KENYA: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00176R001600050004-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 14, 2008
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 1, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of Secret
Central
Intelligence
Kenya: Prospects for Stability
Secret
N/ JIM 82-10011
November 1982
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KENYA: PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY
Information available as of 1 November 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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FOREWORD
This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum assesses prospects for
stability in Kenya over the next five years. It also addresses implications
for the United States, including contingencies that could affect US
interests.
The Memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the Nation-
al Intelligence Officer for Africa, with the participation of the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. It was coordinated
with the intelligence organizations of the Departments of the Army and
the Air Force, with that of the Marine Corps, and with the Departments
of the Treasury and Commerce.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Traditionally pro-Western Kenya, one of two East African states
that permit US access to their military facilities, is experiencing
unprecedented political stress brought on largely by an economic
decline. The country's mounting problems have aggravated tribal and
communal tensions and highlighted other basic problems such as
overpopulation, corruption, and the uninspiring and ineffective leader-
ship of President Moi and his administration. A recent coup attempt by
Air Force personnel has further weakened the government. The
heretofore apolitical Army, which put down the uprising, now has a
greater voice in government decisions.
Thus far Moi has made harsh threats in response to the revolt but,
outside the Air Force, has not resorted to massive arrests of potential en-
emies. We believe, however, that he will turn increasingly to repression
to maintain his hold on power, in part because of pressure from
influential hardliners in the regime. He may buy time by intimidating
his opponents, but he risks making new enemies and driving diverse
groups to cooperate with one another and to consider extralegal tactics
against the government.
Despite Moi's problems, we believe that he has about an even
chance to serve out the remaining two years of his term. His prospects
are helped by his ability to outmaneuver potential opponents and by the
lack of a well-organized dissident movement. Divisions among his
opponents-particularly the moderate leaders of the powerful Kikuyu
tribe-will give Moi a fairly good chance to win reelection in 1984 if he
can prevent a more dramatic economic decline or widespread political
unrest. A coup or an assassination would be the most likely cause of his
ouster before the election. Under these conditions, we believe the
conservative senior military leadership probably would intervene to
ensure the succession of a moderate regime.
Over the next five years, we believe, Kenya will encounter
increasing instability and a weaker central government no matter who is
president. Tensions over food, land, and other scarce resources are
certain to intensify because the government cannot reduce significantly
the country's annual population growth rate of 4 percent-one of the
highest in the world. Economic woes, including a large current account
deficit, and record levels of inflation and unemployment will continue
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to plague the country. Furthermore, Kenya's hope of substantial
external aid may be damaged by foreign donors' dismay over its lack of
financial discipline and increasing instability. International investors
may hold back because of growing concern about instability in Kenya
following the coup attempt, thereby damaging the country's foreign
exchange position.
A budding radical movement may well pose a challenge to Moi or
a moderate successor within the next five years. A coup by radicals in
the Army similar to the uprisings in Liberia and Ghana is possible,
although the opposition of the senior military leaders would continue to
weigh against the chances of a radical takeover. Radicals are likely to
need considerable time to organize a strong challenge to the present
system. Moreover, the leadership and large portions of the general
population will still benefit from Kenya's market-oriented system. On
balance, therefore, we believe the moderate leadership has a good
prospect of remaining in power at least through the period of this
assessment.
In the event that Moi or another moderate politician continues to
rule Kenya with the backing of conservative military leaders, US
interests are likely to be affected in the following respects:
- Nairobi will remain suspicious of the Libyans and Soviets and
keep them at arm's length. Kenya will maintain its generally
pro-Western stance, but will continue to temper these senti-
ments to preserve its position as a nonaligned nation. As a result,
it will adopt foreign policy positions that occasionally vary from
those of the United States.
- Kenya will remain fearful that Somalia-which also permits US
access to its facilities-retains irredentist designs on Somali-
inhabited northeastern Kenya. Kenyan leaders are overly con-
cerned that the provision of offensive arms to Somalia by the
United States could again make the Mogadishu government a
threat to Kenya's security. Such a development could prompt
Nairobi to reconsider its military relationship with the United
States.
- Kenya will continue to seek greater US aid throughout the
period of this assessment. On the economic side, Kenyan
officials will argue that Washington is not responding adequate-
ly to Nairobi's economic needs, and will ask for more assistance.
The coup attempt has increased the urgency of Kenya's pleas
for greater help. On the military side, the Kenyans will continue
to seek assistance and cooperation, but they also will be sensitive
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to the likely negative domestic political costs of too close an
identification with the United States, and this will introduce
strains into the bilateral relationship.
- Moi's increasing loss of popular support may lead his opponents
to intensify their attacks on the bilateral military relationship
with the United States. A weakened Kenyan government may
react by reducing the level of military cooperation, applying
restrictive interpretations to the implementation of the access
agreement, or-in the unlikely extreme case-canceling the
accord altogether. Kenya also may seek to diversify further its
sources of military equipment.
In the less likely event that radical leaders should gain power in
Kenya, they probably would adopt a nonaligned policy and seek
assistance from both East and West. A radical government almost
certainly would move quickly to distance itself from the United States,
particularly by canceling the military access agreement. Because there
is strong anti-Communist sentiment in Kenya, however, the regime
would be unlikely to become a Soviet client state.
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