the period of this estimate, jeopar-
dize military benefits and possibly operations in the
Sahara and thus may markedly increase dissatisfaction
in the officer corps. Furthermore, sustained civil
unrest, stemming from mounting economic hardship,
would test military loyalties. We believe that the
senior leaders of the military would act preemptively
to restore order
45. The Moroccan military generally endorses King
Hassan's pro-Western policies, which coincide with
US interests in the region. Nevertheless, closer US-
Moroccan ties, initially well received in Morocco, have
become the focus of criticism by some officers, who
feel that levels of US assistance are not adequate to
meet the country's needs. They are also questioning
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more vigorously the value of US-Moroccan military
access and transit agreements as Morocco's financial
difficulties slow the influx of new military materiel.
46. Succession and Stability. In the event of death
or disability of the monarch, we believe the throne
would pass to King Hassan's designated successor, 21-
year-old Prince Sidi Mohammed.
48. We believe that most officers would support
relationship over the next two years.
Implications for the United States
49. US-Moroccan relations are likely to remain
strained over the period of this estimate. Even if
Rabat's ties to Libya rupture or continue to recede in
importance, several problems are likely to plague the
50. The country's economic problems will make
Moroccan officials especially sensitive to US aid levels
and quick to blame the political fallout from financial
hardships on outside forces, including the United
States. The spread of fundamentalist sentiment, fueled
by social and economic ills, is likely to involve an anti-
Western and anti-US current and thus push King
Hassan to distance himself from Washington at least
on issues with high visibility
51. Morocco's union with Libya has added a sub-
stantial element of uncertainty and strain in a relation-
ship that has traditionally been one of Washington's
strongest in the Arab world. We believe that King
Hassan, while prepared to accept some loss of Wash-
ington's confidence for tactical benefits from Libya,
will work to protect Washington's strategic and treaty
interests in Morocco, as long as US assistance does not
erode substantially and he does not feel unduly pun-
ished for Morocco's friendship with an avowed US
enemy. F_~
52. A significant warming in US-Algerian ties-
particularly one marked by a substantial arms sale to
Algiers-would likely cause Rabat to undertake a
serious review of its ties to the United States. We
do not believe Hassan would necessarily dismantle
Moroccan-US relations; his reaction would depend on
the recent yield of the relationship with Libya, the
extent of the US commitment to Morocco, and the
press of Morocco's domestic difficulties. Nevertheless,
a risk exists that Hassan would reduce cooperation
with the United States and possibly seek closer ties to
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.'
2 The Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart-
ment of State notes that in the past, King Hassan's reaction to
improved US-Algerian ties has been largely to promote even closer
relations between the United States and Morocco and to argue for
more US assistance to preserve the regional balance. Short of US
adoption of the Algerian position on the Western Sahara, the King
is likely to continue to follow this pattern
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53. Rabat's relations with Moscow and the Bloc
have been given greater visibility in the last year.
Moscow already has a substantial investment in Mor-
occo's phosphate industry, and a Soviet-Moroccan
trade accord signed in 1984 was given such a favorable
endorsement as to suggest a Moroccan willingness to
undertake closer ties. Rabat's greater attention to
Moscow and the East Europeans is also an effort to
cultivate diplomatic support on the Saharan issue.
King Hassan courted the Soviets in the 1960s and
probably recognizes that closer ties to them would not
solve Morocco's long-term financial problems but
could enhance Morocco's nonaligned credentials and
give it better position in its diplomatic competition
with Algeria.
54. We believe Hassan will proceed cautiously in
what appears to be a warming in Moroccan relations
with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. His objec-
tives will remain limited to lobbying for support on
the Western Sahara and gaining practical economic
help through increased trade and development assis-
tance. Nonetheless, a Moroccan-Soviet courtship-no
matter how tentative-will give the appearance of
flagging Moroccan confidence in Washington.
57. Continued economic problems in Morocco and
the unrest it will foster could pose a variety of dangers
for US interests in the future. Under mounting domes-
tic pressure, King Hassan may feel compelled to
undertake steps that could significantly erode relations
with the United States. These might include, in order
of declining probability:
- Placing conditions on access agreements with the
United States that would make them unwork-
able.
- Agitating tensions with Algeria in order to rally
national solidarity, and in so doing, try to push
the United States to take Morocco's side or risk its
treaty relationship with Rabat.
- Accepting substantially increased assistance from
Libya, should Tripoli be in a position to extend it,
in exchange for bringing Rabat's policies in closer
parallel to Tripoli's.
- Fomenting nationalist sentiment over Spanish
enclaves in Morocco and again put the United
States in a difficult position with two friendly
states.
- Accepting Libyan-supplied Soviet arms or nego-
tiating an arms package from the Soviets direct-
55. US interests are not directly at stake in the
Western Sahara dispute. However, the continued
stalemate and escalation in Algerian-Moroccan ten-
sions will adversely affect a range of indirect US
interests. To the extent that the United States is
identified as favoring either of the two main antago-
nists-Rabat and Algiers-Washington has become a
focus for their competition. In the current circum-
stances, this has hindered the development of closer
ties to Algeria and increased the risks in managing US-
Moroccan relations.
56. We believe that in general Morocco will contin-
ue to pursue moderate, constructive policies that will
frequently coincide with or support US interests in the
Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. With respect to
the Arab-Israeli dispute, we suspect that Rabat will
look increasingly to Western Europe and other Arab
moderates in tailoring its position on specific issues,
while still maintaining its overall endorsement of US
ly.
58. A dramatic transformation of the Moroccan
political framework is not likely unless King Hassan
passes from the scene.
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